

**Justice for Hungary**





# **JUSTICE FOR HUNGARY**

**REVIEW AND CRITICISM OF THE EFFECT  
OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON**

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COUNT PAUL TELEKI: ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF HUNGARY



## CONTENTS

Page

<b>Count Albert Apponyi</b> , sometime Minister:	
THE HISTORIC MISSION OF HUNGARY AND OF THE STATES AGGRANDISED TO HER DETRIMENT.....	1
<b>Eugene Horváth</b> , Professor of University:	
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON..	21
<b>George Lukács</b> , sometime Minister:	
THE INJUSTICES OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON. ....	123
<b>Oliver Eöttevényi</b> , sometime Lord Lieutenant:	
CULTURAL EFFECTS OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON ...	189
<b>Béla Földes</b> , sometime Minister:	
THE PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON UPON HUNGARIAN ECONOMICS .....	251
<b>Baron Julius Wlassics</b> , sometime Minister:	
LEGAL AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON THROUGH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND ARBITRATION	287
<b>Albert Berzeviczy</b> , sometime Minister:	
THE TREATY OF TRIANON AND DISARMAMENT.....	313
<b>Francis Fodor</b> , Asst. Professor of University:	
THE TREATY OF TRIANON IN THE LIGHT OF GEOGRAPHY	327
<b>Emil Nagy</b> , sometime Minister:	
THE ROAD TOWARDS RECTIFICATION .. . . . .	361



The Historic Mission of Hungary  
and of the States Aggrandised  
to her Detriment.

BY COUNT ALBERT APPONYI



Surveying mankind as a whole, we find that from certain angles light is thrown upon the historic mission of some special nation. The assertion that the mere fact of existence implies mission may sound strangely to our ears, but it is profoundly true. We must take it to mean that no individual and no group of individuals can contain all the possibilities of the human type; some particular quality is found in a higher degree in one or the other, and the *complete man* would mean the synthesis of all men, with the inevitable reactions of quality to quality. Even this definition is not exhaustive: for there may be possible types as yet non-existent; it follows that the complete man does not exist, nor will he ever exist, though the type continues to evolve unceasingly. Only once did it live amongst us in perfection, in the person of the God-Man; and from Him we learn this: that moral weakness is no logical ingredient in human nature, but rather a deduction from its perfection, a flaw, a negation, not inherent in the idea, although ever present in fact.

But these considerations lie outside the scope of the conception with which I propose to deal here. I use them merely as a starting point for my argument that human type in evolution arises out of the aggregation of individuals, the synthesis of innumerable peculiarities. The millions of individuals, however, form an immense mass, and the majority of these individuals are so colourless that their contribution to the shaping of the human type is negligible. To bring development about, it is necessary that out of the masses superior individuals should emerge, in whom the latent possibilities of their peculiar mass become a recognisable dynamic force.

From the human point of view the most important of agglomerations is the *Nation*, for within its sphere

every human ability and activity manifest themselves. It is through national unity that the mass of individuals evolves into *mankind*, that is to say, a spiritual, a moral, and finally perhaps a legally constituted unit. Only the sum of special gifts developing in national individualities can make up the content of this unit, endowing it with qualities, no one of which can replace the other. The English cannot contribute to the common treasure of mankind what the French, or the Italians, or the Germans can give, and therefore mankind cannot dispense with any of them. The destruction or decline of any one means the impoverishment of all; from which the logical deduction is that just as the maintenance of strong national individuals is necessary to mankind as a whole, so any struggle in which these destroy or even weaken each other is pernicious. Nationalism and internationalism are opposite ideas only to the superficial; as a fact, they complete and perfect each other.

In this sense, as I have said, every nation which contributes something to the shaping of the perfect human type, fulfils, by its mere existence, an historic mission, one tending to the development of humanity. Any nation incapable of making such contribution, either perishes, is assimilated, as raw material or component part, by a more vigorous compound national type, or — like many savage peoples — vegetates without history; for history begins for a nation with its participation in human development.

The world-historical significance of nations has yet another aspect, apparently distinct from, but in fact closely connected with what I have said: the political form, the outer manifestation of its force and its influence upon the shaping of other national units. In this field nations which believe themselves to be self-sufficing frequently come into conflict with each other. Historians have perhaps given too much space to the descriptions of these conflicts and their immediate effects, without any deep perception of their significance from the point of view of their bearing on the development of mankind, — a narrow-

ness of view induced by extreme national bias. The classification and appreciation of the various aims of these conflicts of nations, with regard to their results on humanity at large, is one of the most difficult tasks of the historical philosopher. Without attempting to grapple with it, I may venture upon certain statements which may help us to see our way through the chaos. First of all, let us set aside, as irrelevant for us, all those conflicts which arise solely from the aims of an ambitious ruler, or political leader, or dynasty. If these coincide with real national aims, they will fall under one of the categories I shall presently enumerate; otherwise they are merely a hateful misuse of national forces, the nation in such cases becoming mere raw material and blind instrument.

But even the soul of a nation is often seized with the desire to rule over others. *In regere imperio populos, Romane, memento* — these words of a Roman poet express the feeling of the whole Roman people; but modern nations too sometimes become intoxicated with the glory forced upon them by their leaders. Generally speaking, a policy of conquests cannot be justified from the moral point of view; yet there are cases where such a policy promotes the higher interests of mankind. Among these cases the Roman hegemony is perhaps the most conspicuous; it created relative peace — the *Pax Romana* — in a great part of the globe, where otherwise a perpetual strife of tribes would have gone on; thus it promoted the extension of Graeco-Roman culture and for centuries gave security to its development among the barbarians it finally conquered; at the same time it afforded scope and possibilities for the expansion of Christianity, which could hardly have been obtained without it. The British boast that British command of the sea has had a like result is not unfounded. It has in fact given mankind the *Pax Britannica*, the freedom and security of the sea.

Generally speaking, it may be said that the conquering action of a nation is in some cases justified, as, for instance, when it replaces a rule unable to create and maintain order and safety by one capable of bestowing these bene-

fits. In such cases I would base the legal title of the conqueror on a political analogy with what Roman law calls the acquisition of the right of property *per specifikationem*. i. e. by the creation of value in material valueless of itself. In the case we are considering, the conqueror forms a valuable national entity out of heterogeneous bodies of individuals, politically valueless.

The territorial and political displacements of nations may be approved from the historical, if not always from the moral point of view, if they serve the higher interests of mankind, if they tend to further material and intellectual development in the territories thereby affected. Whenever this is not the case, a displacement is injurious — perhaps even fatal.

The judgment of history must condemn unconditionally conflicts and displacements between nations standing on the same cultural level. Whether due to the whim of rulers and statesmen, or to unhealthy national ambition, such conflicts divert the forces of each nation concerned from that internal development by which it might increase the treasures of mankind, without any compensating advantage. The one result possibly achieved in such cases might be the re-establishment of equilibrium, which is a preliminary condition for the full development of national ability. Experience, however, shows that a war seldom results in such re-establishment, but rather in alternations of ascendancy, i. e. in a perpetual vicious circle.

It must be noted that in the foregoing remarks I have always had in mind nations crystallised into independent States, or at any rate capable of such crystallisation. In addition to these, there are, however, nation-fragments, which, owing to their geographical position or to their inherent weakness, are unable to form a State. These are necessarily compelled to take refuge within the bounds of other States; it is desirable that this should be where they have the best chance of developing their intrinsic abilities, in the free exercise of human rights.

On the basis of the above considerations it will not be difficult to define the historic mission which the Hungarian

nation and the Hungarian State fulfil in both directions: firstly, through the development of their national gifts, and secondly, through their political structure. In the former connection the Hungarian *race* must be considered, and we must ask: does it posses such qualities, can it point to such achievements, that it may be expected to offer some characteristic contribution to the moral and spiritual riches of humanity? Would humanity be the poorer, were there no Hungarian nation? To these questions we may boldly and confidently reply in the affirmative. I do not propose to enumerate those of our scientists who have enriched positive science by original discoveries, some of great practical importance; I will only indicate two evidences of international recognition, not as if they were isolated instances of distinctions awarded to Hungarian science, but because they are most widely known: the annual mathematical competition named after Bólyai, and the statue raised to the memory of Semmelweis by the world's gynæcologists. Is it necessary to cite our great poets, Petőfi for instance, who, in spite of the language-barrier, was honoured all over the world, on the occasion of his centenary. In plastic art Hungary can boast some of the most distinguished names of the age. Our musical achievements, both creative and executive, have appealed to the audiences of all the world. Is there then any one who, from the point of view of humanity, could see unmoved the disappearance of everything that has been created, and is being created, by Hungarians? I venture to maintain, that in this respect not one among the smaller nations stands above us, and only a few can equal us. Holland, it is true, has her Rembrandt, but she has no Petőfi.

And are not the effects of our national character upon the surrounding peoples evident? This is a difficult question indeed, which cannot be solved in the manner in which independent intellectual achievements are registered, by enumerating names and works; a question no one has as yet, to my knowledge, attempted to answer, but one which perhaps deserves enquiry. Anyone who follows

attentively the political struggles of Greater Roumania, cannot but perceive, even from a distance, the difference in the type of the leading personalities in the former Roumanian Kingdom and that of the Roumanians of Transylvania; a difference to be accounted for by the fact, that the latter lived among us, felt the influence of their Hungarian environment — whether they liked it or not — and gained therefrom a certain colour which distinguishes them from their fellow nationals. It cannot be called a "cultural" difference for the Roumanian politicians, most of whom have had a French education, stand by no means on a lower level than any in the rest of Europe. But there is a something that may be called a radiation from the soul of Hungary, which has certainly not been detrimental to those affected by it.

Let us now examine the historic mission of the Hungarian nation from the second, the political point of view. How have we influenced, and how can we henceforth influence the political evolution of nations with regard to the great interests of mankind? The reply to this question is written on the pages of history. It has recently been proclaimed by that great scientist who now occupies the throne of St. Peter, when he, raising to the Cardinalate another great scientist, this time a Hungarian, spoke of the Hungarian nation as one which for centuries has rendered distinguished services to Christianity and Western civilisation. The providential mission of the Hungarian race in the history of nations became a fact when our forefathers, an Oriental tribe, migrated from Asia to Europe, settled in the most dangerous region of that continent, founded there a State with a stable organisation, assimilated the Christian culture of the West, and yet maintained their national peculiarities; thus forming a bulwark against further attacks of lower Eastern cultures. At the same time they ensured the development of their own culture, and its possibilities of expansion eastwards.

To the fulfilment of this mission everything that formed the Christian Hungarian national State was essential: body and soul. The body was a territory, created as

a unit by nature itself. It remained unchanged for a thousand years. Its frontiers are strongly marked towards the East, the North and the South, less strongly towards the West; it possesses a unified river system; it shows different economic conditions completing each other in its various districts, which are connected by easy internal communications. The soul on the other hand was that vigorous national individuality, which by virtue of its political ability rose above the general mediæval standard of Europe and instinctively found and created the conditions of its mission.

The one decisive step forward — the acceptance of Western Christianity — would not have been in itself sufficient for the fulfilment of that mission; the nation had to develop political qualifications for its work. To this end Hungary had to seek a form of state-organisation differing from that of the West, whose intellectual tendencies it was nevertheless essential for her to assimilate to the utmost. The political organisation of the near West, whose religion we had embraced, offered an obvious model; but had we accepted it, we should have become incapable of our historic mission, indicated, but not yet clearly perceived at that period. The political institutions of the whole European continent, especially of our neighbour, Germany, were based upon the ideas of private Law, i. e. the supreme political power was everywhere connected with — and dependent on — private rights. The relations between governor and governed bore the character of mutual personal loyalty rather than of devotion to the community. This resulted in the creation of minor groups within the national unity, to such an extent, that unity became in fact merely theoretical, and was capable of a collective manifestation of power only in exceptional cases, if at all. Now let us imagine a Hungary so constituted in face of the Turkish danger! She would have collapsed at the first blow, and the whole of Central Europe would have been overrun by the Turk. Fortunately, the national tradition which we brought with us from Asia, and the profound statesmanlike wisdom of

our first Christian King, St. Stephen, gave a different character to our State. The primitive political organisation of the heathen Hungarians bore from the beginning the stamp of public law. Independently of private relations it created a central supreme power, approved by the whole community and derived therefrom, and did not suffer the intrusion of intermediate factors, however powerful, between that power and the collective body of freemen. This fundamental character of the primitive Hungarian State was maintained in the Hungarian Kingdom, and even intensified and consolidated; in its further development, the Hungarians defended it with persistent ardour against the infiltrations of Western feudalism. These facts must be borne in mind in considering the Golden Bull; it did not, like the English Magna Charta, aim at a restriction of the royal prerogative, but was rather designed to strengthen and secure that prerogative, which later obtained its definite shape and its synthetic relation to national freedom in the doctrine of the Holy Crown. This doctrine, or rather this fundamental feature of our constitutional life, brought into organic unity the King's exalted position and the meanest subject's freedom. Thus the Hungarians, alone among the continental nations, rejected mediæval conceptions, and stood forth as a strongly centralised State with a special national character, which avoided the dangers both of Germanic particularism, and of Byzantine ossification. By virtue of its organisation the central power disposed of the whole force of the nation, and of all possible manifestations of its power. And thus we became able to fulfil our historic mission, when and as long as this had to be realised by armed force. This possibility was no mere accident, but an organic consequence of the vigorous internal development, which continued to absorb the higher Western civilisation it had accepted. In my opinion there is no more impressive phenomenon in history than this harmony between the evolution of the Hungarian constitution and the historic mission of the Hungarian nation. The word *harmony* is insufficient here; the evolution of the constitution in the sense of strict unity was

a direct condition of the fulfilment of our world-mission. And since this constitution, even though it had assimilated the ideals of the West, grew out of the depths of our national genius, since it was created solely by the working of that genius, it may be asserted that the Hungarian national individuality was fore-ordained to perform a task decisive for the fate of mankind. No other nation could have carried out Hungary's historic mission.

But this mission was not confined to the military task of defending the political frontiers. When the armed struggle came to an end, the rivalry in cultural expansion continued; and here the mission of the Hungarian nation was no less clearly defined, than when it was expressed by force of arms. Passing through various stages, Hungarian culture has been purely Western: from the Crusades onwards, through the Reformation and the French Revolution, down to the scientific, literary and artistic vacillations and progressions of modern times it has been the active and passive participant in all the intellectual and moral currents of the West. The eastern boundary of Hungarian rule and Hungarian influence, has been likewise the political and cultural boundary of the West. But cultural boundaries may be changed without affecting political frontiers; the latter, however, cannot be changed without cultural reactions. Applying this axiom to the case in point, we may say that if the Western boundary-nation, Hungary, keeps her status, Western ideals can radiate from her and through her to the neighbouring nations, without detriment to their political individuality, and even to their great advantage. But the displacement of political frontiers, which has actually happened to the detriment of Hungary, i. e. of the West, must involve an aggressive campaign of a lower against a higher culture, the extension of the former by means of political power to the detriment of the latter, and hence the cultural decline of the affected territories. This follows from the nature of things. The nation, or let us say: among the races combined into a political nation the one which impresses its type upon the State, cannot suffer its

political superiority to be questioned by the cultural superiority of some other race; it must, therefore, endeavour to crush out this superiority, for the attainment of a similar high level would take a long time; and the assertion of an indisputable superiority is never so essential as in the first years of a new political structure.

In this connection I may perhaps be able to throw some light on a problem that obviously presents itself. We have seen how decisive a part was played by a suitable political organisation and an appropriate territory — the soul and the body of the State — in determining the historic mission of Hungary as the defender of the Western boundary. The soul, however, which chose this body as its abode, was a compound soul; the Hungarian race alone did not entirely fill the territory; it was not the sole element in the framework of the State in which it developed and exercised its practical abilities. To use the language of public law: the political Hungarian nation included members of alien races. How then did a uniform cultural superiority and its effects assert themselves? What was the part played therein by the non-Hungarian nationalities? How far did their several national cultures assert themselves?

The question is of general significance and requires a general reply. In this part of Europe, where our ancestors settled, it is a geographic impossibility to create perfectly homogeneous national States. From the point of view of the higher development of humanity such a situation should be met as far as possible by an organisation of groups, in which the leadership would devolve, not on the numerically, but on the culturally superior race, notably in cases where the numerical difference is but slight. This seems self-evident. The non-ruling races should, however, enjoy complete freedom, and even adequate encouragement in the development of their own cultural individualities. In support of this thesis I would urge that the intellectually superior race is certainly more capable of contributing to the common moral stock of humanity, when aided by the

advantages which political supremacy undoubtedly offers; while, at the same time such a race feels no impulse to maintain its supremacy by obstructing the development of the rest. Its superiority is not artificial, rests not solely upon force, whereas, as we have seen, the less cultured race, when it attains political supremacy, cannot but feel the incongruity of its position, and to try a rapid equalisation, which can be achieved only by the suppression of the higher culture, the more valuable elements. On the other hand the races or fragments of races, which live in a State the character of which is determined by a race on a higher cultural level, are undoubtedly deprived of the developing force they might win from an independent political organisation of their own, but they need never be oppressed. (Whenever such oppression occurs, it is due to a mistaken policy, not to immanent necessity.) They may even expect equitable support, and — a fact not adequately appreciated by many who deal with the question — their permanent contact with a higher culture and with an adequate State organisation will gradually raise them to a higher level. We shall return to this aspect of the subject later.

If we apply these considerations to Hungary, to ancient, unmutilated Hungary, we shall find that her mixed national composition did not detract in any way from her historic mission, and that, from the point of view of general human progress, there is nothing to be said against her pre-war political structure. I say "structure" advisedly, for I do not pretend that no political mistakes have been made, but these did not arise organically from the structure of the State; they might have been avoided or remedied without subverting the organisation itself, which was upon the whole a healthy one. A strong State possessed of an efficient central power and entirely filling the area within the natural frontiers was needed in these parts for the defence of the West; the Hungarian race alone proved capable of organising it: hence its historic title to impress its national character upon that State. The first German immigrants undoubtedly stood on a higher

level of intellectual culture than the Hungarians of the time, but on the one hand their relative numbers were too small to entitle them to leadership, and on the other, their political ideas were — as has been stated before — in direct opposition to the requirements of political efficiency; in this respect the Hungarians, otherwise more primitive, were their superiors. As compared with the cultural level of all later immigrations — that of Germans always excepted — the superiority of the Hungarians, both political and intellectual, was obvious and manifested itself ever more clearly; they maintained the superiority of their political organising capacity even against later German immigrants who, indeed, could hardly be regarded as the representatives of the higher German culture, since they were for the most part simple farmers and traders. With respect to cultural evolution the historic destinies of the non-Hungarian citizens of the country were not only not opposed to the Hungarian mission, but even moved in a parallel direction, since the goal of their aspirations was assimilation to the West. One group of these already belonged to its cultural community; as to those groups which stood outside it, the ascent to its level was facilitated by their union with the Hungarian State. It is possible, it is even certain, that they enjoyed less positive support from the State for the development of their own national culture, than they would have enjoyed in a State of their own; but on the other hand, this development took, even if unconsciously, a sounder direction, under the influences of Western surroundings. What they lost in quantity, they gained in quality. A striking example of this is the undeniable cultural superiority of the Roumanians of Hungary to those of the pre-war Kingdom.

These considerations afford clear evidence of Hungary's fitness for the great mission she had to fulfil in the Eastern part of Central Europe, on the border-line of the West, in the field of armed conflict as well as in that of cultural effort. She alone was qualified to fulfil this mission, by virtue of her political aptitudes, and that peculiar combination of originality and receptive capacity which

characterises her national genius. We have also seen that for the successful fulfilment of this mission the territory of pre-war Hungary was the required framework. Her disintegration, the loss of great territories where Hungarian culture flourished (such as Transylvania and Upper Hungary) have weakened, not only the Hungarian nation, but also the defensive and expansive force of the West, in every respect. strategical, political and cultural. She no longer represents the Western spirit, issuing from its natural stronghold, supported by a sturdy phalanx, to extend its influence without material conquests; the ramparts of that stronghold are partially demolished, the phalanx has been weakened by the loss of some of its best troops. The Eastern spirit has assumed the part of aggressor and conqueror, which part, however, it cannot play by raising itself — that would take too much time — but only by oppressing the higher cultural forces. The result is terrifying.

But let us cast a hasty glance at the opposite view of the case. Let us consider impartially, in the light of facts, whether the Succession States aggrandised by the partition of Hungary possess *as such* an historic mission? Does their existence serve, or will it serve in a measurable space of time, the material and moral progress of humanity?

If my answer must be in the negative, I do not wish to question the excellent qualities of the *nations*, whose sphere of activity has thus been amplified. I am speaking of *State-organisations*, not of *nations*. Each of these has certainly an historic mission which it is not even difficult to establish. Thus the *Czech nation* is that offspring of the great Slav family which has advanced furthest towards the West and stands on the highest level of culture; it is a considerable factor in the economic progress of Central Europe and has already enriched mankind with great achievements in every field of intellectual activity. Thus the *Serbian nation*, in which the energies of the southern branch of the Slavs still require development to achieve distinction elsewhere than on the battle-field, shows obvious capacity for such development. Thus the *Rouma-*

*nian nation*, which enters the workshop of mankind with a very distinct racial intermixture, the Latin-Slav, is called upon to develop the special aptitudes of this most interesting racial combination. The peculiar situation of the two last-named nations consists in this, that their independent existence and their emergence from the embraces of the East, are too recent to enable us to recognise their real significance as yet; but no one will doubt that such significance exists. Yet their aggrandisement to the detriment of Hungary was to the detriment of the great interests of human progress, not only because it weakened forces more mature, but because it *obstructs rather than assists the nations thus aggrandised in the fulfilment of their own historic mission.*

After what I have said as regards Hungary's mission the first of these two theses needs no further explanation. The second may seem a paradox. Must not a nation of necessity win strength in every direction, when it unites into one State all those who belong to its race and speak its language? The argument seems obvious, but its objective basis is unsound.

By their territorial expansion these races have, as a matter of fact combined into their new political organisations not their kindred only, but large numbers of aliens whose numerical proportion and cultural standard create a debatable situation, as regards racial unity and cultural conditions. Owing to the high intellectual standard of the leading race, the Czecho-Slovak Republic would seem to have the advantage in both respects, if we take the Czechs and the Slovaks to be of the same race. This, however, is at least open to question; I, for my part, hardly believe that the majority of the Slovaks can have approved the disappearance of their distinct national individuality, and I venture to ask whether they do not still regard themselves — and rightly so — as an independent branch of the great Slav family, possessing special qualities? Taking this view of their situation, it has become much more precarious by their annexation to Czecho-Slovakia; for, though the Hungarian rule did not perhaps sufficiently foster

the development of their individuality and intrinsic forces, yet, owing to the marked racial disparity between Hungarians and Slovaks, the latter were not threatened with absorption. The Czechs, it is true, show concern for them, but owing to the close relationship, and the disproportion of political forces, they are likely to smother them in brotherly embraces. Only the blind can fail to see that Czechisation of the Slovaks, due to the Pittsburg fallacy, is a fundamental idea of Czech policy, the success of which is assured. I will not mention the Hungarian minority, almost a million in number, annexed by Czecho-Slovakia quite arbitrarily, without even the pretext of geographical necessity.

In the case of the territorial acquisitions of Great Roumania and Great Serbia the anomaly is still more striking. In the territory of 21,000 square kilometers which Great Serbia took from Hungary proper — leaving Croatia out of account —, in a total population of 1.5 millions there are roughly speaking 460,000 Hungarians, 300,000 Germans, about 300,000 Slovaks, Ruthenians, Roumanians and other races, and only 90,000 Croats and 380,000 Serbs, thus altogether 470,000 Jugoslavs, representing not quite 30% of the annexed population, just a little more than half the combined number of Hungarians and Germans. On what principle, we may ask, was this acquisition based? It is not even justified by a relative majority, still less by an equitable claim to cultural superiority. I will not raise the question as to whether, in a purely Jugoslav State, represented by a Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (its racial unity unimpaired by the aliens taken from Hungary), Serbian hegemony over Croats and Slovenes, the latter two formed by their long association with the West, would serve the interests of human progress. But can the actual Jugoslav agglomeration, with its marked diversities of cultural tendencies and degrees of development be regarded as a homogeneous nation? I do not propose to touch upon the Macedonian question: I am content to show that the territory alienated from Hungary destroys the homogeneity of the new-born State, entails retrogression in this territory

itself, and weakens rather than strengthens the political development of the country as a whole, and the progress of the ruling race.

This is still more evident in the case of Great Roumania. Out of the increase of the population, obtained on the plea of the nationality principle, and amounting to 5.2 millions, only 2.8 millions or 53% are Roumanians; 47% are non-Roumanians, including 1.7 million Hungarians, and 560.000 Germans; together 2.3 million persons belonging to nations which represent Western culture; the rest belong to fragmentary groups. Now, can Roumanian supremacy in this territory be justified when the numerical preponderance of the Roumanians is so small, smaller than the absolute majority of the Hungarians in pre-war Hungary, and the cultural disproportion so striking, as shown by the following figures, taken from the census of 1920?

Total population of	I. Hungarians	II. Germans	III Roumanians	IV. Mixed
Transylvania . . . . .	34.3%	8.7%	55.0%	2.8%
<i>Illiterates</i> . . . . .	20.1%	2.1%	74.6%	0.7%
Those who can read and write . . . . .	48.0%	15.5%	35.8%	0.9%
Those who have passed through a middle-school	63.9%	17.0%	18.2%	0.9%
Those who are in offices	60.5%	14.5%	24.5%	0.5%
Economic <i>intelligentsia</i> .	71.7%	20.7%	6.5%	1.0%
Intellectual workers . .	63.5%	16.1%	19.6%	6.8%

That this immense cultural superiority of the Hungarians and Germans did not result from artificial oppression, is shown by the fact that the number of those employed in public offices (24.5%) greatly exceeds the proportion of those who were able to attain leading positions in the field of economic life, or even in that of free intellectual avocations (19.6% and 6.5 respectively).

As, in spite of the cultural inferiority demonstrated above, the Roumanians of Transylvania are on a higher level than those of the former Kingdom, no compensatory infiltration can be expected from the latter source. Thus

the extension of Roumanian rule to the territories alienated from Hungary will obviously and necessarily result in a catastrophic decline of the standard of government, and, owing to the natural desire of the ruling race for speedy equalisation, in oppression, if not destruction, of the higher culture. The Roumanian Agrarian reform, the occasion of noisy international publicity, serves this end in Transylvania, where it was hardly needed from the social point of view, and where it nevertheless assumed more radical proportions than in the former Kingdom. It confiscates, without anything like serious compensation, the resources (chiefly investments in landed property) of all the great Hungarian cultural foundations, and thus makes the maintenance of most Hungarian educational and scientific institutions a matter of supreme difficulty, almost of impossibility. But such a policy obstructs Roumanian cultural development likewise, because it diverts the national energies into mistaken channels, and wastes upon oppression forces which should be utilised for progress. The nationalist spirit thus denies its nobler instincts and becomes anti-cultural. Moreover, the fact already mentioned must not be overlooked: the inclusion of a certain group of Roumanians (this applies equally to Serbs) in States on a higher cultural level reacted favourably upon Roumanian cultural development itself; hence the extension of Roumanian rule to the detriment of Hungarian rule cannot be regarded as a pure gain, even from the point of view of Roumanian culture and of the national mission connected therewith. In fact, much has been lost, and nothing gained by the favour shown to unhealthy greed.

Summarising the facts set forth above we arrive at the following conclusions:

The Hungarian nation had and has a lofty world-historic mission, determined by the achievements and tendencies of a thousand years, in the fulfilment of which it has been obstructed and weakened by the catastrophe of Trianon. This mission was, and still is the defence and the peaceful extension of the higher standards of Western life, by political and military, as well as cultural efforts,

according to the requirements of the age. The Trianon mutilation has detached from the West territories it had already conquered, and thrown them back into semi-Oriental conditions, imperilling thereby existing Western culture in these territories, and slackening the progress of those who do not yet possess such culture, because they no longer feel the stimulus of its rival power. The mutilation of Hungary, the weakening of the Hungarian nation, is a loss to the great intellectual and moral interests of mankind, a loss without compensation.

It is difficult to discover any humanitarian mission in the *States* which were expanded to the detriment of Hungary, although the *nations* whose rule has thus been extended, undoubtedly possess such missions. These nations have, however, not gained, but lost energies for their fulfilment by the unhealthy territorial expansion granted to them. True, it united politically kindred groups formerly severed; but, on the other hand, the annexation of many alien elements standing on a higher cultural level has disturbed the newly won racial homogeneity of the States, and driven their activity into a wrong direction. It has fostered in them a bellicose, imperialistic spirit, thereby paralysing the development of native culture for an incalculable space of time, or at least making it useless for humanity at large. They are fated to destroy more cultural values than they are able to produce.

The final result of Trianon, the weakening of forces that serve the higher interests of mankind, and the strengthening of those that are in opposition to them. Can conditions which may thus be summarised be called "peace"?

# Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon

BY EUGENE HORVÁTH



## I. The European Position of Austria-Hungary during the first Decade of the Century.

Modern historians of all schools agree that the last thirty years of the nineteenth century were mainly devoted to extra-European expansion, as a result of which the inflammable matter of European antagonisms was sensibly diminished.

It was as if the explorers of the period of discoveries had risen from the dead, and an incessant stream of migrations set towards unfamiliar shores which soon became well known, and found their masters, for the European Powers rapidly conquered and annexed them. European history, after the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871, was a mere reflection of the gigantic and incessant scramble outside Europe, interrupted only by a brief breathing-space between 1890 and 1900 when the Powers, in the dearth of further territories to divide, took up positions along the coast of China.

Nothing shows more plainly how decisive this quarter of the century had been for the European Powers than the fact that whereas in Europe the idea that victorious Germany was held up between the claws of the offensive Franco-Russian alliance was quietly accepted, in the Far East, French, German and Russian warships lay side by side, and their respective Governments co-operated against the Chinese Empire, recently defeated by Japan.

The *rapprochement* between these three Powers, however, meant further that of the whole European continent, a continental alliance, a Napoleonic "Continental

System", which not only excluded England, but implied a dangerous consolidation of economic, political and military forces over against her shores.

England was isolated.

She never felt it more acutely than at the time of the South African war, when the French and the German press attacked her with one accord, and the Russian Government invited the continental Powers to form an anti-English coalition.

Let us examine the changed situation more closely. France threatened England, because, starting from the West African territories she had conquered, she was feverishly seeking a road towards Egypt, where, since the times of Louis XIV. and Napoleon, French influence had been considerable. The Russian Empire threatened her, because through the Asiatic Orthodox Churches Russia extended her influence across Egypt as far as Abyssinia, at the same time exercising a formidable pressure upon Persia, and upon Turkey, the Power which held the keys of the Straits, and commanded the Indian boundary mountains where British and Russian outposts faced each other. To crown all these dangers, Russia, through the railway line above Peking, had attained the goal of her ambitions, warm waters for her shipping. Germany's attempt to reach the Indian Ocean by means of the Bagdad railway, while at the same time in the North Sea she was building warships of greater speed than those of Great Britain, was an aggravation of the dangers already mentioned. On the shores of the North Sea there was no other Great Power but England, and British public opinion watched with uneasiness the growth of German armaments.

In the beginning of 1901 the difficult task of steering the English ship of State out of the dangerous waters of isolation devolved upon King Edward VII. who succeeded to the throne at the dawn of the twentieth century. If we glance at the European situation in 1910, when Edward VII. died, it will be evident that the idea of the continental alliance was extinct, and that the German Empire was

the isolated Power, whereas England was surrounded by friendly nations.

When we enquire into the causes of this change we shall see that it was the outcome of a policy of compensations which chose as its essential basis the elimination of Anglo-French colonial controversies.

Morocco had been divided up between France and Spain as early as 1901. Italy, when she joined the association in 1902, received Tripoli as her reward; the price of England's adhesion in 1904 was the surrender of Egypt to British rule. Upon this basis was built up in 1904 the British-French Entente Cordiale which further included Spain and Italy, by virtue of secret agreements. Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, but by binding herself to the West she engaged herself as it were for an "extra" dance

The initial outlines of the Entente affected the Triple Alliance, but did not affect that alliance between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, which was the basis of the Triple Alliance. Within the Triple Alliance Italy had undertaken obligations only against France; after the secret agreement with France she had to modify these gradually, until after proclaiming her neutrality in 1914 she openly sided with the Western Powers in 1915.

The basic principle of the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance was that of defensive preparation against Russia, but at that time Russia was bleeding on the battlefields in the Far East, and was compelled to withdraw entirely from European politics. She even abandoned her Balkan schemes, and consented to co-operate with the Dual Monarchy in the carrying out of reforms in Macedonia — a collaboration which temporarily removed Austro-Russian antagonism from the danger-zone of European politics.

This explains the reserved attitude adopted by Russia at the time of the Bulgarian movement in Macedonia, and also why, in the interest of her activities in the Far East, she exercised a moderating influence on her Slav allies, when the pro-Russian Serb Radicals came into power.

It may perhaps be safely assumed that the advocates of a Franco-Slav hegemony even then invited Russia to the political fields of Europe, and reckoned with her return from Asia.

Already in the autumn of 1901, and on two later occasions, the articles signed "ABC" in the "National Review" published in London, considered the equivalent to which Russia would be entitled should she join a combination to be formed against Germany; and about the same time we note the first indications of endeavours to secure Italy and Russia by promises made to the prejudice of Austria-Hungary. It was then that the possibility of a cession of Italian territories of the Dual Monarchy was first discussed, and that the dark shadow of Russian aspirations in the Balkans and in the Danube basin first became visible. The Serbs soon understood these aspirations, and on April 8, 1908, the "Pester Lloyd" published the programme of the pro-Russian Serb Radicals, which was alleged to have been elaborated by Nichola Pashitch, the leader of the party. It claimed for Serbia the southern territories of Hungary, together with the Southern Slav provinces of the Monarchy. Their acquisition could naturally only be hoped for and made possible with the assistance of Russia, and entailed the breaking up of European peace and of the European *status quo*; a heavy responsibility rested upon the promoters of such a plan. This responsibility was recognised by the English political writer Seton-Watson who, in his book written in extenuation of the Sarajevo murder of 1914 (R. W. Seton-Watson: Sarajevo, London, 1926), stated that "the Radicals had from the very first opposed Austria-Hungary, and Svetosar Markovich, the inspirer of their programme, had proclaimed in very explicit language that 'the liberation and union of all Southern Slavs can only be attained through the destruction of Austria-Hungary' and that 'its existence and that of Serbia are incompatible'." As Austria-Hungary never declared the existence of the Monarchy to be incompatible with that of Serbia, Seton-Watson lays upon the Serbs the responsibility of having prepared the world

war, since he shows that in peace time they sought to extend the frontiers of Serbia by force of arms, and planned the overthrow of Austria-Hungary.

French political writers in quest of Russian support soon perceived that the equivalent for Russia's return into European politics, and the great services expected from her would in fact be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. This was told us by Chéradame in 1901 in his propaganda book on the Austrian question, where we read that "the eventuality of a partition of Austria hangs merely on a thin thread, on the life of a septuagenarian monarch."

All these were of course mere forecasts and speculations, and there was no opportunity for their realisation until the possibility of an agreement between England and Germany was at an end.

When, however, in 1905 the German Government demanded an examination of the Moroccan question, to which the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Delcassé, wished to reply by a declaration of war, and when England, feeling herself bound by the Morocco-Egyptian agreement, sided against Germany, Russia's return to the political field and a benevolent consideration of her aspirations in Eastern Europe became actual; the realisation of her ambitions was thenceforth a problem of the day.

It devolved upon the Liberal administration which came into power in England at the end of 1905 to cope with this question, which was so delicate and important from the point of view of British interests; the outgoing Conservative Government had only dealt with the war in the Far East, and had left to its successor the handling of the British-Russian *rapprochement*.

Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, who appeared on the scenes at this juncture, set to work to revive the pro-Russian and anti-Austrian tradition of Gladstone, the reorganiser of his party. Nothing is more characteristic of Sir Edward Grey's weakness than the fact that in pursuing the new policy he never went so far in support of his ally as to face the enemy, nor, in his attempts to disarm the enemy, so far as to restrain the

ambitions of his ally. From the party programme of Gladstone Sir Edward Grey only took over the friendship with Russia; he showed no enmity to the Dual Monarchy, which he left to the mercy of the Tsarist power; likewise, his friendship for France was not accompanied by any hatred of Germany, though this was a natural consequence of his policy, as was also the annihilation of German power. No one will ever accuse him of having hated any one; objective historians will only say that the country he preferred became the centre of the war, in which it was supported by all the forces at the disposal of the British Government, and in which millions of lives were sacrificed. Sir Edward Grey promised France full protection against a German attack; this, however, was anticipated and preluded by Russian aggression, and the Anglo-French alliance made no attempt to avert it by means of pressure upon Russia.

It is necessary to recall all this, since we must qualify Russia's entry into European politics as the most momentous consequence of Sir Edward Grey's assumption of office. From this moment onward he adhered to the plans of the Franco-Russian alliance, reinforced by British support: this support increased in proportion to the growing predominance of Germany until such time as Russia seized the initiative and, regardless of her allies, and in the absence of a moderating pressure on their part, caused the outbreak of the world war.

During his first two years of office, Sir Edward Grey, in accordance with Russian aspirations, pursued an anti-Islamite policy, the milestones of which were the acquisition of the Sinai Peninsula, the dividing up of Persia, and the discontinuance of Macedonian reforms: milestones which were set up on the high-road to the world war.

The British Government, in an ultimatum to expire in ten days, demanded on May 3, 1906, the cession of the Rafa-Taba line. Sultan Abdul Hamid received the ultimatum from the Turkish Minister in London under a threat of war, and acknowledged it on the 14th; it called forth the Nationalist movement in Egypt. The House of

Commons was greatly surprised when on April 11. 1907, Sir Edward Grey rose from his seat and announced "the greatest loss which the country could suffer", namely, that Lord Cromer, Consul-General in Cairo, the responsible administrator and respected Viceroy of Egypt ever since the occupation, had resigned his post, a disappointed and embittered man. From this time onward England never felt safe as regards the possession of Egypt. In 1911 she placed the iron-fisted Lord Kitchener at the head of affairs, during the war she converted the country into a protectorate, and in 1922 she was compelled to recognise it as an independent State

The Anglo-Russian Treaty concluded in St. Petersburg on August 31, 1907, divided Persia into a British and a Russian sphere of influence. Whereas, however, the English did not effect any changes in the southern provinces apportioned to them, in the northern, the Russian sphere, Nicholas Hendrikovic Hartwig, the Russian Minister, turned the Russian Legation at Teheran into a regular arsenal. With the assistance of the Russian General Liakow, the commander of the Cossack Brigade, he dissolved the Persian Parliament, and Russian troops crossed the Persian frontier. The Persian nation at once took up arms against the conquerors, whereupon the Shah, always complaisant to Russian advice, took refuge at the Russian Legation In order to save his life he was escorted thence to Russian territory. At the end of 1909 Hartwig was transferred to Belgrade, where he fell under the suspicion of having organised the Balkan wars and the murders in Bosnia.

In his note addressed on December 18, 1907, to M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, Sir Edward Grey declared the Macedonian reforms to be insufficient, and proposed that Macedonia should be evacuated by the Turkish troops, and placed under international control. Any such international control would have been wholesome in itself, but the pith of the question lay elsewhere. We must take it to be the fact that Macedonian reforms had hitherto been carried out jointly by the

Dual Monarchy and Russia, and that, therefore, Russia had not had a free hand in the matter. Sir Edward Grey's proposal, however, released Russia from this restraint, and left her at large in a territory whence the Turkish garrisons were expelled for having stood in the way of Russian interests.

Looking more closely into the matter we note that in London a Balkan Committee had been formed with the object of freeing Macedonia from Turkish rule, or as its regulations declared: "the object of the Committee is to educate public opinion to the effect that Great Britain undertook a heavy responsibility when by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 she allowed Macedonia to pass again under Turkish rule." We understand what interests would have been served by revision of the Berlin Treaty, if we glance at the names on the board of the Committee: the fact that Paul Miljukov, the standard-bearer of the Russian neo-Slav policy, is among them, explains everything.

It is probable that the aspirations of Russia and of Miljukov date from as early as 1905, because Russian policy, freed from its preoccupations in the Far-Eastern theatre of war, then first hoisted its flag in the Balkan Peninsula. We often read that in 1906 Austria-Hungary started a tariff war against Serbia, to serve selfish Hungarian interests by preventing the importation of Serbian cattle into the territory of the Dual Monarchy, but it is forgotten that this tariff war was preceded by a Serbo-Bulgarian customs union. Neo-Slav policy based its whole Balkan campaign upon the alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, concerning which we now possess documents filling a whole volume. The customs union was secretly concluded, and in such a manner that the Serbian delegates negotiating a new commercial treaty in Vienna, suppressed the fact of its existence, and when it came to light, they declared for the customs union, and adopted a policy of reprisals against the Dual Monarchy. As, however, the latter was at the time a much stronger power than Serbia, these one-sided measures could only be maintained with the support of some other State. Seton-

Watson himself, in his book on the Sarajevo murder, named Russia as this State, and the official journal of the Balkan Alliance, the "Italia all'Estero", indicated the revision of the Bosnia-Herzegovina settlement, i. e. of the Treaty of Berlin, as the determining factor in Russian action. To-day it is easy enough to correlate these facts.

The plan of the international protectorate over Macedonia, however, led unexpectedly, in the summer of 1908, to the Turkish revolution, which meant that, after the examples of Egypt and Persia, the Turks, the leading nation of the Islamite world, were preparing to break loose from European influences and to defend their own interests. How necessary this was, Turkey could only surmise; she was unaware of the British-Russian agreement made on June 9, 1908, at Reval, in which, at the meeting of King Edward VII. and the Tsar Nicholas II., the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Petrovich Isvolsky, was granted a free hand towards Turkey by the delegates of the British Foreign Office.

Neither was Baron Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, aware of this pact, when he endeavoured to throw light upon the entanglements of secret agreements by announcing in January, 1908, the project of a Bosnian railway from Uvac to Mitrovitza. To this the Dual Monarchy was entitled under the Berlin Treaty, but its adversaries interpreted it as an attempt to expand through Mitrovitza towards Salonika. The effect produced by the project threw light upon what had so far been obscure, for Serbia not only protested, but turning to Isvolsky, proposed the building of a Danube-Adriatic railway which would not only have facilitated the Russian advance to the Adriatic, but would have bisected the Austro-Hungarian railway line, and prevented the proposed advance of the Dual Monarchy. A painful impression was produced in Vienna by the fact that this sudden flash of light revealed Italy ranged at the side of Serbia, an attitude which Nicholas II. acknowledged by visiting Racconigi in 1909, and there signing an Italo-Russian agreement. Thus, as the Prince

of Montenegro was the father-in-law of King Victor Emanuel III., and Peter, the Serbian King, was his brother-in-law, a wall was built between Austria-Hungary and Salonika across the Balkans, almost along the proposed railway line.

Baron Aehrenthal's diplomatic skill was never more clearly shown than in his subsequent declaration that he had abandoned the idea of the Mitrovitz railway. British writers now corroborate our account of the whole transaction. In the book quoted above, Seton-Watson is compelled to assume that Baron Aehrenthal never intended to build the proposed railway, and thus the charge of a projected movement towards Salonika falls to the ground. The English historian Gooch, the greatest living authority on these problems, plainly states that the cause of the whole confusion was that "at the end of 1907 Sir Edward Grey boldly resumed the initiative".

Baron Aehrenthal, when he became aware of all these facts, made a concrete proposal to Russia. His *démarche* had the desired effect, and shortly after the Reval agreement the two hostile and alienated Powers agreed upon the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy in order to prevent these two provinces from sending representatives to the Turkish Parliament; in return, the Dual Monarchy consented to the opening of the Straits. Isvolsky was perfectly satisfied. In his memorandum of July 2, 1908, he already assented to the annexation, at the meeting at Buchlau on September 15 he personally assured Baron Aehrenthal of his consent, and when the annexation had actually taken place, he warned off Serbia and refused armed assistance. Serbia mobilised, but the Tsar himself told Pashitch, the Serbian, Prime Minister, who had hastened to St. Petersburg, that the Bosnian problem could not be solved without war, and that, therefore, Serbia should "arm and — wait."

The neo-Slav politicians of Russia and Serbia were terribly disappointed when they learnt that Isvolsky had from the outset come to terms with the Viennese Government, and had promised to leave Serbia to face the

expected attack alone. The Foreign Minister himself had to resign and, to escape odium, he accepted the post of Ambassador in Paris.

The defeat of Isvolsky did not of course affect the general policy of Russia. Withdrawing from the Far East and Persia, she had since 1905 concentrated all her forces in Europe, taking up positions along the German and Austro-Hungarian frontier.

Only a spark was needed to set the world ablaze; before his death, however, King Edward VII. had enjoined peace to his Ministers, and Nicholas II. visited Potsdam at the end of 1910; it was felt that a great improvement had taken place in Russo-German relations.

Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired peace; in his note of February 27, 1909, he refused to give armed assistance to Russia, should she attack the Dual Monarchy. This had also been refused by France.

All Baron Aehrenthal's skill, however, failed to conceal the weaknesses — ever more and more manifest — of Austria-Hungary. The statesmen of the Western Powers were convinced that Francis Joseph's waning life was the frail thread upon which the existence of the Dual Monarchy depended.

The decline of the Dual Monarchy was not due to the decadence of the peoples composing it, but to their inter-relation, so rigidly and immutably maintained during the long decades of Francis Joseph's reign.

Austria-Hungary was composed of two states (hence the term Dualism or Dual Monarchy), but not of two nations, for whereas Hungary was on the whole a national state, amongst the various races of Austria the non-German races formed the majority, so that the Government, instead of ruling through Parliament, conducted affairs by means of Cabinet Decrees. It is a mistake to assert that Hungary had forced her national policy upon Austria; this assertion is based upon a misapprehension of the actual situation; during the whole period of Dualism Hungary had been on the defensive. Since the "Ausgleich" the Hungarian Governments had been exclusively occupied

with the affairs of Hungary, and had not troubled about the internal affairs of Austria; in fact, a dislocation had taken place between the two States which gradually increased; Hungary, on the one hand, had been gaining strength internally; in Austria, on the other, the Government had been gradually lapsing into senility and impotence. Francis Joseph was reluctant to effect any changes in the conditions laid down in 1867; the Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand, however, recognised that these were no longer consonant with the principles of evolution. His mistakes arose, not from his recognition of the actual situation, but from his reliance on his Slav advisers, as a consequence of which he had determined to shift the centre of administrative gravity from government by the minority to government by the majority, thus taking the leadership from the Germans and giving it to the Slavs. When universal suffrage was introduced in Austria, the very first elections in 1907 resulted in an anti-German majority, so that henceforth the German government, in order to maintain the Austrian Empire, was forced back upon a system of absolutism which it would gladly have avoided.

On the other hand, the friends of the Crown Prince sought to create a popular parliamentary State which was to include Hungary; finding her reluctant, however, they set themselves openly against her. It was at this time that General Conrad prepared a plan for the military occupation of Hungary, which fact clearly shows that Hungary's attitude was defensive and by no means offensive; nor was she alone here; she took her stand by the aged sovereign, who, in conjunction with his Hungarian advisers, adhered to the system of Dualism.

In opposition to them Francis Ferdinand relied upon the General Staff, the only institution which had not become common to the two countries in spite of the "Ausgleich", but had remained an exclusive body; on their maps there was no boundary line between Austria and Hungary. The Czechs, defying the German administration, and relying upon the support of the Crown Prince, them-

selves erased the boundary lines, and began a propaganda amongst the Slovak population of Upper Hungary. Although Hungary had practically no Czech population, for in 1910 there were only 8000 Czechs in a total population of 20 millions, and although this small minority resided mainly in Budapest, the Czechs still published a Czech paper for the benefit of the Slovaks in Hungarian territory, and it was from them that the English political writer Seton-Watson, under the *nom de plume* of Scotus Viator, obtained the data on the basis of which in 1908 he acquainted the world with the "struggle of the races" in Hungary. Since 1905, it should be remembered, the British Government and British public opinion had shown an increasing interest in the territory coveted by Russia, and Seton-Watson in person travelled to Hungary to study the situation. He went to Prague instead of Budapest, and in Prague he was induced to undertake Czech propaganda in preparation for the annexation of the Slovak territory.

The ostensible purpose, therefore, of Czech propaganda was an unfavourable presentment of the Hungarian administration and the eventual liberation of the Slovaks; the truth, however, which no longer needs demonstration is, that it aimed at the annexation of the Slovak territory with all its non-Slovak inhabitants. Added to this, the Czech agitators, enjoying the support of the Crown Prince, sought (without his knowledge) to open the way for Russia across Upper Hungary, and Russia at the same time began to excite the Ruthenians across the Carpathians in order to extend her frontiers towards the West. It also seems to have escaped Francis Ferdinand's notice that in the political trials following upon the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the accused Serbs — amongst them the Serbian diplomat Spalaikovic — were defended by the Czech lawyer Masaryk, so that the first outlines of the Crown Prince's Great-Austrian popular Empire seemed to involve Russia, whose neo-Slav politicians looked forward, hand in hand with the Czechs and Serbs, to the death of Francis Joseph and the accession of Francis Ferdinand. The Serbian Government succeeded in acquainting Seton-

Watson with their propaganda in this connection, and in his book on the Southern Slav question in 1911 he used the material received from Belgrade.

The foundations of the tragedy of Austria-Hungary were thus laid, because the rigid outlines of the State were disturbed by new forces. Austrian political writers — in the first place the Crown Prince's partisans (Professor Friedjung, Count Czernin) — maintained that Hungary was leading the secession movement, whereas she was only intent on her own defence, and when Austria was forsaken by all, Hungary shed the blood of her sons in the trenches of Galicia and the Isonzo, in order to defend the lines left open by deserters, and thus to uphold the Dual Monarchy.

## II. The Attack of Tsarist Russia 1911—1914.

On the basis of researches made into the question of war guilt it may be regarded as evident that the avalanche was set in motion by the Moroccan campaign begun by France in the spring of 1911. Not merely because, in defiance of the Treaty of Madrid of 1880, guaranteeing the independence of Morocco, she occupied the country and assumed a protectorate over it in 1912, but also because the Spanish campaign in Morocco, the Italian campaign in Tripoli, and the Russian attempt to seize the Straits were the indirect results of this French adventure.

Austria-Hungary was between two fires when her ally, Italy, declared war on Turkey, who had been regarded by Austria as a natural ally, and when Russia demanded from the Porte the opening of the Straits. Count Aehrenthal was of opinion that it would be wise not to thwart the designs of either Power, arguing that whilst the Italians and the Russians remained on the sea and left the Balkan Peninsula in peace, there would be no war in Europe. He thought the Italians would satisfy their ambitions in Africa, whereas the Russians would proceed towards the Levant, which, from the point of view of the Dual Monarchy, would have meant a further diversion from the Balkans.

British Government circles thought differently, and whereas they supported Italy, they invited Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, to abandon all plans concerning the acquisition of the Straits. Thus it happened that while France felt safe in the possession of Morocco,

Italy in that of Tripoli and England in that of Egypt. Russia had to forego her age-long hopes, in spite of acquiescence in principle on the part of Austria-Hungary.

The reason why this check had no immediate tragic consequences was that Russian aspirations turned towards the Balkans, a development Count Aehrenthal, in the interest of European peace, had done his utmost to prevent. He had hardly warded off the threat of Italy during the Italo-Turkish war, when a much more powerful State advanced from the East, whose intervention he was not strong enough to resist, because Tsarist Russia, which had been granted a free hand in this direction, was concentrating all her forces to break through into the Balkans, thus offering the Dual Monarchy, which stood in her way, the alternative: "to be or not to be".

The result was the Balkan League which, under the supreme protection of Tsar Nicholas II., declared war on the Turkish Empire, eventually taking from her all her European territory as far as the Tchataldja lines. The London Conference of May 30, 1913, ceded the whole Peninsula to the Balkan League, the members of which: Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and even neutral Roumania, obtained large territories.

We will not deal with the history of the first Balkan League and the first Balkan War, but we may point out that Article III. of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, concluded on March 13, 1912, — and the Russian plan had been built upon this alliance — stipulated that should Austria-Hungary attack Serbia, Bulgaria should place 200,000 men at the disposal of Serbia against the Dual Monarchy, even should the latter merely send troops into the Sanjak of Novibazar, returned to Turkey in 1908.

The above-mentioned Treaty further stated that one copy would be sent to the Russian Government requesting them to take cognisance of it, and to give it their benevolent attention. When M. Poincaré, the French Prime Minister, first obtained knowledge of the Treaty on the occasion of his visit to Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, in Petrograd in the summer of 1912, he declared

that "this Treaty contains the seeds of war not only against Turkey, but also against Austria, and at the same time lays the foundations of Russian hegemony over the Slav Kingdoms." Seton-Watson, one of the Western representatives of Russo-Slav interests, in his book on the Sarajevo murder, added that "the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was reached very largely under the influence of Russia, and especially its Minister in Belgrade, Mr Hartwig. It is important to note that Serbia made a condition of her adhesion, the promise of Bulgarian military support on her Northern frontier in the event of Austria-Hungary's intervention — obviously in the calculation that then Russia would also become involved and make Serbian resistance possible."

Thus Tsarist Russia assumed responsibility for the war, and theories whereby it is sought to fix this responsibility upon other nations and governments are futile.

As regards Hartwig himself the report of Baron Griesinger, the German Minister in Belgrade, of November 12, 1912, is characteristic: "Fidelity, the Roumanian Minister, told me and the Austrian Minister of a conversation with Hartwig. Russia intends to make Serbia a Slav outpost, incorporating Bosnia, Herzegovina *and the southern districts of Hungary*. Roumania is acting against her own interests if she remains on the side of Austria-Hungary; for at a favourable moment she would merely have to stretch out her hand *and take Transylvania*." Thus the charge that Hungary provoked the war falls to the ground, since twenty months prior to its outbreak Russia offered Serbia and Roumania terms which were unimaginable without a war in which Hungary would have to defend herself. At the reception of the diplomats accredited in Bucharest Maiorescu, the Roumanian Prime Minister told Waldhausen, the German Minister, that the Russian Government ought not to leave Hartwig in Belgrade, a remark duly reported by the German Minister to his Government on November 19, 1912.

It is a well-known fact that in spite of all this Hartwig remained at his post. He was, indeed, a pioneer

of Russian aspiration, and his presence was essential, in view of certain anxieties which preoccupied the Russian Government.

In the course of the war Serbia occupied not only territory inhabited by Serbians but also Albania, which had been jointly recognised by Austria-Hungary and Italy as a common sphere of influence. It was to the interest, therefore, of these two Powers that like the other Balkan countries, Albania should be declared independent, and that the Serbian troops should be withdrawn from her territory. Count Berchtold, however, committed the tactical error of making this demand alone, and not in conjunction with the Italian Government. Italy lay low, mindful that the Balkan League enjoyed the protection of the Entente Cordiale. Count Berchtold accordingly made the proposal independently, and accepted the odium of the business. That it was no mere Austro-Hungarian conception was shown by its subsequent acceptance, not only by Italy, but at the London Conference by the Great Powers generally, in whose name the demand was eventually addressed to Serbia.

Petrograd took a different view of the matter. Russian displeasure was directed, not at the Great Powers and Italy, but at the Dual Monarchy, and Count Berchtold's proposal was resented as an interference. In addition to concentrating troops on the Galician frontier, the Russian Government did their utmost to win over Roumania. The Grand Duke Nicholas visited Bucharest, and after he had left — as reported by Waldhausen, the German Minister, on December 19, 1912, — "the Russian Minister asked Maiorescu plainly whether Roumania would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-Austrian war, as had been the case in the Balkan War; to which the Prime Minister replied evasively that a war between the two countries was inconceivable."

This evasive reply did not discourage the Russians, for in January, 1913, a Russian action had been initiated with which we must deal in detail, since it involved the

formation of a second Balkan League, directed, no longer against Turkey, but against the Dual Monarchy.

Russia's action was due to the fact that the recognition of Albanian independence stultified the first Balkan League.

The Serbian troops, leaving the shores of the Adriatic, invaded Macedonia where the Serbian Government, disregarding the terms of the Treaties of 1912, demanded indemnifications from Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government insisted on the terms of the Treaty; but Bulgaria had suffered heavy losses in human lives during the war, and now Serbia turned against her in alliance with Greece, who dreaded a Bulgarian occupation of Salonika. Sazonoff saw with growing anxiety that the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance, upon which the whole fabric of Russian aspirations was based, was degenerating into a fratricidal war; he supported the Serbs who were the neighbours of the Dual Monarchy, and endeavoured to secure the support of Roumania for them. He was induced to abandon Slav Bulgaria and side with non-Slav Roumania by the consideration that a Serbia, adjacent and hostile to Austria-Hungary, and a Roumania, recuperated by a long peace under the protection of the Triple Alliance, were of infinitely greater value to him than a Bulgaria bleeding from her recent wounds. He had succeeded in securing Slistria for Roumania in exchange for her neutrality during the first Balkan War, and Russia handed over this town to King Charles at the Conference of the Powers held in Petrograd.

The Russian Government had thus every hope of placing Roumania instead of Bulgaria in the line of battle, and consoled the Serbs, through the Serbian Minister in Petrograd, by openly promising them support against the Dual Monarchy. "The Foreign Minister told me yesterday that after our great successes he has confidence in our forces, and thinks we shall be a match for Austria. Thus we must be satisfied with present conditions for a time, regarding them as temporary, since the future is ours."

Sazonoff said this, obviously confident that when his roubles were poured into Bucharest, he would be able to

win Roumanian public opinion, and to turn it against the Dual Monarchy

Waldhausen, the German Minister in Bucharest, reported accordingly on January 11, 1913, that "Russia is agitating through spies in Roumania against Austria." Count Quadt, German Minister in Athens, added in his report of March 1, 1913, that "one of my Roumanian friends who has just returned from Bucharest tells me that the Russians have recently been hard at work to detach Roumania from the Triple Alliance. Russian propaganda filters through the population, down to the lowest stratum".

That it also found its way up to the highest circles we learn from the memoirs of M. Take Jonescu, a former Prime Minister who, travelling through Paris on New Year's Day, 1913, assured M. Poincaré, the French Premier, that "France and her Allies will never be faced by the Roumanian Army". As the sometime Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in the appendix of his memoirs mentions the sums Take Jonescu received out of the roubles sent to Bucharest, we may estimate the latter's charge that the war was brought on by Count Tisza at its proper value. (A. Marghiloman: Note politique 1897—1924. Vol. IV. Bucharest, 1927.)

It is true that M. Maiorescu, the Prime Minister, did not identify himself with the Russian idea, but Russia did not believe that Maiorescu would have the last word in the matter, as is shown by Sazonoff's letter of May 6, 1913, to Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade. In this he declared that Serbia would have to fight another war which would involve her very existence, because "Austria's agony can only be prolonged for a few years". The Serbian Minister in Petrograd reported in a telegram of May 13, 1913: "Sazonoff again tells me we should work for the future, because we shall get much territory from Austria".

The German Government made a serious political mistake when out of consideration for the Hohenzollerns in the Balkans (Charles, King of Roumania, and Sophia,

the Queen of Greece), they sided with Roumania against Bulgaria. Roumania, it should be remembered, joined the Balkan League and sent her troops against Sofia, and Bulgaria, unable to defend herself against the enemies that assailed her on every side, sued for peace.

At the Bucharest Peace Conference it was already manifest that the second Balkan League — although Roumania had had a Treaty with the Dual Monarchy since 1883 — was directed against Austria-Hungary. According to the report of July 3, 1913, of M. Delcassé, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, Hartwig constantly reminded Pashitch of the Austrian peril, and the latter replied that in this contingency he expected support from Russia. Delcassé further reported that Venezelos, the Greek Prime Minister, had assured Prince Demidoff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, that "the Greek Government would support Serbia against Austria-Hungary" and M. Dard, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest, declared that at the Bucharest Peace Conference Serbia laid down the programme for the near future through Spalaikovic, the Serbian delegate, as follows: "Bulgaria must stand closely behind Serbia and Roumania, in order to help these two Powers in the realisation of their national aspirations to the prejudice of Austria-Hungary". On these bases Pashitch was perfectly justified shortly afterwards in saying to Bogishevitch, the Serbian Minister in Berlin, at Marienbad: "I could have brought about a European war at the time of the first Balkan War, in order to acquire Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I was reluctant to make greater concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia in exchange for the acquisition of those provinces (Bosnia and Herzegovina)".

The report of Count Waldburg, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Bucharest, dated from Sinaia September 16, 1913, throws an interesting light upon the question as to how far the French diplomats supported the Russian plans. "As the antagonism against the friendly neighbouring state gained ground, French and Russian influences became manifest, zealously fostered by Shebeco and

Blondel. The French Minister in particular developed a lively activity in favour of Russia, and, it must be added, not without success. Although no actual sympathy for Russia was created in Roumania, the memory of Bessarabia had faded, while *the eyes of every Roumanian were directed towards Transylvania.*“ Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, reported on December 19, 1913, as follows: ”Jovanovic, the Serbian Minister, who is on the most intimate terms with M. Dumaine, and whom the latter described to me recently as 'perfectly loyal', was advised by the French Ambassador that Serbia should as soon as possible come to terms with Bulgaria. The basis of an agreement could easily be found. Serbia should cede the Istip and Kotchana territories to Bulgaria in exchange for the promise that Bulgaria would *support Serbia in acquiring the Serbian territories of Austria-Hungary.*“ On March 12, 1914, Waldhausen, the German Minister in Bucharest, reported that Tardieu — his paper, *Le Temps* received a certain sum from the roubles distributed among French journals by the Russian Embassy in Paris — had lectured in Bucharest on the subject: *Roumania's Alsace-Lorraine is in Transylvania.*“

King Charles reassured the German Minister by saying that the French were anxious to render services to the Russians. In his letter addressed on April 18, 1914, to Tschirschky, Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, wrote that Beldiman, the Roumanian Minister in Berlin, had made the following statement: ”Russian emissaries and Russian roubles are at work among the population“. Bratianu, the Prime Minister, told Beldiman that he estimated the fund at the disposal of the Russian Minister at Bucharest for propaganda at one million roubles.

There is no doubt that this propaganda was effectual.

Among its activities in purely Hungarian territory was the agitation in the Máramaros district, the unmasking of which brought to light the Pan-Russian propaganda carried on among the Ruthenians living in Hungary. In the proceedings against Alexander Kabalyuk, the Russian agitator known as ”Father Alexei“, who was sentenced to

four and a half years' imprisonment by the Debreczen Court of Justice on March 3, 1914, for inciting to sedition against the State, it was shown that the accused openly proclaimed to the Ruthenian peasants that conversion to the Russian Orthodox Church would pave the way for Russian rule. He distributed amongst the population pamphlets and prayer-books containing prayers for the Tsar and his family. He himself prayed for liberation from Hungarian rule and smuggled in copies of the Russian newspaper, *Russkaja Pravda*, containing such items as this: „The time has come to take up arms and fight for the right of Holy Russia. Serbia is threatened by Austria, but Russia is concentrating her troops on the Galician frontier.“ All this happened in 1912, in peace time.

From the records of Serbian agitation we shall only take the case of Vazul Staic, professor at the training college for schoolmasters at Zombor, who was sentenced by the Szeged District Court to five and a half years' imprisonment on August 5, 1913. With a grant from the Hungarian State Staic went in the summer of 1912 with his pupils to Southern Hungary for purposes of study, but on arriving at the frontier he unexpectedly passed into Serbia. It appeared later that Staic had secret relations with Milan Pribicevic, Secretary of "Narodna Odbrana", the Serbian secret society. When the travellers, who had no passports, arrived at Belgrade, they were taken to the premises of the society where "they heard things which they were forbidden to repeat". The students were then sent to Nish, where they attended a military parade, and where they saw Staic talking publicly to Major Pribicevic. It is interesting to note that Staic was eventually acquitted by the Royal Curia on November 3, 1915, during the war.

As an example of Roumanian agitation we may mention the attempt of February 23, 1914, at Debreczen, where the office of the Hungarian Greek-Catholic Bishop Miklóssy was blown up by a bomb received through the post, and the Bishop's Chaplain, his Secretary, and a friend of the latter were killed. The sender of the bomb was one Catarau, of Russian extraction, professor at the Military

Academy of Bucharest, who, with the connivance of the Roumanian authorities, escaped arrest. According to Marghiloman's memoirs the Roumanian Government sent him to Cairo, and thence, on his detection, under the protection of Lord Kitchener, to some other country disguised, he is said to have enjoyed the hospitality of ten different Governments up to the outbreak of the war (Marghiloman: Note politice, Vol. I. page 537.)

In the beginning of 1914, therefore, Russia's attack was imminent.

This was made obvious by Russia's warlike preparations and the displacements of her troops, and more especially by the events of June, 1914, which led directly to the declaration of war.

Tsar Nicholas II. visited Constanza with his whole family in order to win Roumania, and we have three documents to prove that on this occasion the attack on Austria-Hungary was discussed. The first is the report dated June 19, 1914, of Major Bronsart, German Military Attaché in Bucharest, according to which "a Count Apraxin conversed freely with the Roumanian General Staff officers present, and told them that *Roumania could acquire Transylvania in one or two years with Russia's help.*" The second document is Sazonoff's memorandum to the Tsar, dated June 24, 1914, according to which he asked Bratianu, the Roumanian Prime Minister, at the Constanza meeting, "what the attitude of Roumania would be in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary?" The third document is a note addressed by Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, to Count Tisza, informing the latter that Sazonoff and Bratianu had come on June 16 in a motor car into Hungary in the direction of Brassó, and that the Russian Foreign Minister had shown Bratianu the land which Roumania might acquire with the aid of Russia. This story had been confirmed by German diplomatic documents, but Sazonoff himself corroborated it, and in his memoirs he described the incident as follows: "Bratianu, wishing to give me an idea of the beauties of the Car-

pathians with their magnificent forests, took me to a point on the frontier the name of which I forget. After a brief halt, to the stupefaction of the Hungarian sentries the car crossed the frontier and we proceeded a few versts into Hungarian territory. When entering Transylvania, the same idea must have crossed our respective minds, namely, that we were in Roumanian territory that awaited its liberation from Hungarian rule. We did not, however, exchange these ideas, because the time had not yet come for plain speaking. This Transylvanian excursion was no deliberate step towards the political solidarity of Russia and Roumania". (D. S. Sazonoff. *Sechs schwere Jahre*. Berlin, 1927. pp. 136—137.)

Two weeks later, on June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franzis Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, and according to the data published by the Serbs, both the Serbian Government and the Russian Legation in Belgrade were cognisant of the murder.

Hence there can be no doubt that we must accept the hypothesis of a Russian attack, well organised, carefully decided, ever more menacing from 1911 onwards and finally culminating in the world war. The assumption, therefore, of the Treaty of Trianon that Hungary is being punished for her complicity in bringing about the war, is untenable; the war was not provoked by Hungary. She was a victim, against whom Russia and her Allies had long before the Sarajevo murder planned an armed attack, and the ultimate partition of her territory.

The further assumption that Franzis Ferdinand was not murdered by Serbian Serbs, but by Austrian subjects, falls to the ground, because according to the Serbian Minister, Jovanovitch, the attempt had been directed from Belgrade, and the question had even been dealt with several times by the Serbian Government.

Equally groundless was the allegation accepted by the ignorance of Western Europeans, that the murder was instigated by Count Tisza himself.

Hence it follows that the responsibility for the preparation of the world war rests definitively upon the Govern-

ment of Tsarist Russia. It was Russia who urged on Serbia and Roumania against Austria-Hungary, caused the Crown Prince of this country to be murdered, and promised its territories to others.

### III. The Responsibility of the Hungarian Government for the War.

The question of the responsibility of the Hungarian Government and its Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, did not arise with the outbreak of the war, a fact which leads us at once to inquire into the origin and motives of the charge.

When war was declared in the summer of 1914, the name of Count Tisza was never mentioned in the circles where world policy was being framed, for the reason that among all the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy the Hungarian Prime Minister was perhaps the one least well known in foreign countries. Two circumstances tended to bring his personality prominently before Western public opinion at a subsequent date. One of these was the fact that when in 1916 the leaders and agents of the Russian Slav propaganda divided up Eastern Europe, they themselves considered it strange that two-thirds of Hungary should be detached. When certain Transylvanian agitators escaped into Roumania in the beginning of 1915, one of them, Lucaci, meeting on a Danube steamer the brothers Buxton, who were agitating in the interest of Bulgaria, was told by them that "England will never allow Hungary to be touched. England counts upon Hungary because she is strong, has 20 million inhabitants and will always be separated from Russia by her religion, whereas the Roumanians are fewer in number, and their religion is akin to that of the Russians." When the Tsar went to Constanza, he said "I come to my fellow-believers". He was silent as to the Latin character of the

Roumanians, which differentiates them from the Slavs, but insisted upon their religious affinities with the Russians.

These Roumanian correlativeists, together with the Serbs, accepted the ecclesiastical and political supremacy of the Tsar, but it was not long before they began to feel some uneasiness as to whether the Governments of the Western Powers would sanction the disintegration of Hungary on the lines laid down in 1915 by the emissaries of the Russian Slavs. Accordingly, Seton-Watson, who was serving these Russian Slav interests, started in 1916 a propaganda paper called "New Europe" with the object of propagating and popularising the Russian Slav ideas, and inducing their acceptance by the public opinion of the Western countries. With the same end in view, he called his propaganda book published in 1916 "German, Slav, and Magyar", and maintained in it the thesis that the prime instigator of the war was Hungary, working with Berlin through Vienna.

It was necessary not only that Hungary should be declared guilty, but that she should appear as the arch-culprit, in order to justify the disproportionately heavy punishment meted out to her. For the same reason Hungary had in 1916 to be divorced from the Dual system of the Monarchy in which she was merged until 1914; and therefore Hungary and her Prime Minister, almost unknown to the Western Powers so far, had to be placed before a gullible world as the deliberate promoters of the war.

Thus it happened that Dr. Benes, in his pamphlet published in 1917, discovered and maintained that in the Austro-Hungarian Crown Council of July, 1914, "war was insisted upon by Count Tisza and the Hungarian nobles". In the same year the Roumanian, Take Jonescu, whose receipts for the roubles of the Russian Legation at Bucharest were published by Marghiloman, added his testimony to the effect that "the principal author of the war was Count Tisza; he provoked the universal massacre." As a corollary to these arguments it was suggested

that Count Tisza caused Francis Ferdinand to be murdered in order to precipitate the outbreak of the war, and the chain of events came to an appropriate end with the Treaty of Trianon, which inflicted upon guilty Hungary a punishment duly proportioned to the crimes she had committed.

A turning-point in the history of the charge came, when after the November revolutions of 1918 the Socialist savants invaded the Government archives of Berlin and Vienna, and published numbers of the most secret documents in order to unmask the guilty Emperors and show the responsibility of their Governments for the war. From the new Austrian Red Book thus published it became evident that no Crown Council had ever been held in July, 1914, no "Hungarian nobles" had attended the joint ministerial conferences, and the only Hungarian present, the Prime Minister, Count Tisza, had in the name of Hungary strenuously opposed the resort to military action against Serbia.

At the time of the Sarajevo murder Count Tisza was at his estate in Geszt; he was only received three days later, on June 30, by the Emperor, when he came to offer the condolences of the Hungarian Government. In Vienna he learnt that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, intended to inflict a military chastisement upon Serbia, an intention which the French Prime Minister, Viviani, declared in 1922 he found "quite natural". Count Tisza was opposed to such measures, because he foresaw that they would provoke Russian intervention and bring about a European war. He protested against the plan verbally to Count Berchtold, and to the Emperor in a memorandum submitted on July 1. In the latter he said *inter alia*: "When discussing the matter with Count Berchtold I made no secret of my disapproval of the plan as a fatal mistake, and of my repudiation of all responsibility for such a step. In the first place we do not yet possess sufficient proofs to enable us to hold Serbia responsible, and to provoke a war in spite of her reassuring declarations. We should have the

worst possible *locus standi*, the whole world would regard us as disturbers of peace, and we should enter into a new war under the most unfavourable circumstances.“ Since on July 2 Tisza expressed himself in a similar sense to Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, Count Berchtold stood alone in his determination.

In order to secure the chastisement of Serbia, the Foreign Minister drafted on July 2 a letter addressed in the name of Francis Joseph to the German Emperor, in which he announced the measures he proposed to take. He sent the draft to Budapest, that the Hungarian Prime Minister might express his opinion on the contents. Before, however, he had received Count Tisza’s telegram, demanding a modification, he had sent the original letter by Count Hoyos to Berlin, where on July 5, it was submitted to the Emperor, who approved the plan, and promised to stand by his ally. Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, received instructions to this effect, and now it only remained to win over Count Tisza.

It was under these circumstances that the joint Cabinet met on July 7, under the presidency of Count Berchtold, who proposed immediate military action against Serbia, on the basis of the attitude adopted by the allied Emperors. The Hungarian Prime Minister, however, declared emphatically: "I should never consent to a surprise attack on Serbia, without preliminary diplomatic action, though this seems to be intended and has unfortunately been agreed upon in Berlin through the intermediary of Count Hoyos.“ Count Tisza thus remained isolated among the other Ministers present, and in a second memorandum submitted to the Emperor on July 8, he stated: "I was not in a position to accept the plan in its entirety, and to take upon myself responsibility for the intended military attack upon Serbia.“ The Hungarian Cabinet Council held in Budapest on the following day unanimously accepted the attitude adopted in the above mentioned memorandum, and authorised the Prime Minister to exert the influence pertaining to the Hungarian

Government by virtue of the "Ausgleich", "according to the principles and in the direction indicated by him."

Count Tisza is reproached by hostile critics with having, in the second ministerial conference held on July 14, abandoned his position and approved the war. Had he been consistent, he should have resigned.

There is no doubt that at the above mentioned conference Count Tisza did not oppose the military chastisement of Serbia. We will not attempt to justify this change of front by the fact that he had become convinced of the complicity of Serbia in the murder, since clearly proved. We refrain, because the facts now universally known, were not fully established at the time.

We must regard as the principal argument for Count Tisza's point of view the fact that in his opinion violent measures against Serbia would precipitate the armed intervention of Russia. The Russian agitation in the Máramaros district, the acceptance by the Serbian and Roumanian Governments of instructions from Petrograd, Russia's open menaces and the arming of her forces all showed that the Governments which proposed to chastise Serbia would have to reckon with the military power of Russia. In taking this view Count Tisza differed radically from the joint Cabinet and the General Staff; they only took into consideration the Serbian campaign and later, entirely neglecting Russia, sent a considerable part of the Austro-Hungarian Army against Serbia. At the beginning of July Count Tisza received Count Berchtold's note on the Transylvanian incursion of Sazonoff and Bratianu, and this confirmed his opinion of the dangers underlying prompt decisions that might prove fatal.

We cannot, therefore, regard his change of attitude as a deliberate reversal of judgment on insufficient grounds, as represented by his enemies. Count Tisza was certainly not the man to abandon his position lightly; attacks merely made him more stubborn, and under contradiction he was capable of defending his view against the whole world. His change of attitude seems to have been justified by two circumstances which could not have

failed to have a decisive effect upon such a personality as that of Tisza. One was the attack on Hungary planned by Russia. Count Tisza would not have been the man he in fact was, had he, on the eve of the life-and-death struggle of his nation, of a Russian attack and possible occupation, ranged himself on the side of the hostile Government, instead of taking his stand with that of his own country. The other circumstance was that he, seeing the General Staff concentrating against Serbia, recognised the absolute defencelessness of the whole line of the Carpathians, and agitated by the thought of Hungary's isolated and forsaken state, accepted the assurances of the German Government that they would support Hungary in her efforts of self-defence.

From this time onward Hungary did not face the Russian avalanche alone, and this sufficiently explains Count Tisza's "conversion" as the French termed his acquiescence. Hungary's responsible Prime Minister, in the joint Cabinet of July 14, agreed to the ultimatum to be sent to Serbia, but on the condition that the Dual Monarchy should previously make a solemn declaration binding themselves not to annex any portion of Serbian territory. The motion was carried with great difficulty, because the conference would only consider little Serbia; Count Tisza, however, foreseeing the Russian attack, insisted upon his condition, anxious, on the eve of the struggle to avert from himself and his nation any charge and suspicion of having caused the war.

It is impossible not to connect this attitude with the forest of bayonets marching through the endless Russian steppes towards Hungary, as to which Sazonoff, in his circular telegram sent on July 14, declared to the Governments: "we reject in anticipation any moderating action that may begin in Petrograd."

In the correspondence of Count Tisza published by the Hungarian Academy of Science we find several passages which explain the motives of his decision. Thus on August 26, 1914, he wrote to his cousin, the Countess Margaret Zeyk, that his conscience was clear because "the noose

was already round our neck". After the Galician retreat he himself drew the attention of the Germans to the fact that defence had only been made possible by the promise of German support. As a consequence of this warning the Germans sent troops to defend the Carpathians.

As to the rest the influence of the Hungarian Government seems to have come to an end with the decision of July 14.

The Hungarian Cabinet Council held on July 23 took cognisance of the delivery of the Serbian ultimatum; according, however, to the statement of M. Eugene Balogh, the Minister of Justice, published in the "Review of Foreign Affairs" in 1925, the Hungarian Government only learnt subsequently that Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, had not accepted the Serbian reply and had broken off diplomatic relations. They also only learnt subsequently that the Emperor had given the order for mobilisation, but for this they accepted political responsibility by not resigning. Baron Giesl tells us even more in his memoirs published in 1927; prior to the delivery of the ultimatum, he saw the Hungarian Premier who said to him: "Everything must be avoided that could violate Serbia's sovereign rights, and thus lead to war. But if we ter". (Baron Wladimir Giesl: *Zwei Jahrzehnte im Nahen Orient*. Berlin, 1927.) The fact that he remained at the head of the Government is sufficiently explained by the armed intervention of Russia; even had Count Tisza resigned, this would not have affected the resolution of the Russian Cabinet of July 24, 1914, by which they asked the Tsar to order the mobilisation, thus making ready to intervene, unsolicited, in a matter pending settlement between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, in favour of one of the parties. This, because Russia had predetermined the outbreak of war.

## IV. The Diplomacy of War Aims

The preparation of a Peace Treaty is as a rule governed by the war aims of the combatants; these inspire its programme and embody the results which it was proposed to secure by war.

Hungary's war aims were defined and limited when Count Tisza declared on the eve of the outbreak that the Hungarian Government did not seek to annex any territory. Every one knew what this meant. It meant that Hungary, where the proportion of Magyars in the census of 1910 exceeded 50% of the total population, had no wish to acquire territories which would increase her non-Magyar population, and increase it in such a manner that the new population would have kindred races and nations behind it beyond the frontiers. When as a result of the first year of the war the military force of Russia collapsed, and in the summer of 1915 Poland was liberated, the future of that country was planned on the unfortunate basis of a partition of Russian Poland between Austria and Prussia. The proposed extension of Galicia would, however, have imposed upon Austria such a strong non-German majority that Count Tisza considered it necessary for Hungary to assume part of the burden thus laid upon the Austrian Empire. Whereas the latter, if she had taken over the Northern Slavs, would have become a German-Czech-Polish agglomeration where German hegemony could only have been secured by alliance with the German Empire, Hungary, by including the Southern Slav provinces — Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina — would have become a Hungaro-Southern Slav State. There is no doubt that

this undertaking would have meant a heavy sacrifice for Hungary, aggravated by the fact that owing to the collapse of Russia, Serbia and Roumania would have looked to Hungary for guidance, and that the Hungarians would have been obliged to find a solution for the Roumanian question, as well as for that of the Serbo-Croatian populations. All these possibilities, however, remained within the orbit of the Dual Monarchy. Even Serbia cannot say that Hungary entered upon the war with the idea of conquering Serbia, since it is now conclusively proved that Count Tisza protested in the name of the Hungarian Government against any annexation. It cannot be shown that the Hungarian Government abandoned their attitude during the war; the war aims of the Hungarian Government did not affect the existing political frontiers. The only object of the Hungarian Government was self-defence and an attempt to parry the formidable attack directed against Hungary.

In its every detail this attack was planned to effect a forcible change in the existing political frontiers; the enemy Powers in short, proposed to upset the European *status quo* based upon and secured by international treaties.

Remembering his excursion to Brassó in June, Sazonoff in July openly invited the intervention of Roumania, and promised her Transylvania in return. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, on August 7, 1914, he submitted to Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, the draft of a Treaty, according to which "Roumania undertakes, from the signing of the present agreement, to participate with all her military forces in the Russian campaign against Austria-Hungary." Russia on the other hand "undertakes not to make peace with Austria-Hungary until the provinces of the Dual Monarchy inhabited by Roumanians have been ceded to the Roumanian Crown". The Russian Embassy in Paris informed him on the following day that the French Government sanctioned the agreement, and on this basis the Russo-Roumanian pact was concluded in Bucharest on October 1; Bratianu, the Roumanian Prime Minister,

accepted the Russian offer of the Hungarian territories inhabited by Roumanians.

Referring to the agreement between Sazonoff and Diamandi, the Roumanian Minister in Petrograd, Bratianu declared at the Peace Conference in Paris that Roumania had really never been neutral, which meant, in short that according to the statement of Roumania's responsible Prime Minister, Roumania was as a fact no less than Serbia a belligerent State opposed to the Dual Monarchy, from the very beginning of the war. As Roumania had never denounced the Treaty concluded in 1883 with Austria-Hungary, and renewed in 1913, through which she enjoyed considerable advantages, she was simultaneously the ally of two countries at war with each other.

Tsarist Russia on the other hand, by organising the Serbian and Roumanian aspirations, the realisation of which could never have been dreamt of by these States without Russia's armed assistance, and by seeking the realisation of her own ambitions, openly assumed the terrible responsibility for the war.

From the point of view of Hungary it was important that under Russian protection her neighbours in the South should have attacked her openly; the centre of gravity, therefore, must be sought not in the two Balkan states which were used as tools by Russia, but in Russia's war aims as regards which valuable information has been supplied by her own friends and emissaries.

At present we possess a great mass of data bearing upon the fact that since 1911 the main line of attack of the Russian Slav propaganda ran through Northern Hungary towards the West. The English themselves discovered in the beginning of 1914 that the Ruthenians of East Galicia went over to the Russians before the war, and that the Russian troops were guided towards Cracow by Russian secret agents. In the same manner these agents crossed the Carpathians and caused the Máramaros trial of 1911, which showed that the Ruthenians of Hungary were victims of Russian agitation. Whilst the Russians endeavoured to prepare the Ruthenians of Hungary for

a Russian Slav advance, the Czechs developed a powerful propaganda through the intermediary of the Slovaks of Hungary, by means of whom they proposed to get into touch with Russia. The Slovaks were dissatisfied with the Hungarian administration, but as appeared later, they were unable to preserve their cultural independence against the Czech invasion, and this would have made it easy for the Czechs to combine with the Russians, through the Slovak and Ruthenian territories of Hungary.

This was the programme for which Garrick Thomas Masaryk, professor at the Prague University, endeavoured to win the sympathies of his English and French friends. This is why, on the outbreak of the war, in October, 1914, he went to Rotterdam where, as he tells us in his memoirs, in a little hotel he met some of his English friends; among them was Seton-Watson who corroborated his statement in the "Review of Reviews" in 1923. The Englishman listened for two days to Masaryk's dissertations on a new Europe, and said subsequently that Masaryk's prognostications had been fully realised by the Peace Treaties. What the changes were which Masaryk, according to Seton-Watson, presaged with a perspicuity of which no other statesman in Europe would have been capable, is sufficiently explained by the Memorandum prepared by Seton-Watson on the basis of this conversation for the information of the British authorities, published in the "Slavonic Review", London, 1925. According to this Memorandum Bohemia claimed for her share of the spoil, Upper-Hungary from the mouth of the Morava to the mouth of the Ipoly, with the exception of the Csallóköz; the boundary line turned along the Ipoly to the North and followed this river to its source, whence it ran towards the East along the borders dividing the Hungaro-Slovak and the Slovak-Ruthenian speaking peoples. According to the Memorandum the Czechs claimed Pozsony and Kassa, and hoped to see Ungvár, Munkács and Máramarosziget in the possession of Russia. Seton-Watson duly noted all he had heard, and eventually transmitted it to the British Foreign Office.

The story was told rather differently by Masaryk in his Memoirs, for he made no secret of what was passed over in silence by Seton-Watson. Masaryk said that on his arrival in Rotterdam he wrote a letter to his friends, i. e. Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, the former "Times" correspondent in Vienna, and the Frenchman, Ernest Denis, and that, on meeting Seton-Watson, he acquainted him with his "national programme and plans" and discussed them with him for two days. "Our dear friend, on his return to London, prepared a memorandum on the basis of what I had told him, which was sent to the Allied Governments of London, Paris and Petrograd. Vinogradov, the Oxford professor, who went to Petrograd just at this time, handed it in person to Sazonoff". The fact that Seton-Watson in his memorandum went beyond a mere relation of what he had heard from Masaryk is revealed in the Memoirs: "Steed and Seton-Watson rendered great services to the cause of our liberation, not only by enabling me to publish our programme in the papers of the Northcliffe group and by introducing me to influential circles in London, but also by their advocacy of our anti-Austrian programme, in their capacity as English politicians and writers." Nowhere can we find a more authoritative statement of the fact that the two English politicians became the Western agents of the Russian Slav programme. Through Professor Vinogradov, who was of Russian extraction, this programme reached Sazonoff, the person most competent to act upon it, in the autumn of 1914. Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, also referred in his report of December 14 to a Masaryk memorandum; it may be assumed, therefore, that he also had received a document which he sent to Petrograd.

Isvolsky, however, was not interested in the Czech plans and aspirations alone, and he appended to his report several enclosures in which Franjo Supilo described Serbian hopes and ambitions.

Supilo's name was not unknown to the Hungarian authorities. This journalist, a Dalmatian by birth, had made himself conspicuous by his pro-Serbian propaganda, and

had fled from the Austrian authorities to Fiume, where he carried on his campaign in his paper "Novi List". Although he was living in Hungarian territory, and enjoying the protection of the Hungarian authorities, in the course of conversations in 1907 with the Serbian General Atanackovic, he offered Fiume, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, and asked from this State a loan of 100,000 francs for propaganda purposes. After the outbreak of the war he escaped through Italy to Paris, and in his memoranda handed to Isvolsky he not only repeated the above-mentioned offer, but added Southern Hungary as far as the Pécs—Mohács—Szabadka—Zenta line. The Great Serbian State thus to be formed he wished to constitute "under the protektorate and with the aid of our kindred power, the Russian nation", because "Serbia, especially during recent years, has given proofs of her ability to undertake such a political task, and it is the duty of Russia to foster this creation of the Slav intellect". From the fact that Seton-Watson wrote an emotional obituary notice of Supilo, in the "New Europe" of 1917, and that he referred to their meetings, it is evident that the memoranda of Supilo and Masaryk, Vinogradov's journey to Petrograd and Isvolsky's reports were the tokens of a harmonious cooperation as early as the autumn of 1914, in which the determining factors were the Russian aspirations and the adhesion of the Czechs and Serbs to Russia behind the German-Austro-Hungarian front. It also follows that the propagation in the Western countries of these Russian Slav plans was undertaken by Seton-Watson, Steed and Ernest Denis.

This *exposé* would be incomplete were we not to add that the plans for the creation of the Czecho-Slovak and Southern Slav units must not be taken to mean that the Czechs of Austria and the Slovaks of Hungary, or the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs of Austria and Hungary had determined to create a Czecho-Slovak and a Southern Slav confederation. This was by no means the case. The actual facts were that the Czechs of Austria proposed to annex the Slovaks of Hungary, and the Kingdom of Serbia pro-

posed to absorb the Serbs of Hungary, together with the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs of Austria and Hungary. Hence the question of a Great Bohemia and of a Great Serbia, as described by Ernest Denis in his "La Grande Serbie", published in 1915. The idea and denominations "Czecho-Slovak" and "Serb-Croat-Slovene" only became current in 1916, when the Czech and the Serb propagandists sought to further their plans of annexation by insistence on the right of self-determination.

The fact that Sazonoff certainly accepted the Paris and London proposals transmitted to him by Isvolsky and Vinogradov is proved by the memoirs of Maurice Paléologue, the French Ambassador in Petrograd (*La Russie des Tsars, 1914—1916*). Paléologue, in the beginning of 1915 made proposals to the effect that Austria-Hungary should be detached from Germany by means of a separate peace, to which Sazonoff replied with a brief and emphatic refusal: "No. Austria-Hungary must be broken up." Paléologue considered this statement so dangerous that he reported it to Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, with the remark that it was to the interest of France that a great political unit should be maintained in the Danube basin.

In the meantime the Western agents set to work to formulate the Russian Slav propaganda.

Thus in the beginning of 1915 Ernest Denis' above-mentioned book appeared; it adopted the standpoint of the Russian Embassy in Paris, and Isvolsky, in his report of October 13, 1914, asked Sazonoff for a large sum of money, to be devoted to propaganda in support of the Russian idea, and in favour of the breaking up of the Dual Monarchy. In Denis' book we read for the first time that the boundary of the territory claimed by Serbia and to be detached from Hungary was to be formed by the line Báziás—Lugos—Maros—Szabadka—Baja—Muraköz, which line was in fact occupied by the Serbian troops on the basis of the Military Convention concluded in Belgrade on November 8, 1918. Thus the Serb claims propounded by Denis have in fact been satisfied, though the populations

in question were not consulted, and never agreed to them, which is all the more important as these populations were predominantly non-Serb.

Whereas Ernest Denis, together with Isvolsky and Supilo, was concerned only with the propagation of the Serbian scheme of annexation, Seton-Watson in the spring of 1915 received from Masaryk a memorandum which proposed for the consideration of the statesmen of the Western Powers an elaborate plan for the apportionment of the whole Middle Danube basin.

Masaryk, an expert in the German and Austrian legal and political systems, was well aware that the dividing up of Austria-Hungary was a purely destructive measure which the Great Powers could not accept without the creation of a new political system in the Danube basin to replace the Dual Monarchy. Therefore, in contrast to the above-mentioned propagandists, he undertook to create a Central Europe under Czech hegemony in the place of Austria-Hungary, differing altogether from Mittel Europa on the lines suggested by Naumann and approved by the Germans. He thus undertook more than the Serbs, but he made the serious mistake of basing this new Central Europe upon the Russian Power. It is true, however, that this solution was in accordance with the military situation in the spring of 1915. It was further justified by the facts that only Russia could overthrow Austria-Hungary, that Russia proposed her own predominance in the place of the hegemony of the Dual Monarchy, and that Russia, with her Army Corps along the outer ridge of the Carpathians, was a very substantial fact.

These considerations led Masaryk to draw up the outlines of the new Central Europe as follows in his memorandum transmitted on April 15, 1915, through Seton-Watson to the British Foreign Office: "The Czech realm would consist of the so-called Czech states, i. e. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; to this would be added the Slovak territories of Northern Hungary from Ungvár through Kassa, along the ethnographic boundaries and

following the Ipoly river down to the Danube, including Pozsony and the whole of Slovakia to the North of the new Hungarian frontier. The Slovaks are Czechs in spite of the fact that they use their own dialect as a literary language. The Slovaks are longing for independence, and accept the programme of their union with Bohemia... The maximum of Czech and Serbo-Croat aspiration is represented by a connecting link between Bohemia and Serbia-Croatia... This would be rendered possible by giving a narrow strip on the Western frontier of Hungary to Serbia, or half of it to Serbia, and the other half to Bohemia. This corridor would be formed out of the Hungarian counties Pozsony, Sopron, Moson and Vas... This Serbo-Czech corridor would facilitate the exchange of goods between industrial Bohemia and agricultural Serbia-Croatia, and woud lead from Bohemia to the Serbo-Croatian ports. The corridor would naturally be of great military importance. We must add that the plan of the corridor is accepted by many Serb and Croat politicians... The Czech politicians hope that they will solve the final reconstruction of the Balkans in harmony with Russia and the Allied Powers. For Bohemia and the Balkan Slavs the friendship and support of Russia is essential... We intend to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is only wanted by a few Radicals. The dynastic question could be settled in two different manners. Either the Allied Powers would give us one of their Princes, or there would be a personal union between Bohemia and Serbia if the Serb-Czech corridor came into being. The Czech people, we must emphatically repeat, is entirely pro-Russian. A Russian dynasty would be in every way popular. The Czech politicians wish in any case to create the Czech Kingdom in entire harmony with Russia. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive influence... The preliminary condition of the Czech programme is the defeat of Austria-Hungary, and the breaking up of this artificial state... Bohemia wishes and hopes that her Russian brethren will soon occupy the Czech and Slovak territories. This would be the best solution not only of the

Czech, but also of the Austrian, German, and other questions“.

The memorandum if analysed touches Hungary at the following points: the Czech State will not be composed solely of the ancient Czech provinces (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia), but will also include the Slovak districts of Northern Hungary under the plea that the Slovaks are Czechs. We must add that the memorandum passes over the fact that Northern Hungary is not inhabited by Slovaks alone, and that to establish the Czech nationality of the Slovaks it would be necessary to consult not only the Czechs, who were anxious to annex them, but also the Slovaks themselves. As regards the latter Masaryk contradicts himself when he states in a breath that "the Slovaks are longing for independence" and that they "accept the Czech annexation". According to him the Czecho-Serb corridor would serve a military and an economic purpose, the latter consisting in forwarding the products of Czech industry to agricultural Serbia. Mindful of the well-conceived interests of his own people, Masaryk is primarily concerned to obtain markets for Bohemia (the essentially industrial district of the former Empire) in Northern Hungary, whose industry was in fact destroyed by the Czechs after annexation, and in Serbia, who had thus to renounce the creation of a national industry. The industrial predominance of the Austrian Empire was henceforth to be replaced by that of industrial Bohemia.

This new Central Europe would, therefore, have been created in the interest of Czech industrial hegemony, and at the cost of the destruction of industry in the Central Danubian nations and states, while the objective of its expansion was to be that same Salonika to which Russian Slav propaganda had barred the way of Austria. Or in other words, the Austro-German influence that had weighed so heavily upon the Central Danubian territories was to be replaced by Czecho-Russian influence.

But even more ominous than this programme was that part of the memorandum which invited the Russians to realise the plans above outlined. The armies of Russia

were ranged along the Carpathians, and Masaryk desired to see them occupying the Ruthenian and Slovak districts of Hungary, in order to pass into Bohemia by the Lemberg—Cracow and Kassa—Zsolna railways. Bohemia would have been given a Russian Grand Duke as King, and Serbia and Roumania would have received Russian Grand Duchesses as Queens. If we add that the Ruthenian districts would have been annexed by Russia and her Western frontiers thus extended as far as Nyiregyháza, it is obvious that the leading part in the dismemberment of Hungary would have been played by Russia. Her Grand Duke would have reigned in Prague, her Grand Duchesses in Belgrade and Bucharest; her troops would in any case have made use of the projected strategic railway in the proposed Czecho-Serb corridor, and her Regent would have installed himself in the Royal Palace in Buda, which meant that the Western frontiers of the Russian Empire would have been washed by the waters of the Adriatic.

This frank exposition of Masaryk's ideas caused some misgivings in responsible circles in London, where the Russian advance had already roused grave suspicions. In Hungary the terms of the memorandum were unknown at the time; they remained a secret until they were published in Munich in 1923, by the Austrian writer, Charles Novak, in his book, "Der Chaos".

The memorandum was given by Masaryk to Seton-Watson, who introduced the document and its author to Sir George Clerk, a Counsellor in the British Foreign Office. This gentleman remained in permanent touch with Masaryk and, in the autumn of 1919, when appointed British Minister in Prague, undertook to form a coalition Government in Budapest, as related by Seton-Watson in the "Slavonic Review". These incidents are referred to in Masaryk's memorandum in the following passage: "About the middle of April, 1915, I went to Paris and London on a political mission at the invitation of Seton-Watson and Steed. I stayed for some time in London, where I prepared for Sir Edward Grey and political circles a memorandum, in which I set forth all I had told Seton-Watson in Holland."

This statement agrees with Novak's communications, and also with Steed's statement ("Through Thirty Years") to the effect that he and Seton-Watson possessed the entire confidence of the leaders of Slav propaganda, and that they were in permanent touch with Masaryk.

It appears, however, that the agents of this propaganda failed to induce the British Foreign Office to accept the Russian Slav plans, for in the spring of 1915 the British Government drew non-Slav Italy into the war, and endeavoured to draw in non-Slav Roumania. Their action was obviously based upon the fact that the Italians and the Roumanians did not belong to the Slav races, and that British interests demanded, either that Austria-Hungary should be preserved, or, if the Dual Monarchy were unable to resist the Russian attack, that the non-Slav races should reach Budapest before the Russians.

Italy could not resist the formidable pressure brought to bear upon her in the Treaty of April 26, 1915, which realised all her aspirations. The promise made to the Roumanians, however, (which Seton-Watson undertook to urge) remained a promise, because Bratianu, after the success of Gorlice, shrank from attacking. Austria-Hungary made an unexpected recovery, and the German-Austro-Hungarian troops drove the Russian armies back towards the Russian plains, while the Italian Army was bleeding in a series of battles on the Isonzo without any appreciable results.

In spite of this, Seton-Watson's book on Roumanian claims (Roumania and the Great War, London, 1915) was not forgotten, for the territories promised by him to Roumania in the spring of 1915 eventually came into her possession, while his apportionment and that of the Treaty of Trianon differed only to the extent of two or three kilometers. The importance of the book, therefore, lies in the fact that its delimitation of the frontiers coincided with that prescribed by the Treaty of Trianon. "The county of Máramaros", he writes, "would fall to be divided between Russia and Roumania, and the river Tisza would form at once a natural and fairly accurate ethnographical

frontier. The town of Máramarosziget being on the south bank, would fall to Roumania. Leaving the Tisza a little south of Huszt, the frontier would presumably follow the line of the Havas hills, then cutting the county of Szilág, it would then strike across the county of Bihar to the outskirts of Grosswardein (Nagyvárad, Oradea Mare) and thence past Nagy Szalonta to the Körös east of Gyula. Thence almost straight south to the river Maros at a point 3 or 4 miles from Arad. It would then follow the course of the Aranka, the old and now neglected Channel of the Maros. A triangular piece of territory, of which the important Hungarian town of Szeged is the apex and which is mainly Magyar by race, would thus be retained by Hungary. The new frontier between Roumania and Serbia would begin at a point on the Aranka roughly half-way between Maros and Tisza, and would follow a South Eastern course to the Danube near Moldova. The towns of Kikinda, Bechkerek, Panchevo and Weisskirchen (Bela Crkva, Fehértemplom) would fall to the Serbs who have an overwhelming majority in the Western districts of the county of Torontál, while Temesvár and probably Versecz would fall to Roumania.“ The Treaty of Trianon adopted this line in its entirety, save that Versecz was given to Roumania instead of to Serbia.

This was the situation when in the spring of 1916 Russia, collecting all her forces, prepared for a new and decisive blow. The Governments of the Central Powers having failed to induce her to conclude a separate peace, a general attack, in the centre of which Austria-Hungary stood, began in June, 1916. The greatest effort was made by Russia; as a result of the secret Treaty of Bucharest of August 7, 1916, Roumania joined her, and attacked Transylvania, her promised land; the line was closed in the South by the Entente forces standing round Salonika and in Albania; the Central Powers, owing to their own mistaken policy, were thus cut off from the Mediterranean.

The activities of the Russian Slav agents in Paris and in London exploded simultaneously with the volleys of the Russian attack. Edward Benes, the chief of the Czech

propaganda bureau in Paris, published his pamphlet, the title of which embodied its thesis; "Destroy Austria-Hungary (*Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie!* Paris, 1916.) The pamphlet repeated Masaryk's programme, in that it proposed to overthrow the Dual Monarchy, not for the benefit of its populations, but in the interest of Czech aspirations. At the same time Seton-Watson started a periodical in London, which he called "New Europe". The programme of "New Europe" was summed up by the Russian Kowalewsky as follows: "The complete elimination from the map of Europe of Austria-Hungary". In other words, Seton-Watson placed his periodical at the service of Russian Slav aspirations. This again was told us by Masaryk in his Memoirs: "Mr. Seton-Watson set forth our programme in his periodical "New Europe"; the influence of this excellent paper was considerable".

It was in vain, however, that Seton-Watson added to the Russian writers on his editorial staff, Masaryk, certain Serb and Roumanian professors, Denis and Eisenmann (who had hitherto dealt with the Hungarian problem, and now sided with the Czechs), and also the French politician André Tardieu, who was in close connection with Isvolsky. Russia collapsed as a result of the revolution of 1917, and the standard-bearers of the neo-Slav policy left the sinking ship. Through Tardieu and the Franco-Russian Alliance they were enabled to take refuge on the French vessel. The waves of the Russian advance broke on the Carpathians. Bohemia was not given the opportunity of greeting the Russian armies within her frontiers, and it was in vain that Ernest Denis wrote his propaganda book "Les Slovaques" (Paris, 1917), for the Slovaks as a fact were fighting the enemies of the Dual Monarchy. Serbia was occupied by the troops of the Central Powers, and thus the Corfu Treaty of July 20, 1917, — according to Steed's memoirs, in the form laid down by him and Seton-Watson in London — was concluded on foreign soil, in exile; here Trumbich, a Dalmatian refugee, promised Southern Hungary, with which territory he had nothing to do, to Serbia, although even the Croats of Croatia had

stubbornly fought against the Serbs. Roumania concluded peace with the Central Powers on May 7, 1918, invalidating the secret Treaty of August 17, 1916, the claims of which she had now to renounce. France, on the other hand, who was expected to take up the advocacy of Russian Slav interests, was herself awaiting with increasing anxiety the approach of the German avalanche, with Hindenburg's threatening figure in the background.

This was the situation when in the spring of 1917 America entered the war, and re-established the equilibrium upset by the collapse of Russia.

President Wilson made such imposing military preparations for his intervention that on the news of his coming all began to adapt themselves to the American attitude. The Central Powers, as well as the Entente, revised their war aims and looked forward with excitement to the opinion of Washington

On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George summed up his point of view as follows: "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims"; by this pronouncement the British Government dissociated itself from the machinations of Russian Slav propaganda.

Three days later, on January 8, President Wilson stated in his famous Fourteen Points that "the peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development".

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the declarations of the British Prime Minister and of the President of the United States defined the war aims of Great Britain and America, and that each of these statements was an attempt to express these aims in the terms of consideration for the interests of the peoples concerned.

Seton-Watson soon perceived that these declarations were contrary to those secret aspirations he advocated, in the interest of Russian Slav ambitions, in the columns of "New Europe", and as chief of the Austro-Hungarian department of the Northcliffe bureau, where, in accordance with Russian instructions, all his efforts were directed

to the complete elimination of Austria-Hungary from the map of Europe. Through the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, which, under the leadership of Lord Northcliffe, stood at the disposal of Crewe House, he handed a memorandum to the British Foreign Office on February 24, 1918; in this, turning against Lloyd George, he recommended that "statements that the Allies do not wish to dismember Austria, should be avoided. Hungary as the weakest link in the chain of the enemy States . . . the agencies existing should be utilised. These agencies are chiefly the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the South-Slav Committee". (Published by C. Stuart: *Secrets of Crewe House*. London, 1920.)

In the memorandum thus conveyed through Lord Northcliffe, Seton-Watson, working against Hungary, recommended to the attention of Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, the propaganda organs of Czech and Serb citizens, who were aliens to Hungary and were not representative of the Hungarian populations. Lord Balfour proved so accessible to these influences, that two days after the receipt of the memorandum, on February 26, he declared himself that "a propaganda which aids the struggle of the nationalities now subject either to Austrian Germans or Magyar Hungarians towards freedom and self-determination, must be right, whether the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg rule be the final goal of our efforts". From that day onwards the idea of partition was definitely assured, as also "the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire".

A still greater success was achieved by Seton-Watson when he diverted President Wilson from the standpoint with which he had intervened in the European war.

In another memorandum prepared by him and directed against the Fourteen Points, Lord Northcliffe presented an ultimatum from his propaganda bureau to his Government in the terms published by Seton-Watson in "New Europe" of October 17, 1918, and by Lord Northcliffe on November 4 in the "Times" and the "Matin". In

this, war was openly declared on the principles laid down by President Wilson on January 8, 1918. "The Fourteen Points cannot be understood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace, but in the full conviction of the power and the will of the Associated Powers to enforce a peace that shall be just and lasting, we take the opportunity of distinguishing explicitly between principles and conditions which are indisputable: 5. . . . The assurance to all peoples of Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary". According to the peace conditions published in "New Europe" this meant: "VI. Austria-Hungary . . . 3. independent Bohemia would be constituted out of the existing provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia and the Slovak counties of Northern Hungary; 4. . . Transylvania and the Roumanian districts of Hungary proper and of Southern Bukovina would be united with the Kingdom of Roumania; 5. . . . a united and independent Jugoslav State would be formed, consisting of the two Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carniola and portions of Istria, Carinthia, Styria and Southern Hungary; 6. . . Hungary, reduced to the Magyar kernel, would become entirely independent, and, after sweeping away its corrupt and politically bankrupt oligarchy, would adopt extreme democratic forms". (R. W. Seton-Watson: Our Peace Terms, New Europe, October 17, 1918.)

There is no doubt that these terms were at variance with the war aims of the British and American Governments, and were in fact the Russian Slav war aims which, as we shall see, were adopted by France out of consideration for her Russian ally and dread of the German enemy. French statesmen may urge, to justify their acquiescence, that they relied upon these terms for their own security against Germany, and regarded them as the guarantees of the peace to be imposed upon the enemy. No such motives could be pleaded in the cases of England and America, and if they nevertheless accepted the peace terms dictated

by Russian Slav interests, it was because these terms were so manipulated by the agents of these interests as to make them seem acceptable all round.

Already in the first days of 1918 Seton-Watson made it clear that the collapse of Tsarist Russia meant the disappearance of that military power which might have imposed its conditions upon Europe by force of arms. The task of giving definite form to the peace terms, therefore, devolved upon the Western democracies, which accepted the axiom that the basis of future peace must be a manifestation of the will of the peoples, or as Seton-Watson put it: "self-determination . . . must be laid down as the first condition of peace."

Thus "the right of self-determination" became a catchword potent enough to replace the Russian bayonets so fervently awaited by Russian Slav propagandists, who now turned their attention to the shaping of the peace treaties in accordance with the catchwords of democracy, instead of imposing them by the arms of autocracy.

The great difficulty, however, was that the populations which were to have expressed themselves were inaccessible Hungary in particular had never been occupied by enemy troops to such an extent as to make the preparation of any kind of political action possible. None of those who had so far expressed themselves in the name of Hungary were Hungarian citizens; the Hungarian nationalities differed from those of Austria in that they had fought valiantly on all fronts, and thus Seton-Watson was compelled to accept the verdict of the prisoners of war as the "self-determination" of the territories to be detached from Hungary.

Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed, the authors of the Corfu Pact of July 20, 1917, were startled when they found that Great Serbia, as created by them with the approbation of the Czechs, claimed territories which were assigned to Italy by the London Treaty of April 26, 1915. When, therefore, the Italian deputy Torre arrived in London at the beginning of 1918, they succeeded eventually in bringing him into touch with Trumbich, the mayor of Zara, who was their partisan, and who in their eyes repre-

sented the Southern Slav State as created by the Corfu Pact. Trumbich spoke scornfully of the Italians, who had recently been defeated; Torre, on the other hand, evaded negotiations, saying he was not authorised to conclude an agreement. If the two nevertheless came to terms on March 7 in the so-called London Pact, in which the Italian and Southern Slav differences were compounded, it may be assumed that the Pact was in fact created by Seton-Watson and Steed. With the original copy of this agreement Seton-Watson hastened to Rome, where he convoked a "Congress of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary". Using the London Pact as a basis of argument, he succeeded on April 8, in bringing about the Rome Pact, in which the nationalities of Austria-Hungary — according to Seton-Watson's article in the "Review of Reviews" of 1923, mainly Czech emigrants — without any knowledge, naturally, of the populations really entitled to self-determination, organised a united attack, and brought their "right of self-determination" into harmony with Russian Slav interests.

It was this Rome Pact which determined the acknowledgment by the Great Powers of the Governments of those nations alleged to have been represented in its preparation — the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugoslav Governments. It was then that the term Czecho-Slovak was substituted for Czech, and Jugoslav for Serb, because the Czechs and the Serbs, deprived of the support of Russian arms, sought to strengthen their cause and enlist the sympathy of the Governments and the public opinion of the western democratic Powers by advertising the right of self-determination as the basis on which the new states were to be created.

The manner in which America accepted the alleged exercise of the right of self-determination by the nationalities of Austria-Hungary was even more debatable than the proceedings of the Congress in Rome.

Masaryk was of opinion — and rightly so, many will say — that the greatest success of his life was the conversion of President Wilson. He induced the President to abandon his Fourteen Points, and entangled him in the

secret stipulations of the Russian Slav plans, thus inaugurating the Wilson tragedy.

Masaryk was well aware that neither the Czech nor the Slovak peoples were capable of expressing themselves as to self-determination. And if we add that Upper Hungary was not inhabited solely by Slovaks, it is manifest, that had a *plébiscite* been taken, even under the depressing conditions of defeat in war, the result would not have been in accordance with Masaryk's wishes. But he made no attempt to consult the population in question, which would indeed have been impossible; on June 30, 1918, he made an agreement in Pittsburg with the leaders of the American Slovak Associations, which he drew up after the form of a state treaty. In this document he promised the Slovaks an extensive self-administration, which the representatives of the Slovak Associations accepted, at the same time agreeing to the incorporation of Slovak territory in Bohemia.

Before analysing the "Pittsburg Treaty" we must note that Masaryk presented it to Wilson as a manifesto of the right of self-determination; Wilson accepted it as such without examining it, abandoned that part of his Fourteen Points it contravened, and recognised the Czecho-Slovak State, whereas thenceforth Masaryk ceased to regard the "Pittsburg Treaty" as a treaty, in which, it must be admitted, he was perfectly right.

The "Pittsburg Treaty" of course lacked all the essentials of a state document. It was not a treaty made by the Slovaks of Upper Hungary, for these never authorised any one to conclude such a treaty, and were not even aware that it had been concluded. Even less can it be considered a treaty on behalf of the population of Upper Hungary, because this is only Slovak in part. Finally, the Slovaks of Upper Hungary did not unite with Bohemia; they were incorporated into the Czech state; the term Czecho-Slovak is merely a camouflage for annexation. When the Slovaks realised the situation and demanded the execution of the "Pittsburg Treaty", Masaryk expressed himself as follows in his memoirs, published in 1925: "On June 30 (1918)

I signed the agreement (the Czecho-Slovak agreement — not Treaty) between the Slovaks and the American Czechs. This agreement was concluded in order to tranquillise a small Slovak faction who dreamt of God knows what in the way of independence... demanding separate administration, Parliament and Courts of Justice. I signed the agreement without hesitation, because it was the local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks; it was signed by American citizens..." Undoubtedly this statement is crushing for the "Treaty" and the Slovak nation, but it is favourable from the Hungarian standpoint and from that of international law. It is favourable, because both Hungarians and Masaryk, are agreed that American citizens were not competent to conclude between themselves any treaty regarding the fate of Upper Hungary without consulting its population, and against their interests. Therefore, the "Pittsburg Treaty" is legally invalid. The Slovaks' contention that it is binding is a matter they must settle, not with the Hungarians, but with those who concluded the so-called "Treaty". However the matter may stand, two facts should be borne in mind as of primary importance: firstly, that the territory disposed of by the "Pittsburg Treaty" was inhabited by 1,703,000 Slovaks and 2,860,000 non-Slovaks; thus the Slovaks were only a minority of the population concerned, and could not have represented it even if they had been given any kind of authorisation. Secondly, that Masaryk presented the agreement to Wilson as a Treaty, upon which basis the President recognised the Czecho-Slovak union and Government officially on the part of the United States, which he obviously would not have done, if Masaryk had presented the document to him in the terms in which he described it in 1925.

It may be assumed that Masaryk himself feared that the success he had achieved might be imperilled by influences at home; this in fact occurred on October 16, 1918, when the Austrian Emperor Charles I. recognised the various nationalities of Austria, and gave them a free hand as regards internal administration. As a consequence of this decision Bohemia acquired constitutional indepen-

dence, and the Czech people obviously wished to avail themselves of this freedom without the intervention of the emigrant Masaryk. Masaryk thereupon hastened to Wilson in order to counteract the free manifestation of Bohemia's right of self-determination as granted by the Emperor. Nothing shows Wilson's moral weakness more glaringly than his admission, in his reply to the Austrian Government of October 18, that he must abandon the attitude he had adopted hitherto, and upon which the Emperor's decision and the liberation of the Austrian nationalities were based, and further, his declaration that the Austrian Government could not give its peoples a free hand as regards self-government, because the President of the United States had already made a private person a binding promise which conflicted with the right of self-determination.

Masaryk who, as a result of this declaration, became the President of the Czech Republic, was reproached by many for having induced the President of the United States to abandon his principles and his pledges. To this the passage of his memoirs refers, in which years afterwards, in 1925, he explained the matter as follows: "Various publications, in dealing with Wilson's reply to Austrian peace overtures, ask how it happened that he so soon abandoned his pronounced friendship for Austria. Whilst I was still in America all sorts of legends were current concerning my relations to him. I will give the principal reasons for these: before the war I had already studied his books on State and on the development of American Congress. I carefully read his speeches, and I selected certain passages to support my arguments. In this manner I succeeded in inducing Wilson and Lansing to accept our programme step by step."

However surprising was the success achieved by Masaryk in winning over Wilson from self-determination to annexation, still more surprising was his success in the annexation of the Ruthenians.

We have seen that Russia wished to assimilate the Ruthenians of Hungary in order to obtain a footing in the

Hungarian lowlands and thus to open a road towards the Adriatic.

Tsarist Russia, however, collapsed, and after the termination of the war, no one desired to increase the power and extent of Soviet Russia, more especially by means of a territory that would have brought her into Central Europe.

This was the situation when the Ruthenians of America, on July 26, 1918, in Mokesport in Pennsylvania, declared for the union of all Ruthenians and expressed their wish to join Ukrainia, the state of the Russian Ruthenians. When G. J. Zhatkovic handed over this declaration to Wilson on October 21, 1918, the latter declared that there could be no question of such union. Zhatkovic was perplexed and remained in Washington where, on October 26, he agreed with Masaryk, who belonged to the President's *entourage*, that the Ruthenian territory of Hungary, the union of which with Ukrainia had been disapproved, should be incorporated with Czecho-Slovakia, already recognised by Wilson.

We are unaware how far from the point of view of international law an agreement is valid in which two alien citizens decide the fate of a nationality. Masaryk was no Hungarian, but an Austrian subject, and Zhatkovic had emigrated to America when four years old. These two unauthorised persons agreed that the North Eastern comitats of Hungary, where, in addition to the Ruthenian population there were many non-Ruthenians, and where the population had no knowledge of the Washington agreement made between two alien private persons, should be incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia. Thus was created the "Podkarpatska Russia" or "Russinsko" province, to which Masaryk promised self-government. He appointed Zhatkovic its first Governor, but Zhatkovic resigned on May 16, 1921, on the ground that the province had been denied the promised self-government. It is unnecessary to continue this analysis, for the authors of the transaction have themselves thrown sufficient light upon it.

It might be argued that irrespective of these facts, the

right of self-determination was expressed in all the territories to be detached from Hungary at the end of 1918, when the Slovaks passed a resolution in Turócz Szentmárton on October 30, the Serbs in Ujvidék on November 25, and the Roumanians in Gyulafehérvár on December 1, to the effect that the Slovaks wished for union with the Czechs, the Serbs of Hungary for union with Serbia, and the Roumanians of Hungary for union with Roumania.

This is perfectly true, but out of the 105 delegates of the Turócz Szentmárton meeting 58 were local personalities, and the meeting at Kassa declared in favour of Hungary. The meeting at Ujvidék was held in the shadow of Serbian bayonets, and in such a manner that the non-Serb majority of Southern Hungary was excluded. The non-Roumanian population, finally, unrepresented at the Gyulafehérvár meeting, held a meeting at Kolozsvár and declared in favour of Hungary.

If, therefore, these territories were nevertheless annexed by Bohemia, Serbia and Roumania respectively, the annexation was made against the will and the interests of the populations concerned. All the more so as the territory claimed by the Czechs was inhabited by 1,703,000 Slovaks, 2,860,000 non-Slovaks and a few hundred Czechs. The total population of 1,519,000 of the territory claimed by Serbia was composed of 378,000 Serbs and 1,141,000 non-Serbs. In the territory claimed by Roumania there were 2,819,000 Roumanians and 2,417,000 non-Roumanians, including 1,664,000 Magyars.

As a final result, therefore, in the interest of 5,042,000 persons (including 1,703,000 Slovaks who cannot be regarded as Czechs) 6,651,000 persons came under alien rule; or, if we deduct the Slovaks, for the benefit of 3,339,000 persons, 8,354,000 persons were annexed.

Self-determination as proclaimed by Wilson was thus transformed into annexation, which was the secret war aim of the Entente Powers; they are in striking contrast to the aims of the Hungarian Government, whose Prime Minister, Count Tisza, repudiated all schemes of annexation at the outset and only consented to a defensive war on condition that no annexations would be effected.

## V. The Diplomacy of the Armistice and of the Peace Conference

International Law has so far left unsolved the problem of armistices, because no one seems to know exactly what are the relations between an Armistice and a Peace Treaty.

We cannot therefore ask how far a Peace Treaty should or should not conform to an Armistice, but we may take as a starting point upon which all international jurists agree: that an Armistice suspends military operations, that it must be observed by both parties, that it can be denounced and that it can be violated. Although we might raise the question, whether an Armistice which was neither denounced, nor violated, but mutually observed, in any way anticipates the Peace Treaty to be concluded, we shall leave the examination of this question, together with others, to those who will be able to follow the phases of the case in point in the present chapter. To them we shall make only this observation: In spite of the Armistice the war continued as far as Hungary was concerned; new military operations were even begun, as is clearly proved by the fact that whereas on the day of the signing of the Armistice there was not a single enemy soldier on Hungarian soil, at the time of the signing of the Peace Treaty two-thirds of Hungary were not only occupied by her enemies, but had, a year and a half before, been incorporated into foreign states, though such annexation was, as a fact, only legitimated by the Peace Treaty.

Our sole comment on this fact shall be a reference to the Roumanian Prime Minister's statement at the Peace Conference in the summer of 1919, to the effect that he was astonished to find that the Powers still regarded the Armistice as in force, whereas Roumania had acted on the assumption that it had long ago ceased to exist.

However the case may stand there is documentary proof that Austria-Hungary asked for an Armistice, and concluded a legal Armistice in due legal form at Padua on November 3, 1918. This Armistice was operative for the whole of Austria-Hungary, and was the last document signed by Austria-Hungary as such.

That this document was duly drawn up, existed, and served as a basis at the peace negotiations, is obvious from the fact that the Peace Treaties refer to it; it had, therefore, no mere historic interest.

The first point against this agreement was raised at the time of the negotiations; it was objected that it merely referred to the Italian front, which is important, since it implies that it would have been possible to conclude separate agreements as regards the other fronts. All the more so as the Padua Armistice did not at all affect Hungary, except as regards Fiume.

Setting aside for the moment all Hungarian standpoints, interpretations and arguments, let us examine the book of General Kerchnawe (*Zusammenbruch der österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrmacht im Herbst 1918*. München, 1921.), whom no one will accuse of undue sympathy with Hungary. On the basis of the documents of the Austro-Hungarian General Head Quarters, which, again, uncertainty obtained at the time at the General Head anything but pro-Hungarian, he shows that this same Quarters. General Weber, the head of the Austro-Hungarian Armistice Comission, reported on November 1 and 2, 1918: "To item 3: Although this item prescribes the evacuation of all territories occupied by Austria-Hungary during the war, it still gives the South-Western line as that behind which the Austro-Hungarian forces must be withdrawn. As regards this General Badoglio said that on the

Montenegrin and Serbian fronts, and in the directions of Roumania, Ukrainia and Poland, the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy as hitherto existent shall serve as demarcation lines for the purposes of evacuation. According to the communication just received from the General Head Quarters of the Italian Army the Entente and the United States have entrusted General Diaz, Chief of the Italian General Staff, with the conclusion of an Armistice on all Austro-Hungarian fronts, and according to the communication received from (Italian) Head Quartes, no Austro-Hungarian Armistice Commission will be received on the Roumanian or Balkan fronts. It follows that the Armistice concluded here will be valid for all Austro-Hungarian fronts.“

We must add that at the meeting of the Supreme War Council in Versailles on October 31, when the conditions of the Armistice to be concluded at Padua were laid down, Vesnitch, the Serbian Minister in Paris, dealing with item 3 mentioned later by General Weber, asked for the evacuation of all Jugoslav territories. The French Prime Minister, Clemenceau, who presided — the meeting was held on the premises of the American delegate, Colonel House — hereupon remarked that “the conditions of the Armistice must not be confused with the peace conditions“, and that “our Armistice conditions do in no way forestall our peace conditions“. Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, said that in case of evacuation provision must be made for the maintenance of order in the evacuated territories, and probably this was the reason why the Supreme War Council unanimously decided not to occupy further territories of Austria-Hungary; hence the Governments (i. e. of the Succession States) which demanded dismemberment were debarred from immediate occupation and annexation. (Mermeix. *Les négociations secrètes.* Paris, 1921.)

Such was the genesis of the Armistice, the terms of which, according to the data published by General Kerchnawe, were communicated to and accepted by the Hungarian revolutionary Government. That they had been

accepted is also evident from the fact that the French statesman, Gabriel Hanotaux, who had written the history of the termination of the war, stated in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" of 1924 that "two Hungarian Lieutenant-Colonels appeared in Belgrade on November 2, to ask Field-Marshal Franchet d'Espérey for a cessation of military operations in accordance with the Armistice concluded at the Villa Giusti." Finally, we have proofs that the fact of the conclusion of the Armistice had been communicated to Franchet d'Espérey, and that he acknowledged it as binding upon him. The Hungarian General Breit, in his book on the Hungarian Revolution and the Red War, mentions that Franchet d'Espérey had been instructed to restrict himself, in negotiations with the Hungarian delegates in Belgrade, to military questions, because an Armistice had been already concluded.

We have no reason to doubt the correctness of the above data, but we must note that the political and the military situation underwent a considerable change on November 4.

The realisation of the Russian Slav plans on behalf of those who had rendered services to the Entente Powers during the war, was, as we have seen, undertaken by France after the collapse of Tsarist Russia. André Tardieu, a former champion of Russian interests, and one of the most influential persons at the Peace Conference, said in his book on the Peace Treaties (*La Paix*. Paris, 1921.) that "France was the Power towards which the peoples which claimed the Hapsburg inheritance instinctively turned. France listened readily to their appeal... On the day on which the delegates of Germany put their seal to the Peace Treaty, France, through the instrumentality of that Peace Treaty, continued her military action. She responded to the offers of allegiance from Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest. Under her leadership a reorganisation of Europe is being effected... Upon the ruins of Austria-Hungary a new Europe is being built up, which promises new support in place of the vanished peril... There must be no pity for Hungary."

The fact that Tardieu was one of the authors of the

Treaty of Trianon lends special weight to the above statement, because it shows that the Peace Conference, disregarding international law, had, in spite of the Armistice suspending military operations, begun a new war, and in the interest of Russian Slav plans had set to work to overthrow Hungary, a State with a cultural past a thousand years old. Was not this the reason why Count Tisza remained at his post, fully aware of his responsibility, on the eve of the projected ruinous attack by ten million Russian bayonets?

Even more important than Tardieu's statement is the fact that Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade and Bucharest, the would-be aspirants to the spoils of the partition planned by the Russian Slavs, who were eager to occupy the new territories, but were prevented by the Padua Armistice from so doing, were now encouraged by France with the help of Tardieu.

But it was not only at the Peace Conference that France listened to their appeals; we may indeed say that she took the initiative even more momentously on November 4, 1918, when Field-Marshal Foch, in view of the fact that Germany had not yet surrendered, took over supreme and unlimited command on *all* fronts with a view to an attack on Germany from the South East. The American General Bliss, a member of the American Peace Delegation, notified in the "American Journal of International Law" in 1922 that the Supreme War Council in Versailles had decreed as follows on November 4, 1918: "Article II. Field-Marshal Foch shall undertake the supreme direction of the military operations against Germany on all fronts, *including the Southern and Eastern fronts.*"

Thus the authorisation given to General Diaz to conclude an armistice was invalidated, and at the same time the decisive part played by Italy came to an end. We may assume that the friendly relations between France and Italy also terminated, for the French dictatorship was so little concerned with Italian interests that in the beginning of 1919 a Franco-Serb military convention was concluded against Italy.

With the supremacy of Field-Marshal Foch French interests became predominant, and in close connection with these, Russian Slav interests; the joint programme, diametrically opposed to the terms of the Padua Armistice, was published by Lord Northcliffe in the "Times" and the "Matin" of November 3 and 4, 1918. We know that the part of the programme dealing with Austria-Hungary had been elaborated by Seton-Watson; we also know that it contemplated the partition of Hungary, and that it embodied the subsequent decisions of the Peace Treaty, save for the difference of a few kilometers.

Bearing all this in mind, let us now summarise the chronological order of these decisive events: October 31, 1918 the Supreme War Council lays down the terms of the Padua Armistice; November 1—2: their acceptance; November 3: the Armistice signed at Padua; November 3—4: publication of the Russian Slav programme; November 4: annulment of the Padua Armistice, and triumph of the annexation plans prepared by Tsarist Russia.

In extenuation of the part played by France we must mention that the Russian Slav demands exploited her difficult situation, for at that time the eyes of every Frenchman were turned towards Germany. Field-Marshal Foch feared that the retiring armies of Hindenburg and Mackensen would unite; had Mackensen's troops made a stand south of the German frontiers, somewhere in Hungary, the whole military situation might have been altered. According to Hanotaux' statement in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" of 1924, it was at this juncture that the delegates of the Hungarian revolutionary Government came to the aid of the French, and made Franchet d'Espérey a present of the capitulation of Hungary and of Mackensen's army. The victory became complete: "Mackensen was encircled".

Franchet d'Espérey knew perfectly well that he could not conclude an armistice with the Hungarians, since that had already been done at Padua. He was therefore only prepared to conclude a Military Convention such as may be concluded by any superior officer at an opportune

moment. It follows that the agreement made at Belgrade on November 8, and signed on the 13th, is mis-termed the "Belgrade Armistice"; it was no armistice, but merely a Military Convention.

Great was the disappointment of those who went to Belgrade to conclude an armistice, because they were dissatisfied with that of Padua. They believed that if they declared themselves pacifists, and laid down their arms, the enemy would do the same. The enemy did indeed welcome their gesture joyously, but then ordered their own troops to advance. Oscar Jászi, himself a member of the delegation, who had looked forward to the moment when he could face the representatives of the Entente preaching peace to the enemy, came away with the impression that Franchet d'Espérey was a "coarse, sabre-rattling, ignorant" soldier who had no notion of pacifism. (*Magyariens Schuld Ungarns Sühne*. München, 1923.) The fact was that Franchet d'Espérey welcomed the laying down of the enemy's arms, because, by occupying the southern and eastern frontier districts of Hungary, he barred Mackensen's way across Hungary to Hindenburg. Thus came about what Jászi called the "brutal armistice forced upon us", which threw open the roads into Hungary for the friends of France.

The Belgrade Military Convention in fact determined a territory to be occupied by the Allies. It designated the Nagy Szamos, Beszterce, Maros, Szabadka, Baja, Pécs, Muraköz line as that behind which the Hungarian troops must be withdrawn. On the basis of these geographical points the Belgrade Military Convention arbitrarily modified the terms of the legal Padua Armistice, in that, instead of providing for the temporary occupation of *certain points* to ensure the safety of the Allied troops, it prescribed an occupation of territory for which the Armistice gave no authorisation.

What actually happened in consequence was even worse, because Franchet d'Espérey not only disregarded the Armistice by occupying a vast area to the rear of Mackensen, but occupied it, not with Allied troops, but

with the troops of the Governments which were interested in the dismemberment of Hungary. These troops, nominally under his command from an Inter-allied point of view, in the occupied territories represented their own Governments and were their executive. The Serbian General Mishitch, who drafted the Convention in the adjoining room, did not for a moment doubt that the territory to be occupied would be annexed to Serbia, and when the Serbian troops received orders to advance, as we learn from British sources, they hastened to occupy as great an area as possible within the prescribed time. The actual occupation in fact exceeded what they had hitherto claimed.

It may be urged that the Serbs and the Roumanians were included among the Allies, and that the Belgrade Convention did not designate the nationality of the troops of occupation. To this we must reply that the population concerned did not, when speaking of Allies, mean Serbs or Roumanians; they even believed that in the interests of peace and security the British, French and American commands would not effect the occupation through the Governments interested in the dismemberment of Hungary. This assumption was rudely overthrown by the action of these Governments, when, immediately after the occupation, they turned out all Hungarian officials and replaced them by an administration of their own, in defiance of the terms of the Armistice.

Thus, from the very beginning the Belgrade Military Convention was not observed, but was violated by one of the parties thereto. To this Franchet d'Espérey replied that the Hungarian revolutionary Government had asked for the laying down of arms, but had at the same time been silent as to the fact that this offer was made after the Germans had signed the Armistice on November 11. To Franchet d'Espérey the carrying out of the Belgrade Convention was of no importance, neither was the manner in which it was carried out of much interest; the population of the occupied territories were, after all, enemies. We must controvert the statement in the British official history of the Peace Conference that "the Hungarian

Government were reluctant to acknowledge the Armistice of November 3, and the Allies, therefore, continued their advance in Hungary until, upon the request of Count Károlyi, they signed a Military Convention in Belgrade". The Hungarian Government *de facto* acknowledged the Armistice of November 3, and asked in Belgrade for its execution. Here, however, acting upon instructions received from Versailles, where on November 4 the Armistice of the 3rd had been set aside on account of the German situation, the military authorities proposed to occupy the territories in the rear of Mackensen. The French objective was the capture of Mackensen. They supported the Serbian and Roumanian occupation as long as Mackensen had an army. When this army melted away, they captured him in Hungarian territory, violating the sovereignty of the Hungarian State.

According to General Bliss' report of March 27, 1919, published amongst Wilson's notes, the Belgrade Military Convention had been observed only by the Hungarians. When, therefore, the Powers of the Peace Conference referred in the summer of 1919 to the Convention, Bratianu was perfectly justified in saying he was unaware that it still existed and was in force.

We are then entitled to ask whether the legal Armistice concluded in Padua on November 3, 1918, has been carried out, denounced or violated? whether it has or has not been in force at all? Otherwise we must conclude that one of the contracting parties had already set it aside as early as November 4, without the knowledge and consent of the other party, in defiance of International Law, and in the interest of secret agreements and annexations. It was dropped — together with Italy, who had received a mandate and authorisation to conclude the Padua Armistice.

We shall of course be told that by this time Austria-Hungary had already ceased to exist, and that thus one of the parties to the Armistice had disappeared.

To this we shall only reply that although the nations composing Austria-Hungary were at that time in a state of revolution, and were struggling to conform to the principle

of self-determination, it was not the actual situation but the programme published in the "Times" and the "Matin" of November 3 and 4 in the interest of the Governments bent on annexation which, by preventing the peoples of the Dual Monarchy from exercising their rights of self-determination, caused them to wrench themselves violently asunder and made them enemies for ever; such was the direct result of the Allied procedure, and of the Peace Treaties.

Although the Belgrade Convention mentioned only "Allies", and stipulated that the administration should remain in Hungarian hands, in all the occupied territories the Hungarian authorities were at once removed, and replaced by Serbian and Roumanian officials. The Serbian Government annexed the territories occupied by its troops on December 1, 1918; the Roumanian Government followed suit on January 11, 1919, taking, not only the occupied territories, but all those it had previously claimed.

That the partition of Hungary was not based upon the Armistice of November 3, 1918, is clearly proved by Edward Benes' statement in the "Matin" and the "Times" of November 5 and 6, 1918, to the effect that the Czechs must occupy Upper Hungary, and by the statement of the Serbian Government that the fate of Hungary would not be decided on the spot, but at Versailles.

We must, therefore, assume that after the setting aside of the legal Armistice, the Supreme War Council took into account the demands of the Governments interested in the partition of Hungary. This conjecture seems to be confirmed, not only by the above-mentioned declaration of the Czech Government, but by the fact that M. Jusserand, the French Ambassador in Washington, on November 29, 1918, on behalf of his Government handed to Wilson, who was about to start for Europe, a carefully drafted statement of those peace terms which had been prepared on the basis of the annexation schemes.

Wilson, in the original draft of his League of Nations programme, as published by Lansing, which he brought with him to Europe, proposed that the peoples of Austria-

Hungary should themselves decide their fate after a certain interval, after mature reflection, and then only when the questions concerned had been considered by the Powers after they had solved the German problem. In contrast to this the memorandum of the French Government already mentioned declared that "the fate of Austria-Hungary cannot even form the subject of discussion, because this Power has ceased to exist... neither the Armistices nor the President's Fourteen Points can form the concrete basis of the work of the Conference".

There could be no doubt that Austria-Hungary had in fact ceased to exist as a Power; its peoples and nations, however, had not ceased to exist, and though the enforced dissolution did not cause the defunct Dual Monarchy a pang, it brought about the enslavement of its nationals.

While Wilson was travelling to Europe with his own proposal and the French memorandum, in Hungary, in spite of the principle of International Law that an armistice terminates hostilities, fresh military operations had begun which we must regard as a struggle between races, and as an arbitrary prolongation of a war that had come to an end.

## 1. The Czech Occupation.

Apart from the fact that Seton-Watson, in his memorandum submitted through the Northcliffe bureau, had already in the first days of November proposed the incorporation of Northern Hungary into Bohemia, Benes supported this proposal in the "Times" and the "Matin" by pleading that an annexation was necessary in view of Bolshevism in Hungary, in order to defend the Western States against this peril which "the Czechs alone could avert should certain terms of the Armistice be modified in their interests".

In his book quoted above General Breit publishes an alleged note of the Czech Government of November 4, 1918, in which they informed the Hungarian Government that in view of the fact that Czecho-Slovakia had been

recognised by the Powers, and its delegate invited to the Peace Conference "we are entitled under the terms of the Armistice, to occupy all points of importance".

At the same time the Czech Peace Delegation claimed Pozsony as the capital of Czecho-Slovakia, as a "Slovak town for centuries past", whereas Seton-Watson stated in "New Europe" that Pozsony was a German-Hungarian town, which the Czechs claimed as a commercial centre.

The French Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx, the liaison officer of the Entente Mission sent to Budapest, stated, that owing to the Allies having recognised the Czech State and Army, the Czechs were entitled to occupy Slovakia, because they were taking part in the carrying out of the Armistice "which prescribed the occupation of the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy"; as a fact, no such occupation was enjoined in the Armistice. In his note of January 10, 1919, he modified his statement by declaring that the Padua Armistice merely referred to the south-western front, "therefore the Czecho-Slovak State had a sovereign right as regards all those territories which it occupied within the limits of the temporary frontiers assigned to it". This is in itself a confused and illogical conclusion.

Finally the Prague Professor Hobza, head of the department for International Law of the Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs, wrote in the "Revue Générale du droit internationale public" of 1922 that Bohemia "had obtained sovereign possession of the territories in question by cession".

As Upper Hungary had never been a component of the Czech State, and there could, therefore, be no question of re-absorption, we are faced with such an array of titles as *to suggest that in support of the annexation*, ever new claims had to be invented. We will only insist that the Padua Armistice prescribed a strategic occupation, not annexation; that the recognition of a State as such does not entitle it to conquests; that there was no Bolshevism in Hungary at that time, and that the "cession" was extorted by force of arms.

In fact the Czechs themselves were uncertain what territories to claim. In their demand of December 6, 1918, they claimed 1.9 million inhabitants, amongst whom there were 220,000 Hungarians; on January 26, 1919, 2.9 million inhabitants including 899,000 Hungarians were under Czech occupation; the Treaty of Trianon eventually gave them 3.5 million inhabitants including over one million Hungarians.

In the "Times" of December 6, 1918, Masaryk stated that only the Czech claims as to the western and north western frontiers of Upper Hungary were indisputable, but he omitted to add that this frontier had been determined for a thousand years past, and was the ancient frontier of Hungary towards Bohemia.

In the "Times" of January 9, 1919, he added that in exchange for Pozsony, Hungary would receive „a great number of important Czech villages“, as to which no one knows anything; no villages or territories inhabited by Czechs were ever allotted to Hungary, nor did Bohemia ever cede any Czech territory to Hungary.

The Czech Peace Delegation handled the question in a much simpler manner; they said that the possession of Pozsony was for them a "vital question" as regards which they even refused to negotiate; they needed the Danube section in view of the important part awaiting them in Central Europe (*"de remplir son vrai rôle dans l'Europe centrale"*). As a Danube State, Bohemia reckoned on a great development towards the East, taking over Austrian aspirations. Thus the Csallóköz on the banks of the Danube came into Czech hands, although in addition to its 101,839 Hungarians and 2883 Germans, it had only 453 Slovaks and 1 Czech.

Hence the Czech Government was not content with Bohemia's independence, but aspired to hegemony in Central Europe. As they said in 1921 to the French publicist, Charles Rivet: "Prague will become the diplomatic centre of Central Europe; this will considerably diminish the importance of Vienna and Budapest, but on the other

hand it will impose upon us the duty of putting these two towns into the background politically and economically“.

The occupation of Upper Hungary had been effected in Slovakia and in Russinsko under the direction of the French Generals Pellé and Hénnoque respectively, which meant the maintenance of the Franco-Russian Alliance. As M. Benes' confidential circular of October 25, 1924, published in "Foreign Affairs" of 1925, said: "Czecho-Slovakia must remain the connecting link between France and Russia, and the 30,000 Russian professors, students and citizens who have taken refuge in Bohemia will become the apostles of the Franco-Czech-Russian friendly alliance.“

On the basis of all this it is not difficult to establish that Czecho-Slovakia was not created as a free State, but was designed to undertake the leadership in Central Europe. Its leading politicians thought that Hungary would be submerged in anarchy, and would yield to Czech supremacy, and that, by raising the bogey of Hungarian Bolshevism — by encouraging it, as many Hungarian newspapers showed — they could induce the Western Powers to give them a mandate in Hungary.

In order to separate Hungary from the Western States Benes, in the "Times" of November 6, 1918, renewed his proposal as to the corridor through Western Hungary; on returning to Paris in December, 1919, he offered the Serbian delegates an armed alliance with the idea of creating the corridor with their combined forces, should difficulties arise. As he said in his *exposé* of Czech foreign affairs in 1924, he had in January, 1920, invited the Austrian Chancellor Renner, a pro-Entente Socialist of Czech extraction, to visit Prague, and had proposed that Austria should receive Western Hungary, which the Peace Conference was reluctant to give to Czecho-Slovakia—France indeed having been the sole supporter of the latter suggestion. The further spoliation of Hungary was the object of these negotiations, and thus the *Burgenland* was handed over to weak and impoverished Austria.

## 2. The Roumanian Occupation

According to Article II. of the Bucharest Treaty of August 17, 1916, Roumania was not allowed to conclude peace with the Central Powers. As, however, Roumania did conclude peace with these Powers in Bucharest, on May 8, 1918, the Treaty of 1916 was, according to the Serbian delegate Vesnitch, to be regarded as no longer operative.

Field-Marshal Foch, however, when he took over the supreme command, intended to hold Mackensen's army in check by means of the Roumanian army. Tilea, the Secretary of the Prime Minister Vajda-Voevod, in his book on the diplomatic activities of his chief, mentions as noteworthy that General Coanda, the Chief of the General Staff, was reluctant to accept the order sent by Clemenceau from Versailles on November 10, 1918, to take up arms in violation of the second Bucharest Treaty. All the more so as the Roumanian Government, according to Marghiloman's Memoirs, had two days before, on November 8, informed Field-Marshal Mackensen that he might retire without misgiving, because "the Roumanian Government had no intention whatever of occupying Transylvania". (A. Marghiloman: Note politice 1897—1924 Bucharest, 1927. Vol. IV.)

Bratianu, the Roumanian Prime Minister and head of the Peace Delegation, treated the question more airily when he declared that the Roumanian Government had never taken either neutrality or the Peace Treaty seriously. In his speech before the Peace Conference on February 1, 1919, he said that he had merely wished to gain time by the peace negotiations, and that King Ferdinand had looked forward impatiently to the renewal of hostilities. In his speech of July 1, 1919, he admitted that Roumania had in the autumn of 1918 been invited by France to take up arms, and that therefore in his opinion France was responsible for the violation of the Peace Treaty.

He thought all this justified the annexation of the territories promised by the Treaty of August 17, 1916. The French General Berthelot in fact gave orders, in the

autumn of 1918, for these territories to be occupied. As, however, he informed the Hungarian Government that the territories in question would be occupied by French troops, we may point out that this was never done. Although Berthelot repeated his statement in December, 1918, the population never saw the promised French troops, on whom they had relied for the observation of the terms of the Armistice. Instead of the French they were given the Roumanians, who, in spite of the Belgrade Convention and promises made subsequently, removed the Hungarian officials everywhere; the Roumanian Government finally annexed the whole territory on January 11, 1919.

The territory claimed by Roumania extended from the Dniester to the Tisza. But Bratianu said at the Peace Conference that Roumania, deferring magnanimously to the Powers, would not insist on the Tisza line, although in the course of the last centuries the Hungarians had crossed the Tisza, and getting a foothold in Roumania, had founded great towns such as Debreczen.

Vesnitch, the Serbian delegate, insecure in the possession of the Banat occupied by Serbia, protested against the Roumanian claim to the Banat, whereupon Clemenceau suggested a *plébiscite* which was rejected by both parties, because out of the total population of the Banat, of 1,58 million, there were only 284,000 Serbs and 592,000 Roumanians. The Banat was accordingly divided as proposed by Seton-Watson in 1915.

The Peace Conference, on February 26, 1919, had offered a further strip 70 kilometers wide to the Roumanians in the territory beyond the Tisza, when the report of February 25 of General Charpy, Field-Marshal Franchet d'Espérey's Chief of Staff, arrived. It stated officially that the Belgrade Military Convention had only been observed by the Hungarians, and not by the Roumanians. The decision, however, had been made, and was already, through Berthelot, in the hands of the Roumanian General Staff on March 8. The French Command in Belgrade only communicated it to Budapest on the 19th, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx handed it to Count Michael Károlyi on the 21st. Ká-

rolyi hereupon made way for the Communists. This resulted in a further Roumanian advance and occupation, which caused Hungary loss and damage officially estimated at 6.5 milliard Swiss francs.

All these disasters followed from the fact that the Armistice concluded on November 3, 1918, and accepted by Hungary, was not carried out, but that a new war was begun on the basis of the decision of November 4. Although the Armistice did not contain any provisions regarding the partition, occupation and annexation of Hungary, as a result of military operations begun in defiance of the terms of that very Armistice which was supposed to have terminated the war, two-thirds of Hungary were detached and incorporated into foreign countries, in obedience to a decision which was never communicated to the population.

Austria-Hungary, therefore, who on November 3, 1918, concluded a legal armistice with the Allied and Associated Powers, but no longer existed, according to the memorandum of the French Government of November 29, did not die a natural death, a process which would have taken time. "At that time", said Edward Benes in 1924, "the Allies were not yet certain whether Austria had really perished.. the formation of our Government was a *fait accompli* for the Allies. After a hard struggle of four years I signed the peace conditions as the Czecho-Slovak Delegate, and these were handed to the already demolished Austrian Empire". (Edward Benes: Problems of New Europe. Prague, 1924).

Austria-Hungary was as a fact disintegrated and dismembered by armed occupations, as regards which no provisions had been made in the Armistice, but which were subsequently legalised by the Peace Treaties.

Whether, from the point of view of International Law, there is or not a definite relation between Armistices and Peace Treaties, practice has shown that whereas the former do not terminate war, the latter have brought nationalities into violent conflict, and prepared the way for a future struggle between races.

## VI. Creation and Guarantees of the Peace Treaty

The Peace Conference, awaited with feverish anxiety and exaggerated hopes by peoples longing for peace, has not fulfilled its mission.

Its very title was misleading. It differed from all former peace conferences, in that only one of the interested parties was represented. As its Statutes expressly stated: "the Conference shall include the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers".

The assembled representatives prepared the Treaties in the shape of peace conditions which were handed to the representatives of the vanquished States together with an ultimatum, requiring them to subscribe to the terms laid down by their conquerors without modification or discussion.

The peace conditions were so onerous that there was no expectation of their acceptance without coercion; the vanquished were threatened with disarmament, blockade, withholding of food-stuffs and medicaments, physical and moral misery, and the maintenance and extension of minatory measures by force of arms, should they refuse their signatures.

Under these circumstances there was no refusal to sign, but the very fact of such signature left a loophole for the criticism and discontent of the future.

For the lack of a bilateral understanding excluded the possibility of mutual reassurance.

Should any ask how the members of the Peace Conference could shut their eyes to the real situation, Inter-

national Law and eventual reaction, he will find the answer in Lansing's book.

Lansing tells us that at the Peace Conference no one spoke audibly. "Everybody seemed to talk in whispers and never to say anything worth while except in confidence. The open sessions of the Conference were arranged beforehand. They were formal and perfunctory. The agreements and bargains were made behind closed doors." (The Peace Negotiations. London, 1921.)

He also states that President Wilson, who really decided the issue of the war, and on whom the fate of peace obviously depended, communicated only with Colonel House, his intimate friend. Colonel House, however, according to Steed's memoirs, asked the latter for advice, and Steed, on his part, was in constant touch with Seton Watson and Masaryk. There is no doubt, therefore, that Wilson indirectly acted upon Masaryk's instructions, and thus accepted the Russian Slav plans in their entirety. Nothing is more characteristic of Wilson's weakness than his adoption, together with friendship for the Slavs, of their anti-Italian sentiments. Italy, who had been charged with the conclusion of the Padua Armistice, from the moment of Wilson's appearance became the step-child of the Conference, from which she eventually withdrew with a sense of wounded dignity, while at the same time the close community of interests between the French and the Slavs was cemented, apparently under the patronage of Wilson. The Peace Conference thus became a struggle between aspirations in which Italy was worsted.

The chairman of the Sub-Committees dealing with the Hungarian question was André Tardieu, the former confidant of the Russian Ambassador in Paris, who has himself told the story of the creation of the Treaties in his book on the Peace Conference.

To those who may urge that there were no doubt others who attended the meetings and influenced the discussions, and who might have protested against certain proposals, we must answer that the majority of those present invariably accepted the proposals of the so-called

"experts" in South-Eastern problems, whose knowledge no one questioned. Seton-Watson, in his speech of December, 1924, at Richmond (U. S.), explained his successes and those of his friends as follows: "As I speak I see in front of me quite a number of the men who played a real part at the Peace Conference, and who understand that the alliance of a few experts, knowing their own minds and concentrating all their efforts on the attainment of *a given end*, can sometimes achieve ends unattainable by the leaders of uninformed opinion and uninformed statesmanship."

It is, therefore, highly probable that these "experts" were the persons who drafted the provisions for the partition of Hungary, and who ensured their acceptance. We will only add that not one Hungarian was consulted as to the fate of his country, and that the above-mentioned "experts" were all foreigners interested in the dismemberment of Hungary.

It may also be objected that the "experts" alone were hardly of sufficient authority to carry through their proposals. It must be remembered, however, that these proposals had been accepted by the respective General Staffs, and that the Supreme War Council continued to be one of the chief advisers of the Peace Conference. Such a Council of Generals can hardly be regarded as an instrument of peace. This military corporation, headed by Field-Marshal Foch, and the Conference of Ambassadors, directed by the French Government, acted wholly in the spirit of the above-mentioned French memorandum of November 29, 1918. The fundamental principle of this memorandum was that Austria-Hungary must be regarded as a dismembered Power that had ceased to exist, in which principle we recognise Benes' programme published in the "Fortnightly Review" of November, 1920, where he said: "we wished to prove that Europe does not need any more Austria-Hungary".

When the "experts" submitted their proposals the number of those who came under foreign rule appeared exaggerated.

When the news was received that Bolshevism had broken out in Budapest on the presentation of the decisions of February 26, 1919, Lloyd George himself wrote on March 25: "There will never be peace in South-Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar *Irredenta* within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy, and economics or communications, which can be adjusted by other means".

We must add that before this, on March 8, 1919, the Italian Government had also put forward a proposal concerning the solution of the Hungarian question, while General Smuts wished to return to that of Wilson's points in the Covenant of the League of Nations. that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should themselves decide their future fate. Wilson, however, had already consented to the cancellation of this point, and thus the only possibility left was the creation of additional Treaties to protect the alienated minorites. This was the origin of the Minority Treaties, as regards which Wilson said that the new States had only received the annexed territories after having signed these Treaties. Their non-observance, therefore, ought to annul the annexations. That Wilson's statement was true may be conjectured from the fact that the Roumanian Government only accepted the Minority Treaty on the eve of the expiration of the ultimatum sent to them, at midnight of December 3, 1919, at the French Legation, and solely, as King Ferdinand wrote to Poincaré, because Roumania was completely exhausted and on the eve of revolution (A. Marghiloman: Note politice 1897—1924. Bucharest, 1927. Vol. V.)

Hereupon the question arose whether an international Treaty or State sovereignty is of greater force. Subsequently this question was fiercely debated, the new States insisting on their sovereignty in face of the Minority Treaties, and

using the former as a pretext for assimilating the minorities.

At the moment the desideratum was the creation of a durable instrument within the shortest possible space of time, and its framers in their haste looked with anxiety towards Hungary, where in the autumn of 1919, after the collapse of Bolshevism, recovery began in a spirit which, by its strongly nationalist character, threatened to become a danger to the new States.

Having elaborated the German peace terms during a spell of feverish activity, and handed them over, the Peace Conference dissolved on May 7, 1919, and was replaced by the Conferences of Prime Ministers, Ambassadors and Generals respectively.

At first there were hopes of counter-balancing the national restoration of Hungary by means of the Socialists; these, however, withdrew from politics at the beginning of 1920.

The victors then turned against the Hapsburgs, and passed decrees to the effect that they would resist any attempt at restoration.

However, it still seemed uncertain whether the Hungarian Government would sign the Peace terms; accordingly, Millerand, the President of the French Republic, presumably with the knowledge and concurrence of his Allies, delivered them on May 6, 1920, together with a letter in which he promised an eventual rectification of injustices.

This was the so-called *Millerand Letter*, according to which should "an enquiry on the spot perhaps reveal the necessity of altering certain parts of the frontier line provided for in the Treaty, and should the Boundary Commissions consider that the provisions of the Treaty involve an injustice at any point which it would be to the general interest to remove, they may submit a report on this matter to the Council of the League of Nations. In that case, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that the Council of the League of Nations, if requested to do so by one of the parties concerned, may, under the same condi-

tions offer its services to obtain by a friendly settlement the rectification of the original tracing in places where the alteration to the frontier is considered desirable by one of the Boundary Commissions. The Allied and Associated Powers feel confident that this procedure constitutes an appropriate method for removing any injustice in the tracing of the frontier line which may give rise to well-founded objections."

From this Millerand Letter it was generally expected that the peace terms and the injustices of the Treaty in general, notably the delimitation of the frontiers, would be modified.

In dealing with the subject we must bear in mind two questions: why was the letter written? had Millerand any control over the two bodies mentioned by him, before which the question of a modification would eventually come?

It must be remembered that the Millerand Letter was not written purely in the interests of Hungary, and that it was not inspired by compunction at the injustice it mentions, but was very naturally and comprehensibly evoked by the fact that Count Albert Apponyi, the head of the Hungarian Peace Delegation, resigned before the signature of the Treaty, and it was feared that the remaining delegates would refuse to sign. It therefore seemed necessary to raise hopes of an eventual mitigation of grievances. Hungarian statesmen, including Count Apponyi himself, declared subsequently that the Treaty was signed on June 4, 1920, in the Trianon Palace, in reliance on these hopes, and in the belief that the ill-considered terms they had accepted would soon be reconsidered.

Nor was it only Hungarian statesmen who took Millerand's promises seriously, but even the French themselves, for after the signature, in June, 1920, France, in view of the Russian peril, initiated further negotiations with Hungary on the basis of and with reference to the Millerand Letter, and its promises of relief.

The French Government did not make its proposals through the Council of the League of Nations mentioned

in the Millerand Letter, obviously because by that time they knew, better than any one else, the facts we shall now set forth.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was not created in the form or in the spirit desired by President Wilson; it omitted all reference to the right of self-determination, and passed over in silence the annexations which had been effected by the Armies of the interested Governments before the conclusion of peace, in flagrant violation of the Armistice and of International Law. The Covenant thus prepared was then brought into organic relation with the Peace Treaties. If we look at any one of these, we shall find that it begins by laying down what we must regard as the fundamental defect of the whole peace structure, because it bases the peace of the future on the inhuman decisions of an unhappy war. In the same manner the League of Nations sought guidance, not from the ideals of peace and humanity, but from the Councils of Ambassadors and Generals which kept up the war coalition, and received instructions from them in all military and political matters. If it should be said that although the Council of the League was composed of representatives of this coalition, the Assembly included representatives of all members of the League, and was thus an international body, we must reply that the Council possessed unlimited power over the Assembly, towards which it was in no way responsible. In a political respect the League of Nations was comparable to an autocratic State with a submissive Parliament.

We can now understand how, as a natural consequence of such conditions, the Conference of Ambassadors on June 22, 1920, immediately after the Hungarian delegates, encouraged by the promises in the Millerand Letter, had signed the Peace Treaty, sent secret instructions to the Boundary Commissions, (instructions published subsequently in 1922 in the *Journal Officiel* of the League of Nations) prohibiting the consideration of any racial, ecclesiastical or economic arguments that could involve or necessitate the slightest rectification of the frontiers as

defined by the Treaty of Trianon. The Millerand Letter was never communicated to the Boundary Commissions.

Thus the League of Nations excluded the possibility of any rectification of the frontiers, as was demonstrated by the American writer Kellor (F. Kellor: Security against War. New York, 1924. Vol. II.), and as we shall ourselves show.

By its decision of April 23, 1923, the Council of the League restored two villages in the Salgótarján section, the annexation of which had been found questionable by the Boundary Commission, but did not restore any territory north of these villages, though this had been unanimously recommended by the same Commission.

In the Serbian section the Boundary Commission awarded the whole of the Muraköz to Hungary, whereupon the Serbian delegate declared the Commission had no right to propose a modification of the frontier as determined by the Treaty of Trianon, and the Serbian Government upheld this opinion even against the League of Nations. M. Poincaré, the President of the Conference of Ambassadors, in his note to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, declared on November 5, 1922, that "the Conference of Ambassadors, considering the proposals formulated by the Boundary Commission to be without substantial basis, has decided that the Hungaro-Serbian frontier shall be drawn according to the Treaty of Trianon and the instructions in force."

The League of Nations, by accepting this note, acknowledged the supremacy of the Conference of Ambassadors, an institution unknown to International Law, and thereby made it evident that the League of Nations, in its present form, is not an impartial body standing above the parties, but merely an instrument of the war coalition.

In their meeting of August 4, 1921, the Boundary Commission in charge of the Roumanian frontier decided to adhere strictly to the Treaty. As the conduct of the French General Meunier, the President of the Commission, conveyed the impression that he was not impartial, the Hungarian Government withdrew their delegate and

refrained from bringing the matter before the Council of the League. In his letter of December 26, 1922, M. Poincaré asked that the uncertain situation should not be prolonged indefinitely, but neither the Conference of Ambassadors nor the Council of the League succeeded in winning the confidence of the Hungarian Government in their impartiality.

Thus the new frontiers were drawn, and their definitive determination left matters as follows

In 1910 *Hungary* had an area of 282,870 square kilometers with 18,264,533 inhabitants, out of which the Treaty of Trianon left her 91,114 square kilometers with 7,481,954 inhabitants.

*Roumania* alone annexed a greater area than that of present-day Hungary; she acquired 102,787 square kilometers with 5,265,444 inhabitants. These included 2,699,631 Roumanians and 2,835,916 non-Roumanians, so that the number of those subjugated exceeded that of those liberated. The former included 1,879,231 Hungarians.

*Czecho-Slovakia* annexed 62,937 square kilometers with 3,575,685 inhabitants including practically no Czechs, because out of the 18 million inhabitants of pre-war Hungary there were only 8000 Czechs altogether. The annexation, therefore, on the whole affected non-Czechs, the above figure including 1,584,843 Hungarians.

*Serbia* acquired 20,956 square kilometers with 1,499,213 inhabitants including only 390,307 Serbs and 1,476,293 non-Serbs, amongst whom were 683,631 Hungarians.

*Austria* received 5055 square kilometers with 392,431 inhabitants including 142,431 kindred Germans, and 250,000 non-Germans, amongst whom were 80,000 Hungarians

*Hungary*, therefore, lost 191,735 square kilometers (retained 91,114), and 10,781,773 inhabitants (retained 7,481,954).

To replace pre-war Hungary where 10 million Hungarians were amalgamated with 8 million non-Hungarians (out of a total of 18 264,533 there were 9,944,627 Hunga-

rians and 8,319,906 non-Hungarians) three States were formed, composed as follows:

*Czecho-Slovakia* with 13,724,453 inhabitants, including 6,299,237 Czechs and 7,425,216 non-Czechs;

*Jugoslavia* with 13,621,592 inhabitants, including 5,136,693 Serbs and 8,484,899 non-Serbs;

*Roumania* with 16,016,935 inhabitants, including 10,548,170 Roumanians and 5,468,765 non-Roumanians.

As a final result, therefore, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania possessed a total population of 41,084,817, out of which 22,265,576 belonged to the annexing States and 22,900,021 to the annexed minorities; thus the total of the latter exceeds that of the former. In spite of this fact the annexing minority (for they are in fact a minority), kept all political and military power for themselves.

It is only natural that under such circumstances the new States should have feverishly sought securities which would enable them to maintain themselves. The first essential of such security was the elimination of the exercise of the *plébiscite*.

According to Wilson's original plan and proposal the peoples of Austria-Hungary should have themselves decided their fate. As, however, the Powers made an exception as regards France, and detached Alsace-Lorraine from Germany without a *plébiscite*, under the plea of „reunion“, the Czechs, Serbians and Roumanians discouraged a *plébiscite* by insisting on the catchword „reunion.“ This is why the Czechs revived the tradition of Prince Bratislav, and changed the name of Pozsony to Bratislava, though there had never been any Czech province in the territory of Hungary. This also explains why the Serbians laid stress on the Voivods who had ruled them in the first half of the sixteenth century; it is true that Serbians, escaping from Turkish rule, remained for a short time in their tribal organisatons under Voivods, but on this slender basis an illusion was created in the West, and has even found its way into serious works, to the effect that Temesvár was the cradle and the burial-ground

of ancient Serbian dynasties. In like manner, the Roumanian claim to Transylvania was bolstered up by references to the Roman Emperor Trajan who conquered Dacia; there was silence as to the fact that the Roumanians, coming from the South, only appeared in Transylvania in the thirteenth century, with a culture they could only have acquired amongst the Greeks and Slavs of the Balkans.

The protagonists of the Peace Conference were only too thankful to accept a ready made historical basis for the various claims, and as regards Hungary recognised the principle of „reunion“, whereas this is diametrically opposed to the actual facts of historical evolution.

The further consequences were, that because France had felt entitled to compel the Germans settled in Alsace-Lorraine after 1871 to return to their own country (repatriation), the Czechs, Serbs and Roumanians, driving the original Hungarian population into present-day Hungary, converted *repatriation* into *expatriation*, and by herding the population of two-thirds of a territory into the remaining one-third, converted Central Europe into the powder magazine of future war.

As it had been the vital interest of the Czech, Serbian and Roumanian Governments to reduce as far as possible the number of incorporated alien elements, these were not only expatriated, but also compelled to emigrate. Moreover, the agrarian policy of these three States became in fact an instrument of war used for the confiscation and destruction of the material resources of the Hungarians, which they regarded as the only means of maintaining their own States in the future.

In addition, they disarmed Hungary and armed themselves to such an extent that in the event of war, one Hungarian would be faced by 144 Czech, Serbian and Roumanian soldiers perfectly equipped.

Thus the „reunion“ condemned millions of Hungarian families to oppression and misery, and threw Hungary back into the darkest conditions of Turkish rule and Austrian absolutism.

Seton-Watson may claim the distinction of having

conceived the plan of perpetuating such conditions, i. e. the rule of inferior peoples over peoples of a higher culture, against the will of the latter. In December, 1919, he invited to his London house the delegates of Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Roumania, where, as Tilea, the Secretary of the Roumanian Prime Minister Vajda-Voevod has told us, he proposed the organisation of a Little Entente as a pendant to the Great Entente, in order to secure the Treaty of Trianon formulated by him. As Brown, the American jurist, said in the "American Journal of International Law" in 1920: "The chief beneficiaries of the mutilation of Hungary are compelled to band themselves together in a defensive alliance."

What can this mean but that the Peace Treaties, far from reassuring the souls of men, perpetuated the threat of war? Seton-Watson himself admits as much in the "Slavonic Review" (of 1926), the paper edited by him and devoted to the propagation of Russian Slav interests: "the neighbours of Hungary remain in a certain sense in the same ideological opposition to it as at the beginning of the War." He himself, therefore, regarded the Treaty of Trianon as one bringing „not peace, but a sword.“

Benes undertook to direct the Little Entente on the lines agreed upon at the end of 1919, in Seton-Watson's house. He declared the fundamental principle of the Little Entente to be the stabilisation of the Treaty of Trianon, and the acquisition of guarantees, and stated, in the "Nineteenth Century" of 1924 that international relations must be based upon the literal observance of the Peace Treaties. According to him „the League of Nations, built ideologically on the basis of these principles, and forming a part of, or even a corrective to, the Peace Treaties, was to be the embodiment of the methods mentioned“. Although this contradicts Article 19 of the Covenant, it clearly shows that the Little Entente sought to involve the League of Nations in the dismemberment of Hungary and the ratification of the annexations.

The signing of the Treaty of Trianon, therefore — induced by the Millerand Letter and Article 19 of the

Covenant — did not signify either peace or security for Hungary. Towards Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Roumania she was surrounded by frontiers occupied by armies through which, for a long time, only expatriated Hungarians were allowed to pass into mutilated Hungary, and where railway stations and open railway lines were blocked with truckloads of refugees.

A fortnight after the signature of the Treaty of Trianon, on June 20, 1920, the Austrian Socialists declared a boycott against Hungary, and railway communication was cut even towards the West. Hungary was completely isolated from foreign countries, and it seemed as if a nation had been condemned to death.

The crisis, which was the crisis of the whole of Europe, because at the same time the Soviet troops advanced and approached the German frontier, came to an end on August 7 by the collapse of the Austrian boycott, owing to Austrian dependence on the importation of food-stuffs from Hungary, whereupon new guarantees had to be sought.

On the following day, the 8th August, 1920, the Socialist "Arbeiterzeitung" in Vienna published statements regarding the alleged armaments of completely disarmed Hungary. Benes was then on his way to Belgrade, where on the same day, August 8, a military alliance in support of the Treaty of Trianon was concluded against Hungary, who was alleged to be arming.

This was the origin of the Little Entente, a network of alliances which Roumania joined in 1921. Opinions may differ as to its mission, but not as to its objects. The French Professor Louis Eisenmann, who had relations with the Czech Government, stated in the "Review of Reviews" (1924), edited by Wickham Steed, another ally of the Czech Government:

„A first consequence of Magyar recalcitrance (i. e. opposition to partition of the motherland by armed force of foreign governments interested in the partition) was to weld the elements of the Little Entente into a definite political system for the defence of the Peace Treaties. A

second consequence was to wreck the conclusion of political and economic agreements with Hungary and to prolong a state of tension, embarrassing, doubtless, to Czechoslovakia and her Allies, but much more harmful for Hungary."

The attack was reinforced by the attitude of Czechoslovakia in connection with the cession of Western Hungary to Austria. She promised armed assistance to Austria for this annexation at the meeting of the Austrian President Hainisch and the Czech President Masaryk at Hallstatt on August 10, 1921. In her note of September 13 she demanded from the Hungarian Government the cession of the territory in question.

If we add that during these negotiations King Charles arrived in Hungary, and that on October 23 Benes proposed to throw the overwhelming forces of the whole Little Entente upon disarmed and devastated Hungary, in order to solve simultaneously the Hapsburg question, the question of Western Hungary and that of creating a democratic Hungary with men of his own choosing at the head of affairs. (A. Mousset: *La Petite Entente*. Páris, 1923), we must conclude that the success of Czech ambitions, the destruction of Hungary and in all probability a European conflagration were only averted by the intervention of the Great Powers at the eleventh hour.

The Czech politicians who created the network of the Little Entente made no secret of the object they had in view.

In the Declaration of Independence issued in 1918 they undertook to unite the States of the Middle Danube in a confederation built upon the ruins of Austria-Hungary; this plan had already been foreshadowed in the Treaty of Trianon in the shape of a 'Czecho-Austrian-Hungarian Customs Union, but it was more fully developed in the guise of the political unification of the Austrian and Hungarian Republics under Czech leadership in the statement made to the French publicist Rivet, already quoted (Ch. Rivet: *Chez les Slaves libérés. Les Tchécoslovaques*. Paris, 1921).

The Czechs maintained that this plan had been accepted by the French Government in consideration of the advantages offered to them by an Alliance of Slav Empires in the rear of Germany: a Polish Eastern Europe, a Czech Central Europe and Serbian Balkans. This may be gathered from the secret instructions sent on October 25, 1924, by the Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs to their diplomatic representatives abroad, as published in "Foreign Affairs" in 1925.

"M. Benes considers that the natural sympathy which connects the Slavs of Czecho-Slovakia with the Slavs of France, who showed herself to be attracted towards Russia by her political interests the maintains in Czecho-Slovakia an *élite* of more than 30,000 Russians whom he advises not to meddle in politics; they are professors, students and middle class people who will be ready when the moment has come to return to Russia to play their part as apostles for an *entente* with Czecho-Slovakia and France." (A Secret Document, Foreign Affairs, London. Vol. VI. 1924. p. 180).

The Czech Government was well aware that should all guarantees of the Treaty of Trianon fail — such guarantees as the destruction of the Hungarian nation, a Central European confederation under the direction of Czecho-Slovakia, the holding of the League of Nations to the letter of the Peace Treaty (in 1924 in the „*Fortnightly Review*“ M. Benes declared that the League of Nations, in the course of the debate on regional pacts, had "entirely approved and sanctioned our policy, i. e. that of the Little Entente"), and the systematic oppression of minorities — they must look for the restoration of the Russian Power under the protection of which Russian Slav aspirations had taken concrete shape in 1915, and which alone could supply a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of the aspirations embodied in the Peace Treaty, a guarantee which the subjugated peoples refused to give.

Hungary in fact refused to sign a guarantee treaty which was designed as the complement of the Treaty of Trianon.

She was not inspired by any anti-pacific sentiments, but by a determination to resist the growing menace that confronted her, and to defend herself in the interest of self-preservation.

True to her traditions, she preferred freedom to slavery and trusted that the world would at last recognise the grave injustices which had been perpetrated in these little known regions of Europe.

As we have seen, already at the Peace Conference certain declarations and proposals had been made which betrayed uneasiness, lest these one-sided decisions should not be considered consonant with the spirit of peace, and should perhaps fail to find their justification in the "facts" so zealously maintained by the "experts" of one of the parties. Doubts and suspicions were even expressed to the effect that such precipitate decisions might imperil the peace of Europe.

In the House of Commons and in the House of Lords of the British Parliament, as early as 1919 and 1920 remarks were made showing a certain anxiety as to the decisions of the Treaty of Trianon. We must not attribute these solely to the pro-Hungarian sentiments of the speakers, Captain Elliot, Lord Bryce, Lord Montagu, Lord Newton, Lord Phillimore, Lord Sydenham and Lord Weardale, but in no small degree to the fact

that, dealing with Hungarian affairs, they desired to draw attention to the responsibility which the British nation had assumed by signing an unjust treaty and covering it with its whole moral authority.

We must not forget that at the same time America rendered a still greater service to the cause of Revision. Robert Lansing, the Foreign Secretary, alarmed at Wilson's pitiable pliancy, and reluctant to share the responsibility devolving upon America, resigned. His action, the reasons for which he explained in his book

(*The Peace Negotiations.* London, 1920), was involuntarily approved through the fact that the Peace Treaties laid before Congress, which were in direct opposition to the President's own principles, were not accepted. Wilson hereupon withdrew from public life, and died subsequently, broken in body and spirit. On August 29, 1921, his successor concluded a peace treaty with Hungary, from which the Trianon frontiers were omitted.

Both Great Britain and America have thus openly expressed their perception of the defects of the Treaty of Trianon, seriously censured it, and declared it to contain verdicts gravely affecting European peace.

Much more serious was the position of Italy who, acting in the name and on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, had concluded on November 3, 1918, a legal armistice with Austria-Hungary which on the following day was invalidated by the Supreme War Council at Versailles, while at the same time the supreme right of arbitration was conceded to France. This French arrogation was naturally supported by the Slav elements, and thus Italy found herself between two dangerous fires. Wilson also supported the Franco-Slav interests, and neglected those of Italy. At the Peace Conference Italy was even humiliated. This induced the Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti, to become the apostle of Revision, and a whole series of books by him (*L'Europa senza pace.* 1921. — *La decadenza dell' Europa.* 1922. — *La tragedia dell' Europa.* 1922. — *La pace.* 1924.) fell like hammer-strokes upon the Paris peace-structure. There is no doubt that a victorious, a peace-dictating Italy, was and is much more qualified than a vanquished Hungary to throw light upon the problem: was she duly authorised in the autumn of 1918 to conclude a legal armistice with Austria-Hungary? If so, why was it not carried out, and who is responsible for the fact that it has neither been denounced nor observed?

André Tardieu, representing the French Government and French public opinion at the Peace Conference, maintained the thesis that the overthrow of Austria-

Hungary was a well deserved punishment, and that the dismemberment of Hungary would give security and satisfaction. According to this thesis it is incumbent upon France to insist upon the letter of the Treaty of Trianon. Apart from the fact that distinguished French politicians have also noted the untenability of the principles advocated by Tardieu (Senator De Monzie, the deputy Tisseyre etc.), the Russian attack of 1920 made the French Government forget, not later than a week after the signature of the Treaty of Trianon, the principle that the dictated peace terms must be regarded as final. On June 24, 1920, four days after the Austrian Socialists had declared their boycott against Hungary in order to make the hostile ring round Hungary complete, on the eve of the Russian attack, the French Government proposed to the Hungarian Government that in exchange for certain economic and political advantages (obviously connected with the Trianon frontiers) the Hungarians should lend their support to the Poles attacked by the Soviet.

"The French Government", — said the note transmitted through M. Fouchet, the French High Commissioner in Budapest, "in observance of the Peace Treaty and guided by the declaration embodied in the Covering Letter addressed by the Allied and Associated Powers to the Hungarian Peace Delegation, is prepared to offer its good offices in respect of any step aiming at a friendly agreement between Hungary and her neighbours, the object of which is to eliminate every cause of friction, to the satisfaction of the interested parties". The French Government hereby officially admitted that the Treaty of Trianon did not provide for such friendly agreements, and that the rectifications indicated in the Millerand Letter, i. e. a modification of the Treaty, are alone calculated to promote mutual reassurance. At the above-mentioned time support was all the more essential, as the Czech Government, under the influence of the Czech Communists, was by no means averse from the idea of a junction with the Russians and their admission into Central Europe, as proposed in the Memorandum of 1915. This junction, it was thought,

might be effected, after the Polish front had been pierced, at a point where the Galician Ruthenians annexed by Poland were in sympathy with the Russians, and through the Slovak-Russinsko corridor. As according to the plans of 1915 the frontiers of Russia were to extend as far as Nyiregyháza, the French Government knew perfectly well that a Bolshevik advance could not fail to jeopardise a Hungarian Government but lately restored upon the ruins of Bolshevism.

However, the repulse of the Russian attack restored Benes to his former power. The Czech Government, after expelling the Communist members of the Cabinet, called upon the French Government to account for the promises made to Hungary. It is interesting to note that as early as July 27, 1920, the Czech Government informed Nincic, the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the French Government had promised Russinsko to Hungary Ninchitch however, only replied after the Russian defeat, on August 29, i. e. 33 days later, asking Benes to protest. Benes on the same day addressed a circular note to the Great Powers, to which the United States replied that they knew nothing about the matter. The President of the French Republic, however, had to deny categorically the existence of a secret treaty between France and Hungary (the details were published by the Czech Government itself: *Documents Diplomatiques. II. Prague, 1921*) and Paléologue was replaced at the Quai d'Orsay by Berthelot.

The return of the French Government to the former rigid standpoint meant not merely a reaffirmation of the dogma of the inviolability of the Treaty of Trianon, so obviously contradicted by the Paléologue Note, offering the Hungarian Government advantages which signified a modification of the Treaty in the sense of the Millerand Letter. Their return was even more significant: it meant that French interests and French policy in this part of Europe were subordinated to other interests which made any *rapprochement* between France and certain nations impossible and obstructed her in her freedom of action and in her regard for her own interests.

France, knowing she could not do otherwise, accepted the situation and renounced those interests in favour of those enemies of Germany, who had helped her against Germany, and who held out hopes of such assistance in the future. The actual situation, however, shows evolution everywhere and it would be flouting the possibility of evolution to prevent the Eastern Slavs from developing in the direction best suited to their own interests. Since France could not reasonably be certain that the Governments of Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest, placed under the control of the French General Staff, would always be at her disposal, it showed both weakness and self-sacrifice on her part to have renounced the possibility of a *rapprochement* with the peoples of Central Europe, and to have yielded the monopoly of free initiative to the Little Entente.

This insistence on the terms of the Treaty of Trianon made it possible for the Little Entente, in the absence of relations with the Western Powers and of a Russian attack, to become a powerful agglomeration, usurping the direction of Central European affairs for some years.

Benes, travelling in the summer of 1920 to Roumania, could achieve nothing on his arrival in Bucharest (August 17), because they did not expect him, but Field-Marshal Foch, soliciting assistance against Russia. The latter in fact arrived on the following day (August 18). After the Russian danger had passed, Benes was fortunate enough to win over Take Jonescu, who was equally intent on the creation of an Entente. It is true that Roumania would have been better pleased, if, instead of helping Czecho-Slovakia to stiffen the Treaty of Trianon, she had obtained Czech and Serbian help against Russia; this, however, could hardly be hoped for in view of the Slav sympathies of these States. The return of King Charles, however, created such a favourable situation for a concentration against Hungary, that the Little Entente not only took definite shape, but even succeeded in securing the support of Italy through the pro-Slav Foreign Minister Count Sforza, and that of Poland through the pro-Slav Foreign Minister Constantine.

Skirmunt. The force of this combination was felt by King Charles, who was removed from Central Europe. Hungary, however, was thereby saved from a second attack by the Little Entente approved by the Great Powers.

Henceforth Franco-German relations were the standard to which the Little Entente adapted themselves in their endeavours to convert their negative aims into positive ones, and in their search for new possibilities and opportunities of attack.

Such an opportunity offered itself at the time of the Ruhr occupation, when the Roumanian Government, under the pretext of a projected Hungarian attack, concentrated troops on the frontier facing the river Tisza. A prompt international investigation established that there were merely a few frontier posts on the Hungarian side, and in his memoirs Marghiloman called the check suffered by the Roumanian Government in its attempt to emulate the Ruhr occupation, a serious moral defeat.

From the political point of view, however, Franco-German antagonism was in fact the only thing by which the Little Entente, intent upon the rigid maintenance of the Treaty of Trianon, could have been guided, although their reliance upon its manifestations in determining their own policy meant in the course of time an increasing burden for the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania.

The burden made itself felt in the fact that whereas the very existence of the Little Entente depended upon arms and armaments, the peaceful development of the three countries depended upon friendly agreements with Hungary.

From whatever standpoint we may regard the question, no mutual reassurance, the only true basis of peace, can be achieved on negative lines. Hence it follows that the pursuance of a policy aiming at the forcible dismemberment of Hungary, the occupations and annexations preceding the Peace Treaty, the Treaty of Trianon itself and the oppression of the minorities, were not calculated to reassure the nations and to promote a

*rapprochement* between them; they did not serve the cause of peace, but that of war.

It was, therefore, a logical consequence of what had gone before that the Succession States could not expect from a Hungary persistently threatened by them, and from the Hungarian nation they hoped to destroy, a Guarantee Treaty confirming the unjust Peace Treaty; they have therefore been obliged to seek security in increasing armaments, in a progressive estrangement of nationalities. Such a state of things is pregnant with an elemental force driving relentlessly towards a fresh war, and the embitterment of 40—50 million persons threatens the peace of Europe.

Hungary, therefore, cannot be blamed for considering her own security, in view of her strongly armed enemy, and for insisting upon her liberty, her independence and her civilisation of a thousand years; the estrangement was not of her seeking and was not built up upon her decisions.

In the course of time others also became aware that behind the network of the Little Entente there is some unknown quantity which makes *rapprochement* and conciliation impossible. Hitherto this had passed unnoticed amidst the general absorption in the German question.

The voices of Lord Newton and Lord Bryce, of Senator de Monzie and Signor Nitti found no echo until Franco-German antagonism had lost its aggressive character by virtue of the Locarno agreement in 1925 and the subsequent London Treaty. The problem thus solved, at least in its main outlines, the Powers turned their eyes towards the East.

After the assuagement of the great Western antagonism, the problem of the East to the rear of Germany became actual; it was recognised that in spite of the Peace Treaties this whole territory has remained an Eastern front, complete with barbed wires, state of siege, and armed forces ready for battle.

Such is the Eastern front as created by the new boundaries which the British Government refused to

guarantee at the time of the Locarno agreement, thereby ranging itself with those who hope for modifications, and would take into account the interests of the peoples concerned, a conception directly opposed to the policy which created these frontiers, endeavours to maintain them by armed force against the will of the population, and takes its stand upon the inviolability of the Peace Treaties.

British policy as outlined above is identical with that pursued by Hungary from the beginning.

The Hungarian Government was opposed to the war at the outset, and some surprise will no doubt be felt when documents are published, which show that they likewise opposed the intensification and prolongation of the war.

The Hungarian Government made the first attempt to terminate the war and conclude a peace, and never demanded any territory for Hungary.

Hungary openly accepted Wilson's conditions; the Hungarian Government began the armistice negotiations on this basis, and on November 3, 1918, concluded the Padua Armistice which they supposed to be binding.

It was not the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian nation who took up arms without denouncing the Armistice, who distorted and violated its terms and provoked a new war culminating in that Treaty of Trianon which she, broken and tattered, marched to the table under bayonets, was forced to sign.

On the other hand, it was the Hungarian Government which set aside all idea of *revanche* in the form enjoined by certain Great Powers. The Hungarian Government sought protection and guarantees in the community of the League of Nations against those one-sided measures and armed ambitions, against which the Treaty of and armed ambitions, as to which the Treaty of Trianon offered no securities, either to victors or vanquished.

Under the feeble protection of the League of Nations Hungary struggled on, waiting for the time when the settlement of Western questions and the dissipation of

the dense fog that overhung the German problem, would enable Western statesmen to discriminate between the various countries that existed to the rear of Germany, and to consider whether the measures taken by them, in ignorance of the actual situation, would bring about reconciliation among peoples, and promote peace or war.

The guarantee of the League of Nations in the matter of material help enabled the nation, bleeding from a thousand wounds, but resolute in its will to live, to ensure its existence, and look forward to the changes of which there seemed some hope after the conclusion of the Locarno agreement.

The atmosphere thus created made it possible for public opinion throughout the world to respond sympathetically to Lord Rothermere's article in the *Daily Mail* of June 21, 1927.

The success of this appeal rested not merely on the universal interest it excited, and in its suggestion that the Powers, freed from the nightmare of Franco-German antagonism, could now deal with the Eastern problems, but further on its assumption that the policy which maintains antagonisms by rigid insistence on the Peace Treaties, (the basis of the Little Entente), is out of date. That such rigidity was never contemplated by the authors of the Peace Treaties is proved by Mr. Lloyd George's letter of September 1927, to M. George Földiák, bank director of Budapest, where one of the protagonists of the Peace Conference declared that "in reference to the whole of the treaties of 1919—20 I can state emphatically that their authors never claimed for them such a degree of perfection that they held them to be immutable... We all distinctly contemplated the possibility of certain clauses and provisions of the treaties themselves being made the subject of discussion, adjudication and possible revision by the great tribunal set up in the first clause of these treaties — The League of Nations". Article 19 of the League of Nations in fact held out hopes of revision,

which were raised again by Mr. Lloyd George in his speech in the Queen's Hall on October 24, 1927.

Lord Rothermere, in the article referred to above, proposed as a practical solution the restoration to Hungary of the border territories inhabited by Hungarians. This seems to have met with the general approval of public opinion throughout the world.

It will be seen, however, that should these rectifications be effected on the basis of the Millerand Letter, only those fortunate enough to be re-united with Hungary would profit. A settlement which would reassure and reconcile the peoples of Central Europe would still be outstanding.

For to decide the fate of peoples without consulting them, against their will and interests, and then to maintain decisions by force of arms, is contrary to all ideas of peace and human evolution, of liberty and dignity, and above all, of democracy.

The Hungarian nation has never shown signs of reluctance to live in peace and work together with neighbouring peoples: the causes of estrangement must be sought in the obstacles to peace and reconciliation created after the termination of the war, in defiance of International Law, and regardless of the interests of the peoples concerned.



# **The Injustices of the Treaty of Trianon**

**BY GEORGE LUKÁCS**



## 1. It is not a Treaty but a Ukase

The peace concluded after a war can only be lasting and reassuring to the souls of men if it be based on the principles of justice and equity, and if it secure the free development of nations. It cannot be maintained that such have been the results of the Treaty of Trianon. It is indeed misleading to call it a Peace Treaty, for a Treaty means an agreement between two contracting parties. The Treaty of Trianon, however, is an one-sided prescription which Hungary was compelled to accept by military force.

The Treaty of Trianon is in fact a twentieth century version of the lamentable event known to history as the first partition of Poland.

Of all the Peace Treaties concluded after the world war, the Treaty of Trianon is undoubtedly the harshest, the most inhuman, and the most unjust. Upon none of the vanquished were such terrible penalties, threatening the very existence of the nation, inflicted as upon Hungary. She was deprived of two-thirds of her territory and of three-fifths of her population, and the mutilated trunk that remained was shorn of almost every facility for economic prosperity and progress. The remaining part, the centre of pre-war Hungary, was thus torn from its peripheries where lay the best part of the country's coal, salt, iron and other minerals, as also its timber, natural gas, pasture land, its most fertile soil and its reserve of agricultural labourers.

What was the reason for this exceptional harshness?

Perhaps because Hungary was responsible for the declaration of war? But Hungary did not stand alone in the decision, and at the joint conference of the Dual

Monarchy where the die was cast she used all her power and influence to oppose measures that would lead to war. It was not Hungary's fault that her efforts were in vain.

The question of Hungary's responsibility was decided by her legal and political situation, and by the attitude of her representatives at the time when the war broke out. Was Hungary at the time the absolute mistress of her actions and of her fate?

Yes, legally, but not in fact.

In her union with Austria Hungary in principle preserved her legal independence. The Hungarian Royal Crown was apart from and independent of the Austrian Imperial Crown, although they had both been put upon the same head. The Great Power known as Austria-Hungary really represented a personal union of two sovereignties which combined for common action in external affairs, and formed therefore in this respect a real union. Certain joint institutions gave substance to this union. According to law both countries had an equal influence in the conduct of foreign affairs; in practice, however, the Austrian point of view always prevailed, because it coincided with that of the Sovereign who exercised the executive power. Thus Hungary was often obliged to consent to the adoption of a foreign policy opposed both to her interests and her will. This was the case at the time of the deliberations that preceded the world war.

From the State papers that have been published, it appears that the then Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, one of the strongest personalities of modern Hungarian history, stood alone in the Crown Council in opposition to the bellicose sentiments expressed not only by the Austrian Prime Minister, the Joint Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff, who were Austrians, but also by the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was a Moravian, and the Joint Minister of Finance, who was a Pole, in a word, by all the non-Hungarian advisers of the Crown.

Although he found himself thus isolated, and under the onus of threats from Berlin enjoining a vigorous

policy, Count Tisza, this typical representative of Hungarian conviction, did not abandon his standpoint. There is no doubt that the proposal to begin direct *pourparlers* with Russia, as the only possibility of averting war must be attributed to him. And when he failed here and all his efforts proved futile, he still demanded and obtained the point of disclaiming all intention of territorial aggrandisement, by which he hoped that the war which had become inevitable might at least be localised.

How then was Hungary responsible?

That Hungary opposed the war, and that her official representative, Count Tisza, did everything in his power to avert it is clearly proved by the Red Book published by the Austrian Government after the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, which contains the minutes of the Joint Cabinet Conferences of July 7 and July 19, 1914, as well as the memoranda addressed by Count Tisza to the Monarch on July 1 and July 8. In the first of these Count Tisza protested vigorously against the proposed attack on Serbia by the Dual Monarchy. He declared that in the event of an offensive war the whole world would regard the Dual Monarchy as disturbers of peace, and a European conflagration would follow under circumstances most unfavourable for ourselves. At the Joint Cabinet of July 7 the Minister for Foreign Affairs who presided in fact proposed that the occasion of the Crown Prince's assassination should be utilised to square accounts with Serbia, who must either be annihilated or so reduced as to make her no longer dangerous to the Dual Monarchy. With the sole exception of Count Tisza all the Ministers attending the Conference agreed with the Foreign Minister. These statesmen were: the Joint Minister of War, the Joint Finance Minister, who was also in charge of the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, the Admiral in command of the Austro-Hungarian fleet, and finally the Austrian Prime Minister. Thus the Hungarian Prime Minister stood alone against all the leaders of the joint affairs of Austria-Hungary, and the representative of Austria. Hereupon, as

also at the following Joint Cabinet Council, Count Tisza most decisively declared that he would under no circumstances consent to an attack upon Serbia by the Dual Monarchy without previous diplomatic proceedings. He expressed his firm conviction that *the conflict might be settled by diplomatic methods*. He was of opinion that a severe but temperate note should be addressed to Serbia, enumerating the grave offences of which she had been guilty towards the Dual Monarchy, inasmuch as her State officials had taken part in the crime of which Franz Ferdinand, the heir of both thrones of the Dual Monarchy, had been the victim, and that equitable demands should be made with a view to our complete satisfaction. He believed that peace might be preserved in this way. In addition he demanded drastic administrative reforms in Bosnia where the Police was shamefully inefficient, the chief reason of which in his opinion was that the Governor of Bosnia, though an excellent soldier, knew nothing about civil administration. As a corollary to these measures, Count Tisza advocated the adoption of a reasonable Balkan policy which would guarantee the security of the Dual Monarchy, and preclude all subversive intrigues originating in the Balkans. All the other Ministers present were of opinion that no results could be achieved by diplomatic steps, that accounts with Serbia could only be settled by force of arms, and that the authority and the prestige of the Dual Monarchy would suffer irreparably, should there be no final settlement this time. Count Tisza persisted in his opinion, and declared with prophetic emphasis that an aggressive war would immediately provoke Russian intervention, would make the neutrality of Roumania doubtful, and could result in a European, or even a world war that would be a catastrophe for Europe and might prove fatal to the Dual Monarchy. Count Tisza's firmness induced the Joint Cabinet to abandon the idea of an attack without diplomatic preliminaries; they agreed to his proposal that a severe and energetic message should be addressed to Serbia, enumerating our grievances and our demands, and thus enabling Serbia to make her *amende*.

Count Tisza also stipulated that the message should not be so worded so as to make a refusal inevitable. Only in the event of a refusal on the part of Serbia and her evasion of the elementary duties of a friendly neighbouring State, should an ultimatum be sent, and should the time limit fixed in this expire without compliance, it would be manifest to the whole world that war had been forced upon us, such a war as no Power can avoid if its very foundations are attacked. The odium would then rest upon Serbia who even after the Sarajevo murders had refused to make honest atonement.

In addition to all this it had also been decided, as urged by Count Tisza, that should all diplomatic *démarches* prove fruitless and should the Dual Monarchy eventually be compelled to declare war, immediately on its outbreak all Powers should be notified that the Dual Monarchy neither wished to annihilate Serbia, nor to take any territory from her.

Thus from the published documents recording the course of events immediately preceding the war, it is manifest that Hungary — through her official representative — *did everything possible to avert it*. When she was unable to enforce her will against the non-Hungarian statesmen, she at least insisted that the declaration of war should be preceded by a diplomatic *démarche*, and also that the Dual Monarchy should disavow any intention of annexation. It was not the fault of the Hungarian Prime Minister that the notification of the Dual Monarchy was not promptly and efficiently made. For this the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs was responsible. Owing to this neglect the intention of the Dual Monarchy to abstain from conquest did not become generally known, and hostile propaganda even proclaimed to the whole world that the Dual Monarchy was intent on forcible conquest.

Thus the absolutely baseless assertion that Hungary was guilty of provoking the war was embodied in the Peace Treaty, and as a punishment she was subjected to the partition of her territory, and to a process of economic impoverishment unparalleled in history.

The documents now accessible to the public prove that Hungary not only never desired the war, but that through her official representative she did all in her power to avert it. *From the point of view of Hungary, therefore, the world war was a defensive struggle forced upon her.* She stands acquitted of the charge of war-guilt

Under these circumstances the mutilation of Hungary may be compared to the infliction of capital punishment for a venial offence, or rather for no offence at all.

It may perhaps be urged that the arbitrary Trianon prescriptions were not punitive ordinances, but measures designed to replace a polyglot structure held together only by right of possession and perhaps coercion, by more homogeneous, natural groupings.

Our reply would be this: the structure called Hungary has existed for ten centuries; it has resisted the most formidable attacks and invasions, and whenever her solidarity was temporarily disturbed, it was invariably restored, as it were automatically, and by irresistible internal forces. Hungary, therefore, was not an artificial composition. By nature, this area is a predestined political unit, as also an ideal geographic and economic unit.

Its geographical unity is obvious. It is not only we who say so; the great French geographer, Réclus describes Hungary as the most wonderful natural unit in Europe. If we look at an orographic and hydrographic map of Europe which shows no political frontiers, the outlines of Hungary at once strike the eye. Looking more closely at the map we notice how the valleys of the Carpathians surrounding Hungary descend towards the great Hungarian plain, and that intercommunication between these valleys is far more difficult than access to the great central lowlands. We also notice that all the rivers flow towards the Danube, a fact which points to the necessity of uniform control of the river system, and of a central administration for the forests of the districts where they rise. The lack of such administration must inevitably be felt throughout the great plain. In fact the disastrous flood of 1925 which devastated vast areas of the

lowlands was the direct consequence of the Roumanians having neglected to regulate the upper course of the Körös rivers; Hungarian efforts to avert the disaster were of course, in vain.

Further study will convince us that economic forces are so distributed over this area that its various sections are mutually interdependent and constitute an organic unit within which all the demands of a flourishing life-process and of an energetic development can be satisfied. The peripheries contain wood, salt, coal, chemical and mineral products, water power, natural gas, the labour required for the development of industries; the centre, on the other hand, is a great agricultural plantation on fertile soil, the yield of which can only be secured and increased, if we are able to counterbalance the uncertainties of the climate by systematic regulation and exploitation of the water power which extends from the mouths of the rivers up to their sources, and further, by more intensive methods of cultivation, the raw materials for which are to be found on the peripheries.

It is true that the soil of the Hungarian plains is fertile, but this alone will not suffice to secure the economic prosperity of the country. Both soil and climate are capricious. The yield of crops, especially as regards fodder, varies greatly. The task of equalising these variations falls upon the periphery which is less fertile but more constant. It is especially the mission of the territories inhabited by Hungarians, bordering on the great central plain. Plains themselves for the most part, they supply the greater part of the crops, owing to the moister and more equable character of a climate tempered by the vicinity of mountains. These districts formerly supplied 30% of the wheat grown in Hungary, 40% of the rye and 30% of the maize. We are told that we could counteract the dryness of our climate by systematic irrigation. But how can any uniform irrigation system be maintained when our network of rivers was destroyed and the upper courses of all our rivers taken from us? Not only is it impossible under present conditions to maintain a uniform system of

irrigation; it is also impossible to take effective measures of protection against floods.

Just as all the rivers flow towards the Danube, so the population of the peripheries find in the centre of the country the natural market for their produce and their personal activities. This centre is the great basin of the lowlands, itself condemned to stagnation and threatened in the roots of its existence, by the cessation of the free exchange of goods and labour based upon the indications of nature, — an interchange to which an immemorial system of roads lends itself.

It is a vital condition of the existence of highlanders to descend as agricultural labourers into the plains, and to return to their mountains on the termination of the summer harvest. Cut off from the plains they are unable to find those corn-growing districts that would provide them with employment and subsistence.

These natural causes have created in the course of centuries a living and indestructible social organism, culminating in a political unit. The disintegration of this organism by political frontiers which disturb the natural boundaries affects it in all its parts, for nowhere can these find substitutes for those geographical connections, and economic interrelations which were offered them by their Hungarian fatherland.

These are the natural foundations of the political structure that has been preserved by an historical continuity of ten centuries, has struck roots deep into the souls of the people, and has formed their mentality.

*Hungary is an ideal geological, economic and geographical unit, a uniform self-supporting area.*

It is true that its population comprised several races. The lack of racial unity is the only solid pretext for disintegration. On this point the arguments of our greedy neighbours were accepted, and on the basis of one-sided testimony only the nucleus of the historical Hungary of a thousand years, the centre which is purely Magyar, has been left to us; the peripheries, two-thirds of the country, were parcelled out among our ambitious neighbours with

the idea of creating national states in the place of polyglot Hungary. It was declared that international justice would thus be satisfied; that peace would be definitively ensured, and that, at the same time, there would be an end of that oppression of subject nationalities of which we were accused by our enemies.

We protest, in the first place, against the deceptive axiom that the principle of nationality must always be given precedence as against historical tradition, economic prosperity and the interests of moral and intellectual progress. History itself is a living refutation of the rigid application of such a principle. History teaches us that there have been as many conflicts between peoples of the same race as between rival stocks. It shows further that great masses have spontaneously migrated, leaving the cradle of their race to seek better conditions of life among aliens. Hungary herself became polyglot by means of gradual immigrations. None of the non-Hungarian races of Hungary can claim to be the original stock of the country. The infiltration of the Roumanians began in the thirteenth century, their wholesale immigration took place in the eighteenth century, and the bulk of the Serbs began to immigrate at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. These gradual immigrations so inter-mixed the races that out of the 12,537 villages of pre-war Hungary, in 3792, constituting 40% of the total population, the inhabitants were composed of mixed races, and in none of these villages did any of the races amount to 90% of the total. The only exceptions to this rule of intermixture were the population of the great Hungarian basin in the centre of the country, the Slovaks in Upper Hungary, and certain Hungarian and Roumanian groups in the south-east.

It is, therefore, impossible to apply the principle of nationality rigidly to Hungary.

The question arises whether the Treaty of Trianon has succeeded in creating homogeneous States, or at least States more homogeneous than pre-war Hungary. Let us consider the figures. Of the 18 million inhabitants of

Hungary 11 million were alienated, among whom were 3½ million Hungarians and 1¼ million Germans. The majority of these 3½ million Hungarians are in geographical proximity to post-war Hungary, and consequently in a position which would really permit the territorial application of the principle of nationality. Why was the application of this principle refused to Hungarians alone, when it was applied to the other nationalities?

In the territory occupied by the Czechs there are 1.680.000 Slovaks, 1.085.000 Hungarians, 202.000 Germans and 124.000 Ruthenians. There were no Czechs in this territory. The Czech claim to it is based upon the supposed racial affinity of Czechs and Slovaks. But against these 1.680.000 Slovaks there are almost as many non-Slovaks, the majority of whom — out of the 1.085.000 Hungarians more than 700 000.— live on the border of present-day Hungary. The population alienated by the Roumanians is composed as follows:

43% Roumanians (2.940.000), 35% Hungarians (2.430.000), 16% Germans (742.000), and the remaining 6%, other races. Thus the Roumanians are a minority. In the territory occupied by the Serbs the number of Serbs, including Catholic Jugoslavs, is 526.000, i. e. 22% of the total population of 2.370.000, whereas the alienated Hungarians constitute 33%, and the Germans 27% of the total population. Thus the principle of nationality was applied to this territory in such a manner that the minority of 33% overruled the majority of 67%. What is this but a grotesque travesty of that principle?

The anomaly so loudly proclaimed by these figures is exaggerated by the fact that this arrangement caused races of a higher culture to be subordinated to races of an inferior culture. For 80% of the alienated Hungarians and 82% of the Germans can read and write, while among the Roumanians and the Serbs, to whose benefit the alienation was made, only 30% of the Roumanians and 60% of the Serbs are literate. Out of the inhabitants of pre-war Hungary there were 54.5% Hungarians, 16% Roumanians, 2.5% Serbs, and among those who passed a second-

ary school, there were 84% Hungarians, 4% Roumanians and 1% Serbs.

The transfer of national hegemony to races of a lower civilisation is by no means indifferent from the point of view of the interests of human culture. A striking proof of their inferiority was furnished by the Roumanians and the Czechs: immediately after the partition of Hungary they dismissed the professors of the Universities of Kolozsvár and Pozsony and replaced them by elementary school teachers; the Roumanians at once expelled the Hungarian schoolmasters, leaving 200.000 pupils in the streets.

In the case of the Czechs the cultural inequality is not so startling, but Czech culture is altogether alien to the population of the detached territories, even to the Slovaks, and is in general ill fitted to replace those institutions of Hungarian culture which it has ousted.

But — it may perhaps be said — Hungarian tyranny weighed heavily upon the subject nationalities, and it was necessary to put an end to this. We will merely refer to our Law XLIV of 1868, proclaiming the equality of nationalities; it is a model of liberal sentiment in respect of subject nationalities, and secures the rights of the non-Hungarian elements far more effectually than the so-called Minority Treaties for the protection of the alienated populations in the Succession States.

It is possible that some few of the provisions of the Law of 1868 were not fully carried out. But had our treatment of the nationalities been ten times harsher than is asserted by our enemies, it would still have been a thousand times less irksome than the intolerance displayed by the Succession States.

The estableissement of certain rights for the minorities in the Minority Treaties is of no practical value, nor are the obligations laid upon the Succession States to respect them, because no sanctions were prescribed. In the absence of sanctions the national minorities became the victims of gross despotism and oppression in the Succession States, and the Minority Treaties mere scraps of paper.

We should be fortunate indeed did the Hungarians in

the alienated territories enjoy all those rights and privileges which we secured to our non-Hungarian citizens. To give one instance of the liberalism and tolerance of Hungarian rule: the Hungarian State devoted 11 million crowns to the support of the churches and schools of the Roumanians in Transylvania; these, numbering 2.9 millions, possessed 3000 elementary schools, whereas the 7 million Roumanians of pre-war Roumania had only 5000 such schools. Hungary has for a thousand years treated her non-Hungarian citizens as brothers; their culture was not only free, but was subsidised by the Government; and to this cultural autonomy Hungary would have added territorial autonomy, had the Great Powers demanded this after the war. The Hungarian Government would also have readily placed the treatment of minorities under the effective control of the League of Nations. If, therefore, the Great Powers wished to improve the fate of the nationalities of Hungary, this would have been a real solution. But by replacing in the new polyglot States Hungarian by Czech, Roumanian and Serb hegemony, not one step has been taken on the road of justice and freedom. The sole result has been the cruel oppression of a higher by a lower civilisation.

The charge that Hungary had forcibly assimilated the subject nationalities and had enforced their use of the Hungarian language, is also entirely unfounded.

There is no doubt that a certain moderate assimilation has taken place, but this was a natural process, and not the result of coercion. The heart of the country is the great central plain which connects all the other parts. A gravitation from the peripheries towards this centre was natural, mainly for economic reasons, and this partly explains the assimilation. Another reason for this assimilation was the unquestionable superiority of Hungarian civilisation over that of the subject nationalities, a result of the fact that the Hungarians, instead of accepting the customs and the religions of the East, adopted Christianity and Western civilisation.

It is also untrue that we prevented the intellectual

development of the subject races. Quite half of the nationalities only settled in Hungary in the eighteenth century, and consisted mostly of rude herdsmen and agriculturists; it took time and labour to educate and civilise these elements. The most convincing proof of the baselessness of this charge, and of the civilising influence of Hungarian rule is the fact that the intellectual level of the Slavs and Roumanians of Hungary was much higher than that of their brethren in the neighbouring States. There are many more among them who can read and write — and this is the criterion of civilisation — than among their co-nationals beyond the frontiers.

Let us now examine the national character of the States aggrandised to the prejudice of Hungary, the so-called Succession States, to see whether the partition of Hungary has resulted in combinations more in harmony with the principle of nationality. Are these really national states, do they differ in this respect so essentially from historic Hungary so as to justify to a certain extent all those moral and economic cataclysms, that great cultural decadence, brought about by the disintegration of Hungary?

Figures again shall make reply.

The total population of historic Hungary (without Croatia) of 18 million souls was divided in the following proportions: 54.4% Hungarians, 16.1% Roumanians, 10.7% Slovaks, 10.4% Germans, 2.5% Serbs, 2.5% Ruthenians, 1.1% Croats, 2.2% others. The total population of Czechoslovakia is about 13.5 millions, of which 46—48% are Czechs and Moravians (about 6 millions), 12—13% Slovaks (1.7 millions), Czechs and Slovaks together about 60%; 27—30% (3.7 millions) Germans, 6.5% (1 million) Hungarians, the rest Ruthenians and Poles. The total population of 16—17 millions of Greater Roumania is composed as follows: 60—62% (10.5 millions) Roumanians, 13—14% (2.6 millions) Hungarians, 5.5% (1 million) Germans, and finally, Ruthenians and others. The total population of 12.5 millions of Greater Serbia is composed of 40—42% (5.1 millions) Serbs, 22% (2.8 millions) Croats.

9% (1.1 millions) Slovenes, 7—8% Hungarians, 7—8% Germans, 5% Mussulmans, the rest other nationalities. These figures show that Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania are racially a mixture to a greater extent than Hungary was. The total of the dominant race hardly exceeds the Hungarian majority in pre-war Hungary, and in the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Czechs are even a minority, if we disregard the fiction which represents the Czechs and Slovaks as of one and the same race. Thus in the name of the principle of nationality an old historic, geographical and economic unit, a living organism, has been destroyed, only to be replaced by new political organisations which from the racial point of view are as mixed as Hungary was, which can boast racial unity no more than could Hungary, and which lack other elements that for ten centuries gave to Hungary a force of cohesion, an indestructible vitality and a prosperity, the value of which we only realise now we have lost it.

Thus the partition of Hungary has resulted in the creation of three States of mixed nationalities instead of one, and of a situation distinctly less favourable. It has disintegrated a tried, existing geographical and economic unit, without having provided an adequate substitute, and has endeavoured to force into unity territories and populations which are geographically and economically distinct and separate. Whereas the geographical boundaries of Hungary were a chain of mountains uninhabited for the most part, the frontiers of the new States cut through the arteries of the economic organism; territories where the population is densest, and where economic and commercial life is most active; districts and villages which have for centuries lived in the closest economic relationship, have been thrown into different countries by the violent severance of natural ties.

Jugoslavia is the only country that may be regarded as an organisation where the Jugoslav race is predominant; that is to say, if we add together the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, these three races constitute three parts of the population of Greater Serbia. But anyone acquainted

with history will hardly agree to count these three races as one. Be this as it may, one quarter of the population is composed of alien races. Whence comes that alien element which disturbs the racial unity of Jugoslavia? Exclusively from Hungarian territory annexed by Jugoslavia, because only an insignificant proportion (22%) of the population of the annexed territory is of Jugoslav nationality. From the standpoint of the principle of nationality this annexation is wholly unjustifiable; according to this principle, this territory ought to have been detached from Jugoslavia, even had it belonged to her.

The self-determination of peoples and the principle of nationality are the fundamentals of the creation of universal peace. The application of one of these principles, however, in disregard of or even to the prejudice of the other may result in the greatest injustice. Those who blindly follow the principle of nationality attribute an overwhelming importance to the possession of a common language. It is, however, unjust to declare in advance that this principle is decisive under all circumstances, and equally unjust to suppose that every one interested in the question is of the same opinion, and need not therefore be consulted. In these days the economic factor is of equal, if not of greater force than that of language. The factors to which man clings most closely are the surroundings made up of various elements, not language alone, but also traditions, customs, origin, economic ties and the normal process of life. Difference of language alone is not a sufficient ground for political and economic alienation, when unity is imperatively demanded by nature, an historic community of a thousand years, the traditions and institutions attached to such community, and the close relations of economic life. Differences of language merely make it incumbent on the dominant race to foster the free development of the languages and individualities of the various nationalities, but do not demand the breaking up of areas which belong otherwise to each other.

Thus the principle of nationality has not profited by this breaking up.

But perhaps this disintegration was effected because the population of the alienated territories preferred to belong to the neighbouring States rather than to Hungary?

In the first place this cannot be true of the alienated Hungarians and Germans, and these constitute 45% of the alienated populations. And it would only apply to other nationalities if they had been given an opportunity of deciding by way of a *plébiscite*. The Hungarian Peace Delegation asked nothing more at the Peace Conference. The self-determination of peoples ought to have been respected, and it was the duty of the dictators to order *plébiscites* to be held. The Peace Conference refused to do this.

Upon what principles then were these new political organisations in the territories taken from us determined? They outrage the standards of history, geography, national economy and culture, and the reputed principle of nationality on which they are based is very insecure-ground. Their true bases are unhealthy ambitions, insatiable appetites, arbitrary instincts, hatreds, in short sentiments diametrically opposed to the principle of international justice. No structure built upon such foundations can endure, for organic forces are in revolt against such a violation of the natural order of things.

Thus Hungary was confined within artificial frontiers; she has been bereft of two-thirds of her industry; her most fertile districts of arable land, the Bácska and the Bánát have been presented to her neighbours; it is true, the great central plain has been left to us, but in what a condition!

Deprived of the possibility of a uniform regulation of water power, of the Transylvanian Alps and the pastures of the Carpathians for live stock, compelled to import timber, minerals, chemical products, and all raw materials required by industry! How can agriculture thus paralysed, and in addition ruthlessly looted by the Roumanian invaders support a nation? We have lost 60% of our compatriots, including 30% of pure Hungarians, who groan under an inexorable foreign yoke; we have lost the best part of our natural resources and the majority of those

cultural institutions which Hungarian civilisation had laboriously created in the course of centuries. They have taken from us the flourishing Universitites of Pozsony and Kolozsvár, the law-schools of Kassa, Nagyvárad and Pécs, the Protestant theological Colleges of Pozsony, Sárospatak, Eperjes, Nagyenyed, Maros Vásárhely, municipal museums, lyceums, gymnasiums and technical schools. All these have been destroyed with fanatical hatred and only in some cases replaced by institutions of an inferior grade — a process which will hardly redound to the glory of civilisation. Our excellent scientists have been expelled, and with them the directors, the officials and the employees of the undertakings. Nothing can compensate for this banishment of an Intelligentsia. The genius of mankind protests against this shameless waste of intellectual and moral forces, this wilful and deliberate set-back to civilisation, which is not only a deadly blow to Hungary, but also means an impoverishment of the human race.

The population alienated from us is faced with moral and economic decadence. This unnatural state of affairs is a menace to the peace of Europe.

This outpost of the West, for centuries the guardian and guarantor of its tranquillity, has been destroyed and replaced by vague and soulless mechanisms.

During the centuries which preceded the arrival of the Hungarians and their conversion to Christianity the West of Europe, constantly exposed to barbarous invasions, never knew tranquillity and peace. Its security has only existed since the Hungarian bulwark was erected. It is to the interest of permanent peace that the powder-magazine of Eastern Europe should not be enlarged and extended into the very heart of the continent. But this has actually been done, by attaching the greater part of Hungary to the Balkan States.

Historic Hungary steadfastly fulfilled her mission of maintaining the equilibrium, and securing the peace of Europe in the face of threatening dangers from the East. Her organic unity made her equal to this task. Pre-war Hungary possessed all the conditions of organic unity, save

one, that of racial unity. But this is also lacking in every one of the States erected upon the ruins of Hungary, nor do any of these possess Hungary's other qualifications. These Succession States cut through the natural geographical frontiers, obstruct that fruitful internal migration which brings workers to places where they find employment, interrupt the continuity of those traditions which created a common mentality in the past between those who had lived together for centuries, had undergone the same hardships, shared in the same glory and success, and met good and evil fortune alike together. Is it not to be feared that this tried centre of stability will be converted into a powder-magazine? We should not foster illusions, but should realise that these new artificial States will be undermined by irredentism, of a more dangerous kind than that which was said to have existed in Hungary, which existed perhaps in certain sections of the Intelligentsia, but never penetrated the masses. This new irredentism will be that of nationals not only irritated by subjection to foreign rule, but also by the fact that their rulers are their inferiors. It is conceivable that a minority of a higher intellectual level should rule a majority on a lower plane, but it is an organic impossibility that a minority or small majority of a lower culture should permanently dominate peoples who have attained a higher degree of civilisation, and that these should voluntarily submit and assimilate themselves.

The artificial arrangements embodied in the Peace Treaties will never secure political stability in this much disturbed part of Europe. Yet it is this alone that can save Central Europe from the perils that threaten it from the East.

These new States, moreover, stand in the way of the economic reconstruction so much needed; not only the economic recovery of Hungary, but also that of the Succession States themselves will be retarded if for no other reason, because in these, races of a higher culture are subordinated to their inferiors, and further, because the alienated populations, separated from the other parts of

that organic unit with which alone progress was possible for them, are doomed to a lamentable decadence. If in this part of Europe, so near to the fiery furnace of Bolshevism, labour conditions become increasingly difficult, and the resumption of productive work impossible, social order is bound to be imperilled.

The restoration of historic Hungary can alone satisfy the needs of the population and secure the interests of Europe, of civilisation, and even of the nations who are under the fatal delusion that the impoverishment of Hungary means their own enrichment. Neither public interest nor international justice offers any ground for the partition of Hungary.

Whether in a State, or an autonomous province, the agglomeration of men into a unit can only last if it be composed of homogeneous elements, kept together by the manifold ties of sentiment and interests, past and present, by geographic economic and historic communion.

The framework of such a unit cannot and must not be determined by foreign arbiters. This is why the Hungarian Peace Delegates demanded that the Hungarian people and the nationalities living in Hungary should be given an opportunity of deciding their future for themselves.

There is but one fiat to which we should bow, to which we should even sacrifice historic Hungary, and that is the fiat of the inhabitants of this contested territory. Any other solution is mere coercion. Only the freely expressed will of the peoples should be decisive. When such expression is made impossible, as it was, this is an admission that reluctant millions were forced to accept a foreign yoke, and the enslavement of the vanquished is thus approved as a guiding principle in the twentieth century!

The *plébiscite* is a moral institution, consonant with justice and human dignity. In spite of tyrannical oppression on the part of the Succession States, we still confidently demand a *plébiscite*, because it is our conviction that it was not only contrary to the interests, but also

contrary to the wishes of the various nationalities of pre-war Hungary that they were alienated, to say nothing of those four million pure Hungarians, the forcible alienation of whom is an unjust and cynical negation of human right and human feeling.

## 2. Slovakia

The north-western part of Hungary, called at present Slovakia, was a geographically integral part of historic Hungary. The geopolitical unity of Hungary is almost unparalleled, though it shows some analogy with that of Great Britain, of Italy and of the Iberian peninsula. It is not a mere coincidence that political States should have arisen in geographical unities, nor is it a mere coincidence that Hungary should have been able to maintain the unity determined by her geographical frontiers for over a thousand years. The frontiers of Hungary were at the same time a watershed, and the rivers rising in the Carpathians all flow down to the fertile central plain where the Slovaks have earned their livelihood for centuries. North-western Hungary was never attached to Bohemia politically, and the Czechs and the Slovaks never lived in political community.

It is true that about the middle of the ninth century the Moravian Principality and the Slovak Duchy of Nyitra amalgamated and constituted the Great Moravian Empire. The Czechs, however, never belonged to this Empire of Svatopluk, which indeed lasted less than half a century. The Czechs also maintain that later, during the Hussite wars, a part of north-western Hungary was incorporated in Bohemia. This, however, is not true. The actual fact is that the widow of the Hungarian King Albert invoked the aid of Giskra, the Captain of the Hussites, to put her youthful son, Ladislas, upon the throne. For these services Giskra received as his private property the castle of Zólyom and a part of north-western Hungary. The marauding Hussites, however, were definitively expelled from Hungary

by King Matthew in 1465. Thus the Czechs cannot plead historic rights.

Their ethnographic theory that the Czechs and the Slovaks are really one and the same nation with a common language and a common history is unfounded and fantastic. These two peoples have always differed in respect of race, language and political history. Czech and Slovak are kindred languages, as are, for example Polish and Slovak, Serb and Bulgar, or Italian and Spanish. But the Czech and the Slovak peoples barely understand each other, if we except the more educated classes of both races, though even these find great difficulty in communicating with each other. If they speak one and the same tongue, what is the use of a dictionary? Yet Czechoslovak dictionaries exist. Not only their language, but their geographical conditions, their manner of life, their agriculture, their architecture, the plan of their villages, their costumes, mentality, character, music and poetry are entirely different. If the two languages be kindred ones, there is little affinity between the peoples.

But even should we recognise the ethnic unity of these two peoples (which we by no means do), it would in no wise justify the annexation by the Czechs of a territory the population of which is 47% Slovak and 53% non-Slovak.

There is no doubt that for the Czechs it is a great advantage to possess, or to exploit Slovakia, but it is disastrous for Slovakia and is causing her economic ruin.

The mountainous district inhabited by Slovaks is rich in forests, minerals and water power, but very poor in agricultural products, especially in cereals. The Czechs have accordingly annexed the plains in the south of Slovakia, inhabited by one million Hungarians, in order to make up partly for the deficiency of food-stuffs in the Slovak territory.

North-western Hungary, inhabited by Slovaks, and the great Hungarian plain were entirely inter-dependent. It was the custom among the Slovaks to row down into the Hungarian plains in order to sell their wood, and to buy

flour, cattle, and food-stuffs. They also descended into the plains to gather in the harvest and thus make a living. The lowlands, on the other hand, obtained from Slovakia the wood, salt, mineral products, and water power they required. The Hungarian Governments have always made great financial sacrifices in order to create and develop industry in the Slovak territories, so that a considerable number of the Hungarian industrial plants were in Slovakia. These were of great service to the Slovaks, because they offered them new possibilities of income, but also of great service to the lowlands, enabling them to obtain industrial products from Upper Hungary. By the alienation of Upper Hungary the population, in the first place the Slovaks, have lost their harvest earnings, without obtaining any compensation from Bohemia, and the industrial concerns were ruined one after the other, for being separated from Hungary, they were unable to sell their goods, or to withstand the keen competition of Czech industry. Thus alienated Upper Hungary, and with it the whole Slovak population, has become a Czech colony, destined to supply Bohemia with cheap raw materials and cheap labour, but to be ruined industrially and to be deprived of agricultural earning. The great Czech factories have killed Slovak industry, and owing to the closing of the frontiers Slovak agricultural labourers can no longer make a living in Hungary.

It is, moreover, untrue that the Slovak people wished for union with the Czechs. The assertion refers to the Pittsburg resolution of May 30, 1918, and to the Turócz-Szentmárton resolution of October 30, 1918. The first was passed by a certain section of misinformed Slovak emigrants, and the second originated with the Turócz-Szentmárton so-called Slovak National Council. As regards the former it is evident that emigrant Slovaks in America are not competent to decide the fate of the Slovaks at home, and many of those who had signed the Pittsburg resolution subsequently withdrew their signatures with indignation when the real situation became known to them. Quite recently the Slovaks of America acclaimed

Lord Rothermere for his chivalrous denunciation of the injustices of the Treaty of Trianon. As regards the Turócz-Szentmárton resolution, the members of the so-called Slovak National Council were chosen by the Czechs among those on whose support they could reckon, and even so the resolution was carried by a majority of a few votes only. The truth is that the Slovaks never wished to be detached from Hungary, because if there be two nations in the world who are mutually dependent, it is the Hungarian and the Slovak nation. The only satisfactory solution would have been a *plébiscite*, but this was banned by the Czech Government for obvious reasons. Thus the selfish ambitions of certain Czech statesmen created the unnatural union between Bohemia and Slovakia, disastrous to Hungarians and Slovaks, although the existence and prosperity of Bohemia could have been secured without the ruin of Slovakia and Hungary.

Even now we Hungarians ask nothing more than a *plébiscite*, for we are convinced that the Slovaks never desired union with the Czechs, and are still less likely to desire it after their recent experiences. The Hungarians and the other races in the alienated territory would naturally wish with all their hearts to be re-united with Hungary. A *plébiscite* would of course have to be held under neutral control.

### 3. Russinsko.

This territory, from which the autonomy prescribed by the Treaty of Trianon has been persistently withheld by Czecho-Slovakia, included four Comitats of Upper Hungary. part of Máramaros, Ung, Ugocsa and Bereg. The population of this area consists of 42% Hungarians and Germans, 42% Ruthenians and 16% other nationalities.

The Ruthenians of Hungary have no history of their own, and no sense of national individuality. The original inhabitants of the territory in question were Hungarians and Saxons, and about the year 1360 King Lewis the Great settled Ruthenians there, who thus escaped the

persecution of the Poles. The Ruthenians of Hungary preserved their language, their customs and their religion, and far from wishing to separate from Hungary, they amalgamated with the Hungarians in all national and political respects.

Thus at the time of Francis Rákóczi, in 1703, the Ruthenians were the first to take up arms in defence of Hungarian liberty against the oppression of the Hapsburgs, and in the War of Independence of 1848/49 they fought loyally on the side of the Hungarians. The Ruthenians of Hungary never asked for national independence. They have lost their Russian character and have been assimilated by the Hungarians with whom they lived in perfect harmony. The Ruthenian orientation was towards the West; they became Catholics in the sixteenth century, and have since then possessed educated priests.

The town population of the territory is composed of 90.4% Hungarians and Germans, 4.1% Ruthenians, 5.5% others; the rural population of 33.4% Hungarians, 44.8% Ruthenians and 21.8% other nationalities. Thus the Ruthenians are not an industrial, but an agricultural people, who earned their bread by harvest work in the Hungarian lowlands.

This territory is distinct from Bohemia: in geographical situation, religion, historic past and, above all, by the will of the Ruthenian people. All the valleys and rivers of this territory flow towards the Hungarian plains, and communications follow this natural direction. The Ruthenian language differs so greatly from the Czech, that the two peoples do not understand each other. The Ruthenians are Greek Catholics, the Czechs are Hussites. No tradition connects the two peoples, beyond the fact that the Ruthenians fought on the side of the Hungarians against the invasions of the Hussites. It is not to the interest of the Czechs to foster Ruthenian industry, and they oppress it with all the means at their disposal.

Owing to the annexation by Czecho-Slovakia the Ruthenians were deprived of the possibilities of earning a livelihood by harvest work in Hungary, and Hungary,

on the other hand, lost the salt mines and other mines, and also the control of the forests, as a result of which she is exposed to the danger of floods. It was an outrage upon common sense to detach this territory from Hungary; half of the population are Hungarians, and the other half, the Ruthenians, live in perfect harmony with the Hungarians, and 65—70% of them even speak Hungarian. Hungary, moreover, did much for the economic prosperity of the district. A systematic *régime* was established, the Ruthenians were provided with cattle, their home industry was fostered, credit was organised, State-owned lands guaranteed steady employment.

This Ruthenian district had grown into the Hungarian plains; they cannot exist apart. The Ruthenians, although they have preserved their customs and traditions, always desired to remain with the Hungarians, never dreamt of separation; no wonder then that they are unhappy under Czech rule.

It should also be borne in mind that the Czechs have never given the Ruthenians the autonomy prescribed by the Peace Treaty, and have never even promised it for the future. What is this but a violation of the Peace Treaty?

To detach this territory from Hungary was the more ill-judged, in that Hungary is the most effectual bulwark against Bolshevism, whereas a Russinsko forced under Czech rule offers little security in this connection.

#### 4. Transylvania.

The Treaty of Trianon alienated from Hungary not merely Transylvania, but also the greater part of the Tisza and Körös district (the Comitats of Ugocsa, Szatmár, Szilág, Bihar, Arad, Krassó-Szörény, Temes and Torontál entirely or in part), as well as the southern part of Máramaros, and assigned all this to the Roumanian Kingdom. The population of the territory annexed by Roumania consists of 43% Roumanians, 35.5% Hungarians,

11% Germans (Saxons), and the remainder of other nationalities. Thus the Roumanians form only a relative majority, the number of Hungarians and Germans, who have identical interests, exceeds considerably that of the Roumanians, — a fact all the more decisive as the other nationalities living in this territory (Ruthenians, Serbians, Slovaks) had no wish to become Roumanian. Taking Transylvania alone, the figures are as follows: 55% Roumanians, 34.3% Hungarians, 8.7% Saxons. Hungarians and Saxons together thus constitute 43% of the population, as against a small absolute majority of Roumanians. An insignificant majority, however, cannot be accepted as decisive in determining political dependence.

The Hungarians are the original inhabitants of Transylvania, the Roumanians immigrated much later. The Hungarians and Saxons possess a much older and more highly developed civilisation; they live in the towns, are engaged in trade and industry, have always played an active part in Western civilised life, and have always taken the lead in Transylvania. It is impossible for Hungarians and Saxons to abandon the high level attained through the assiduous work of centuries, to become merged in an inferior Eastern civilisation and to accept the Balkan standard of morals. All the spiritual and material weapons which secure the preponderance of a race are in the hands of the Hungarians and Saxons; they can only be deprived of their superiority by persecution, and brutal force, and these are freely applied by the Roumanians who have unexpectedly become their masters.

Everything in Transylvania that stands for civilisation and progress, is the work of the Hungarians and Saxons. Their superiority, however, is by no means a result of artificial support given by the Hungarian State, nor of oppressive measures directed by them against the Roumanians. Any assumption of the sort is disproved by the fact that for three hundred years Transylvania lived an entirely separate and independent national life, and thus the Transylvanian Hungarians could not have derived any advantage from the numerical superiority of the

Hungarians in Hungary; their position in Transylvania was due to their own merits. The inferiority of the Roumanians of Transylvania to the Hungarians and Saxons is not, therefore, the result of oppression. The Roumanians are a young nation without traditions and only awoke to a sense of nationality in the middle of last century. They took their religion from Byzantium, the language of their ritual was Slav, and the Roumanian Church acquired its independence in Transylvania through the support of the Protestant Princes of the province. The national literature is quite modern. Even in Roumania proper the Roumanian race was unable until recent times to constitute a uniform State; they were ruled by various Voivods, who paid tribute sometimes to the Sultan, sometimes to the King of Hungary, and sometimes to the Prince of Transylvania. The rule of these Voivods weighed heavily upon the Roumanian people, who had no share in their government, and no elected representatives. Far from the current of historical events they lived the quiet life of shepherds and serfs. The Hungarians, on the other hand, connected themselves from the earliest times with Western civilisation, and for ten centuries they have taken an active part in all European events, from the Crusades and through the Reformation up to the present time. Thus the backwardness of Roumanian civilisation is natural enough, and it is also natural that living in political community with superior races it will be long before they attain their level.

Within the zone of the Carpathians the first real State was constituted by the Hungarians in the tenth century, after they had taken possession of the Transdanubian district and the lowlands. They could not, however, regard their tenure as secure until they possessed Transylvania, and therefore one of their tribes hastened to occupy the region. There they found a scanty Slav population living in a loosely knit community. Saint Stephen drew Transylvania into closer union with the Hungarian Kingdom which had meantime embraced Christianity, and Saint Ladislas effectively organised

that province to meet the threatened invasions of the Cumans and Petchenies from the East. Of the Hungarians who chose Transylvania as their future home, some settled in the Maros district (these are the ancestors of the Transylvanian Hungarians of to-day), and some — the Szeklers — in the area of the Küküllő and Olt rivers. In the territory between the Olt and the Maros, and in the area of Besztercze-Naszód King Géza II. settled Saxons, a German tribe from Flanders and the lower course of the Rhine. Thus in the twelfth century the districts of the Hungarians, Szeklers and Saxons took shape, each of them enjoying a separate territorial autonomy. The Roumanians in Hungary are mentioned for the first time in the beginning of the thirteenth century (1210). At this time began the infiltration into Transylvania of the half-nomad Roumanian herdsmen, who had lived in the East, together with the Cumans and the Petchenies. Roumanian immigration into Transylvania across the Danube assumed greater proportions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, owing to the advance of the Turks in the Balkans. The advance of the Roumanians can easily be traced by means of historic documents, which show that it kept pace with that of the Turks. The fantastic invention by which the Roumanians claim descent from the original inhabitants of Dacia, the legionaries and settlers of the Roman Emperor Trajan, dissolves under scientific criticism. The Roumanians of Transylvania are not the descendants of Latin immigrants in Dacia, but of the Wallachs, a Balkan tribe.

The immigrant Roumanians had great difficulty in adapting themselves to the economic, social and legal order of the Hungarian State. The subsequent constitutional law of Transylvania was built upon the unity of three nations (*unio trium nationum*), concluded in 1437 between the Hungarians, Szeklers and Saxons. It was an alliance of these three nations for mutual defence against attack, primarily against that of the Turks. The union of the three nations, however, did not affect Hungarian suzerainty over Transylvania.

After the battle of Mohács a decisive change took place in the position of Transylvania. After the occupation of Buda (1541) by the Turks they established themselves in the centre of the country, and historical Hungary was divided into two parts, an Eastern and a Western part. In 1542, at the Diet of Torda, Transylvania proclaimed itself an independent State, and inaugurated the period of the Transylvanian Principality which lasted until 1690. Casting off allegiance to the Hungarian Kingdom, it became a vassal of the Sultan, though in other respects, it remained the home of freedom of conscience and liberty of worship on the basis of the union of three nations and four religions. In the community of European States independent Transylvania represented Hungarian constitutional energy; and by its respect for freedom of conscience and liberty of worship, became a model State and one of the standard-bearers of civilisation. The peaceful and orderly conditions prevailing in the Transylvanian Principality made it a real asylum for the peasants of Moldavia and Wallachia, who escaped from the persecutions of the Turks and of their own Voivods in such numbers that at the end of the period of the Principality they represented half of the population of Transylvania. The Princes of Transylvania undertook to civilise these savage hordes. Prince George Rákóczy I. had the Bible translated into Roumanian (the Roumanians knew it only in Slav), and thereby not only deposed the Slav liturgic language in the Roumanian Church, but also laid the foundations of Roumanian national civilisation. Meanwhile Transylvania steadily resisted the endeavours of the Hapsburgs to incorporate the country in the Austrian Empire; their persistence was rewarded by the so-called *Diploma Leopoldinum* which accorded a special provincial autonomy to Transylvania; the Principality voluntarily returned to the Hungarian Holy Crown, from which fate had severed it for centuries. During this new epoch of Transylvanian history, the period of the so-called *Gubernium*, the province remained faithful to its constitutional principles, the union of three nations and four religions. But at the same time Transylvania

constantly urged complete union with Hungary; this was formally decreed in 1848, but obstructed by the Austrian absolutist *régime* then in power, was only actually effected in 1867.

Meanwhile the civilisation of the Roumanians was a question of great difficulty for the Hungarian Governments; the Hungarian Kings converted many of the Orthodox Roumanians of Transylvania to the Catholic faith, thus overcoming one of the cardinal obstacles to culture. The institutions of the Hungarian State, and Hungarian administration, together with the educational institutions of Transylvania tended to civilise the Roumanians to a certain extent, but their culture, although far superior to that of the Roumanians of the Roumanian Kingdom, falls short of that of the Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania.

When after a divorce of three hundred years Transylvania was reunited with Hungary, the autonomy of the Hungarians, Szeklers and Saxons came to an end, and was replaced by the administrative autonomy of the Comitats, which autonomy was extended to the Roumanians. The former territorial autonomy was replaced by national equality, by the self-government of all nationalities.

This principle enabled the autonomous bodies, from the administration of the villages up to the central government, to chose the language of their deliberations. The administrative and religious autonomy of the nationalities was completed by their economic autonomy. The forests of the Saxon „Seven Judges“, of the Comitat Csik, of the Roumanians of the Krassó-Szörény and Naszód districts and the large estates of the Szekler landowners of Marosszék were all autonomous national properties. The liberty of the Churches was also based upon a liberal autonomy. Thus Transylvania was the home of religious freedom, of learning, of friendly collaboration and of democratic administration. Thus every institution of civilisation was penetrated by the spirit of autonomy, and confidence was inspired by the idea that every measure was being applied by freely elected officials controlled by the

people. Constitutional principles and a sense of equity are, therefore, deeply rooted in the Transylvanian population.

The incorporation of Transylvania into Roumania throws back this province with its advanced institutions into conditions which it had long ago left behind. In Roumania there is no trace of a local autonomy with historical roots, the people are excluded from public life, right is subordinated to party strife, and the result is a corruption which endangers public morals and economic life. Roumania has swept away the modern institutions of the Hungarians, Roumanians and Saxons of Transylvania, balkanising administration and public spirit. The rights of the minorities secured by Treaties exist on paper only and serve merely to bluff international Congresses.

Those who took part in the meeting of Gyulafehér-vár demanded complete national freedom for the people of Transylvania, equal rights and liberties for all religious bodies, democratic institutions in every field of public life, more especially universal suffrage (to include votes for women) and secret ballot, freedom of the press, right of public meeting and assembly, and freedom of propaganda for all intellectual ideas.

These demands go much farther than the rights secured for the minorities by the Treaties.

However, Roumania has paid as little respect to one as to the other, and treats all non-Roumanians who came under her rule with revolting harshness. The object of the agrarian reform is not to help the peasants, but to ruin the Hungarian landowners. It is thus only one of the means for the oppression of the minorities. All State functions are reserved for the dominant race. The minorities are entirely excluded from constitutional life, and all local autonomies are suppressed.

Transsylvania had long ago solved the question of nationality, at least as regards those nationalities (Hungarians, Szeklers, Saxons) which were mature enough for self-government and for participation in official life. At that time the Roumanians who had immigrated in masses much later than their fore-runners, were not yet fit for

these tasks. Later, when they had attained a higher degree of civilisation, and could justly claim the prerogatives enjoyed by the other nationalities, the constitutional privileges of these gave way to the equality of all citizens.

The Transylvanian question must be solved in accordance with this traditional Transylvanian spirit. All the more so as the leaders of the Roumanians of Transylvania never thought of secession from Hungary, and aspired only to a certain autonomy within the boundaries of the Hungarian State. Transylvanian race-consciousness and Transylvanian patriotism are underlying sentiments in them which cannot be suppressed; their case is comparable to that of the Germans, French and Italians of Switzerland who feel themselves to be in the first place Swiss, and only afterwards Germans, French or Italians.

The Roumanians of Transylvania did not even hesitate for a moment when Roumania declared war on the Dual Monarchy. On this point we need only refer — setting aside the countless declarations of loyalty made by the Roumanians of Transylvania and their leaders (Bishops, members of Parliament etc.) — to the Roumanian national protest issued by all the leaders of the Roumanians of Transylvania in 1917, when the note of the Entente Powers to the President of the U. S. was published, declaring that the object of the war against the Central Powers was the liberation from foreign rule of the various nationalities. In the protest in question all the leading Roumanians of Transylvania categorically repudiated the assertion that they were living under foreign rule. They declared that the Roumanians of Transylvania were free citizens of the Hungarian fatherland, and that there was not a single law in Hungary that discriminated in respect of rights, liberties and duties, between citizens speaking Hungarian and those speaking any other language. The Roumanians of Hungary, therefore, did not acclaim the promised liberation, but insisted on the integrity of the Hungarian State. They also declared that they did not adhere to their Hungarian fatherland from motives of self-interest, but because they were convinced by the

experience of centuries and by historic tradition that their intellectual, political and economic development could only be secured within the boundaries of Hungary.

Up to November, 1918, there was no trace among the Roumanians of Transylvania of a secession movement. The Roumanian leaders adhered unswervingly to the programme laid down by the national congress of the Roumanians of Transylvania in 1881. The essential feature of this programme was insistence on the territorial autonomy of Transylvania, i. e. a demand that the Hungarian law of 1868 on nationalities should be supplemented by provision for their territorial autonomy. The secession movement only came into being after the collapse of the Central Powers, when Transylvania was occupied by Roumanian troops, and under the pressure of these troops. Even the Gyulaféhérvár resolution was passed by an insignificant Roumanian fraction only, under such pressure. The population of Transylvania had no opportunity of expressing itself, and therefore the actual situation is one of annexation of which they are the victims. We are convinced that were a *plébiscite* now held, the Transylvanians would, after their recent experiences, show themselves even less disposed for union with Roumania, than formerly.

History, therefore, teaches us that Transylvania cannot exist without Hungary; owing to the geographical situation of the province, and the identity of Transylvanian and Hungarian civilisation. The numerical preponderance of the Roumanians in Transylvania since the eighteenth century, and their national and political aspirations which gradually developed in the nineteenth century make the territorial autonomy of Transylvania an urgent problem. In view of the considerable changes brought about by the war, and the interests involved in a peaceful cohabitation of the three nations, (the Hungarians, Roumanians, and Saxons) the political consolidation of Transylvania without a complete political and territorial autonomy is unimaginable. Moreover, the geographical situation of Transylvania, her economic conditions and the development

of Roumanian civilisation under Hungarian protection imperatively demand that Transylvania should be given political and territorial autonomy within the boundaries of the Hungarian State.

Of all possible solutions the most inadmissible is that which proposes to realise Transylvanian autonomy in connection with a union with Roumania.

Even the Roumanians of Transylvania have been disillusioned by the Balkan *régime* established in the province, and the corruption and despotism of its executive. The Transylvanians — including the Roumanians — wish for security, order and economic development. It is of European importance that permanent peace should prevail in the province, that its peoples should develop freely, and that civilisation should be preserved. This is only possible if Transylvania remain in contact with Western civilisation, and if the rights and peace of the minorities be preserved. Transylvania has hitherto been united with Hungary, who would certainly grant it that complete autonomy which the Roumanians have plainly and definitively refused. Under such circumstances to leave Transylvania incorporated in Roumania would be an outrage upon civilisation. In every respect there is the greatest possible contrast between Roumanian and Transylvanian institutions. The incorporation of Transylvania into Roumania means the degradation of the free, democratic and highly developed Transylvanian institutions and privileges to the low level of the primitive requirements of the Roumanian State.

Transsylvania has for centuries been a home of democracy, and European institutions, ideas and principles acquired a democratic character when introduced in Transylvania. The Transylvanian constitution has been built up on the complete equality of races and religions; legislation, administration and jurisdiction were based upon the same principle. And what lent special value to the Transylvanian constitution, was the full protection enjoyed by the racial and linguistic minorities. Roumania, on the other hand, condemns these minorities to slavery.

Transylvanian autonomy within the boundaries of Hungary should of course only extend to historic Transylvania, other Hungarian districts annexed by Roumania such as the Körös and Máramaros districts, would naturally find their future happiness in reunion with Hungary.

## 5. The Bácska and the Bánát

The Serbs support the annexation of the Bácska and the Bánát by historical and ethnographical arguments. These are entirely unfounded. The Serbian despots never exercised sovereign rights in the territory of Hungary, although some of them became connected with the Árpád dynasty, and possessed great estates in Hungary which, however, had merely the character of private property. During the period of Turkish invasion great numbers of Serbian settlers came into Hungary, especially those who were expelled by the Turks. A considerable settlement was effected under the Emperor Leopold I., when 36.000 Serbian families, under the leadership of Arsen Czernovitch, the patriarch of Ipek, settled in the Bácska, the Bánát and Syrmia. The majority of the Serbians at present living in the territory of historic Hungary only immigrated in the course of the eighteenth century.

The Roumanians of the Bánát infiltrated from Transylvania and Lesser Wallachia. The Swabians from the Rhine province and Wurttemberg were settled mainly by Maria Theresa and Joseph II. in Southern Hungary, by the latter chiefly to counter-balance the Hungarians. These Swabians, however, became intimate with the Hungarians, and always sided with them; the most glorious example of this solidarity was their attitude in the War of Independence of 1848/49. The Germans of Southern Hungary can never be regarded as a race with interests opposed to those of the Hungarians.

If we consider the Bácska and the Bánát jointly, the relative majority belongs to the Hungarians, followed by Germans, Roumanians and Serbs. (605.000 Hungarians,

570.000 Germans, 490.000 Roumanians, 430.000 Serbs). In the Bánát itself the population is composed as follows: 590.000 Roumanians, 380.000 Germans, 280.000 Serbs and 240.000 Hungarians. The population of the Bácska is overwhelmingly Hungarian. Hungarian predominance will not even be affected, if we add to the Serbs the Shokatz and Bunievatz races who, however, differ greatly from the Serbs.

These two races immigrated into Hungary from Dalmatia in 1687, a few years before the Serbs came from the Ipek district. The Bunievatz are Catholics and use Latin letters, the Serbs are Greek Orientals and use Cyrillic characters. The Bunievatz use the Gregorian calendar, the Serbs the Julian calendar. The Bunievatz and Shokatz adapted themselves to the Hungarians, always sided with them, and in 1918 declared against secession.

Originally the population of the Bánát was also purely Hungarian, but in the course of time, as the Turks expelled the Hungarians, considerable settlements took place, mainly of Roumanians, Serbs and Swabians. But in addition to these Bunievatz, Shokatz, Ruthenians, Croats, Bulgars, Czechs, Italians, Spaniards, French and Greeks also settled in the Bánát, all of them to replace Hungarians killed when defending Hungary and Europe against the Turk. As a result of this the population of the Bánát is so intermixed that almost every village is composed of various nationalities, and that it is impossible to establish ethnographic boundaries.

Among the four main nationalities, the Hungarians and the Germans were far ahead in respect of education. In the towns the Hungarians are the acknowledged leaders, loyally supported by the Germans. Among the five towns of the Bácska the population of four is preponderatingly Hungarian, and only in one of them is there a Serb majority. Out of the eight towns of the Bánát there is one with a small Serb majority, in all the others the Hungarians and the Germans predominate.

The only just proceeding would have been to leave these territories inhabited by a mixed population with

Hungary, for they entirely depend on Hungary geographically, historically, orographically and hydrographically. It cannot be to the interest of Europe nor indeed of the civilised world, that the frontiers of a thousand years should be changed, that this territory should be balkanised, and made over to an inferior type of Oriental culture and to Balkan strife.

Neither the Bácska, nor the Bánát has ever been a separate province; they were always component parts of Hungary, divided into several Comitats. Neither of them was even an administrative unit, save for a short period when the Bánát was under Austrian military rule. When Hungarian constitutional independence was re-established, this short-lived military separation ceased.

Is it justice that the Hungarians, surrounded by alien races, living in the very heart of Europe and concentrated in one State, should lose 37.5% of their own nationals, they who defended Europe with their life blood and offered hospitality to the expelled, Serbs persecuted by the Turks, and the Roumanians oppressed by the Phanariots? Is it equitable that these same peoples should snatch from them the best of their nationals and of their territory? Hungary can never accept these losses, because she is convinced that should the peoples with whom she lived in close community be consulted they would declare for the maintenance of political and economic union with Hungary, and would at most ask that the rights formerly enjoyed by the various nationalities should be crowned by territorial autonomy.

The Hungarian nation which, mutilated and despoiled, has obtained complete independence and is no longer bound by those ties which connected it with the Austrian Empire, would certainly lend a willing ear to the expressed wishes of the nationalities. In practice they enjoyed more extensive rights in Hungary than those granted them in theory by the Minority Treaties. These theoretical assurances moreover have proved futile, because the Succession States, in gross violation of their obligations, systematically persecute and oppress their minorities.

## 6. Burgenland

In the past very little was known of Hungary in foreign countries where neither our policy nor our economic situation was understood. Foreign statesmen, industrials and financiers were ignorant of our country, because we had no foreign trade and no diplomatic body apart from those of Austria. Hungarian independence could not manifest itself in external relations. The common diplomatic representation merely served Austrian interests. Our exports passed into Austria and were transmitted to foreign countries deprived of their Hungarian character. Legally, Austria and Hungary were equal partners within the Dual Monarchy, but Austria was the stronger, on account of her larger population and her greater wealth, and also because the ruler and the dynasty were Austrian.

The history and the internal structure of the two States were, however, widely different. The territorial unity of the Austrian Empire was the result of the policy pursued by the dynasty; the various countries and provinces composing the Empire, although each possessed an historic past of its own, came in the course of time under the rule of the Hapsburgs and were united by them. Austria was an artificial structure created by the tenacious policy of the Hapsburgs. Hungary, on the contrary, was not an agglomeration of conquered countries and provinces, but has been from the beginning a uniform body, a perfect geographical unit, and for ten centuries also a national, historical and economic unit.

The disintegration of Hungary is therefore a very different matter from that of Austria. Austria was an agglomeration of separate provinces united under Hapsburg rule. The world war swept away the Hapsburgs, and the decomposition of the various provinces was almost an automatic process. Hungary, however, was a uniform living organism, Croatia being the only separate province. Had we lost Croatia alone, this might have been justified by its provincial independence. Its loss is only painful to us, because it cuts us off from the Adriatic. But the rending

in pieces of the living body which Hungary was is a tragedy that cannot be compared with the natural decomposition of the Austrian Empire. All the more regrettable is it that even diminished Austria was among those who shared in the spoil and hacked off a bit of our flesh and blood.

Austria claimed on historic grounds the Western Hungarian territory known as Burgenland. There is no legal basis for such a claim. It is untrue that this territory was originally inhabited by Teutons. When the Hungarians took possession of it, they found there a scanty Slav population, slightly intermixed with Goths and Avars. No one ever questioned Hungarian rule. Certain Austrian nobles in the twelfth century began to covet the Hungarian fortresses and estates along the frontier. The Hapsburgs, in return for money lent to the impecunious Hungarian King Sigismund, obtained mortgages on certain estates. These mortgages, however, were of a private nature, and in no wise affected the territorial sovereignty of the King of Hungary. Austria, therefore, cannot claim Western Hungary on these grounds.

Neither can she do so on economic grounds, under the pretext that this area feeds Vienna. Firstly, if a great city obtains its food supply from a neighbouring country, this does not constitute a legal title to annex that territory, and secondly Vienna obtains comparatively small quantities of food-stuffs, mainly vegetables from the Burgenland. Vienna obtains the bulk of its food supply, meat, milk etc. from other parts of Hungary, mostly through the intermediary of Györ, and considerable quantities come from the Hungarian lowlands. If, therefore, Austria is entitled to annex territories that feed Vienna, she could claim half Hungary. In addition, the Germans living in these territories, the so-called Hientzes, are not Austrian Germans or Styrians, but are of Frankish and Flemish origin, with many Hungarian features in their language and customs. These Hientzes declare for Hungary.

Austria has not only no legal title to the annexed territory, but its annexation was an act of base ingratitude.

an immoral act; for Hungary suffered with Austria during the war, and in fact went to war for the benefit of Austria; she herself never desired the war, which was against her interests.

The only territory, moreover, which was consulted by the Peace Conference as to the proposed transfer, was Sopron with its environs, and they declared for Hungary and remained within her frontiers. This was an indication that had the Peace Conference complied with the natural request of the Hungarian Peace Delegation, as to *plébiscites* in the territories the transfer of which was contemplated, the present situation would have been very different. The mutilation of Hungary was an act of injustice, coercion and robbery, contrary to all law, and contrary to the will of the population who were driven like sheep from Hungarian territory to foreign domination.

## 7. Injustices in the Execution of the Treaty

So far we have dealt with the injustices embodied in the Treaty of Trianon itself. Let us now glance at the illegalities perpetrated against the Hungarians by the unjust execution of the Treaty.

The truth is that whereas those articles of the Treaty (about 99% of the whole) which are ruining us are being applied with the utmost severity, nay, ruthlessness, the remaining one per cent, which embody certain rights accorded to us, are overlooked. An infinity of injustices is the result of this attitude; they would fill volumes, but we shall restrict ourselves to a general statement without dwelling upon details.

In the first place we must mention that we were misled by the so-called Millerand Letter. This letter, which was handed to the President of the Hungarian Peace Delegation together with the Treaty, contained a promise that the League of Nations would see to the rectification of the proposed frontier line, should this be so drawn as to prejudice racial and economic interests. Although this promise

entitled us to hope that at least some part of the 3½ million Hungarians forced under foreign rule would come back to us, and although this promise induced the Hungarian Government to accept the crushing terms of the Peace Treaty, the suggested rectifications were not only never made, but the Millerand Letter was presently so interpreted as to exclude the possibility of rectification. This shows that the Millerand Letter was merely a decoy by which we were induced to sign the Treaty.

Even the merciless Treaty of Trianon left untouched Hungary's internal, constitutional organisation, and did not impose any restrictions upon our national sovereignty. And yet, when in the autumn of 1921 the late King Charles unexpectedly returned to Hungary, the forces of two of the Succession States, in defiance of the prohibition embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, mobilised and marched to the Hungarian frontier, threatening war upon our completely disarmed country, unless the King and the dynasty were at once deposed. The League of Nations, instead of protecting the disarmed country against the illegal military preparations and menaces of its neighbours, disregarded the application of the Hungarian Government for assistance, and thereby sanctioned the interference of the Succession States in Hungary's internal affairs.

If the Succession States are thus allowed to terrorise and coerce Hungary in questions as regards which not even the Peace Treaty admits of interference, it will be easy to realise that these States do not respect the very few rights accorded to us by the otherwise disastrous Treaty. There are only 3—4 such favourable clauses in the 364 articles of the Treaty. One of these clauses establishes that the Treaty of Trianon and the so-called Minority Treaties connected therewith secure certain rights for the national minorities; the second provides for a general limitation of armaments following upon our disarmament; the third prohibits the confiscation of the properties of those who retain their Hungarian nationality; and finally, the Treaty does not leave certain controversies between Hungarian

nationals and the Succession States to the mercy of the latter, but refers these questions to Mixed Arbitral Tribunals.

We shall prove that we are unable to assert the few rights enumerated above, for the Succession States disregard all stipulations favourable, or at least not unfavourable to Hungary — and this they are permitted to do with impunity.

## 8. The Question of Minorities

The Peace Treaties — notably the Treaty of Trianon — have in defiance of Wilsonian principles transferred vast territories from one country to another without consulting the populations concerned. To the credit of the Great Powers, however, it must be said that prejudiced though they were in favour of the Succession States, they made it a condition of their territorial aggrandisement that the minorities transferred should be duly protected from eventual oppression, and compelled the Succession States to guarantee such protection. To this end the Great Powers concluded with all the Succession States separate treaties, commonly known as Minority Treaties, in which all the rights prescribed for the racial, linguistic and religious minorities are exactly defined.

These prescriptions are less important in themselves than the fact that the question of the rights of minorities was withdrawn from the constitutional orbit of the States concerned, and brought into that of international law. It must be dealt with, not alone by the State in whose territory the minorities live, but also by the signatory Powers of the Treaties, within the limitations of the latter.

The Succession States have not only undertaken to embody the prescriptions of the Minority Treaties in the Codes of their respective laws, but also to place the rights secured for the minorities under international protection. This protection is exercised by the League of Nations partly through the Council of the League, and partly through the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The legal definitions of the rights secured to the minorities are, unfortunately, somewhat narrow and defective. For example, the right of using a minority language before the Courts was secured, but the right to use it before the administrative authorities, a matter of even greater importance, was not included, nor was the right to use it at meetings of local administrative bodies. Another defect is that certain terms of the Treaties are vague. Thus they stipulate that those minorities which represent a considerable proportion of the population must be given facilities, for the instruction of their children in their own tongue; but they fail to define these facilities, nor is the required proportion determined, and these uncertain terms are open to the arbitrary interpretation of the majority. It is further characteristic of the careless drafting of the Treaties that they do not secure autonomous rights for the minorities living in compact masses, save in a few cases, such as those of the Ruthenians in the Czechoslovak Republic, and the Szeklers and Saxons in Roumania. It should, however, be added that even these exceptions are valueless, as they have never been carried into effect. Further, there is no provision allowing citizens themselves to decide whether they belong to the majority or to some minority. Yet this is very necessary, and its omission leads to frequent abuses, the State often claiming some individual of the minority for the majority, on the strength of his name, or of some other arbitrary criterion. The obvious purpose of such manoeuvres is to improve statistics in favour of the majority, or to deprive the minorities of certain rights dependent upon some numerical criterion (e. g. maintenance of schools, the language used in schools). The falsification of statistical returns and of the results of a census and the manipulation of statistical data for the purpose of preventing the minorities from proving their right to the use of their own language in schools should be penalised. The Minority Treaties omit to insist explicitly on the equality of all citizens of a State in respect of franchise and agrarian legislation, irrespective of race, language and religion. It was necessary

to state this, for it has become the practice to treat the minorities in respect of franchise and land reform with less consideration than the majorities. There is no stipulation in the Minority Treaties which secures for the minorities the right of using their language, equally with the language of the State in all official proceedings, in districts where they represent a considerable proportion of the total population. Nor is it stipulated that official communications to the minorities should be made in their own language in districts where they are scattered over the area concerned. It is not stipulated that their children should be taught in their mother-tongue wherever possible. The Minority Treaties do not contain any stipulations that the legal status of the schools maintained by minorities should be the same as that of those maintained by majorities, that the minorities should be left in enjoyment of their endowments, and that the endowments taken from them should be returned. The Minority Treaties ought to have stipulated that in political matters the State should take into account the feelings of the minorities, and should pursue a policy satisfactory to all citizens.

In 1868 the Hungarian State granted by legal enactment, voluntarily and without outside pressure, more extensive privileges to minorities than those exacted by the Great Powers from the Succession States. The Hungarian law secured to the minorities rights on the basis of which they could freely enjoy their own national and religious life, and develop their culture. They were in no way cut off from social and cultural relations with their fellow-nationals in other countries. It is of course desirable that the rights of minorities in the Succession States should be so far extended as to make them equal to those as they enjoyed in Hungary, but as a first international step it would be sufficient to enforce the minimum of rights as embodied in the Minority Treaties, since these prescribe the protection of the lives and liberty of minorities, acknowledge them as citizens with rights equal to those of nationals, and to a certain degree accord the freedom

of using their language before the Courts, of maintaining schools, and of developing their culture.

Unfortunately, however, these minority rights exist only on paper, because in the international field all that happened was that they were placed under the protection of the League of Nations. In practice, moreover, this protection proved valueless, because the League of Nations has never exercised its powers on its own initiative, and the minorities have neither the right nor the possibility of demanding protection. The Succession States, which pursue an imperialistic policy, were from the outset reluctant to sign the Minority Treaties, but eventually did so, as this had been made a condition of their territorial aggrandisement. As, however, the League of Nations not only fails to exercise any control over the treatment of the minorities, but pays no attention to their complaints, the Succession States naturally disregard the obligations undertaken by them and treat the minorities in an entirely arbitrary manner, well knowing that they have no means of seeking legal redress.

All the Minority Treaties contain the stipulation that measures relating to minorities are international obligations and are under the control of the League of Nations. They further provide that every member of the Council of the League may draw the attention of the Council to the violation of any of these obligations, or to the danger of its violation, in order to enable the Council to take the steps and issue the instructions which seem adequate in a given case. Finally these Treaties also provide, that should there be any divergence of opinion between a member of the Council of the League and the State interested, it should be regarded as a dispute of an international character, and should, upon request of the member of the Council concerned, be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Thus in theory we possess a well constructed system for the protection of the rights of minorities. But what is the value of a theory, if it is never put into practice?

The Council of the League fails to exercise its power to

protect the minorities, and neglects to deal with complaints addressed to it. This attitude is easily explained. Only a member of the Council has the right to draw attention to a minority question, and the members of the Council are indifferent to complaints and never feel disposed to initiate proceedings. In the Council of the League, in addition to the Great Powers, only the Little Entente and some former neutral States are represented. Until lately, no Central European State was represented, although most of the minorities live in territories alienated from one or the other of these States. The members of the Council are reluctant to deal with minority questions; even if a member should think it fair that the Council should consider some point raised, he eventually fails to take any steps that might arouse the resentment of the Succession States, against which most of the complaints are directed. Thus in spite of thousands of complaints, the Council in the course of five years has dealt only with two, as is officially established on page 31 of „La Société des Nations et les Minorités“, published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

It is in fact evident that the road to the competent forum is barred for complainants belonging to the minorities. The Council of the League takes care that this road should remain impracticable, and even that it should be made more impracticable. It has been suggested in many quarters that the Council should constitute a Committee to deal only with minority questions. The Council, it was urged, is the official protector of the minorities, and should, therefore, systematically deal with their affairs. But the Council has consistently refused to form such a Committee. Instead of this the following practice has been adopted: the President of the Council, assisted by two members, from time to time read over the complaints received, and after this cursory examination decide summarily whether any of them is of such a nature that some member of the Council might demand its being dealt with by that body. In the course of this summary procedure it is decided in the first place whether a complaint is acceptable or not. Some

of the conditions of acceptability are severe, others are fantastic, such as that which requires that the complaint must not be couched in passionate terms. If the complaint be acceptable, it is transmitted to the State against which it is directed, for an expression of opinion. The declaration made by the State concerned is, together with the complaint, communicated to the members of the Council, in order that any who may be willing to take the matter up, may signify such intention. Should no member of the Council come forward, the matter is dismissed once for all. As, however, the members of the Council are invariably satisfied with the declaration of the State against which a complaint has been made, complaints reaching the Council are hardly ever considered, but are shelved in the archives.

To such a pitiable state has the Council of the League, the official protector of minorities, been reduced!

This indifference of the Council of the League must be qualified as a breach of duty. In its decision of October 22, 1920, the Council itself explained how the clause of the Minority Treaties which placed minorities under the protection of the League of Nations must be understood. From the point of view of the League of Nations — said the Council — this lays down not only a right, but a duty, i. e. the duty of seeing that the Treaties concerning the protection of minorities are carried out.

Thus it is the duty of the League of Nations *ex officio* to exercise such control. The Council of the League, however, never takes action in these matters *ex officio*, but waits for an application from outside, and even makes itself inaccessible to the complaints of minorities, and acts indeed as the protector of the majorities, as shown in its constant emphasis on the duty of loyalty on the part of the minorities towards the ruling State. No doubt, the obligation of such loyalty exists, but how is it that the official guardian insists so strongly upon it, while neglecting to satisfy itself that these States fulfil their international obligations towards the minorities? For loyalty must be

reciprocal: and a State which tramples upon the rights of the minorities cannot claim their allegiance.

This attitude of the Council of the League cannot be excused by the plea of national sovereignty which the Succession States are constantly making. These States maintain that every international step taken in the interest of the minorities violates their sovereignty, and is an interference in their internal affairs. There is no justification for this attitude, since these States acknowledged in Treaties that the obligations undertaken by them towards minorities are placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations, and that the violation of minority rights, and even the danger of such violation, are questions for the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The plea is, therefore, a mere pretext for debarring the minorities from all international legal redress. And this means that those States which undertook by international treaties to respect the rights of minorities are freed from all control, and may observe or disregard their international obligations at will. All this, however, would be of secondary importance, could the minorities reach another forum, which is not a political but a judicial body, inspiring more confidence, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. But here again there are lions in the path. One way of approach is through a member of the Council of the League, who must propose that the matter be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Another way if two States are concerned is, that these should mutually agree to bring the matter before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It has already been explained how artificially and arbitrarily the Council of the League deals with minority questions, and in like manner it evades the responsibility of referring them to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The second solution need not be considered under present circumstances, since every one of the Succession States would refuse to appear before a Court.

The sad truth is that *the rights of minorities are in fact only guaranteed on paper, because it is impossible to bring complaints before the competent authorities.*

All Europe resounds with complaints at the failure of the Succession States to observe the Minority Treaties, but there is no one to consider the case of the minorities, because these are debarred from bringing grievances or controversial matters before the competent authorities.

The minorities suffer under this system of terrorism, and they are left to the mercies of the States under whose yoke they were forced. No single item of the Minority Treaties is being observed; the minorities are oppressed, degraded to the level of second class citizens, deprived of the right to use their own language; their properties are confiscated under the plea of land reform, their schools are being closed down or denationalised, they are removed from their posts, deprived of their pensions, obstructed in the exercise of professions such as medicine, law, and engineering; their cultural intercourse with their fellow-nationals in other countries, mainly in the mother-country, is made impossible; in many cases their citizenship is not recognised and they are expelled wholesale.

If, therefore, the League of Nations does not wish to lose the confidence of millions of peoples, it must abandon its obstructive methods in minority matters. Above all, it must break with the actual system which is an open defiance of minority rights, and a neglect of their duty to protect minorities. The indispensable feature of a necessary reform is that the right of inducing the competent authorities to deal with minority questions should not be a privilege reserved for members of the Council, but should be exercised by every State, or at least by all those which are members of the League of Nations. It is further essential that this right should be accorded to the minorities themselves, or at least to their representative bodies.

The situation created by the enforced Peace Treaties can only be maintained for a while — and this not in our interests, but in those of the victors — if the alienated peoples and groups are fairly treated by their new masters, so far at least as to enable them to enjoy the rights secured to them by the Minority Treaties. The League of Nations has undertaken this task, but has so far not ful-

filled it. Should it prove powerless to do so in the future, the idea of the revision of the Peace Treaties will acquire an elemental force. The dissatisfied millions can only be tranquillised and induced to suffer present conditions for the time being, if the Minority Treaties are honestly carried out.

The non-observance of these Treaties and the merciless oppression of the minorities have demonstrated the necessity for the measures contemplated in Article 19 of the Covenant. Unfortunately, the prescriptions in the preamble of the Covenant as to justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, are illusory. There are but two ways of escape from the present *impasse*: one is action by the League of Nations which would give the minorities hope of the redress of their grievances, and the other is the revision of the Peace Treaties. Should the League of Nations delay the proposed action, the second alternative, revision, will inevitably follow. It will be demanded by the public opinion of a conscience-stricken world.

## 9. Loss of Citizenship.

The conduct of Czecho-Slovakia in the question of citizenship in the territories alienated from Hungary is a striking example of the utter disregard of minority rights by the Succession States. The Treaty of Trianon, as well as the Minority Treaty concluded between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Great Powers recognise it as a right of the minorities that they should be acknowledged as citizens. It sounds incredible, yet it is a fact, that the Czecho-Slovak authorities endeavour to get rid of as many Hungarians as possible by refusing to acknowledge even this fundamental human right — a right hardly less elementary than the right to breathe.

All those who possessed *pertinenza* in one of the communes of former Upper Hungary, now Slovakia, have through the transfer of this territory to the Czecho-Slovak

Republic lost their Hungarian citizenship and have become Czecho-Slovak citizens. The question as to who possessed *pertinenza* in Slovakia at the time of the transfer must naturally be decided according to the Hungarian laws, because at the time *pertinenza* could only be acquired on the basis of these laws. The question would have been a simple one, had a list been kept in Hungary of all those possessing *pertinenza*. Such lists, however, are unknown in Hungary for the simple reason that according to the Hungarian law concerning communes *pertinenza* may be tacitly acquired without application for admittance into the community of some village. It is in fact quite exceptional to acquire *pertinenza* by means of a special application. The overwhelming majority of Hungarian citizens acquire *pertinenza* either through descent from parents who possessed *pertinenza* in some commune, or tacitly after living for four consecutive years in some village, and contributing for a certain period, or permanently during residence, to the public revenue of the commune. The acquisition of *pertinenza* by such means is a fundamental and special provision of the Hungarian law concerning communes, recognised and applied by all Hungarian administrative authorities, and also by the High Court. All law books and all writers on civil and administrative law interpret the law in this sense. Doubts have sometimes been expressed as to whether the uninterrupted period of four years refers to residence only, or to the contribution to public revenue. But even this doubt was settled by the High Administrative Court which pronounced that since the law requires the four years' continuity only as regards residence, and not as regards contribution to public revenue, *pertinenza* is automatically acquired, even should the person concerned have failed during his four years' residence to contribute continuously to public revenue, and have only made such contribution on one occasion.

After the annexation of Hungarian territories the Czecho-Slovak authorities at first applied the Hungarian law in the same manner as the Hungarian authorities had done hitherto.

The first disturbance in the application of the law, which is in entire keeping with the words and the spirit of the law, as well as with its legislative intention, was caused by the decision, No. 16.213 of 1921 of the Supreme Administrative Court at Prague which interpreted Article 10 of the Hungarian law to mean that the tacit acquisition of *pertinenza* requires, in addition to four years' consecutive residence in a place, an uninterrupted contribution to public revenue during that period. The Czecho-Slovak administrative authorities at once adopted this decision. Subsequently the Prague Supreme Court made a decision, No 16.455 of December 28, 1923, which entirely set aside the 50 years' practice followed hitherto; it decreed that *pertinenza* could not be acquired tacitly, *ipso facto*, automatically, on the basis of the Hungarian law, and that in addition the village concerned must declare its readiness to admit the applicant into the community. According to this decision residence for four years in the same place and contribution to public revenue merely entitle a person to claim admittance to the community of the village; *pertinenza* itself is only obtained after this has been effected. The attitude of the Czecho-Slovak Supreme Court is opposed to the rule accepted all over the world, according to which a law must in the first place be applied according to its terms, and an interpretation should only be supplied if the text be obscure. As, however, the stipulations of Article 10 of the Hungarian law are perfectly clear, the Prague Court put itself into opposition with the judicial sense of the whole world, when it ventured upon the debatable ground of interpretation.

Owing to this interpretation of the Prague Supreme Court the *pertinenza* of tens of thousands became uncertain in Slovakia, and as any one whose *pertinenza* is not acknowledged, cannot claim citizenship in Czecho-Slovakia, the Damocles sword of homelessness (Heimatlosigkeit) hangs over the head of a great number of peaceful citizens of Slovakia. The Czecho-Slovak State does not acknowledge them as its citizens, and Hungary must not acknowledge them as Hungarian citizens, for the Peace Treaty decrees

that any one possessing *pertinenza* in Slovakia, becomes a Czechoslovak citizen.

What is the consequence of such homelessness? If the person concerned is in an official position, or is retired, he loses his post or his pension; if he is a physician, lawyer, or engineer, he must abandon his profession, he is deprived of his trade licence, he cannot get employment, and may at any time be expelled from the territory of Czechoslovakia. In fact a great many expulsions have taken place. The greatest uncertainty prevails and confidence in and respect for international treaties are shaken.

After many complaints had been made, the Czech Government realised the untenability of their position, and provided an amendment which, however, may be called a *medicinos peior morbo*. They passed a law to the effect that those who have resided for four years in the same place, and have, during this period contributed to the public revenue, but have not been admitted by the village in question to its community, may subsequently apply for such admittance. This law did little to improve the situation, for the fate of the applicant is left to the mercy of the authorities; these may refuse the application of any Hungarian whom they dislike, and make him homeless.

Thus the Hungarian minorities are not even so far safe in the Czechoslovak Republic, that their citizenship is recognised, and arbitrary expulsions are still the order of the day.

## 10. The Collapse of Universal Disarmament

For years past the deliberations of the League of Nations have been seasoned with phrases uttered by representatives of the fully armed Powers in favour of disarmament. These have all expressed their fervent desire to welcome an early limitation of armaments. All these speeches, however, culminate in the conclusion that however desirable disarmament would be, no patriotic Power can adopt the plan until it possesses serious guarantees against attack. „Arbitration, security, disarmament“, these are the catch-

words under colour of which they seek these guarantees, but in the meantime the last named does not progress by one step. This quest of guarantees has been the order of the day since the fulfilment of the promise regarding disarmament, embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant, fell due, and the time came for the victors to disarm. When, however, the vanquished were disarmed, it occurred to no one to offer them guarantees against attack.

The vanquished Central European Powers were disarmed without any guarantees, unless we take the promise embodied in the Peace Treaties as such. Thus the Treaty of Trianon (preamble to Part V) says. „In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Hungary undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow“. Hence it follows that if we are bound to observe the military clauses imposed by the Treaty of Trianon, we have a right to demand that the promise made to us should be kept, and that our disarmament should be the first step towards a general limitation of armaments. No attempt has been made, however, to observe this condition, although we have disarmed beyond the limit prescribed by the Covenant. Article 8 of the Covenant prescribes the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. Our disarmament went much further, because Article 104 of the Treaty of Trianon only allowed us an armed force for the maintenance of order within our territory, and for the control of our frontiers. Thus we have no armed forces at our disposal for self-defence against outside attack. Like the other vanquished Central European Powers, we were left defenceless. As a result of this crying injustice our Army represents 1/13 of the armies of our three neighbours (Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia, Roumania) on a peace footing, and only 1/170 of their mobilised forces. We must not mobilise, we have no reserves to call up in case of attack. The maintenance even of this small Army imposes heavy burdens upon us, because the Treaty of Trianon abolished compulsory service, and insisted on voluntary enlistment. Thus, whereas we were disarmed

without any guarantees, to such an extent that our armed force is hardly sufficient for the maintenance of internal order, and we have no Army to defend us against attack, there is no limit to the equipment of our neighbours, whose armaments are on a much more extensive scale than those of pre-war times. We are defenceless, and at the mercy of our neighbours.

This is the manner in which the promise concerning a general limitation of armaments has been kept!

From the point of view of international law, if it becomes evident that the victorious Powers do not intend to disarm, we shall be released from the obligation to disarm which we undertook conditionally. It will of course be difficult to determine the precise time when it becomes a certainty that the promise made to us will not be kept. But, on the other hand, it is obvious that the fulfilment of this promise cannot be postponed indefinitely. It is up to the Powers to keep their word. We cannot be called to account before the bar of history, if we are forced to declare that the conditions of our prescribed disarmament have become null and void.

## 11. The Confiscation of the Property of the Optants

The Treaty of Trianon, as well as the so-called Minority Treaties stipulate that those who possessed right of citizenship (*pertinenza*) in territory which formerly belonged to Hungary, might opt for Hungarian citizenship, and that in this case they would be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the new State. This is not a special favour, but merely a consequence of the principle of international law which prescribes that the property of alien citizens should be respected. Such stipulations were embodied in former peace treaties: thus the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 contained this stipulation in favour of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, who were entitled to opt for French citizenship, and, in this case, to retain their immovable property in Alsace-Lorraine; it occurred to no one to question their right.

Not so the Succession States, which disregard this right of the optants. Roumania leads the way in this respect, and as a result of her illegal proceedings the League of Nations has been dealing with specific disputes, so far without any result.

After the war Roumania introduced an agrarian reform in the former Kingdom, and another in the territories annexed from Hungary. The second is far more drastic than the first, although it is well known that the Kingdom of Roumania was the land of great estates, whereas in Transylvania there were few of these, and the distribution of land was by no means disproportionate. By the reform in the Kingdom twice as much land was left to the owners as in Transylvania. In the Kingdom the owners were indemnified to the full value of their expropriated property, whereas in Transylvania the land was assessed at pre-war prices without valorisation; instead of money the owners received bonds, the value of which is about 40% of their face-value, so that the indemnification offered was from 1—2% of the actual value of their property. Not only were the stipulations of the international treaties regarding the optants disregarded by the Roumanian agrarian reform, but the optants were penalised in addition; the law decreed that those who were absent from the country between December 1, 1918, and March 23, 1921, — the date of the introduction of the Act, — should lose all their immovable property. This decree, however, was promulgated long after the expiration of the above-mentioned period, and thus those who were affected by it were unable to avert its application. This measure, in addition to its being monstrous from the legal point of view, has obviously the character of nationalist persecution, for the Hungarians of Transylvania affected by it had been expelled by the new masters and forbidden to return.

It is evident, therefore, that the object of the reform was not a regulation of the distribution of land, but its transfer from Hungarian to Roumanian ownership. On the whole this has also been the tendency of agrarian reforms in the other Succession States.

The Hungarian Government regarded the confiscation of the property of the optants as a violation of international treaties, and in 1923 turned to the Council of the League for redress. They were formally entitled to take this step by the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Covenant, which declares that it is the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances affecting international relations which disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. The Reporter of the matter, the Japanese delegate Adatsi, proposed that since it was a question of an interpretation of international treaties, the parties concerned — Hungary and Roumania — should by mutual agreement submit the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This proposal having failed owing to the refusal of Roumania, the Reporter made a new proposal: that the Council of the League should ask the Permanent Court of Arbitration to give an opinion. Owing, however, to the stubborn resistance of the Roumanian delegate this second proposal was negatived, and the Council instructed the Reporter to endeavour to reconcile the two parties. His mediation having proved ineffectual, the Council, at its meeting in the autumn of 1923, merely invited the Hungarian Government to recommend the optants to be patient and the Roumanian Government to treat the Hungarian optants fairly. This shallow exhortation has naturally had no effect, on the attitude of Roumania, who has continued to flout the stipulations of the Treaties concerning the optants.

Recently, at the beginning of 1927, the matter came again before the Council of the League in a different form. There was, however, no longer any question of what had already been vainly attempted in 1923, i. e. to settle in principle the controversial matter between the two States concerned. The business in hand was to enable the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to deal with the legal proceedings initiated by the Hungarian Optants against the Roumanian State. I will deal with this phase of the matter in a separate chapter.

## 12. The Arbitration Crisis.

The only beneficent stipulation of the Treaty of Trianon is that which entrusts international jurisdiction with the settlement of certain controversies arising out of the war between Hungarian citizens and the Succession States, instead of leaving these to the high-handed decision of the latter. The Treaty of Trianon enumerates all these matters, which also include claims made by Hungarian nationals in respect of the illegal retention or liquidation of their property and their rights and interests in the territories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Article 250). Such claims must be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Article 239. On the basis of these stipulations of the Treaty of Trianon a great number of Hungarian nationals, whose property had been confiscated by the Succession States under the plea of agrarian reform, have initiated legal proceedings before the respective Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. As these proceedings before the Mixed Hungaro-Roumanian Arbitral Tribunal have acquired international notoriety and evoked, as it were, a crisis in the whole problem of arbitration, I may be permitted to deal with them in some detail.

In the previous chapter I said that the Council of the League did not succeed in settling the dispute between the Hungarian and the Roumanian Governments. This ill-success, however, did not prevent the Hungarian nationals concerned from bringing their individual claims before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, on the basis of Articles 239 and 250 of the Treaty of Trianon.

When the first claims were dealt with by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in Paris, the Roumanian Government at once raised the question of competence. Their protest was set aside by the Tribunal which declared itself competent. Hereupon the Roumanian Parliament declared that it would not accept the decision regarding competence, and would not recognise any judgements that might eventually be pronounced. In order to give practical expression to this decision, the Roumanian member of the Mixed Arbitral

Tribunal was instructed not to attend meetings dealing with the agrarian reform. The Roumanian Government communicated all this to the Council of the League, and invoked Article 11 of the Covenant, thus expressing the view that peace would be endangered, should it be compelled to fulfil its international obligations, and, as it were, requesting the Council of the League to sanction its attitude. The Hungarian Government, on the other hand, requested the Council of the League to perform its duty as prescribed by Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon, and to appoint a judge to fill the vacancy in the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal caused by the withdrawal of the Roumanian delegate. According to Article 239 this must be effected by the Council of the League, which must nominate two persons from among the nationals of neutral Powers, one of whom shall be chosen by the other litigant, in the present case the Hungarian Government, to fill the vacancy.

From the legal point of view the question is simple enough. The Treaty of Trianon makes the arbitration provided for by the Treaty binding upon all States which have signed the Treaty. According to the Treaty of Trianon the decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal are final and conclusive, and binding upon the nationals of the contending parties. The decisions of the Tribunal regarding its competence are therefore naturally final and conclusive, as would be also its eventual judgement on the merits of the case. Neither the Council nor the Assembly of the League, nor in fact any other international or national body has the right to intervene in the sovereign sphere of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, or to obstruct or limit its procedure. The necessary corollary of the withdrawal of the Roumanian delegate is therefore the appointment of a judge in his place as prescribed by the Treaty of Trianon.

According to the Covenant one of the principal objects of the League of Nations is to promote international co-operation, and to achieve international peace and security by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations. In the present case, therefore, where an international treaty makes arbitration binding

upon all States which have signed it, it is discreditable that the Council of the League should side with the State which is reluctant to respect arbitration.

In spite of the absolute lucidity of the case from the legal point of view, the Council of the League has for more than a year delayed the settlement of the matter by its failure to appoint a judge, and the Hungaro-Roumanian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal has been unable to act since one member out of three is missing. Various reasons have been given for procrastination; sometimes the necessity for further study of the problem, sometimes the illness of the Roumanian delegate. It is characteristic that in September, 1927, the Council, instead of making a decision, put forward certain legal principles and invited the Hungarian and the Roumanian Government to accept them as a basis for further proceedings. Since these principles essentially propounded the standpoint of the Roumanian Government, the Hungarian Government naturally refused to accept them. It would lead us too far to analyse these legal principles, and I shall restrict myself to the mention of one of them: to the effect that the parties should recognise that in matters of agrarian reform Roumanians and Hungarians must be equally treated. As a theoretical principle this sounds well, but in fact it means that Roumania is under no obligation to respect that principle of international law according to which private property may not be sequestered without indemnification, even for public purposes. It further means that Roumania is not obliged either to respect that clause of the Treaty of Trianon according to which the Hungarian optants retain their immovable property, nor that according to which the rights, property and interests of Hungarian nationals must not be subjected to liquidation or retention. The acceptance of the principle which the Council of the League endeavoured to force upon the Hungarian Government constitutes a real danger, since the disregard of the principle of private property is in fact a Bolshevik principle; should Roumania's attitude be sanctioned, she would feel entitled to confiscate the property of other alien nationals, British, French etc. The

Hungarian Government very naturally refused to accept this principle, and it could not act otherwise, if for no other reason, because by accepting it, it would have failed in its duty towards its own nationals.

The matter is still in suspense before the League of Nations. The whole civilised world watches its progress. Should the Council of the League prove too weak to defend the great cause of international jurisdiction, (perhaps the only guarantee of peace) against Roumanian lawlessness, confidence in the League of Nations would be rudely shaken, and the great idea of international jurisdiction would pass through a crisis calculated to jeopardise peace.

I have gone somewhat fully into this matter in order to throw light upon the regrettable situation created by the Succession States, which have derived immense advantages from the Treaty of Trianon, and yet refuse to observe the very few clauses which secure certain rights for the Hungarians. They can act thus without fear, because the Council of the League seems unable or unwilling to maintain a right accorded to a vanquished State.

### 13. The Cup is filled to the Brim.

The foregoing chapters have by no means exhausted the injustices and illegal practices committed by the Succession States in the application of the Treaty of Trianon. I have merely pointed out some of the more flagrant abuses. In conclusion, I would once more lay stress upon the fact that in the tragedy which this Treaty means for Hungary, the most painful part for us has been the handing over of our highly civilised populations to the Balkans, and hence the subordination of Western culture to Eastern barbarism.

The savage manner in which the Succession States, and not only the Balkan States, but even Czecho-Slovakia, which boasts of its culture, destroyed all the creations of Hungarian plastic art in the annexed territories will be an eternal blot upon civilisation and upon the history of the twentieth century. It would fill volumes were we to attempt

to give a complete list of the creations of Hungarian art that were destroyed or mutilated by the new masters. The memorials of the 1848/49 War of Independence, the Kos-suth monuments, the millenarian memorials fell, almost without exception, victims to their vandalism. To quote one example only, all Europe was indignant when the monument of Maria Theresa, the masterpiece of our great sculptor Fadrusz, was ferociously destroyed by the Czechs in Pozsony.

It is characteristic of the brutal oppression of the minorities, that the Succession States prevent the Hungarians who have come under their rule from obtaining any of the creations of the Hungarian intellect. The world should realise that even at the present moment, almost a decade after the conclusion of the so-called Peace Treaties, no matter printed in the Hungarian language since 1918 is allowed to cross the frontier. Thus the Succession States have cut off three and a half million Hungarians from the culture of their native country. This is diametrically opposed to the terms and to the spirit of the Minority Treaties. It is a cruel oppression of the Hungarian minorities. It is also a sign how much these States, armed to the teeth, fear disarmed Hungary, or more correctly the irresistible force of truth.

Civilisation was revolted by the wild pogrom carried out in December, 1927, by the hope of the Roumanian Kingdom, the youth of high schools and Universities, in the purely Hungarian towns of Nagyvárad, Arad, Kolozsvár and Brassó, under the pretext of a Congress. The Hungarians, in the first place the Hungarian Jews, were maltreated and robbed by this savage horde, with the tacit consent of the authorities.

Yet we are not despondent. Our faith is unbroken, and we trust in the force of truth which will prevail.

Let us remember the history of the last few years. The great collapse, the terrible catastrophe was followed by a period of internal lethargy, and in this hopeless atmosphere was born the revolution of despair, which subsequently made way for Bolshevism. The ravages of

Bolshevism were followed by the devastations of the Roumanian invaders, who appeared under the mask of rescuers. The Treaty of Trianon put the crown of thorns upon a morally broken and economically ruined community.

And in this tragic situation we had not a single friend; no helping hand was stretched out to us. We stood entirely isolated and forsaken in the ocean of nations. No friends, everywhere hostile feeling, at the best chilling indifference.

The first turning point was the publication of the documents in the archives of the former Dual Monarchy. This attracted the attention of the civilised world, and made it evident that Hungary had no share in provoking the war. She did all in her power to prevent its outbreak, and when it was forced upon her, she merely fought in self-defence.

The situation gradually improved. We came into more intimate relations with Italy. Great Britain and America showed growing signs of sympathy. Certain English noblemen, with Lord Newton at their head, showed a friendly interest in the Hungarian cause. All these favourable incidents were eventually followed by a campaign in our favour started by Lord Rothermere in the Daily Mail.

Truth has thus entered upon its conquering path, in spite of innumerable obstacles. It is like a small snow-ball from the top of a mountain, which increases as it rolls until it becomes an avalanche sweeping down everything that stands in its way, and in the end crushing — injustice.

Dawn has begun. The mists are dissolving. The sun will reach its zenith. And we of the present generation shall live to see that radiance.



Cultural Effects  
of the Treaty of Trianon

BY OLIVER EÖTTEVÉNYI



## I. The Educational Policy of Great Hungary

There is no surer indication of the culture of a nation than its educational policy. Although it is true that in the general scheme of civilisation schools and their results represent only a fraction of a liberal education, and that self-education is the road towards the final development of culture for most of us, still the nation, or more correctly speaking, its constitutional organisation, the State, instils the fundamental principles of culture in its schools.

We know that the creation and maintenance of schools was long regarded, not as a task of the State, but rather as an activity proper to the Church, and even now the latter plays an important part in this connection. But it is a natural consequence of the constitutional tendencies of our modern age that the determination of educational principles and of the qualifications of those destined to teach should be among the tasks of legislation. This is the case in Hungary. The history of our schools shows that for centuries the State took no part in their creation and maintenance, and that most of these were founded by the Church. This applies to the University founded by Cardinal Peter Pázmány at Nagyszombat, afterwards transferred to and at present functioning in Budapest, as well as to the secondary and elementary schools. Later, when the prestige of the State increased, and it began to assert its will in every department of social life, the idea of the right of the State to intervene gained ground rapidly. This, however, did not mean that the State claimed an exclusive right to create schools; its educational policy was merely directed towards determining type and curriculum, and towards reserving

for itself a right of control, while at the same time recognising the right of other factors as regards the creation and the activities of schools.

When in 1848 the patrician Diet was replaced by a system of popular representation, the Law 19 of 1848, in accordance with the liberal spirit of the age, granted freedom as to learning and teaching to the Hungarian University, the only one existing at the time, and placed it directly under the control of the Minister of Public Instruction. Thus the University, although it had not been created by the State, and was not maintained out of State funds, came under the direct control of the State. It was undoubtedly intended, in laying down this principle, to show that the teaching at the University was regarded as a province of the State. The right of the Hungarian Churches, secured by ancient laws, to maintain colleges was unaffected. Law 26 of 1790 remained in force; this secures the free exercise of the Lutheran and Calvinist cults, and Section 5 provides that these denominations may found schools, but stipulates that for the creation of colleges the royal sanction must be obtained. Generally speaking the establishment of the educational system was included among the royal prerogatives. It will be seen that the State secured full control of higher education. As regards University education this system remained in force up to the present; the more recent Universities and the majority of the colleges are in fact State institutions, whereas in the case of the colleges maintained by the various creeds, the State exercises its influence through a uniform curriculum and regulations controlling the certificates issued.

As regards secondary schools Law 30 of 1880 acknowledges the right of factors other than the State to create and to maintain such schools, and not only recognises such rights on the part of the various denominations, but leaves to them the choice of the language to be used in teaching in the schools maintained by them, merely stipulating that in the non-Hungarian secondary schools, the Hungarian language and literature must be taught in

Hungarian in the two upper classes. In addition to thus recognising the denominational secondary schools, the Law acknowledges the right of municipalities, communes, corporations and even individuals to maintain schools. From all this it will be seen that the State refrained from making secondary school instruction a State monopoly, and allowed this right to other factors which it considered qualified for such a task.

Article 10 of the Law 38 of 1868 on primary education decrees that public elementary schools may be created and maintained, in the manner legally prescribed, by all recognised religious bodies, corporations, communes, individuals, as well as by the State. It is interesting to note that in the enumeration of those who are entitled to maintain such schools, the State is mentioned last; on the one hand this proves that at the time when the law was enacted, only a few schools were maintained by the State, and on the other, it established the right of the State to create elementary schools. It is unnecessary to add that the State reserved its right of control in the sphere of primary education.

The situation in pre-war Hungary may be summarised as follows: in none of the three educational stages was instruction considered an exclusively State activity, nor were the majority of the educational institutions created by the State, though it reserved to itself certain rights of control, with a view to the preservation of uniformity.

There can be no doubt that these principles are in keeping with those of a sound democratic development, based, not on popular catchwords, but on a consistent working out of the democratic idea. Such a conception is directly opposed to that adopted by the so-called Succession States, i. e. those which annexed the greatest part of pre-war Hungary. These, in the name of democracy, have either placed education entirely in the hands of the State, or by introducing the nationalist tendencies of the State into education, have made it an instrument to serve their own interests. By these proceedings they hoped to convince public opinion in the Western States, ignorant of the facts

underlying the question, of their devotion to democratic principles, whereas in fact they were destroying or condemning to a lingering death the right of national minorities to maintain schools, as prescribed by international treaties.

## II. The Educational Policy of the Succession States

In October, 1927, the Roumanian Senate, in the course of the so-called "Address Debate", dealt with the question of education, and a distinguished representative of the Hungarian minorities of Transylvania, Senator Elemér Gyárfás, pointed out that the system of expropriation by the State and the system of centralisation adopted by the Roumanian Government are repugnant to Transylvanian sentiment, not only to that of the Hungarians, but also of the Germans of the province. Public education in Transylvania, he said, had for centuries been based upon the system of denominational schools, and he instanced as characteristic the fact that after 1849, when the Austrian absolutist Government insisted on the creation of German State schools, and in fact established such schools at Nagyszében, Medgyes and Gyulaféhérvár, the Saxons in those towns continued to maintain their denominational German secondary schools. Naturally, the Hungarians, whether Roman Catholics or Protestants, also maintained their denominational secondary schools under the Austrian régime. It follows that the monopolisation of schools by the State was an unknown proceeding in pre-war Transylvania.

To avoid misunderstanding it must be noted that in Roumania primary education is not a State institution in name only, but in fact. Endre Barabás explains in Julius Kornis' book "The Matter of Public Instruction of the alienated Hungarians", in the chapter on primary education in Roumania, that according to the Roumanian Law of July 26, 1924, Roumania is a uniform State and that therefore, compulsory primary education must also be

uniform, this being essential to national solidarity and the higher interests of the State. Thus the law itself does not decree the monopolisation by the State of primary education, and it might be concluded that Roumanian legislation merely aimed at securing uniformity in primary education, and a distinguished representative of the Hungarian law, however, further decrees that the maintenance of elementary schools is the duty of the communes, though the State is responsible for the salaries of the teachers, and that the quality and the quantity of scholastic material (buildings, furniture, appliances for teaching etc.) shall be established by the Minister of Public Instruction. Should the communes fail to fulfil their obligations, the Minister shall be entitled to charge the required sums to their respective budgets. This is really nothing but monopolisation by the State; it is mere quibbling to say that the communes maintain the schools, for the latter are coerced into fulfilling the obligations imposed upon them by the State. It is obvious that to meet these obligations the communes must levy a surtax, and for the taxpayer it is a matter of indifference whether he pays for the maintenance of schools by a State tax, or by a communal surtax. We may therefore say that primary education in Roumania is an essentially State function.

The system of exclusively State education was explicitly introduced only by Jugoslavia, where on July, 23, 1919, the Serbian law of April 19, 1904, on public instruction was extended to the so-called Voivodina, i. e. the territory detached from Hungary. On the strength of this law all denominational, communal and corporation schools in that territory were expropriated by the State.

As regards Czecho-Slovakia, in Slovensko, the former Upper Hungary, there are still many denominational and even communal elementary schools, but the tendency there is also towards monopolisation by the State on the one hand, while on the other the compulsory use of the Czech language in teaching brings the denominational schools into the service of the Czech State idea. The minorities have no right to maintain schools

in places where they constitute less than 20% of the population. In these places the children are compelled to attend Slovak schools. Apart from the fact that the proportion of 20% is entirely arbitrary, and not mentioned in the Minority Treaties, the statistics prepared by the Czech authorities take care that the Hungarians of the alienated communities figure as less than 20%. The process of monopolisation has made much greater progress as regards secondary schools. All the 87 Czech-speaking "Bürgerschulen" are State schools, and only 17 Hungarian schools are non-State schools, while out of 48 secondary schools only 4 are allowed to retain their denominational character.

Comparing as a whole the educational policy of Hungary with that of the Succession States we see that whereas the former not only accepted the activities of other factors, in the first place those of the various denominations, but even subsidised them considerably, the Succession States either declare for exclusively State education, or show a strong inclination towards it.

The speech made by Senator Gyárfás gives food for thought in many respects. The ancient Transylvanian cultural policy invoked by him was by no means restricted to Transylvania, but was based on a principle generally accepted by public opinion in Great Hungary: that public education has never been regarded as an exclusive task of the State, but rather as the duty of other factors, in the first place of the various religious bodies. The Hungarians transferred by the Treaty of Trianon to foreign rule see their schools transformed by tendencies towards monopolisation, centralisation, and in any case nationalisation, tendencies brutally enforced and diametrically opposed to their traditional and deeply rooted conceptions of educational policy. Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia — the latter explicitly and in schools of all degrees, the former two especially in the secondary schools — more or less reject the system of denominational schools and tend towards monopolisation of education by the State. In the so-called Burgenland, i. e. the Hungarian

territory transferred to Austria, no radical changes have so far been made.

If we examine the causes of the above-named tendencies it is obvious that these States seek on the one hand to maintain and expand the educational policy hitherto obtaining in their nucleus territories, and on the other, to make a show of adopting the modern ideology which regards non-State, and especially denominational education as retrogressive and anti-democratic. We can understand the Roumanian and the Jugoslav point of view in enforcing the educational policy hitherto followed by them upon the territories they have annexed, because this is in keeping with their general policy of nationalisation. But it must be remembered that this policy is in contradiction with the age-long traditions of the annexed territories where the communes and the various religious bodies have given ample proofs of efficiency in the performance of their tasks. Thus there is in fact no valid reason why this well-tried system should be abolished, or condemned to a slow death under various pretexts.

Czecho-Slovakia was in this respect faced with an entirely new situation, because formerly she was not an independent State, and although Czech culture was more highly developed than that of any of the other Succession States (Austria excepted), the Czechs could formerly only pursue an educational policy within the narrow limits of Austrian provincial administration. Czecho-Slovakia, when born as a new State, made this question one of principle, because the free-thinking Czech Government abhor all denominational or religious teaching, in fact religious influences of any kind in education. Thus, even if they do not make public education a State monopoly and tolerate for the time being elementary denominational schools, they manifest their anti-denominational tendencies by thrusting the teaching of religion into the background. To illustrate this we may quote what Adolphus Pechány says in his book on public education in the Succession States: that in the Czecho-Slovak schools there is no compulsory teaching of religion; a so-called *lay morality* is taught, which while

inculcating certain moral axioms instils into the souls of youth a great deal of anti-religious and free-thinking dogma. It must be noted here that a whole world separates the Czech conception from the Slovak in this respect; the irreligious tendency is a reflection of Czech mentality, which is diametrically opposed to that of the devout Slovaks, and this is one of the reasons of the permanent conflict between the souls of Czech and Slovak, who are represented as a united people for the benefit of foreign sympathisers.

Many incidents characteristic of Czech anti-religious educational policy are described by Francis Olay in his recently published book. "The critical Years of Hungarian Culture". He states that the Czechs have either closed down or expropriated almost all gymnasiums (middle schools) of Upper Hungary which were maintained by the religious orders. Among these were the Premonstrant gymnasium of Rozsnyó, in existence for three centuries; the Premonstrant gymnasium of Kassa, founded in 1657, the gymnasiums of the Pious Brothers at Podolin, founded in 1642, the gymnasiums of Trencsén, Nyitra, Rózsahegy, Kisszeben and Léva, founded by one or the other of the religious orders in the course of the eighteenth century. Nor have the Czechs shown more mercy towards the Protestant secondary schools; they have expropriated and converted into Slovak schools the Lutheran gymnasiums of Eperjes and Igló. The Benedictine gymnasium of Komárom alone was left untouched, but the estate that served to maintain this institution was confiscated.

If we seek the reasons why the Succession States gradually abolish the denominational schools, we can have no doubt that they regard religion as the vital principle of the Hungarian idea, and it is this idea that they propose to exterminate. In Roumania and Jugoslavia the Roman Catholic and Protestant schools are the results of the age-long traditional Hungarian educational policy, a policy indicative of the cultural superiority of the Hungarian race. This must be strangled by the force of centralisa-

tion, monopolisation. In Czecho-Slovakia the situation is somewhat different. There the present rulers have chiefly attacked the higher culture of the secondary schools, and regard the elementary schools as less dangerous, for a considerable portion of the population which enjoys the benefits of these belongs to a race to a certain extent akin to the Czech, and this fact is not affected by denominational teaching. Czech educational policy, however, paves the way for the rationalist tendency by the above-mentioned introduction of a lay morality in the place of religious teaching.

Considering the problem as a whole we may ask: on which side is real democracy and true liberal progress? On the former Hungarian side, where the Greek Catholic, Roumanian and Serb elementary schools were not only tolerated, but even subsidised by the State, or on the other, where the Succession States avail themselves of every means at their disposal to exterminate the Catholic and Protestant schools which serve to educate the children of an alien race?

### III. The Cultural Level of Hungary and of the Succession States

To determine the cultural level of a nation it is essential to subject all relevant facts to a severe critical scrutiny. Partiality and bias may be explained and excused as resulting from the enthusiasm of the patriot for the values of his nation, but they must not be allowed to colour and distort the theses presented to the independent judgment of the foreigner. It is our duty, therefore, to be strictly objective when we undertake to show that the culture of pre-war Hungary was of a much higher order than that of the Succession States, and that partition of the country was unjustifiable from the point of view of civilisation; for whatever the issue of a war, the representatives of the Powers which prescribe the peace terms should not disregard the demands of civilisation.

• It is a well-known fact that Hungary looks back upon a past of a thousand years. On the soil where this State arose at the end of the ninth century, and a century later became the bulwark of Christianity and Western civilisation, it remained an independent State for centuries, at the cost of terrific struggles, and in spite of the fact that parts of its territory were temporarily subjugated by foreign forces. The thesis of millenary Hungary is not a figment of the ebullient patriotism and fantastic nationalism of our race, but an established fact, which has made its impress on the pages of history through the shifting conflicts of centuries. We do not propose to prove our claim to this territory, our fatherland, by the ancient traditions of a nebulous past. We adduce a fact which may be readily grasped and easily verified by foreign critics: Hungary has been a living force for the last thousand years. This State must have had an historic mission, this nation must have had intrinsic qualities that ensured its existence, otherwise our country would have been unable to maintain itself and would have been obliged to give way to other peoples richer in moral and physical qualities. We need not insist on well-known facts, but we may note in passing that we could neither have overcome the resistance of those strata of our population which clung to ancient heathen beliefs, after our acceptance of Christianity, nor could we have withstood the destructive and assimilating tendencies of the Tartars, Turks and Germans, if the Hungarian nation had lacked inexhaustible force and will to live.

The State was founded by a comparatively small number of Hungarians who could only have succeeded in those stormy times by virtue of their military prowess. After the introduction of Christianity, other, chiefly intellectual and ethical forces, must have supplemented their military qualities, for otherwise the nation, based merely on physical force, could not have survived under changed circumstances. The comparatively small number of Hungarians absorbed the higher culture of their foreign immigrants, mainly Germans and Italians, and increased

their original numbers by the descendants of these. Since no high-handed methods were used to enforce this assimilation, it is certain that the Hungarian race must have had an intrinsic assimilating capacity, which would not have been the case had our people shown themselves inferior morally and intellectually.

Our nation, however, was not reinforced merely by immigration. Other peoples had already lived on the soil which our ancestors conquered, and these were also assimilated to a certain extent. The Hungarians never coerced them, they have always been tolerant towards other races, but a natural process of fusion gradually took place. We need not deny that a considerable part of the present Hungarian nation is not of pure Hungarian descent, but long before the age of modern civilisation the spirit of our constitution enabled every citizen of the country, irrespective of race, to become a member of the political community and even to play a leading part. Among the notable politicians of former ages we find as many persons of non-Hungarian extraction, as among the higher clergy. It is natural that these, when they gained distinction in constitutional life, should have become racially assimilated. But those masses which held aloof from the higher culture of the nation were in no way prevented from preserving their racial peculiarities. Should this not have been the case, should the Hungarians have pursued a coercive policy, no other race would have survived in the territory of Great Hungary, and the authors of the Peace Treaty would have had no pretext for breaking up our country on the plea of liberating oppressed nationalities. Nothing proves the tolerance of the Hungarians more strikingly than the fact that in former times, when the landowners had constitutional rights over their serfs, and would thus have been entitled to assimilate them by force, such assimilation never occurred and was not even attempted. The Hungarian landowner spoke Slovak with his Slovak serfs, and Roumanian with the Roumanians, and never prevented them from maintaining their respective racial qualities. The constitutional reform

of 1848 and the strengthening of the racial idea effected no changes in this direction.

What conclusions shall we draw from these facts? Great Hungary was politically a uniform body by virtue of the constitutional force in the soul of the nation. Racial particularism was unknown in the political field. In Hungary there was no constitutional provincialism. The State existed as a uniform organisation. The racial and linguistic independence of the non-Hungarians was never infringed. For centuries this freedom existed as it were subconsciously, unprotected by laws, since these were unnecessary. When, however, racial self-consciousness began to awaken, when the non-Hungarian races produced individuals who demanded racial independence, or, in other words, when the culture of the alien nationalities developed to such a degree that its members were able to reach a high level of education through the medium of their own language, legislation provided for the due protection of their efforts, and after the restoration of the constitution, this was the fundamental idea of the Law 44 of 1868, the so-called Nationalities Law.

We must here insist that the Hungarian nation never attempted to stifle the cultural development of the alien races in this country, but on the contrary fostered it benevolently. We shall have occasion to point out what part was played by various cultural factors, such as printing-presses, churches and schools, permitted and even supported by the Hungarian State, in the creation of the primitive civilisation of Serbs and Roumanians. Since the culture of the Hungarian race developed normally, and no restrictions hindered the extension of their respective cultures among the alien nationalities, until in due course it became superior to that of their kinsmen beyond the frontiers, the partition of Hungary cannot be extenuated as a measure of relief for the cultural disabilities of the minorities.

In the work already mentioned on public instruction in Serbia by Joseph Berkes, he quotes the statement of the Belgrade University Professor, Stanojevic, to the effect that

the self-conscious, modern nationalism of Serbia was born among the Serbs of Southern Hungary. According to Stanojevic, Ujvidék was regarded as the Serbian Athens, whence the nascent Serbian culture radiated to the Serbs living outside Hungary. The Serbian middle school founded at Ujvidék in 1816 was the cradle of the whole *intelligentsia* of the Serbs in Hungary and in the Balkans until such time as an independent Serbia was created, to develop on a broader basis the cultural work begun on Hungarian soil.

But without exception, the first steps towards the creation of Serbian culture were made, not in the territory of present-day Jugoslavia, but in Hungary, and to some extent in Vienna. Serbian settlers, under the leadership of Arsen Cernojevic, Patriarch of Ipek, were admitted into Southern Hungary in order to re-populate the districts devastated by the Turks. Leopold I. Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, had authorised their immigration by the so-called *Diploma Leopoldinum*, and they naturally sought the protection of the power that had admitted them for their cultural development. From the end of the seventeenth century onward every effort to foster Serbian culture had its origin here, notably the issue of the first printed matter in the Serbian language by means of the severely controlled presses of Vienna and the University Press of Buda. Hungary was the foster-mother of much in Serbian cultural and political life. By securing autonomy for the Greek Oriental Church of the Serbs we promoted the development of their ecclesiastical culture. We have already noted the part played in Serbian cultural life by the Serbian middle school at Ujvidék. But here also, more than a hundred years ago, the first Serbian cultural and literary society, the *Matica*, was founded, and extended its influence over the whole of Serbia. The first Serbian political programme also was drawn up in Hungarian territory, at Nagybecskerek in 1868. These facts speak for themselves.

What has been said of Jugoslavia, applies also to Roumania. Benedict Janesó, the writer most thoroughly

acquainted with the Roumanian question, supplies objective data in support of the thesis that the origins of Roumanian culture are to be found in Hungary. In the second volume of his great work: "History of Roumanian National Aspirations", published in 1899, he tells us what an important part the Roumanians living in Hungary played in the intellectual development of Roumania at a time when Roumania did not yet exist in her present independent form, and when the two Roumanian Principalities — weakened by incessant struggles and under the tutelage of Russia on the one hand, and of Turkey on the other — were incapable of the creation of an independent culture. Nothing better illustrates the tolerance of the Hungarian race and its sympathy with alien aspirations than the fact that the pioneers of Roumanian literary life, such as Samuel Klein, Sinkai and Peter Maior developed their talent as Roumanian historians in Budapest *more than a hundred years ago*. Many of their works were published by the Budapest University Press. A further significant refutation of the charge of Magyar intolerance is the fact that a Roumanian Women's Association was founded in Budapest as early as 1815, the special object of which was the support of Roumanian schools. During the thirties of the nineteenth century, Balázsfalva became the centre of the Roumanian literary and scientific movement, and in 1833 a Roumanian theatre was founded there, which was enthusiastically supported by the professors and students of the Greek Catholic seminary at a time when the students of the Hungarian college at Kolozsvár were punished with solitary confinement — on disciplinary grounds — for having visited the Hungarian theatre. These are further proofs that the Roumanians were allowed to develop their culture freely in earlier periods, and there is no doubt that the cultural level of the Roumanians of Hungary is higher than that of the Roumanians of the former Kingdom. In respect of Roumania, therefore, the partition of Hungary on the plea of liberating an oppressed culture is as unfounded as in respect of Serbia.

Further evidence of the cultural and political freedom

enjoyed by the Roumanians in Hungary is to be found in "The Ecclesiastical, Educational, Cultural and Economic Institutions of the Roumanians in Hungary", a well documented work, published in 1908 by an author who uses the pseudonym "Veritas". According to this book the first Roumanian newspaper in Hungary was issued as early as 1837, and the first Roumanian political journal, the "Gazeta de Transilvania", appeared at Brassó in 1838. Among the middle schools created by Roumanians was that of Balázsfalva, where the language used in teaching was Roumanian as far back as 1834, while at Belényes a similar institution was founded even earlier, in 1828. The *Astra*, the literary and cultural association of the Roumanians of Transylvania began its activities in 1861. It is interesting to note that the first historical work in the Roumanian language, which set forth the hypothesis that the Roumanians are the direct descendants of the Romans, was published in 1812 in Buda, then the capital of Hungary. Its author was Peter Maior, and it is significant in view of the alleged intolerance of the Hungarians, that, as a severe censorship was in force at the time and no book could be published without the permission of the authorities, it appeared under the sanction of the Palatine of Hungary. Maior was the first to propose the use of Latin instead of Cyrillic characters in the Roumanian language, in a book published at Buda in 1819.

The culture of the alienated Slovaks must be considered from an entirely different angle, because efforts are being made — by means of arguments so presented as to mislead uninformed foreign public opinion — to assimilate them racially with the Czechs and thus to create a mythical Czecho-Slovak nation. We do not propose to examine the culture of the Czechs, because it was never influenced in any way by that of Hungary. The arbitrary fabrication of the term "Czecho-Slovak nation" did not even meet with unanimous approval in prominent Czech circles, and the Czech Academy of Science declared decisively against it. The Slovaks themselves disapproved of it, and the political Slovak "People's Party" protested

against it in a manifesto. In his book on education in Slovakia, Adolphus Pechány gives an instructive account of the manner in which the present rulers of Czechoslovakia sought to give substance to this hybrid creation. The law on language, which forms an integral part of the Constitutional Law of 1918, decrees that the official tongue of the Republic is the Czecho-Slovak language. Since no such language exists, both the Czechs and the Slovaks naturally endeavoured to claim supremacy for their respective tongues as the official language. After a struggle that lasted six years, a Government Decree was issued in 1925 which acknowledged that the real *individuality* of the Czecho-Slovak language is manifested in its combination of the Czech and the Slovak *sounds*. There are, as a fact, two entirely different languages, Czech and Slovak, whereas the present Czech ruling only admits a difference *in sound*. It is characteristic that the Czechs insist upon their theory of the identity of the two languages only in their political intercourse with the Slovaks; for internal use, in their own Czech territory, they recognise only a Czech language. In the official "Annuaire" of the Republic the educational institutions in Bohemia proper, in Moravia and in Silesia are scheduled as using the Czech language, whereas those in Slovakia, formerly Upper Hungary, are said to use the Czecho-Slovak language. Thus the schools in the original Czech territories accept and admit the actual situation, but those in Slovakia are supposed to be familiar with the non-existent tongue.

From what has been said above there can be no doubt that there are no Czecho-Slovaks, but only Czechs and Slovaks, and since a Slovak language and culture exist, it is evident that the development of the latter under Hungarian rule was never obstructed. The fact that the Slovak culture is less developed than the Serbian and Roumanian may be explained by the facts that the separatist tendencies of the Slovak people were less pronounced than those of the other two races, and that an overwhelming proportion of the Slovak *intelligentsia* associated themselves with the higher Hungarian culture, and thus

failed to influence the development of that of their own race. It must also be remembered that the Slovaks lacked the stimulating effects of kinsmen living in geographical proximity beyond the frontiers. All this, however, does not affect the fact that Slovak culture lagged behind that of the Hungarians, and thus there was no necessity, from the point of view of cultural progress, to alienate their territories; indeed, the development of Slovak culture was better assured within the boundaries of Hungary than it is in the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

#### IV. The Nationalisation of the Schools in the alienated Territories

We have already explained that in the alienated territories the present rulers, either overtly or covertly, seek to bring what were originally voluntary schools under State control and thereby to undermine and destroy the racial character assured to the minorities by treaty. The methods employed are designed to impress foreigners not acquainted with the realities of the situation as measures consonant with democratic progress and State centralisation; they are in fact measures of merciless nationalisation. Just as the Succession States achieved a transformation in the economic field by securing their own supremacy in all undertakings, so, in their educational policy they endeavour, wherever the Minority Treaties guarantee the maintenance of the minority schools, to destroy all those which cannot be made to subserve the interests of the ruling race. Before analysing the manifestations of their policy, let us consider what we have lost through the Treaty of Trianon in the educational sphere.

According to the statistics in Albert Berzeviczy's article of 1927 in No. 3 of the „Zeitschrift für Politik“, a periodical published in Berlin, we have lost: 2 Universities (Kolozsvár and Pozsony), 4 Colleges of Jurisprudence, 2 Colleges of Agriculture, 1 College of Forestry and Mining, 26 commercial schools, 33 training colleges for

male teachers and 22 for female teachers, 120 Gymnasiums and "Realschulen" (colleges giving a classical or a "modern" education) for boys and 22 for girls, 294 higher popular schools and over 10.000 elementary schools. This is a cultural blood-letting which would have affected the health of nations much stronger than that of the Hungarians. And what has happened to these institutions?

The Universities — State institutions — of Kolozsvár and Pozsony were simply taken over by the Roumanians and Czechs respectively and continued as cultural institutions of their own States. It is true that we created two new Universities — Szeged and Pécs —, and that we transferred the College of Forestry and Mining from Selmeczbánya to Sopron, but this only meant that the staff of professors was retained by the State, and everything that has since been created in those places, scientific institutes, clinics etc. had to be newly created at great expense to the mutilated and impoverished country. All the scientific institutions and equipment, the necessary accessories of higher education, became the property of the Succession States, and we read with bitterness how these have boasted to foreigners as if those cultural achievements had been creations of their own; this happened, for instance, at Kolozsvár when the ancient Hungarian University was inaugurated as a Roumanian University in the presence of representatives of a number of foreign States. As to the Colleges of Jurisprudence, the Czechs abolished that of Kassa, and the Roumanians have transformed that at Nagyvárad into a Roumanian school.

Even more depressing is the situation as regards elementary and middle schools; taking Roumania first, it stands as follows:

In Transylvania, the adjoining Bánát and other Hungarian territories the Roumanians took over 5899 elementary schools, which included, under Hungarian rule, 1369 State schools, 476 municipal schools, 1536 maintained by the Greek Oriental Church, 1119 by the Greek Catholics, 501 by the Calvinists, 474 by the Roman Catholics, 276 by the Lutherans, 43 by the Jews and 29 by

the Unitarians. In 3025 the language of instruction was Hungarian, but up to 1924 the Roumanians had nationalised, closed down or expropriated 2070, i. e. 68% of the total. The situation is similar as regards the other types of schools, because the same treatment was applied to 62% of the 151 "Bürgerschulen", 70% of the middle schools, 78% of the 29 training colleges for teachers, 93% of the commercial schools. In addition to the schools in the strict sense of the word we have lost 1002 agricultural continuation schools, 3561 elementary continuation schools, 194 technical schools for apprentices etc., so that the total loss of the Hungarians in this territory — who number two millions — is not less than 8076 schools.

When all this had been effected, on July 26, 1924, Roumania enacted the law dealing with State elementary education, and on December 22, 1925, that on private education, which decree that Roumania being a uniform State compulsory primary education must also be uniform. Consequently, though the language of instruction in the four lowest classes of the elementary schools is allowed to be the mother-tongue, Roumanian must be the sole language of instruction in the upper classes.

These laws make the maintenance of the schools the duty of the communes; thus in theory they inaugurate the system of communal schools, but — as we have already shown — by empowering the Minister of Public Instruction to lay the burden of maintenance on the communes, they really declare the principle of the omnipotence of the State and make these schools State institutions. The application of the law gives ample scope for strengthening the influence of the State, and therewith its nationalising tendencies.

First of all, in places where, the population being Hungarian, it was necessary to tolerate Hungarian as the language of instruction in the primary schools, they took advantage of the tendentious principle which prescribed that teachers in municipal schools should be employed and paid by the State, and teachers were sent to the Hungarian schools who either did not speak Hungarian at all, or

spoke it very imperfectly; they were given an addition of 50% to their salaries. The territory where such teachers are employed is the so-called *culture zone*. If they settle down definitely, they receive a *present* of 10 hectares of land. Whole legions of quondam Hungarian teachers were dismissed, or were subjected to an examination in the Roumanian language so severe that most of them were unable to pass it, and were replaced by Roumanians. The result aimed at is obvious: in the schools all power is in the hands of the teachers; under their terrorising influence the children cannot help learning Roumanian, and all teaching is given in that language. Even the parents do not dare to object to this, since the knowledge of Roumanian is a condition required in every branch of activity. A natural consequence is that the children are gradually deprived of all ties with the Hungarian race.

Roumania, therefore, does not need a number of training colleges for Hungarian teachers. We have already mentioned how many such institutions were taken over by them. Of all these only one was left, at Székely Keresztúr, but only up to 1925 was it allowed to preserve its original character. In that year a radical change was made; Roumanian was declared the sole language of instruction, and the Hungarian character of the school was only so far preserved that the Hungarian pupils received three lessons per week in Hungarian grammar and literature, *Sapienti sat*.

The right of the Hungarians race prescribed by the Treaties to send their children to Hungarian schools was stultified in a bewildering manner by a stipulation of the law already quoted, according to which Roumanian citizens *who have forgotten their mother-tongue* must send their children to Roumanian schools. This system, which also exists in Jugoslavia, is based on the so-called *analysis of names* which allows the authorities to establish whether the parents concerned were originally Roumanians or not. Thus the natural right of parents to send their children to schools of their own choice was frustrated, for nothing is easier for the authorities than to discover that some

individual was originally a Roumanian, and only became a Hungarian under the alleged coercion and oppression of Hungarian rule. Even were this the case, it is a natural process in the life of nations for certain races to absorb individuals of other races. How many persons, originally Germans, are to be found in France, and how many with French names among the Germans! Immigration, marriage and many other circumstances, together with the natural assimilating power of the majority, tend to change the original nationality of individuals. Which among the civilised nations would think of thus reverting to the origins of persons naturalised perhaps centuries ago? Roumania has performed this miracle.

The Minority Treaty concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania on December 9, 1919, — the precedence of which over any internal legislation is established by the principles of international law, — declares that the racial, linguistic and religious minorities are entitled to maintain schools, and that the State must to a certain degree subsidise them. The Roumanian law of December 22, 1925, already mentioned, declared denominational teaching to be a *medieval survival*, and therefore abolished it and degraded denominational schools to the rank of *private* schools. Thus the right of the Hungarians to maintain Roman Catholic and Protestant schools was rescinded, for the certificates issued by private schools are not recognised by the State. There can of course be no question of State subsidies for these schools. How different was the attitude of the much maligned Hungarians! The Hungarian State granted to all denominational primary schools, (including the Roumanian Greek Oriental and Greek Catholic schools) such considerable subsidies that these constituted the major part of the salaries of the teachers, and only stipulated that the Hungarian language should *also* be taught — to the great benefit of the pupils. The Roumanians have taught us what chauvinism really is, the chauvinism of which we were unjustly accused, but which in their case is a grim reality.

As a curious fact we must mention that in 1926 the Roumanian Minister for Public Instruction decreed that in the schools maintained by the minorities the pupils are not to speak anything but Roumanian in the intervals between the lessons. This is a classic example of respect for the rights of minorities!

Our account of the Roumanian educational policy with regard to primary schools would be incomplete if we did not mention the fact that should some private school be attended *also* by children of Roumanian parents, the language of instruction must be Roumanian, whereas in other cases the language used is determined by those who maintain the school. As regards Jews, in respect of private schools it was decided that if they create such schools, the language of instruction must be either Roumanian or Hebrew. Thus the Jews of Transylvania and of the Bánát, who are for the most part Hungarians, are obliged to use the Roumanian language, or a dead language, instruction in which is certainly attended with great difficulties. Finally we may point out that in all private schools, from the third class onward, Roumanian grammar, history and geography must be taught in Roumanian. What a gulf is there between these measures and the liberal conceptions of Hungarian legislation, which in Law 30 of 1883 even in the non-Hungarian middle schools only made teaching in Hungarian compulsory in the two upper classes of Hungarian language and literature, so that in the German, Roumanian and Serbian middle schools the use of the language of instruction concerned was even allowed at the leaving examination.

If the conditions of Roumanian primary education are disastrous from the Hungarian point of view, they are by no means better in the field of secondary school education. When the Roumanians assumed power in Transylvania and elsewhere, they expelled most of the professors as they had expelled teachers and school-masters. As they wished to transform the secondary schools rapidly into hot-beds of Roumanian culture, but had not an adequate number of professors at their disposal, these were

qualified and created by means of a "lightning" system. The "Slovak", the paper of Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party, once wrote that the Czechs employed as teachers in alienated Upper Hungary were individuals who were "wanted" by the Police, and Ferdinand Juriga, a clergyman and former member of the Hungarian Parliament, who used to declaim in bygone times against the oppression of the Slovaks, has stated in public that "there are no porters in Prague and no house-maids in Brünn, because they have all gone to Slovensko as teachers"; this state of things finds a parallel in the territories annexed by the Roumanians. In 1919 and 1920 courses were held at the Kolozsvár University (already nationalised by the Roumanians), for training secondary school professors, and in these a number of Roumanian parish-priests, so-called popes, obtained a professor's diploma within a few months. As many of these had gone to the seminaries without previous secondary education, it can be imagined what were the cultural attainments of the persons thus qualified to become professors in middle schools. What is more serious is that most of these are still in office. The more impartial among the Roumanian newspapers have pointed out the indefensibility of the situation, and Sotiriu, a professor at the Roumanian college at Brassó, has stated that there are many colleges in Transylvania where even the director was promoted from the ranks of University students or of primary school-masters, and that there was not one member of the whole staff of professors who was properly qualified. It was fortunate, he said, that there were some among the present professors who had previously at least held posts requiring some intelligence, and who were lawyers, chemists or station-masters; there was even a professor at a girls' high school — a tragic-comic case indeed! — whose sole qualification for her post was that she had practised as a midwife.

This system naturally brought about its revenges. In 1925, when Anghelescu, the Minister of Public Instruction, introduced a bill regulating the leaving examination

(in Roumania called "baccalaureat"), he had to admit that foreign Universities had drawn the attention of the Roumanian Government to the very low educational standard of students from Roumanian secondary schools who had presented themselves, and had told them that should the Roumanian Government fail to remedy this, the Universities in question would be obliged to make the admittance of Roumanian students dependent on the passing of an entrance examination.

The system of the *culture zone* was also introduced in connection with secondary schools, though not, as in the case of the elementary schools, on a legal basis. The object was the Roumanisation of the strip of territory that extends from the Hungarian frontier through the territories inhabited by Hungarians to the district where the Szeklers live in one compact mass. By nationalising this zone the Roumanians hope to extirpate the Szeklers, who are surrounded by hostile elements. With this end in view they have closed down under the flimsiest pretexts the Hungarian secondary schools in this zone. Thus the college at Mármarosziget was closed down in 1921 on the ground that its director was said to have shown irredentist proclivities. It is true that a court martial acquitted the director eventually, but this did not affect the fate of the institution. It is obvious that all that was required was a pretext for extinguishing a Hungarian centre of learning, for even if the director had in fact been guilty, he could have been dismissed and it was unnecessary to empty out the baby with the bath! The college of the Premonstrants at Nagyvárad was closed down under some similar pretext, and the Catholic college of Arad on the plea that the educational results achieved were unsatisfactory. After the unfavourable judgment passed by foreign Universities on Roumanian secondary schools this verdict merely provokes a smile.

The above mentioned cases, to which we may add those of the secondary schools of Zilah, Szatmár etc. prove beyond doubt the nationalising tendencies of Roumanian educational policy. The Roumanians resent the

preponderance of the Hungarian *intelligentsia*, and seek to reduce or submerge it. They put into practice the infamous theory of Mello Franco, the Brazilian delegate at Geneva, according to whom the problem of national minorities will be short-lived, because the ruling races will gradually assimilate the minorities, and after a few decades, say one or two generations, there will be no minorities problem. Brutal force, however, will not suffice for the assimilation of races. This requires a slow destruction of racial self-consciousness in the minorities, and superiority of the rulers in the cultural and ethical fields. Now, the Hungarian race will never surrender the leadership in this respect to the Roumanians; it is a characteristic and well-known fact that the Roumanians of Transylvania are on a higher cultural level than those of the former Kingdom. Zsombor Szász writes that this cultural differentiation is obvious even in closely adjoining districts. In those Transylvanian comitats which are situated along the former Hungarian frontier the number of literates greatly exceeds those of the districts beyond that frontier. Thus for example the number of literates in the Comitat Brassó is 74.9%, whereas in the neighbouring Roumanian district Prahova it is only 23.3%; in the Comitat Háromszék 57.4%, and in the adjacent Roumanian district Buzeu 18.7%. These figures speak for themselves and need no further comment. A change can only be brought about by lengthy and arduous cultural labour, very unlikely to be undertaken so long as — according to the computation of the Roumanian State Secretary Banu — the consumption of alcoholic drinks in Roumania amounts to 150 liters per annum and per head of the population, whereas in the Scandinavian States the average is 2 liters.

As a final result there are at present in Transylvania and in the Bánát only seven secondary schools for boys and one for girls, maintained by the Roman Catholic Church, whose certificates are acknowledged by the State, 5 maintained by the Protestants and 2 by the Unitarians. The Roman Catholics were left 1 secondary school and the

Protestants 3 whose certificates are not recognised by the State. Taking into account the educational opportunities of the past, these losses are all the more ominous as the denominational schools are gradually being deprived of the possibility of existence by the confiscation of their landed properties. This is nothing but disguised secularisation, and in fact the most merciless nationalisation.

Let us now consider the situation in the Czecho-Slovak territory, disregarding the question of the Universities and colleges already dealt with in the beginning of this chapter, and examining only the primary schools. According to the book "The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States" recently published, the Czecho-Slovak school law No. 189 of 1919 allows the minorities to create a primary school in villages where there are at least 40 children of school age whose mother-tongue differs from the language of the primary school already existing, and a "Bürgerschule" may be created in places where the number of such children is at least 400. Apart from the fact that this contravenes the stipulations of the Minority Treaties, which decree the unconditional right of the minorities to maintain schools, we would point out that even this law has not yet come into force, and the whole question is left to the mercy of the authorities. As a result the Czech or the Slovak language dominates to such an extent even in the Hungarian schools that after four years instruction the pupils are hardly able to speak their mother-tongue. Even Czech official returns show that the number of non-Hungarian schools increases every year, while that of Hungarian schools decreases.

The situation is worse if we consider the number of teachers. Whereas there is one teacher to every 380 Czechs or Slovaks, there is only one to 745 Hungarians.

Bad as things are in relation to primary schools, they are even worse as regards "Bürgerschulen", i. e. schools that offer a higher type of education. There is one such school to every 6919 Czechs or Slovaks, one to 59.254 Hungarians. As a result last year out of 4500 Hungarian pupils only 41.8% were able to attend a Hungarian school,

and more than half of the Hungarian children were forced to attend a non-Hungarian school. The object in view is quite obvious. These children, who receive their higher education in a foreign language, are lost to the Hungarians when they grow up. Similar methods are even applied to the infant-schools; only in 2.1% of these institutions is the language of instruction Hungarian, and only 64.4% of the 4269 children attending these schools are taught in their mother-tongue.

Though the majority of the Hungarian population is engaged in agriculture, out of the 291 agricultural schools not a single one gives instruction in Hungarian.

There is only one Hungarian commercial school in Slovakia; consequently the proportion of Hungarian pupils to the total of those receiving instruction in commercial schools is only 2.8%. The situation in respect of secondary schools is equally depressing. At present there are no more than two secondary schools where Hungarian is the language of instruction; these represent 1.4% of the total number of such schools, whereas the proportion of the Hungarian race to the total population is, according to Czech official statistics 5.6%, but as a fact, 7.8%.

The situation as regards training colleges for teachers is that although many Hungarian teachers were dismissed and no teachers trained in Hungary are admitted by the Czechs (nor by the Roumanians and Serbs), there is not one Hungarian training college in Slovensko. It is evident that the Czechs deliberately neglect the matter, and that they will ultimately close down the remaining Hungarian schools for lack of teachers. There are, on the other hand, 63 Czecho-Slovak training colleges for teachers. The Czech Government go so far in their utter disregard of the rights of minorities to maintain schools, that neither in Kassa, where out of the total population of 44.000 33.000 were Hungarians, nor in Ungvár where there were 13.500 Hungarians to a total of 17.000, did the Czechs allow the creation of a Hungarian secondary school to replace the college confiscated by

them. This procedure is all the more iniquitous as more than half (52.7%) of the town population of Slovakia is Hungarian.

The policy pursued by the Czechs in the appointment of teachers means, however, persecution not only of the Hungarians, but also of the Slovaks. Stefanek, the Inspector-General of education in Slovakia, himself admitted that the State prefers Czech to Slovak teachers, because the former are more reliable from a political point of view.

We have already mentioned that in Czecho-Slovakia the primary schools were not monopolised by the State, so that only an insignificant number of these schools are State institutions; but the Czechs use the language of instruction as their main weapon and are eager to speed up the Slavising process. The analysis of names already mentioned in connection with Roumanian educational policy is also applied by the Czechs, and the Hungarian pupil must attend a Czech or Slovak school if he was born in a village with a preponderant Slovak population, or if his family name has a Slovak sound. He must also attend a Slovak school in places where the Hungarian proportion of the population is less than 20% of the total.

This Slavising tendency is one of the most painful factors in the Hungarian tragedy. The Hungarians are compelled to become Czechs, Roumanians or Serbs respectively, according to the caprice of the wise men of Trianon. Never in all history has such a game of chance been played with the destinies of a nation. There have been conquests, annexations; these are less bitter than the haphazard decisions that have decreed the assimilation of an ancient race.

Let us now consider the situation in Jugoslavia. Computed by figures, the losses of the Hungarian race seem less serious here, for whereas 1,700,000 Hungarians have passed under Roumanian rule and 1,100,000 under Czech rule, only 560,000 were assigned to Serbia.

The fate of the Hungarian primary schools in these communities was decided by the so-called constitution of

Vidovdan, as established in 1921, which laid down no special rules regarding minorities, but regulated the question of primary education in a uniform manner for the whole of Jugoslavia. It decreed that the task of primary education devolves upon the State, and as a result all primary public schools are State-controlled, though certain private schools are tolerated. At the same time the old educational law of 1904, in force in Serbia, was revived in 1919, but was applied only in the so-called Voivodina, i. e. the territories annexed from Hungary, and in Montenegro. It was not extended to any other of the newly acquired territories, since the Croats had their own ancient educational law, and in the other territories, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia and the Slovene districts the Austrian laws were maintained. For Montenegro even the old Serbian law meant a positive progress, whereas the introduction of this law in the territories taken from Hungary clearly shows the political tendency of the measure. Its main feature is that in the denominational schools confiscated by the State the latter only pays the staff; all other expenses must be borne by the so-called school-districts and villages. If these are unable to maintain the schools, they receive no subsidy from the State, but a loan. This system has sounded the knell of all denominational and communal schools, which may be looked upon as lost from the Hungarian point of view.

The right of the minorities to maintain schools is rendered illusory by the appointment of Serbian teachers to schools in Hungarian villages; of the former Hungarian teachers those who were not dismissed, were transferred to remote parts of the Kingdom, to Macedonia or Montenegro. In places where the Hungarians constitute a minority, Hungarian schools are allowed, or Hungarian classes in the Serbian schools, but only on condition that the number of pupils is at least 30. If the number be less even by one, the children are compelled to attend the Serbian school. Thus the unconditional right secured by the Minorities Treaty are juggled with as by the Czechs with their arbitrary demand for 20% of pupils. And even

in the Hungarian classes above mentioned, in addition to the Serbian language, history and geography must be taught in Serbian.

The system of the analysis of names exists here also, and the Serbs may even claim the dubious credit of having been the first to introduce it. By virtue of a Decree issued by the Minister of Education on February 20, 1922, the nationality of pupils is decided by that of the fathers, but in doubtful cases the authorities decide to which nationality the father belongs. One can imagine how arbitrary such decisions are. If the father's name was not purely and unmistakably Hungarian, or was such that it could be declared phonetically Serbian, in no single instance was he allowed to claim any but Serbian nationality. The practice followed is that if the father's Hungarian nationality is incontrovertible, but the mother is of Slav origin, the child is regarded as Slav.

Last autumn there was a village primary school where the Hungarian and German pupils had been assigned to Hungarian and German classes respectively, and had been taught in their respective tongues for some time. Owing to a denunciation concerning the "Hungarian spirit" prevailing in the Hungarian class, it was forthwith dissolved and the pupils were forced into the Serbian class, although they did not speak a word of Serbian. After what we have already said above it is a matter of course that in Jugoslavia every official, irrespective of nationality, must send his children to Serbian schools.

The question of training teachers in Jugoslavia is also not indifferent from the point of view of the future of Hungarian schools. Since no teachers from Hungary are admitted into Jugoslavia, it should be the duty of the Government to provide for the training of Hungarian teachers. Yet in Jugoslavia there is not one Hungarian training college and the sole "concession" in this connection was the creation of a Hungarian chair in the State training college at Zombor, obviously with the intention of training trustworthy Serbians to become teachers in Hungarian schools.

In private schools, unrecognised by the State, only the four lower classes are tolerated, thus these are incomplete institutions. But it is characteristic that in the fifth and sixth classes of State-recognised primary schools Serbian is the language of instruction; thus the minority character of these classes is entirely suppressed. As regards the teaching of religion, a strongly rationalist conception prevails, as in Czecho-Slovakia. No religious instruction is given in the seventh and eighth classes of Jugoslav secondary schools, nor in any commercial school. Moreover, teachers of religion are compelled to undergo an examination before the State Commission: thus they do not teach on the strength of certificates issued by the authorities of their respective creeds, and, in addition, the religious text-books are not sanctioned by ecclesiastical authority, but by the State, in contravention of the acknowledged rules of Canon Law.

The situation is also distressing as far as secondary schools are concerned. In Jugoslavia there is only one Hungarian secondary school, at Zenta, and the poorer Hungarian parents, living in remote parts of the country, are unable to send their children there. But this suits the purposes of the present rulers. All Hungarian secondary schools were abolished, or expropriated by the State, in 1920. There can, of course, be no question of Hungarian boys receiving a University education in Jugoslavia. Those who come into Hungary to continue their studies meet with all sorts of passport and other difficulties, and, moreover, the diplomas they obtain here are not recognised in Jugoslavia. On the other hand, the "concession" made to the Hungarians under the old *régime*, by which they were given a Hungarian chair at the Universities of Belgrade and Zagreb, was abolished. This fact is interesting to note and to compare with the fact that the chairs at the Budapest University for the Serbo-Croat and Roumanian languages and literature have been maintained without modification.

To complete this chapter we must mention the changes that have taken place in alienated Western Hun-

gary, the so-called Burgenland. According to our statistics already quoted the purely Hungarian population of this territory numbered 26.000, but the Austrians only admit 16.000; and according to their reckoning there are in this territory 230.000 Germans and 40.000 Croats. From the educational point of view, the transfer of territory involved much less of convulsion than in the other alienated territories, owing to the comparatively small total population, and the small percentage of Hungarians.

Lewis Csuppay, in the work known as the "Kornis Collection" tells us that the number of teachers in the Burgenland who were removed from their posts was small, only about 20—30. The majority of the teachers, being of German extraction, joined the "Grossdeutsch" or the Socialist party and became assimilated, so that primary education was at once Germanised. The Austrian authorities then only allowed Hungarian schools in places where the population was entirely Hungarian, so that only five such schools were created. The majority of the schools kept their denominational character, mostly Roman Catholic. They include two complete and one incomplete secondary schools and one commercial school. The last-named is the only one where the Hungarian language is also taught.

Regrettable as are the losses in Hungarian schools in this district, they are unimportant as compared with those in the other alienated territories.

The fate of Hungarian schools in the alienated territories is not only distressing from our point of view, but also from that of culture at large; many institutions, with a past of several centuries, created and maintained at great expense and with much self-sacrifice, have been condemned to death, and even those which still live in the faint hope of being granted grace, are prepared to see even this extinguished. The years which have elapsed since the partition of the country have taught us to take a pessimistic view of the future.

## V. The Disruption and Impoverishment of the Churches

Hungary was not only a geographic and administrative unit, but had become so uniform as regards church administration in the course of centuries, that here again the dictated peace overthrew institutions deeply rooted in the souls of the people. According to Francis Olay's already mentioned work, out of the eighteen Roman Catholic bishoprics of Great Hungary, the territory of four was entirely lost, those of Nyitra, Besztercebánya, of the Szepes district and of Transylvania, and only three were left untouched, those of Székesfehérvár, Veszprém and Eger. Thus only 1/6 of the total could continue their work after the great convulsion. What this means is evident to those who know that the churches in Hungary, and especially the bishoprics, were no mere ecclesiastical administrative organisations, but for centuries past the main supporters of schools and also the pillars of social and charitable activities. Out of the 3310 parishes only 1432 were left, thus more than half of the bases of church administration have been removed.

Out of the seven Greek Catholic dioceses three were lost entirely, Lugos, Szamosujvár and Balázsfalva. Much more painful, however, than the loss of these Roumanian bishoprics was the partial loss of Hajdudorog, because half of this diocese created after long struggles for Greek Catholic Hungarians, was also alienated, in that 80 parishes out of 163 were given to Roumania.

Out of the seven Greek Oriental bishoprics those of Nagyszében, Karánsebes and Versecz were entirely lost, and of those of Temesvár, Arad and Ujvidék only 27 parishes altogether remained in our territory.

The Calvinist and the Lutheran churches have lost all their Transylvanian districts, and have suffered heavy losses elsewhere. The Calvinists have lost no fewer than 1078 parishes, and the Lutherans 706 as against the 1008 and 404 respectively left to them. These two Protestant

churches have thus been deprived of a considerable number of their supporters.

The Unitarians have lost their only church-district, that of Kolozsvár, and only four parishes have remained to them within the present frontiers.

It can be imagined what a blow such a forcible disruption means to every one of the various creeds organised to administer areas much greater than those left to them. The matter is not simply one of a few hundred or a thousand parishes lost; it must be remembered that each diocese or church-district constituted an organic unit from the point of view of administration, education, etc. The convulsion becomes more evident if we take into account the economic background of the question. We have already mentioned that the dioceses of four Roman Catholic bishoprics out of eighteen were alienated, and all their landed property. We have, however, kept eleven dioceses of which only a part was alienated. But in many cases a part of the landed property lies in alienated territory, for example land belonging to the Arch-bishopric of Esztergom; the greater part of this property is situated on the left bank of the Danube and was therefore annexed by Czecho-Slovakia. These prescriptions of the Treaty of Trianon, which disregard all logical adjustment, have caused incredible complications. Similar displacements have occurred in other dioceses, in those of Kassa, Nagyvárad etc.

The princes of the Church themselves have had to suffer in person from the high-handed methods of the Succession States. Turning the pages of the history of recent years we see with indignation that a number of Bishops in the alienated territories were removed from their sees. Among the Roman Catholic Bishops the Czechs expelled Count William Batthyány, the Bishop of Nyitra, Farkas Radnai, Bishop of Besztercebánya and Louis Ballázs, Bishop of Rozsnyó, and the Roumanians did the same to Julius Glattfelder, Bishop of Csanád. Of the Greek Catholic Bishops the Czechs expelled William Novák, Bishop of Eperjes, and Anthony Papp, Bishop of Ungvár.

Parish-priests were also expelled wholesale under the pretext that they showed irredentist proclivities. The most striking instance of such expulsions is that of Victor Palkovics, a parish-priest at Gutor, who had officiated for above half a century in the same place, and was so popular that under the new *régime* he was elected a member of the Czech Parliament. This record did not prevent the Czech authorities from expelling him from the territory of the Republic. It is almost unparalleled in history that priests should be persecuted and removed from their posts for political reasons, and that their cures should be given by the authorities to persons of their own race and political conviction. And what a Calvary was the lot of some of these men! The Bishop of Nyitra, for example, Count Batthyány, who in addition to his high rank in the Roman Catholic hierarchy, was the descendant of an ancient Hungarian family. In his episcopal palace Czech legionaries were billeted who at night held orgies with women of ill fame; the Hussite flag was hoisted on the palace and the traditional midnight mass on Christmas Eve was derided. The most striking feature of the Batthyány tragedy is that these outrages occurred prior to the signature of the Treaty of Trianon, thus at a time when the Czechs had no right whatever to act as masters in that territory. It is not surprising that the shock of these disasters caused the subsequent death of the Bishop.

In addition to the expulsion of priests there are many examples of the confiscation of churches. There is an old Calvinist church at Marosszentimre, which according to tradition, was built by the famous Hungarian Generalissimo and Governor, János Hunyadi, in the fifteenth century. This was confiscated and given to the Roumanian Greek Catholics there on the plea that there were no Calvinists in the place (which is untrue), and that, as Hunyadi was a Hungarian Generalissimo, the church built by him was State property and thus becomes Roumanian property *ipso jure*. The Roman Catholic Order of Minorites had for three centuries possessed a church

and a monastery at Kolozsvár. The Roumanian Greek Catholics coveted them, and intrigued so persistently for them that the Order voluntarily resigned them (one can imagine how spontaneous this renunciation was!) and presented them to the Holy See; the latter gave them to the Roumanian Greek Catholics. We could quote any number of similar examples; the above will serve as illustrations.

It is also characteristic that the Roumanians represent all Greek Catholics as exclusively Roumanians, and on this principle their official statistics are based. When, under Hungarian rule, the Greek Catholic Bishopric of Hajdudorog was created, the Roumanians endeavoured to prevent its creation on the ground that in Hungary only Roumanians and Ruthenians confessed the Greek Catholic faith, and that, therefore, it was unnecessary to found a Bishopric for Hungarian Greek Catholics. The truth, however, was that there were many thousand Hungarian Greek Catholics, and it was the right and even the duty of the Hungarian Government to provide for their spiritual needs. The present Roumanian Government goes even farther, and in their statistics every Greek Catholic is *eo ipso* a Roumanian. Among the Szeklers there are fourteen villages with an almost purely Hungarian population, where out of a total of 20.000 there were 4500 Greek Catholics. In these villages, however, there were also about 200 Roumanian Greek Catholics, thus 1% of the total population. According to the Roumanian official returns, prepared after the annexation, there are in these villages more than 4000 Roumanians, a proof of our statement that the Roumanians represent every Greek Catholic as a Roumanian. A similar return was published in 1920 as regards the Greek Catholics in the Nagykároly district, where about 7004 Hungarians were scheduled as Roumanians.

The present constitution of Roumania, although it secures in principle, or let us say on paper, equal freedom for all denominations, grants a privileged position to the two churches the members of which are overwhelmingly

Roumanians. It declares the Greek Oriental or Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church to be Roumanian Churches, and even declares as regards the former that it is the ruling church in Roumania, and as regards the latter that it takes precedence of all the other denominations. This ordinance, embodied in the fundamental law of the State, is in itself opposed to that modern and liberal progress on which the Roumanians lay stress. It is also strange that the two Roumanian ecclesiastical organisations are described as Churches, and all the others as denominations, the obvious intention being to lower the legal status of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. This intention has already been put into practice in several instances. Every high ecclesiastic, for example, of the Roumanian Churches is *ex officio* a member of the Senate, whereas those of other Churches only if their dioceses include at least 200,000 souls. The feast-days of the Orthodox Church were declared official festivals which every one must keep. As the calendar of the Orthodox Church abounds in festivals, it may be supposed that there are a sufficient number of days when no work may be done. It can be imagined how many compulsory feast-days there are in Transylvania for the non-Orthodox population.

It is interesting, however, to observe the continuous conflicts in Roumania between the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Church, owing to the privileges of the former and the tendency to make all Roumanian citizens its adherents and thus to form a State religion. Although we could quote many instances of the high-handed proceedings of the Orthodox against the Greek Catholic Church approved by the administrative authorities, we will not enter into details. We would only point out that even the ruling race in Roumania has little respect for the religious equality of their brethren. Roumanians oppress Roumanians with official assistance. How can we expect from this race and these authorities any understanding of the rights of minorities!

The grievances of the Roman Catholic and Protes-

tant Churches in the Succession States, especially in Roumania, induced the Western countries in 1920 to ascertain the actual situation by means of commissions on the spot. Zsombor Szász and Francis Olay have published interesting details, and the international press has also dealt with the work performed by these commissions. The United Free Church of Scotland and the League for the Protection of National and Religious Minorities of New York have published the result of their investigations, the former under the title of "The Hungarian Reformed Church", and the latter under that of "The Religious Minorities in Transylvania". The American Unitarian Society on two occasions sent a commission to Transylvania, the second time in 1927. All these investigations have corroborated the complaints of the Hungarians, to which palliating replies have been made by the Roumanians, but the situation has in fact not improved. The new rulers keep on insisting that they demand loyalty from the Hungarians. The claim is not resisted, for our fellow-nationals are perfectly aware that in the interest of consolidation they must submit, however painful this may be, to the new order of things. But we may ask whether they can reasonably be expected to be loyal, if they are made to feel continuously that they are inferior citizens, whose racial, linguistic and religious rights, secured by international treaties, are entirely disregarded. Foreign, and therefore impartial observers, have declared the truth: that in Transylvania and the adjoining, formerly Hungarian territories, the Treaty of Trianon has placed about two million persons of Western civilisation under the rule of a people semi-Oriental in culture and morals. For the characterisation of this Eastern — not to say Balkan — *régime* it will be sufficient to quote the opinion of a foreign commission to the effect that "no reliance can be placed on the promises of the Roumanian Government".

The confiscation of the properties of the Churches in the alienated territories proved an efficient means to undermine their vital power. At the same time the schools maintained by these Churches were deprived of their

support. All this was done under the plea of land reform, as regards which German, and even Roumanian experts have stated that there was no need for land reform as introduced and carried out in those territories, because agrarian conditions in the former Kingdom were entirely different to those in Transylvania, and the necessity of land reform must be, therefore, considered from different points of view in the two cases. We do not propose to deal in any detail with the illegalities committed under the plea of land reform, but we cannot neglect its effects upon the Churches and the schools maintained by them.

According to the Roumanian Agrarian Law of 1921 the following, *inter alia*, may be expropriated. the estates owned by corporate bodies serving public interests, such as corporations, foundations, churches, monasteries, chapters, schools, Universities, institutes, hospitals, villages, etc., and these are distributed in parcels of 7—16 yokes among the agricultural population. Indemnification will be calculated on the basis of the average market prices of the five years preceding the year 1913, but will not be paid in cash, but in bonds. The fact alone that not the actual, but the pre-war market price is taken as a basis amounts to confiscation, all the more so as in the former Kingdom this principle is not applied, but compensation is calculated on the basis of post-war market prices. Thus in Roumania there are two kinds of justice: one for the former Kingdom, and another for Transylvania, a statement confirmed by the fact that whereas in the former Kingdom 850 yokes are the minimum that must be left to the owner, this area is only 500 yokes in Transylvania.

Since the Churches and their endowments and institutions come under the terms of expropriation, the law fixed certain limits as to the minimum to be left, and decreed that every church is entitled to 16 yokes for the maintenance of its school, and to 50 yokes for the maintenance of the church building and for the salaries of the parish priest and of the schoolmaster. Thus a minimum of 66 yokes must be left to every parish. The total of 58.000 yokes of land owned by the Protestant Church of

Transylvania, divided by the number of parishes,, does not yield the minimum secured by law, thus there was no legal basis for expropriation. In spite of this, however, 21.000 yokes were confiscated. The complaint made in 1925 by the Catholic, Calvinist and Unitarian Churches to the League of Nations stated that all the property of 42 Calvinist schools was confiscated, and 13 were allowed much less than the minimum of 16 yokes fixed by law. Many of the Catholic and Unitarian schools shared a like fate.

The properties of the so-called Roman Catholic *Status* and of the former Military Marches deserve special mention.

At the time of the Reformation the greater part of the Transylvanian population embraced the new faith. and many members of the Catholic clergy and even many bishops left the province, leaving their flocks without shepherds. In the course of time the congregations organised themselves and undertook functions formerly performed by the bishops and parish-priests (maintenance of church-buildings, payment of the stipends of priests etc.). Thus the lay element exercised a much greater influence in church administration than would have been possible in normal circumstances. After the reunion of Transylvania with Hungary, the King recognised the situation, and the result was the Roman Catholic *Status*, i. e. the organisation exercising the autonomous rights of the Transylvanian Roman Catholic Church, the president of which is the Bishop, and its members elected ecclesiastics and laymen. These are entrusted with the administration of the property of the *Status*, derived from various donations, especially those of Prince Stephen Báthory. Under the new Roumanian rule this did not escape; it was almost entirely expropriated. Thus all the schools maintained by this *Status* were deprived of their means of subsistence.

The properties of the former so-called Military Marches afford a striking example of the different treatment accorded by the Roumanians to cultural values when

these serve Roumanian or Hungarian aims. The Military Marches were created by the Hungarian Kings after the Turks had been driven out of the country in the seventeenth century. These districts, stretching along the frontiers, were populated by settlers of various nationalities, Szeklers, Roumanians, Saxons, Serbs. They enjoyed various privileges in recompense of their military service which lasted until they were of advanced age, at a time when there was no compulsory service. The military equipment of these districts and the maintenance of these frontier forces naturally required considerable material resources, and these were supplied by the Kings in the form of endowments out of State properties, and also partly by private gifts. These estates consisted of forests and pastures; the total possessed by the Szeklers for example, amounted to 76.000 yokes, that of the Roumanians of the Bánát to 250.000 yokes, that of the Serbs of the Bánát to 50.000 yokes etc.

In 1868, after the introduction of compulsory military service, these Military Marches were abolished, and their estates were by Royal Decree declared independent properties designed to give cultural assistance to the descendants of the frontiersmen. After this, the Szekler, Roumanian, Serb and Saxon properties were administered separately and the ample revenues were devoted to the education of the children of the respective nationalities. After the enactment of the land reform the Roumanians left the Roumanian properties untouched, but expropriated the greatest of those owned by the Hungarians (Szeklers) and Saxons. It is obvious, therefore, that Roumania applied her arbitrary chauvinistic policy to these properties, although they all served the same purpose.

In Czecho-Slovak territory many endowments for cultural purposes were also lost, for example the immovable properties which yielded the Count John Pálffy scholarship fund; this is no longer devoted to Hungarian cultural purposes as intended by the founder, but is partly sequestered, and partly devoted to unknown purposes. The estates of the so-called Fund for Religion and Study

also represent great properties confiscated by the Succession States on the plea that they were Hungarian State property, whereas they were derived from the property of the Jesuit Order suppressed by Maria Theresa, or other endowments made for purposes of study. All these properties were destined and were in fact reserved for such purposes, and were merely administered by the Hungarian State. And what is to be said of the estates of the Budapest University, those of the various Churches, Abbeys, and religious Orders all devoted to the service of Hungarian cultural life, which have been illegally expropriated by the Succession States? We might fill pages with grievances in this field, all arising from the cultural effects of the Treaty of Trianon.

Just as the Czechs and the Roumanians have ruined the Catholic and Protestant Churches under the pretext of agrarian reform, so the Jugoslav State has pursued a policy of spoliation on the same plea, with the difference that the minimum to be left to the former owners is even smaller, i. e. 518 yokes if the property be managed by the owner himself, and 100 yokes if let out. We have already seen how in Roumania the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches enjoy a privileged position, and the adherents of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths are treated as second if not third class citizens, as a real *misera plebs contribuens*. We find an analogy to this in Jugoslavia, where the Serb Greek Oriental Church is favoured. Under the land reform — which in Jugoslavia was not enacted by Parliament, but was based upon ministerial decrees no less effective in their application to the minorities — the properties of the Churches were expropriated or rented on so-called forced leases. In this manner the Roman Catholic Archbishopric of Kalocsa lost its estate of 16.000 yokes, while the Serb Greek Oriental Church had a considerable portion of its estates restored to it, it is true, for alleged cultural purposes. Thus here again we find distinctions as between first and second class citizens, in defiance of the theory of equality and democratic progress so loudly proclaimed.

Although the matter lies outside the scope of an examination of the cultural policy pursued by the Succession States, we feel bound to note certain Serbian official data regarding taxation, to show how differently the ruling majority and the national minorities are treated in Jugoslavia. These facts, we repeat, were published by the Serbian Government.

According to the latest census Jugoslavia has 12 million inhabitants, distributed among six provinces. Of these, the greatest are Serbia and Montenegro, which together possess 36% of the total population. Against this the so-called Voivodina and Syrmia, i. e. the former Hungarian districts known as the Bánát and the Bácska, and the eastern comitats of Croatia-Slavonia, account for less than 15% of the total population. Since the constitution of Jugoslavia in 1919, i. e. during the eight years from 1919 up to the end of 1926 the total of direct taxes collected amounted to 7,764.000.000 dinars. To this sum, however, Serbia and Montenegro did not contribute 36%, which would have been in proportion to the population, but only 23%, whereas the Voivodina and Syrmia contributed not 15 but nearly 26%. Whereas in the former provinces taxation per head was 408 dinars, this figure in the latter was 1118 dinars.

Hence it follows that the inhabitants of the ancient provinces are much less heavily taxed than those inhabited by Hungarians and Germans. It may perhaps be said that these territories are more fertile, and that its inhabitants being better off can afford to pay more. But it must not be forgotten that the Voivodina has suffered cruelly from the expropriations carried out in the name of land reform. There is no doubt, therefore, that the principles of taxation are much more rigid and partial in the non-Slav provinces than in the rest of the Kingdom. It is also a characteristic fact that in Croatia-Slavonia, where it is to the interest of the Government to enlist the sympathy of the province, the quota of direct taxation per head of the population was only 202 dinars. Compare this to taxation in the neighbouring Voivodina!

All this supports our contention that in the Succession States there are first and second class citizens, a classification by which the minorities certainly do not benefit!

But we will return to our consideration of the position of the Churches. In order to throw light upon the difference between the policy pursued in pre-war Hungary towards these and that of the Succession States, it will be interesting to describe the autonomy enjoyed by the Roumanian and Serbian Greek Oriental or Orthodox, and the Roumanian Greek Catholic Churches under Hungarian rule. It will be seen that the equal treatment of all citizens, and the tolerance and loyalty shown towards the Churches whose adherents were preponderantly alien nationals, were a natural corollary of the Hungarian policy. We may leave it to the impartial reader to judge which of the two policies is truly liberal and democratic.

Although the first Serb settlers came into Hungary as early as the fourteenth century, they were almost annihilated during the Turkish occupation; but a large number of Serbs settled in Hungary after the Turks had been driven out of the country by the end of the seventeenth century. It was at this time that about 40,000 Serbian families, escaping from the persecution and maltreatment they suffered at the hands of the Turks, came into Hungary under the leadership of Arsen Czarnojevitch or Czernovitch, the Patriarch of Ipek, and settled in Southern Hungary and the southern parts of Croatia-Slavonia. As these districts had been ravaged and depopulated under the Turkish rule which lasted 150 years, the Serb immigrants were welcomed by the Hungarian King and German-Roman Emperor Leopold I., who ensured their free development by the granting of special privileges embodied in the so-called *Diploma Leopoldinum*. As they all belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, this, a real Serb national Church, was given considerable privileges: an independent Metropolitanship (Archbishopric) at Karlowitz, and later, several bishoprics, among which was that of Buda.

The royal diploma not only ensured the free exercise of the cult, but also granted autonomy to the Serbian Church. The great intrinsic and extrinsic value of this autonomy lay in the fact that it enabled the Serbs to organise their Church on a national basis, independently of all the other Churches. The lay element played an important part in their church administration. The prestige of the Serbian Church was greatly enhanced in 1848 when the Metropolitan of Karlovitz was given the title of Patriarch. The liberal legislation of 1848 confirmed the autonomous rights of the Church, reserving to the State a certain measure of control as regards ecclesiastical matters and schools. This was exercised by submission to the King (for confirmation) of the nomination of the Patriarch and of bishops, and further by the appointment of a Royal Commissary to the Synods dealing with church administration. As regards schools the State exercised the same control as over the schools of the other denominations. Thus it may truly be said that the Serbs really enjoyed national independence, and owing to this peculiar situation the Serb Orthodox Church became in fact a hotbed of Serbian particularism. Even after the Treaty of Trianon the Serb Greek Orthodox bishopric of Buda was maintained, and continues to govern such congregations as remained in the country.

The Roumanian Greek Orthodox Church was not a separate organisation originally. When at the middle of the eighteenth century the Serb Greek Orthodox bishoprics were created, three of these, in Arad, Temesvár and Versec, had Roumanian adherents. A hundred years later the Greek Orthodox Roumanians of Transylvania had their own Bishop, but he was still subject to the Patriarchate of Karlovitz; and only fifty years later, in 1865, was the independent Roumanian Greek Orthodox Church organised. Its head was the Metropolitan of Nagyszében; it was divided into several dioceses and enjoyed full autonomy.

As regards the Greek Catholic Church, it has never been a truly national Church, because it has also had Hungarian members. I have already mentioned that for

these a special bishopric was created in Hajdudorog in 1912. But still, the majority of the members of this Church were Roumanians and these also enjoyed privileges, autonomy and in fact entire independence.

We may say, therefore, that *in pre-war Hungary the Serbs and the Roumanians enjoyed ecclesiastical independence organised on a national basis*, which offered the possibility of racial and cultural development. This cultural independence was analogous to that enjoyed by them in the domain of literature and science. Thus it is not surprising that the first book printed in Roumanian should have been published in Nagyszében, in 1544, and that the first Roumanian grammar was published in 1780 by Klein and Sinkai in Buda. It was also here that Peter Maior's great work embodying the etymologic dictionary of the Roumanian language was published in 1825.

But yet we barbarous Magyars were oppressors!

## VI. The Destruction of Hungarian Monuments

Should the foreigner coming to Hungary from the West choose the beautiful route of the Danube waterway, he will see, an hour and a half after leaving Vienna, a mutilated monument on a lofty rock at the point where the Morava flows into the Danube. More than three decades ago, in 1896, our country celebrated its millenium, the thousandth anniversary of its occupation, and Parliament then decided to erect artistic monuments on all the points which marked the boundaries of the land chosen by the ancient Hungarians as their future home. Seven such monuments were erected, at Munkács, Nyitra, Dévény, Pannonhalma, Zimony, Pusztaszer and Brassó. One of these was at Dévény, at the confluence of the Danube and the Morava, on the western frontier of our ancient country. There it told the foreigner that he was looking at the landmark of a nation a thousand years old. After the collapse, however, during the Czech

occupation it was mutilated, and the statue of Árpád, our leader, was thrown down.

In the South we erected a monument looking towards Serbia at Zimony, and another looking towards Roumania at Brassó. Our commemoration had no aggressive or provocative character, we merely wished to symbolise, within our own territory, the boundaries of our country. But the Serbs and the Roumanians have mutilated or blown up these monuments. Similar vandals were committed at Nitra and Munkács.

The destruction, however, did not end here, and other monuments were attacked.

At Pozsony the population of the town erected a monument in 1897, the work of the gifted sculptor, Fadrusz, to commemorate the coronations which had taken place there for three hundred years. The artist chose the historic moment when the Hungarians, seeing the throne of their Queen endangered, offered their lives and their blood to Maria Theresa. The gigantic memorial of Carrara marble represented the Queen on horseback, wearing the Royal Crown, with a Hungarian noble on either side of her, symbolising the willingness of the whole nation to die for her. The Czechs barbarously destroyed the monument in 1921 by breaking it into pieces. If they had no respect for it as a memorial of Hungarian history, they might have preserved it as an artistic creation.

Pozsony had also a statue of Petőfi, the world-famed poet of liberty. He was the sworn foe of every kind of tyranny, so the Czechs had no reason to regard him as an enemy of their race. But he was a Hungarian, and had therefore to disappear. The statue was removed from the principal square of the town, from the Louis Kossuth Square, which of course now bears the name of some Czech celebrity.

In Kassa, beside the magnificent fourteenth century cathedral, stood a memorial of the War of Independence of 1848/49, and the fact that the battalion recruited in that town, known as the "Red Caps", were the most valiant troops of that war, lent special historic interest to the

memorial. The Czech authorities allowed it to be destroyed by the "irresponsible" mob. We may be thankful to Providence that the remains of Francis Rákóczi II. and his associates which lie in the Cathedral were not also pursued by blind hatred. It is tragic enough that the remains of these national heroes who fought for Hungary's independence more than two hundred years ago and whose bones were brought back in triumph from Turkey, should now be in alienated territory. The remains of Prince Imre Tököly, brought back at the same time, share this fate and lie in the Lutheran church of Késmárk.

The list of outrages on Hungarian monuments may be continued. At Segesvár, where Petőfi disappeared during the battle against the Russians on July 31, 1849, the memorial was destroyed. In Marosvásárhely, the ancient Székely town, the statues of Louis Kossuth, Francis Rákóczi, and the famous Polish General Bem, who fought for Hungary in the War of Independence of 1848/49, perished. At Losonc a Kossuth monument, at Zombor the statue of General Schweidel, the martyr of 1849, at Versecz and Karánsebes the statues of Queen Elizabeth and in the latter town the statue of King Francis Joseph have all disappeared. In Arad the famous statue of the thirteen martyrs, generals in the War of Independence of 1848/49 executed by Haynau, was surrounded by a boarded scaffolding to hide it from the public, and at Kolozsvár the statue of King Matthias Corvinus was mutilated.

In Nagyvárad the Roumanians removed the statue of King Saint Ladislas, in Lőcse the Czechs destroyed the Honvéd memorial, and also the millennium memorial in the High Tátra, on the summit of the mountain. They further destroyed the Honvéd memorial at Körmöcbánya, the Kossuth statues at Dobsina and at Érsekujvár, and the Hunnia memorial at Trencsén. The Serbs destroyed the Honvéd memorial at Versec, the statue of Francis Joseph at Fehértemplom, the statue of Count Leiningen, a Hungarian General in 1848/49, and mutilated the Honvéd memorial at Szabadka.

In short, over a hundred statues and memorials have fallen under the stupid ferocity of the new rulers.

These results of the Treaty of Trianon will certainly be condemned by all civilised persons; we are the chief losers in this barbarous campaign, but the whole civilised world will pass sentence upon those who resort to such methods in pursuance of their policy.

## VII. The Loss of other cultural Treasures; Museums, Libraries, dramatic Art and Press

Owing to the partition of the country great changes have taken place in the complex of our cultural institutions. There is no field of intellectual life in which we have not felt the effects of the fact that institutions and creations developing for centuries on identical principles were suddenly deprived of the conditions of further progress. The development of intellectual life has been considerable especially during the last half-century. The country showed a feverish anxiety to make good what it had been compelled by adverse circumstances to neglect, especially during the twenty years of Austrian absolutist rule preceding the "Ausgleich" of 1867. Every manifestation of our intellectual life was an impulse urging our nation on to highminded competition with the most civilised peoples. During the year of our millenary celebrations we attracted the attention of peoples who had hitherto known little of Hungary, and the consciousness of having fulfilled our mission for a thousand years gave us strength and courage for further achievements. These were recognised even by our enemies. Distant countries have become acquainted with the outstanding figures of our literature, our scientists have reaped honours abroad, the names of some of our artists are known all over the world. Hungarian cultural life in its various manifestations has become one of the creative elements of our race. And even this, our supreme treasure, was mutilated by the Treaty of Trianon.

whose well-meaning but ill-informed creators imagined they were forwarding the development of human civilisation and the self-determination of peoples when they broke up Hungary.

In his frequently quoted book Francis Olay tells us that out of a total in Great Hungary of 1348 scientific and public libraries, containing about 9.5 million volumes, 745, i. e. more than half, containing 4 million volumes, were lost to us. The major part, 326 libraries with more than 2 million volumes, came into the possession of the Roumanians. Some idea of our losses in this direction will be given by mention of the library of Kolozsvár University, which was famous far beyond our frontiers owing to its many-sided and systematic development, and its excellent management. The Czechs enriched themselves with 1.200 000 volumes, the Serbs with half a million. In many places the books of authors whom the new rulers disliked for some reason or other, were simply thrown out. Out of 6000 public libraries with more than one million volumes less than half a million volumes were left to us.

We have lost many of our scientific collections, such as that of the Transylvanian Museum Society at Kolozsvár; the historical Museum of Relics of 1848 in the same place; in all, 56 public collections out of a total of 90. We possessed 485 other scientific institutions, of which we have lost 265. In the list of our national treasures we must strike out a great number of old Hungarian books, ancient prints etc. which can never be replaced. All these are lost cultural values, for we know that the new owners do not appreciate them, and even allow them to fall into decay.

Dramatic art is a factor of intellectual life which has a strong influence on the public at large. We know what an important part was played by this art and its most distinguished representatives in the renaissance of Hungarian national literature at the close of the eighteenth century. It conveys with all the power of the living word the ideas of the poets, and in its highest

forms, is unique as a medium of civilisation. Hungarian dramatic art had a glorious past in Kolozsvár, Arad, Kassa, Pozsony, Temesvár and Szabadka. By its means a branch of Hungarian culture not only flourished in those towns, but sent offshoots far afield. The Succession States were all aware that every one of their adverse measures in this domain was a nail in the coffin of Hungarian culture.

In his often quoted book Zsombor Szász gives moving details concerning the fate of the Hungarian National Theatre of Kolozsvár. This had been built by public contribution, and was not subsidised by the Hungarian State; thus the Roumanian authorities had no legal right to confiscate it. In the early days of the occupation they only interfered with the repertory, prohibiting every piece which in the opinion of the Roumanian censor was in any way directed against Roumanian rule. Thus they forbade Shakespeare's "Coriolanus" and Rostand's "L'Aiglon", heedless of the irritation this was likely to cause to the English and French nations, for it could hardly be argued that Shakespeare or Rostand had intended to agitate against the political aims of Roumania. In some instances they did not forbid the plays of foreign authors altogether, but suppressed certain passages, as for instance, in Molière's "Tartuffe".

After these initial proceedings it is not surprising to find that the Roumanian authorities waited eagerly for the first opportunity to expel the Hungarian company bodily from the National Theatre. This they did in the summer of 1919 — long before the signature of the Treaty of Trianon — and the director was ordered to hand over the theatre. He was given some old building in its place, and the National Theatre was seized and given to a Roumanian company.

The Serb and the Czech authorities adopted similar methods to stifle Hungarian dramatic art. As late as at the end of 1927 the Hungarian newspapers reported that after a hard struggle lasting several years the Serbs had eventually consented to the acting of a Hungarian company in the so-called Voivodina. After a few weeks, however,

the authorities expelled 16 of its members from Jugoslav territory, and a little later the remaining members, including the director, were also expelled. The Jugoslav authorities never give any reason for such measures, and nothing is easier than to trump up some charge of alleged activities against the State.

The position of Hungarian dramatic art is no more favourable in the territories annexed by the Czechs. In former times dramatic art flourished especially in two large towns, Pozsony and Kassa, but even in smaller towns companies were able to subsist, for example, in Komárom, Nyitra, Besztercebánya, Losonc, Rimaszombat, Eperjes etc. At present only one company is allowed to play, and their theatres had to be given over to Czech troupes.

The struggles of the Hungarian press in the alienated territories might be dealt with in a whole volume. From open coercion to cunning devices every kind of obstacle has been put in their way, and nothing shows the living force of Hungarian culture more evidently than the fact that the press, in spite of the ill-will it encounters at every turn, has been able to maintain itself and even to develop to a certain extent, indeed the partition of the country has, in many places, especially in Transylvania, given a new impetus to Hungarian literature. This new tendency finds inspiration not only in local tradition (*genius loci*), but also in the sub-conscious perception by the Hungarians of Transylvania that in these politically difficult times they must be independent in thought and action. Transylvania, when an independent principality, between the power of the Roman-German Emperor and the influence of the Porte, had to seek its own ways and adopt a prudent policy varying with circumstances. At present it is forsaken, and must again seek its road through ideas that find expression in the printed page. This accounts for the recent vigorous output in Transylvanian literature, and even in political writing, which is not to be paralleled either in Upper Hungary or in the southern alienated districts, though as a result of recent

events the representative authors of these territories are also beginning to make themselves heard through the Hungarian press, though less independently than in Transylvania.

It is a fact that the Succession States fear the printed matter published in Hungary more than the devil fears the smoke of incense. Already in the first days of the occupations stringent decrees were issued prohibiting the importation from Hungary of any newspaper or book, and even at present when we cross the frontier, the attention of customs officials is mainly concentrated upon Hungarian newspapers and books. Their authorities are all obsessed by a fear that anything coming from us will necessarily be an attack upon their existence, which they feel to be insecure. This is why none of our newspapers are admitted. General hilarity was caused at the Press Conference held at Geneva in the summer of 1927 by the statement made by Joseph Vészi, the editor of the "Pester Lloyd", an important Hungarian newspaper widely read abroad. He said that his paper counted among its subscribers Ferdinand, the late King of Roumania, who, however, complained of not receiving the journal. Enquiry showed that the paper — although addressed to their King — was regularly confiscated by the Roumanian frontier police. The "Pester Lloyd" was thenceforth forwarded to Bucharest through the Roumanian diplomatic representative in Budapest. But for the absurdity of the business one might well be indignant at the thought that at present, at the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, there are still people who believe that ideas, thoughts and above all — truth, can be made non-existent, can be spirited away by banishing the paper on which they are printed.

Such incidents show how difficult the propagation of Hungarian literature in Roumania is, even scientific works are not allowed to cross the frontier. The same situation exists in Czechoslovakia. It is characteristic of the methods employed by the Czech authorities to prevent the promulgation not only of printed matter published in

Hungary, but even of newspapers published in their own territory if they do not serve the interests of the Government, that some years ago the Czech fiscal administration in Pozsony warned tobacconists that their licences would be withdrawn, should they sell the Hungarian Opposition papers.

In Jugoslavia censorship is in force as regards foreign printed matter; general rules are no longer applied, but it is decided in each individual case what kind of printed matter shall be admitted into the country. It frequently happens that after lengthy proceedings some Hungarian periodical is admitted; but should it publish some article disagreeing with the views of the authorities, the permit is withdrawn. There can of course be no question of our fellow-nationals obtaining the latest productions of Hungarian literature through the normal book-trade channels

In dealing with the question of intellectual intercourse we must mention the obstacles raised by the Succession States in the sphere of associations. After the partition of the country many of the existing cultural, social, charitable and literary societies and others devoted to public interests came under alien rule. Needless to say that the activities of these are obstructed by all available means. Clubs were closed down, premises seized, libraries confiscated etc. The Roumanians for example, in the autumn of 1919, under the protection of the military occupation and long before the Peace Treaty was signed, suspended the activities of the oldest Hungarian cultural society, the so-called EMKE (Transylvanian Hungarian Cultural Society), and sequestered its property and library. In contrast to this it may be noted that the Roumanians of Transylvania had possessed a similar society since 1861, the very active and influential Roumanian Literary and Cultural Society, the so-called *Astra*.

We could quote any number of cases, in Roumania, Jugoslavia and in Czecho-Slovakia, but it is not our intention to give complete statistics; we merely wish to indicate the hostile policy pursued in this field also. It is obvious

that the Succession States, not only as regards the endeavours made by the Hungarians to develop their culture, but also as regards the cultural institutions of the past, deliberately evade the obligations undertaken by them in the Minority Treaties, or, if they make a show of carrying them out, they are careful to open a hundred loopholes and back-doors.

## VIII. Cultural Balance Sheet of the first Decade of the Partition

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in the autumn of 1918, thus the partition of Hungary began ten years ago. It is true that the Treaty of Trianon was made later, but in the meantime the country suffered the horrors of revolution and Bolshevism, as a consequence of which a considerable part of our land was occupied by foreign troops who availed themselves of the favourable circumstances to create *de facto* dominance in the occupied territories.

In the foregoing pages we have reviewed the cultural effects of the Treaty of Trianon; let us now endeavour to draw up a balance sheet of the last ten years.

It is well known that Wilson's Fourteen Points were in the beginning declared to be the principal basis of the Peace Treaties to be concluded. To-day all the world knows that Wilson — although his intentions were sincere — had not the strength of personality required to realise his will. The Peace Treaties made in the suburbs of Paris (Versailles, Saint Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, Sèvres) buried the great principles originally proclaimed by the American President one after the other; and in particular, the truly democratic principle that the nations should themselves decide their future fate. This so-called "self-determination" was magnificently thought out from the point of view of human ideals; it was conceived in the interests of the European nations which, according to American ideas, were more or less oppressed, and of the

races which were not their own masters, and aimed at ensuring the blessings of world peace by enabling them to decide where they wished to belong. It is also well-known that the propaganda carried on during the war by the Entente Powers declared that the aim of the war was to liberate the oppressed small nations. After the war, therefore, provision should have been made for the real freedom of these, and they should have been given an opportunity to decide their future fate for themselves.

It is unnecessary to say that such hopes were not realised; when peace was concluded the small nations, or at least many of them, were not consulted as to their wishes, but were simply told that the new frontiers would be such and such. Those who dictated the Peace Treaties endeavoured to give an ethical basis to their attitude before the world by proclaiming the theory of war-guilt, i. e. that those responsible for the outbreak of the war must suffer its consequences. The question as to who were the culprits was decided by them, without hearing the opposite party.

It is beyond the scope of the present essay to combat this arbitrary assumption and its implicit consequences. The literature published during the past ten years has embodied a sufficient number of confidential diplomatic documents to show the baselessness of the charge, and there is no doubt that the truth will come to light ever more clearly in the course of years. *Thus the ethical basis of the dictated Peace Treaties is destroyed.* The realisation of the theory of self-determination was not even attempted.

And this was also the tragedy of Great Hungary. Our country had been for a thousand years a uniform State, within whose frontiers various races were united in political community. Had we for centuries pursued a policy of coercive assimilation, there would have been no racial problem, for the non-Hungarian races would either have been assimilated or would have perished. But coercion has always been abhorrent to the Hungarian nation; the non-Hungarian races have for centuries preserved their distinctive racial characteristics. When the Treaty of

Trianon was evolved, the right of self-determination was not applied to our case; the other theory: that peoples of one and the same race should be united in independent States was, however, put into practice. No attention was paid to our cogent arguments, and even the data that supported them were not examined. The will of the victors and the one-sided information obtained from the races that had supported them determined the fate of our country. Thus it happened that not only were those districts where non-Hungarian races were in the majority torn off from Great Hungary, but also districts inhabited entirely by Hungarians in close proximity to the remnant of their community. Even had these been less numerous than they were in fact, it is a fatal mistake in the case of such distributions to consider figures alone without taking into account the cultural level of the race affected. Had the victors enquired into this question in the light of the arguments set forth above, they would hardly have broken up the Hungarian State so barbarously.

The partition of the country was, however, effected, with the result that millions of Hungarians were driven under alien sway, in defiance of the right of self-determination. The dictators of the peace terms thought to secure the human rights of the minorities thus created by concluding the so-called Minority Treaties. These were, however, drawn up precipitately; they embodied only certain fundamental principles, leaving open all questions as to their execution. It was the moral duty of the new rulers to fill in the *lacunae* of these Minority Treaties, and to apply them *bona fide* with a due regard for justice. The Succession States acted very differently; they have never regarded the Minority Treaties as imposing obligations upon them, but rather as irksome encroachments on their national sovereignty, to which, as they have repeatedly declared, they will never submit. The struggles of the national minorities have become more and more acute, and as they could obtain no redress from the respective Governments of the Succession States, they have appealed to the League of Nations, the forum to which

the Covenant referred them. Here again they met with disappointment, and realised that they could hope for no redress. Thus there remained but one tribunal to which the minorities might look with confidence, the International Arbitration Courts; these, however, should be developed; their sphere of action and the nature of matters that may be referred to them should be determined in such a manner so as to enable them effectually to play the part of the world's living conscience, and to deal with all the grievances of minorities.

Trusting that knowledge of the facts set forth above will induce the Great Powers at last in some degree to repair what they had destroyed, let us now summarise the cultural effects of the last ten years upon our alienated fellow-nationals.

The first condition of independent national and racial existence is that we should be able to educate the future generation in the ideas and in the language of our nation and our race. Here we can unfortunately only strive for a negative result, since in all the alienated territories the Hungarian schools are condemned to a slow death. We have seen that different means and methods are employed, but the intention is identical: to make it impossible for children to receive a school education that will keep alive in their souls fidelity to their race. If this be continued for a number of years, if it is only in his home that the child receives a Hungarian education, and if outside this he is educated in a sense hostile to his nation and its position in the world, it is almost certain that in one or two generations loyalty to his ancient race will fade, or even die out altogether.

A further essential of national existence on an ethical basis is the adherence of the individual to some positive religion. This has been a characteristic of Great Hungary throughout history, and only on this basis can the future of our race be imagined. The fate of the Hungarians in the alienated territories is distressing also in this connection; the churches to which most of them belong, are threatened, if not with actual persecution with disregard

of their traditional rights and the loss of their ancient institutions. When for example the Succession States cannot wait patiently for the death of a Hungarian bishop, but expel him from his see in order to fill his place with a successor subservient to their political aims, their object is to prevent the spiritual guidance of Hungarian Catholics on traditional lines. And if under various pretexts they confiscate the properties and endowments which maintain schools, they condemn Hungarian denominational education to death. Thus the balance is adverse in the ecclesiastic field also, and no progress can be expected for the Hungarian race in this respect, although we must trust that their vital force will not be broken altogether in the struggle.

The confiscation of the Hungarian libraries and collections, or their assignment to purposes other than those for which they were intended, aggravates the adverse character of the cultural balance, as well as all the difficulties under which Hungarian social institutions and societies have to labour. Where the national spirit is not allowed to develop freely, where every step in advance depends on the mercy of the rulers, no social work in the interest of national self-consciousness can be hoped for.

The destruction or removal of our monuments means a moral loss to our alienated fellow-nationals, for it creates in them the feeling that they are not citizens on an equality with the rulers, that their ideals are forbidden ones, and that they should blush for their historic past. This kills their national pride and undermines their respect for national ideas.

Dramatic art in the alienated territories is not actually condemned to extinction, but its present activities have the character of a temporary struggle against difficulties. It is also certain that owing to the decreasing number of permits issued the influence of dramatic art cannot be so far-reaching as in the past.

With regard to the press and literature, we have shown that in this field, in spite of adverse circumstances,

there are certain possibilities of development. Although our co-nationals in the alienated territories are debarred from the intellectual production of Hungary proper, the press is still perhaps the only intellectual domain where the cultural effects of Trianon are not to be considered purely negative.

We have now passed in review the Calvary brought about by the Treaty of Trianon. We have looked at dissolving views of Upper Hungary, Transsylvania, of the Bánát and of the West, and of millions of our alienated brethren. Separated by frontiers, we are yet one with them in thought and feeling. Our common sufferings in the past and our common unshaken belief in the future bind us together. With all our sympathy in their present fate, we send them this expression of our prayers and our belief. *We shall rise again!*

The Pernicious Effects of the Treaty  
of Trianon upon Hungarian Economics

BY BÉLA FÖLDÉS



## A) General Survey

### 1. Introduction.

The political economist, the statistician, and the mathematician are alike unable to state exactly how disastrous the Treaty of Trianon has been to the economics of Hungary, who has lost 67.3% of her territory, 58.4% of her population, the greater part of her raw material, ores, minerals, her inexhaustible salt mines, nearly all her forest areas, a considerable part of her water-power, railways, banking institutions, savings banks, co-operative societies, her health resorts and her only sea-port. All we can say is that the Treaty has struck at the roots of Hungary's vitality, and degraded her economic culture. We can further point out certain phenomena which throw light upon this brutal attempt on the life of the country. This is all I shall attempt to do, for it is impossible at present to determine the whole weight and effect of the international crime.

One of the reasons for the mutilation of Hungary was the desire of the victorious States to acquire, or at least to control, as great a part as possible of the world's territorial values, economic possibilities, and raw materials. They were further concerned to control economic traffic and its trend, lest these should follow or seek directions opposed to the interests of the victors, or even serviceable to those of the Central Powers. It was not only the territory of Hungary, her population, her national wealth as such that were coveted, but her wood, iron, coal, natural gas, salt, water-power, cattle etc. and the utili-

sation of these resources in the spirit and to the benefit of the victors, who wish to keep the rest of the world in a dependent state, and also to enrich those countries which owe large sums to the Great Powers, in the hope that this will enable them to discharge their debts. Deprived of her natural resources, of a great part of her natural wealth and national revenue, of the possibility of pursuing an economic policy in accordance with her national interests, Hungary is condemned to a slow death, because she possesses no sources whence to draw sufficient vitality. Hungary, whose wheat, flour, wood, cattle and animal products, wine, and sugar were in great demand in the international markets, became, through the impossible terms of the Treaty of Trianon, an outcast, a pariah who may be punished and trampled upon. An unbidden guest at the table of nations. A beggar nation. Expelled from the community of European economics.

## 2. Moral Effects

The damaging effect of the Treaty of Trianon in the economic field will easily be realised if we consider for a moment the terrible fact that the country was deprived of two-thirds of its territory, and almost two-thirds of its population. But the extent of the havoc wrought upon the minds and consequently upon the economic activities of the country by such a mutilation can hardly be imagined or comprehended. We are faced with a thousand forms of dissension, destruction, and decay. The nation has lost its belief in its own vitality, in the dawn of a better future. Minds are filled with despondency, resignation. There is no readiness to work, no spirit of enterprise, no accumulation of capital, no credit, no producing and no consuming capacity. Fortunes, human lives are annihilated, souls are destroyed, a chilling frost has descended on the world of values. Economic life is touched by the breath of death. The process of decomposition lets loose all evil elements, destroys the delicate threads of the organism, loosens the bonds of responsibility, tramples upon the

exigencies of economic life. And if there be signs of a slight artificial process of adjustment, it merely affects the organism of a moribund country and nation.

### 3. The Middle Class

One serious consequence of the Treaty of Trianon is the decay of the middle class, which is unable to provide for its most elementary requirements. The daily records give a heartrending picture of the misery prevailing. Multitudes became homeless and hundreds of thousands streamed into the country from the alienated territories, only to find destitution awaiting them here. Many staved off ultimate ruin by selling their possessions, and among these were persons who had once been wealthy. Tax collectors who were familiar with home interiors, noticed that every month furniture, carpets, mirrors, pictures, curtains gradually disappeared, until only the bare walls, a few chairs, one or two tables and beds were left. Sick persons could not afford to seek medical aid, the physicians' waiting-rooms were empty. Children went to school half starved, and in rags.

Thousands of families lived in railway trucks. If some part of the misery was a consequence of the war, a greater part was certainly caused by the Treaty of Trianon, at any rate in the case of the refugees. These were reduced to beggary by the Treaty of Trianon, for they were expelled from their homes, robbed of their property, removed from their posts. They number some 4—500.000, the maintenance of whom constitutes a heavy financial burden upon the community.

### 4. General Conditions among the Population

It would lead us too far were we to examine all the evil effects of the Treaty of Trianon in connection with general conditions and the increase of the population. It must, however, be noted how deeply the Treaty affected the physical welfare, the physical force of the nation. The

destruction of fortunes, poverty, the struggle for existence, the increase in prices have made themselves strongly felt in regard to general conditions. During the war large numbers of the male population of productive age were either killed, or returned home disabled, affected in health, with a diminished power of resistance, an enfeebled will to live, less vital force, less energy. Nervous diseases assumed forms more and more dangerous, bad housing conditions and insufficient food make hotbeds for disease and increase mortality. Phthisis demands its victims. The equipment of our hospitals is defective, in many places scandalously neglected, owing to the impoverishment of the country. Family life becomes demoralised, the care of children is neglected; they are not regarded as a blessing, but rather as a curse.

## 5. Density of Population.

The changes brought about in the economic structure of the country by the Treaty of Trianon deserve special attention from the point of view of the coefficient indicating the density of the population. Whereas the density of the population in pre-war Hungary was in 1910 64.2% inhabitants per square kilometer, this figure has risen since the war to 91. The density of the population is thus greater by almost 50% than before the war, in a country that was consolidated and constantly increasing in economic importance. It is a well-known fact that the density of the population has a great effect upon the numerical proportion of the various occupations. A dense population tends to find resources in trade and industry, and an outlet in emigration. At present when the countries where our emigrants used to go limit the number of those whom they admit into their territories, the latter expedient hardly counts. Owing, however, to the economic decay of the country, not only do trade and industry possess no adequate absorbing capacity, but they are even compelled to reduce the number of their employees. The greater density of the population, in happier times a sign of prosper-

ity, is at present the expression of a very grave situation. The present density of the population in proportion to the acreage is of course due to the fact that the sparsely inhabited areas have been cut off; the cessation of emigration has aggravated the evil. The impossibility of maintaining in the present territory a denser population, is bound to influence fatally the increase of the population. The Treaty of Trianon made it impossible that the organic connection between areas of denser and scarcer populations should fulfil its double function. Greater density without the possibility of increased industrial and commercial activity must have serious consequences and evokes the shadow of pauperism. The mutual reaction that existed between the various districts of pre-war Hungary, their inter-dependence upon each other and the manner in which they secured mutually their respective existence is a proof of their being destined by nature for each other.

## 6. Economic Structure

The mutilation caused by the Treaty of Trianon has shaken the economic structure of our country to its foundations. By the abundance of raw materials and by the high degree of her economic culture Hungary was predestined to become an agrarian-industrial State. A sound development in this direction was observable before the war, and thus the country could offer a livelihood to those who inhabited the less fertile areas. With the surplus of her agricultural produce Hungary was able to purchase goods manufactured abroad. The population increased, together with prosperity, and the towns became centres of culture. All this has been changed by the Treaty of Trianon. Hungary has lost the markets for her agricultural surplus, and thus her agriculturists are in difficulties. On the other hand, the industry of the country has lost its raw materials which must now be imported. This displacement influences the trade balance unfavourably, since various raw products, wood for example, which were

formerly the main articles of export, must now be imported and the result is a large adverse trade balance. In the Report of our Peace Delegation we read: „The demarcation lines, which in defiance of the terms of the Armistice were made political and economic frontiers, have separated the undertakings on the outskirts from the economic and financial centres controlling them. Artificial barriers have thus been erected between the producing areas and those which were dependent upon them as consumers, our network of communications was destroyed, credit and commercial relations in existence for decades past were paralysed“.

It is but natural that such changes should be attended by great convulsions and material losses. The adverse trade balance leads gradually to the indebtedness of the country which again influences the financial balance and the international rates of exchange unfavourably. To this must be added that we have lost 92 towns out of 139, all of which possessed an intensive economic culture, flourishing trade and industry, and an economically active population with a great capacity for work and for consumption. The social and political position of a country so undermined economically becomes unstable, discontent and poverty seek remedies in adventurous undertakings. The Treaty of Trianon has thus ruined the economic structure of a country which was on the way to becoming a strong, harmonious economic unit in the heart of Europe. This situation would be in no way improved should we follow the advice repeatedly given in Geneva, and become a purely agricultural country. Then poverty would be greater still, culture would diminish, discontent would increase, as would also the danger to European peace.

## 7. Budapest.

The framers of the Treaty of Trianon, not content with mutilating Hungary, taking from her all her natural resources, and surrounding her with iron barriers, also

endeavoured to change the international trade routes indicated by nature itself, and thereby to deprive Hungary and its capital from the great cultural and economic benefits of transit trade. Budapest was not an artificial economic centre in this part of Europe, for it offered great advantages to traffic between West and East, which were based upon the traditions and experiences of centuries, upon an intelligent commercial spirit and upon investments on a large scale. Organically developed routes and centres were replaced by artificial ones, to the great detriment of international traffic. Empty railway carriages move to and fro on these lines, and it is a hopeless business to try to create traffic in such unnatural and anti-economic directions. Budapest, however, cannot be reduced to the level of a provincial town, because its great economic activities were based upon natural conditions. The economic life of the capital was the result of the economic life of the country. A great country supplied it with goods, it absorbed the surplus production of a great country, which it worked up and sold again. The capital has lost its limbs, and its lifeblood circulates more slowly. Many enterprises have been ruined and most of them reduced. Extensive regrouping has become necessary.

## 8. The Working Class.

The Treaty of Trianon was a heavy blow to the working class also. The labour market has become much more limited: the workman who could formerly rely on the countless possibilities of a great, progressive country, must now seek his livelihood and opportunities in a mutilated impoverished country with small prospects of development. Many branches of our industry have lost their *raison d'être*. Wages are also affected by these unfavourable conditions. The workman naturally shares the disabilities which the Treaty of Trianon inflicts upon all citizens of the country. The dissensions of public life also affect the workman who takes an interest in public affairs, and who is aware that his fate and prosperity are closely

connected with those of the country. The decay of family life is especially felt by the workman who looks for happiness within his home. Aged workmen are unable to adapt themselves to the changed circumstances; it is very difficult for them to change their occupations and centres of employment. Discontent among the younger generation induces unrealisable dreams which jeopardise social peace and social order. The Bolshevik Utopia is one of the venomous fruits of the Treaty of Trianon.

## 9. Bolshevism

Unfavourable economic conditions, unemployment, the disorganised state of society offer a fertile soil to Bolshevism. If strong countries like France and England have difficulties in combating Bolshevism and Bolshevik agitation, how much greater are these difficulties in an impoverished exasperated country, faced with a sombre future. As is well known, attempts are made from time to time, to establish a second Soviet *régime* in Hungary. Moscow supplies funds and agitators, who win recruits chiefly among unemployed workmen, and the starving *intelligentsia*, and Communist doctrines are diffused by an untiring propaganda which shrinks from nothing. The maintenance of the injustices of Trianon with the consequent impediments to sound development and economic reconstruction evoke the dangers of social revolution. Were Hungary freed from the yoke of Trianon, Bolshevism would spend its force on the bulwarks of a strong Hungarian State.

## 10. Finances

The Treaty of Trianon imposed financial burdens upon the country which are so cruel as to be unbearable. The various forms of reparations, the irksome valorisation of foreign debts, the maintenance of an army of volunteers, the expenses of foreign Missions, the supplies in kind, the surrender of our railway and shipping material, and many other ruthless stipulations threatened our State-

finances with ruin. In addition, the country has lost many of its sources of revenue, millions of taxpayers, the co-operation of its financial organisations, its economic vitality. Only by a merciless increase of taxation, and an equally merciless reduction of expenditure could the grave dug by Trianon be avoided. But such an excessive increase of revenue was not possible without danger to the interests of private enterprise, without striking at the roots of agriculture, cattle-breeding, trade and industry. On the other hand, the reduction of expenditure also threatened great economic, cultural and social interests. Thousands of officials had to be dismissed, and administrative expenditure rigorously cut down. The equipment of educational institutes, hospitals, laboratories and clinics had to be reduced to a minimum. These conditions were also acutely felt by science. Great sacrifices had to be made in order to repair the railways, and replace the missing rolling-stock etc. Yet the latter was standing in the Roumanian frontier stations, unused, decaying, dismantled and damaged. The financial situation created by the Treaty of Trianon was deplorable.

## 11. Sovereignty

Although of no economic moment in itself, we must mention the heavy blow dealt to Hungary by the limitation in several respects of the sovereignty of the country. The Treaty interfered not only with military and financial, but also with economic matters, with matters of internal and external trade, of sea and river navigation, water-power etc. The spirit of Trianon, an essentially dictatorial spirit, expressed itself in the instructions repeatedly given that Hungary should become a purely agricultural country, and should abandon any idea of a development of her industry. It is true that the Treaty of Trianon has deprived Hungary of many conditions of industrial enterprise, deprived her of her forests and mines, but Trianon has also deprived her of the most valuable of her agricultural areas, of the world famous wheat-growing soil of the

Bácska and of the Bánát, of the greatest of her agricultural enterprises, deprived her of countless advantages and factors of traffic and commerce. All this seems to indicate that Hungary must resign any hope of creating a higher economic culture. But this is impossible, as it is also impossible for her to renounce progress in the field of industry, because without industry there is no economic culture, no secure national revenue, no stability in State finance. An organic economic development is in the last resort one of the guarantees of our sovereignty; such sovereignty is safeguarded, not only by the manufacture of war materials, but by economic solidity.

## 12. Invisible Losses.

One of the most important of the invisible losses caused by the Treaty of Trianon is the loss of two-thirds of the territory which has hitherto represented Hungarian economic unity and character. This great area followed Hungarian guidance, served the interests of the Hungarian nation, accepted Hungarian national points of view. Pupils educated in economic, agricultural, industrial and commercial schools imbued with the Hungarian spirit were scattered all over the country, connecting every part with Hungarian economic life, and by virtue of their thorough scientific and practical training they impressed the stamp of that life upon the whole country. At present this vast territory serves alien, and even hostile interests, and provides the arms for a war waged upon us. Limited to a small territory, with little capital and a diminished population, Hungary is no longer able to develop the economic force she had hitherto possessed. She is unable to supply the energy required for the tasks of the State, the community, culture and economic progress.

## 13. The Violation of the Principle of Reciprocity.

Reciprocity is the basis of every economic contact between nations. The most cruel fundamental idea of the Treaty of Trianon is an utter disregard of this principle,

in that it only imposes burdens upon us, while it secures advantages to our former enemies.

In spite of the clear and acknowledged principles of international law the Treaty excludes Hungary almost entirely from any form of reciprocity and grants favours to her adversaries in every field. Numberless articles of the Treaty begin with „Hungary undertakes“. This is the case in the domain of railways, sea and river navigation, external trade, finance, in almost every sphere. In innumerable measures, the intention to paralyse and starve Hungarian economics is embodied and expressed. Hungary is treated as raw material out of which the new States are to be created and supplied with vital forces. The Peace Delegation was perfectly justified in saying: „Part X (Economic Clauses) is characterised and made unbearable by the fact that the heavy obligations therein embodied are laid upon Hungary alone. All her arteries, her freedom of action in questions of trade policy, the free disposal of her produce are paralysed; complete freedom in Hungary is secured for alien citizens, even for those of the alienated territories, whereas the Treaty absolutely refuses reciprocal treatment of the citizens of this impoverished country which stands on the verge of ruin.“

#### 14. Balance of our Losses.

It would be impossible to express in exact figures the damage caused to the Hungarian nation by the Treaty of Trianon. In addition to the material losses a whole series of imponderabilia must be considered: the shock sustained by the economic structure, the limitation of undertakings, the destruction of commercial relations, the upsetting of economic administration, the loss, on a large scale of capital, and of efficient workers; unemployment among those who remained here, reluctance to work, the decay of thrift, disturbance of mental equilibrium, loss of faith in a better future, purposeless and hopeless attempts and experiments, an increase of the passion for gambling and other moral

and psychological factors all created or intensified by the Treaty of Trianon.

*The balance of our losses may, therefore, be characterised generally speaking as follows. the Treaty of Trianon deprived Hungary of almost everything she had preserved from the past, and many things upon which future development depends.*

## 15. The Economic Interests of the Alienated Territories

It is beyond the scope of our present considerations to estimate the economic losses incurred in the alienated territories. We may note the fact that the agricultural labourers of Upper Hungary have lost their labour market in the Hungarian plains and that most of the industrial undertakings have lost their markets, while others have been suppressed by Bohemia. We may further note that the Hungarian Government, anxious to promote economic development, had invested large sums in the agriculture, cattle-breeding, fishery, forestry, and mining enterprises of the alienated territories, and had also devoted large sums to the promotion of their industry, trade, traffic and credit conditions, had constantly fostered the welfare of those districts and increased the value of their produce by systematic training and teaching. No branch of production escaped their attention, and special care was bestowed upon the territories inhabited by alien nationalities. Foreign experts on many occasions expressed appreciation of the activities of the Hungarian State in promoting the economic culture which at present benefits the Succession States. Transylvania, and Southern and Northern Hungary alone will provide many evidences to support this statement. We will quote one such evidence only. During the period 1898—1910 the Hungarian Government devoted thirty-six million gold crowns to the purchase of breeding cattle with a view to the improvement of economic conditions in the Ruthenian district, to the maintenance of courses where home industry was taught, to the distribution

of seeds, the creation of dairy farms etc. There is no doubt that these districts will degenerate economically, partly because they have come under the rule of culturally inferior races, and partly because their economic progress would not suit the political programme of their new rulers.

## 16. Economic Interests of Europe

The serious injury inflicted by the Treaty of Trianon on the Hungarian nation naturally affects the whole of European economics. The mutilation of Hungary and the check put thereby on the development of Hungarian economic life diminish the consuming capacity of the country as regards goods manufactured in the Western States, and the ability of Hungary to supply these States with articles of food etc. But the injury to Europe is not limited to these disadvantages. It should be remembered that the new States will not be inclined to meet the higher demands of economic culture, for they fear that the more cultured Hungarians might profit in the process. This fear of strengthening the Hungarian race, which is quick in adopting modern methods, will always prevent the new States from keeping pace with progressive culture, and applying the latest achievements of science, and will tend to lower the standard of culture already existing. What use would the Orient express, an electric power-station, rationalisation etc be to the Roumanian peasants in the mountains? There are other reasons why the new States should suppress culture in the annexed territories. Bohemia ruins the industrial plants in Slovakia; in Jugoslavia, the areas where the best wheat of the world grew are becoming swamps, in Roumania the valuable arable land is passing into the hands of primitive herdsmen. It is no shallow phrase to say that the Balkans are spreading into Central Europe. This is aggravated by the fact that politically, the Balkans are also expanding towards Central Europe, in the sense that the uncertainty of Balkan conditions, the mutual hatred and distrust of the Balkan peoples, the

incessant changes and conflicts of politics threaten to infect Central Europe. Trianon has wounded Hungary mortally and at the same time has struck a deadly blow at the cultural development and peace of Europe at large.

The serious consequences from the point of view of Europe of the dismemberment of Hungary are best illustrated by those following upon the exploitation of certain important natural resources. There is no doubt that it is to the interest of Europe, as was explained by the Hungarian Peace Delegation, that there should be centralisation in the Danube-Tisza basin of: 1. all measures protecting against inundations, 2. the administration of forests, 3. hydro-electric installation. These three branches of management are closely connected, they are of European importance, because upon them depends the fate of Hungarian agriculture, and thus the food-supply, not only of Hungary, but of Europe.

## *B) Detailed Examination.*

We shall now deal in detail with the economic losses caused by the Treaty of Trianon. We must always bear in mind when examining the structure of the Hungary of to-day, the fragment left after the Trianon mutilation, its three principal components: first, the capital of the country, a huge head on a small body, with an intensive cultural life and economic activity, an excellent economic staff, great industrial undertakings, powerful financial institutions and an important working-class population. About every eighth inhabitant of the country lives in Budapest. The second important component is the Transdanubian district, with a high, in certain places even very high economic culture, intensive agriculture, cattle-breeding and agrarian industry, many highly developed towns (Győr, Székesfehérvár, Sopron, Pécs). Upper Hungary, which we have lost, was on the same economic level. Finally, the third component, the great plain, the world of lonely farms, still retaining much of its ancient character, where the farmer still moves about on horseback, and where the effects of central administration are as yet little felt. This part of the country has few cultural requirements, its consuming capacity is limited. Thus the general picture is multi-coloured, we find here every degree of culture from that of the prairies to that of the realm of electricity. The capital is deprived both of the pre-war hinterland which supplied it with raw materials, and the market which consumed and purchased its output. In the general economic character of the country, the population of which is mainly engaged in agriculture, the farm world predominates. Pre-war Hungary enjoyed infinite possibilities, post-war Hungary is severely limited.

## 1. Agriculture and Cattle-breeding

*Agriculture.* Hungarian agriculture suffered the following losses as a result of the Peace Treaty:

	Pre-war Hungary	Alienated	Left	%
Arable land (cadastral yokes)	22,304.000	12,721.000	9,583.000	43
Meadows and pastures	10,305.000	7,398.000	2,907.000	28
Forests	12,642.000	10,808.000	1,834.000	14.5
Vineyards	523.241	157.348	375.893	70.5

These figures show that our greatest losses were in forest, meadow, and pastures lands; the loss of arable land is almost commensurate with the loss of population.

As regards the various products, our losses may be stated thus: according to the averages of 1911—1915 the area under cultivation was apportioned as follows:

	Pre-war Hungary	Alienated	Left	%
Wheat	5752	3122	2630	45.8
Rye	1880	694	1186	63.1
Barley	1919	1014	915	47.4
Oats	1862	1262	600	32.2
Maize	4267	2764	1493	35.0
Potatoes	1078	655	423	39.2

(The figures indicate thousands of cadastral yokes.)

The losses in maize and potatoes naturally affect cattle-breeding, as also agricultural industry.

Further losses are sugar-beet 58.1%, hemp 77%, vetch 41.2%, clover 62.8%.

In examining the reduction of cultivated area, not only quantity but also quality must be taken into account. Thus it must not be forgotten that through the loss of the Bácska and the Bánát, Hungary has lost about one million hectares of the best wheat-growing soil in the world. In these two districts money had been freely invested in the medium and great estates and farming was carried on with the most modern machinery. The loss of these districts re-acts upon the public food supply, upon the milling industry and

upon agricultural industry. The latter was especially highly developed in these districts, and its averages to the total production of pre-war Hungary were:

Wood-distilling industry . . . . .	50.00%
Hemp and flax industry . . . . .	41.29%
Silk industry . . . . .	37.24%

Through the loss of Upper Hungary we have lost our best barley-growing district; this re-acts unfaourably upon the cultivation of beetroot and upon brewing, and hence upon cattle-breeding and intensive agriculture.

The grave situation of Hungarian agriculture is rendered more serious still by lack of raw materials, mining products, salt, iron, and wood, because the increased prices of manufactured articles increase the cost of production and render the export sale of our agricultural products extremely difficult. The internal market offers no adequate compensation owing to the diminished purchasing power of the population. The situation weighs heavily upon agriculture and industry alike, and prevents increased production, the great desideratum of the day. Another serious symptom is that farmers are unable to pay adequate wages, with the result that many labourers are obliged to abandon agricultural pursuits.

2. *Cattle-breeding.* The French statistician, Vautier, classes Hungary in the first rank of countries engaged in cattle-breeding (Vautier, *La Hongrie économique*, p. 279). He points out the sacrifices made by the State to promote cattle-breeding and to improve stock. Cattle-breeding has suffered greatly from the Treaty, partly on account of the loss of vast territories. We have seen how the acreage of grass-lands was reduced, and the pastures in the mountains were all lost.

The nature of the soil and the climate of the plain are unsuitable for the cultivation of fodder and for the maintenance of pastures, and therefore cattle-breeding developed mainly in the mountainous districts. The chief markets were Budapest and the towns of the West. The alienated territories themselves consumed but a small frac-

tion of the cattle bred in them. The cattle-trade was therefore directed towards the West. As these territories have been detached, Hungary has been deprived of the essential conditions of cattle-breeding, and the alienated territories have lost their markets. Hungary and her agriculturists have, moreover, lost the special kind of oxen suitable for draught purposes. These were bred mainly in Transylvania. From the point of view of cattle-breeding the open Trianon frontier is exceedingly unfavourable, because it makes measures of protection against disease impossible, and the consequent infections affect not only sanitary conditions in the country, but also injure Hungarian export trade, since foreign countries now bar the importation of Hungarian cattle. Our losses in useful animals were as follows:

	Pre-war stock	Lost	Left	%
Horses (1918) .	1,597.000	850.000	747.000	46.8
Horned cattle .	6,184.000	4,027.000	2,157.000	34.9
Pigs . . . .	7,311.000	3,572.000	3,739.000	15.1
Sheep . . . .	6,577.000	4,758.000	1,819.000	27.7

The consequence is that in present-day Hungary there is one animal only to every three yokes of the total area, in Czecho-Slovakia 1.5, in Jugoslavia 3.9 (twice as many as before the war), in Roumania 3.6.

In considering cattle-breeding the institutions serving such purposes. (stud-farms etc.) must also be remembered.

These losses affect not only Hungarian economics, but those of the whole of Europe.

## 2. Forestry

Prior to the Peace Treaty Hungary was one of the countries richest in forests; she is now one of the poorest. Before the Treaty forestry yielded one of the most important items of our export trade; now the importation of timber is one of the chief items in our adverse trade balance. The loss of our forests is a catastrophe for us. The territory between the Danube and the Tisza is almost

without trees; in many parts the wooded area is less than 1%, and in the other parts timber is scarce, the vegetation consisting mainly of shrubs and useless trees, such as poplars etc. In proportion to its loss of wooded regions, the climate of a country becomes drier and warmer, offering more open spaces to unfavourable winds, while the cultivated areas become covered with sand, and the towns are threatened by the inundations following on the melting of snow in the mountains. The destruction of the forests by the Succession States has already created a serious situation. The Treaty of Trianon has left Hungary at the mercy of her neighbours. The very existence of the lowlands is threatened by the arbitrary methods of Czech administration. With her forests Hungary has lost not only her entire fuel supply, but the raw material of many branches of industry, to say nothing of the hygienic, cultural, climatic and moral energies associated with forests and forestry. The whole economic life of the country is closely connected with its forests, since wood is required by agriculture and for the manufacture of agricultural machinery, for the cultivation of the vine, for railway traffic, for mining, for building.

Our losses are shown in the following figures:

	Before Trianon	Lost	Left	%
Total of forests (in 1000 yokes)	12.858	10.811	2.047	15.9
Oak forests . . .	3.383	2.284	1.099	32.5
Beech and other foliage trees . . .	6.375	5.513	862	13.5
Pine forests . . .	3.100	3.014	86	2.8

Thus the Treaty of Trianon has deprived us of 84.5% of our forests, the greatest loss being that of the pine forests of which only 2.8% were left to us. Out of the total of the alienated forests 1,315.915 hectares were State property valued at 3,859.736.320 Swiss francs. The wood production of pre-war Hungary amounted to 17 million cubic meters, whereas our present production hardly amounts to 1.5 million cubic meters.

In our foreign trade, wood exports represented an export surplus of 57.1 million gold crowns, whereas now we must pay our tribute to those who have taken away our forests. In 1926 we imported wood to the value of 93.1 million gold crowns, more than 11% of our total imports.

The conditions as regards forests throw a glaring light upon the devastation wrought by the Treaty of Trianon. Owing to geographical conditions, the economic life of the country was from the beginning based on the system that the plains, as best suited to this purpose, should be devoted to agriculture proper, and that these areas should obtain their wood supplies from the mountainous districts. The uniform river system afforded cheap transport from the mountains, and the population of these were almost entirely dependent for their food supply on the agricultural production of the plains.

### 3. Fisheries

In Hungary fishing has always been of great importance from the point of view of the national food supply. Fishing, one of the original occupations of the ancient Hungarians, had in the course of time to be regulated and systematised. This had been done during the thirty years preceding the war, and a uniform regulation of production was secured by law. The Budget of the State has devoted yearly considerable sums to the development of fisheries and before the war succeeded in obtaining an annual production of 100.000 metric quintals. Owing to its dismemberment, the country was deprived of the primary conditions of systematic production and of its development on a rational basis.

### 4. Mining

In mining Hungary has for a long time past occupied a distinguished position among the States of Europe, as is shown by her having been one of the first countries to

create a College for mining (at Selmecbánya). Foreign countries have shown a lively interest in Hungarian mining, and the Germans (the Fuggers), the Dutch etc. took an active part in the exploitation of the Hungarian mines. Hungary has produced gold and silver, iron, brown and black coal, copper, manganese, magnesite etc. The Treaty of Trianon has deprived her of the majority of her mines, causing irreparable damage to production and consumption. The following table indicates our chief losses:

	Pre-war Hungary	Lost metric quintals	Left	%
Salt . . .	2,534.000	2,534.000	—	—
Iron ores	12,250.000	10,250.000	2,000.000	16.3
Lignite . . .	79,700.000	23,000.000	56,700.000	71.2
Copper ores	105.000	105.000	—	—

The loss of our inexhaustible salt mines is the most striking example of the ruthlessness of the Treaty. The loss of a considerable number of our coal-mines is acutely felt and influences our trade balance unfavourably, since in respect of certain kinds of coal we are more dependent upon imports than before.

The Treaty has deprived us of 83.7% of our iron ores; and has left us nothing whatever of our copper and many other ores; we have no sulphurous pyrites, no magnesite etc. the supply of which not only met the requirements of the country, but also enabled us to export magnesite bricks to most of the industrial countries of the world.

## 5. Mineral Springs and Watering-places

The Treaty of Trianon has deprived Hungary of most of her watering-places and mineral springs. Before the war there was no country that could surpass her wealth in this respect, a fact confirmed by experts, such as Tognio, Linzbauer, Hunfalvi etc. Some of these estimated the number of mineral springs at 4000, that of watering-places at 200. Hunfalvi, the Hungarian, put the former figure at 2216. Some of our mineral waters have captured the world's

markets, many of our watering-places had won world-wide fame and international importance. Herkulesfürdő was the oldest watering-place in Europe, known as such already under the Roman Emperor Trajan (*ad aquas Herculis saeras*); the Hungarian State spent considerable sums on its development.

Among the climatic health resorts many places of the Tátra were famous. Hungary, deprived of most of her watering-places and health resorts, is no longer able to offer treatment to her sick, who are now obliged to seek it abroad, to the detriment of the finances of the country.

The Treaty has caused the following losses:

	Pro-war Hungary	Lost	Left
Hot springs . . . . .	35	19	10
Cold mineral waters . . . . .	34	30	4
Natron lakes . . . . .	5	1	4
Health resorts . . . . .	20	18	2
Watering-places . . . . .	15	4	7
Seaside resorts . . . . .	4	4	—
Resorts on Lake Balaton . .	18	—	18

Out of 131 establishments there are now 45, 20 of them on Lake Balaton.

## 6. Water-Power

Hungary, through the loss of her mountainous districts and the upper courses of her rivers, has been almost entirely deprived of her water-power. Out of 1.7 million HP only 174.000 remained. We shall realise the full significance of this loss if we bear in mind the progress of electrification all over the world. The coal production of Hungary is insufficient to meet the requirements of the country, and, what is more, her coal basins will be exhausted in 50—60 years. What will then be the fate of Hungary's agriculture, her industry, her economic life? Increased production and irrigation are only possible by utilising water-power; the development of industry and traffic depends upon it. Hungary is no longer able to

contribute to the food supply of Central Europe. Water power is a primary condition of economic development and the Carpathian basin is rich in water-power. It must be the basis of future production of energy, and coal and other caloric substances, as the Peace Delegation explained, can only serve as reserves. The unsystematic exploitation of the forests as carried on by the Czechs, intent on rapid enrichment, involves the destruction of water-power.

The Peace Delegation also explained how well suited the Hungarian mountain districts were for the building of great water reservoirs; such undertakings, however, are only economic if the water be utilised not merely for the production of power, but also for irrigation and if the canals be used to some extent for shipping. Such schemes, moreover, could only be realised if the mountainous districts and the plains belonged to the same State. The mountainous districts alone could not carry them out, and it is not to the interest of the States which annexed these areas to initiate them, because the production of energy alone is very expensive and to some extent superfluous. The Treaty of Trianon has thereby dealt a terrible blow to Hungarian economics, because Hungary's requirements of water-power could have been secured for ever, whereas her stocks of mineral energy will shortly be exhausted. But it also affects the economic interests of the whole of the continent, because the saving of several million tons of coal yearly cannot be a matter of indifference to Europe.

## 7. Industry

Before the war our industrial production constituted a considerable part of our national income. The Treaty of Trianon not only arrested industrial development, not only caused irreparable losses through the alienation of the industrial undertakings in the territories given to foreign countries, but also brought about the decay of those left, owing to the lack of raw materials and the loss of markets.

The following figures show the principal losses:

	Pre-war Hungary	Alienated	Left	%
Number of industrial undertakings . . .	4.291	2.166	2.075	48.9
Horse power of motors	798.049	395.361	402.688	50.5
Workmen employed .	445.792	222.749	223.143	50.0
Market value of production (in thousands of crowns) . . .	3.396.0	1.495.4	1.900.6	55.9

In the various branches of industry the losses were as follows: (The figures indicate the market value of the production in thousands of crowns):

	Pre-war Hungary	Alienated	Left	%
Iron and metal industry	501.763	247.655	255.108	50.7
Machine industry .	305.446	54.526	250.920	82.2
Stone and clay industry	120.630	48.638	71.992	59.7
Wood and bone industry	186.268	144.670	41.598	22.3
Leather and bristle industry . . .	78.139	33.044	45.095	57.8
Weaving industry . .	192.977	112.394	80.583	41.8
Clothing industry .	32.320	8.193	24.127	74.7
Paper industry . . .	49.542	37.983	11.559	23.4
Food industry . . .	1,650.283	699.175	951.108	57.6
Chemical industry .	230.564	104.608	126.556	54.9
Printing industry . .	48.159	5.155	43.004	89.2

Estimated on the production value, on the average 47.1% was lost, the heaviest losses being in the wood industry and the next in the paper and weaving industries. The total value of the production amounted to 3.3 milliard gold crowns; 1.495.4 millions were left to us, and thus our loss amounts to 1.900.6 millions.

As regards Hungary's manufacturing industry the losses were as follows: Out of 4241 factories 2166 were taken, 2075 i. e. 48.9% were left. The losses in the chief categories were as follows, expressed in terms of the value produced:

Starch factories . . . . .	60%
Preserve factories . . . . .	63%
Iron and steel factories . . . . .	60%
Factories for flax goods . . . . .	47%
Factories for hemp goods . . . . .	53%
Factories for cotton goods . . . . .	73%
Factories for woollen goods . . . . .	91%
Oil refineries . . . . .	47%
Cement factories . . . . .	39%
Glass factories . . . . .	68%
Quarries, stone industry . . . . .	95%
Leather factories . . . . .	50%
Sawmills . . . . .	89%
Milling industry . . . . .	43%
Sugar refineries . . . . .	56%
Tobacco factories . . . . .	53%
Beer breweries . . . . .	28%
Spirit distilleries . . . . .	52%
Match factories . . . . .	56%
Chemical works . . . . .	64%

Certain branches of industry were entirely ruined, mainly those which lost their raw material owing to the mutilation of the country. And if we remember to what extent the various branches of production depend upon each other the losses which the country suffered can hardly be estimated. The loss of the districts which formerly supplied the raw materials is all the more serious, since the new States endeavour to prevent their exportation by heavy duties.

We must also consider the fact that the remaining industrial undertakings have been obliged to reduce their production as a consequence of the loss of markets. For example: sugar refining is only able to work up to 60% of its capacity, milling only to 30%, brewing, preserving, and vegetable oil industries only to 12—15%. Milling, one of the prides of Hungarian industrial life, has been especially weakened, owing to the loss of markets, and to the reduction of the quantities to be worked up. Our

flour export in 1913 amounted to 256.9 million gold crowns, whereas in 1926 the figure was only 69.8 million crowns. Our sugar export amounted in 1913 to 68.9 million crowns, in 1926 to 24 million crowns only.

The mutilation of Hungarian industry and the fact of its being deprived of many valuable raw materials is all the more serious since the marketing of our agricultural products becomes increasingly difficult, a situation which will be full of danger when Russia re-appears in the European markets. This danger could only be averted by an increased production and by changes in the tendencies of production. The best antidote, however, would be a strong national industry.

## 8. Commerce

One of the most characteristic consequences of the partition of Hungary is the fact that the economic relations between Hungary and the Succession States, in spite of their dependence upon each other, are hampered by a thousand obstacles. The proposal of the Hungarian Peace Delegation that free trade should be allowed for a certain number of years between Hungary and the territories taken from her was rejected by the Allied and Associated Powers, as they believed that the former commercial relations would soon be revived and that, therefore, the production and commerce of Hungary were in no way endangered. Hungary was also promised that should she meet with difficulties incompatible with peaceful conditions, the Allied and Associated Powers would see that negotiations should be initiated by the League of Nations. Commerce, however, met with obstacles so many and so great as regards import, export, and transit, that it vegetated rather than flourished, but nothing was done to remove these obstacles. Our commerce, which had enjoyed the advantages of free trade within the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy, as well as those of a liberal trade policy, was crippled by the loss of two-thirds of the territory of the country and the annexation of these by hostile States.

Markets were lost, commercial activity was paralysed. Many firms found their occupation gone. The commerce of the capital, extending far towards East and West, languished. Many commercial undertakings of the capital whose sphere of activities lay in the alienated territories lost their *raison d'être*. The corn and flour trade, the wood trade, the wine trade, trade in agricultural machinery, newspapers etc. have lost a considerable part of their former markets. Many old firms have ceased to exist, and those which survived have been compelled to reduce their activities. The following table shows how many firms have definitely ceased to exist and how many have temporarily suspended their operations:

1921	.	.	.	.	.	407 and 3713,
1922	.	.	.	.	.	481 „, 4603,
1923	.	.	.	.	.	581 „, 5933,
1924	.	.	.	.	.	608 „, 5485.

As regards external trade, apart from the hostile attitude of the neighbouring States, the disintegration of the territory especially affects the structure of commerce. Many export articles have been partially or entirely deprived of their markets, and many articles ceased to be exports, and even became imports. The trade balance became strongly adverse and it is to be feared that within the Trianon frontiers it will hardly be possible to improve the situation and show a favourable balance.

The country has suffered great losses in the field of financial undertakings. The total number of banking concerns and savings banks before the war was 4780; 2919 were lost and 1861 remained, i. e. 38.9%. The financial concerns have lost 29.9% of their capital, and the savings banks 32.6% of their deposits.

Insurance has lost 60% of its former sphere of action.

## 9. Communications

1. *Railways*. Hungary was one of the first States to introduce the system of steam locomotives. As early as in

1836 a law determined the main lines to be built, and the first railway was opened in 1846. In a few years the first main lines were ready, including some important international railway lines. The State has been careful, in spite of the great expense involved, to connect by railway lines the centre of the country with the districts on the outskirts, which stood on a lower economic level. The idea was to promote the development of these districts, and the State was willing to spend largely with this end in view. The dismemberment of the country naturally involved the loss of a considerable part of its railway system, but whereas undertakings of other kinds are more or less independent economic units, the network of railways of a country must be regarded as a single living organism, parts of which cannot be torn off without disturbing the functioning of the organism as a whole. The greed and appetite of our neighbours, however, was mainly concentrated upon railway lines and junctions. As was objected by Sonnino at the Peace Conference, hundreds of thousands of inhabitants were transferred to alien rule merely to obtain a certain railway line. In no other country is the network of railways such an organic unit as it was in pre-war Hungary where, apart from a few lines, Budapest was the natural centre of the whole system of communications. Therefore, in no other country could the destruction of the network have had such a disorganising and disastrous effect as in Hungary. Many flourishing junctions were ruined and became useless, because traffic was reduced to a minimum. Great junctions were barbarously separated from the territories upon which they depended, and the new frontier made it necessary to create a number of new railway stations. The former great junctions, such as Pozsony, Kassa, Nagyvárad, Arad, Temesvár, and Szabadka were in active commercial relations with Budapest, whereas it can hardly be imagined that these towns will ever establish similar relations with Prague or Bucharest.

But not only has a considerable part of the network of railways been taken from Hungary, she has also been deprived of a great part of her rolling stock; this not only

increased the disorganisation already caused, but imposed a heavy burden upon the country, since this material had to be replaced. Hungary was deprived of: 68.7% of her locomotives, 73.8% of her passenger cars, 78.8% of her luggage vans and 83% of her goods vans.

The international importance of the network of Hungarian railways has also greatly suffered. Budapest—Orsova—Constantinople, Budapest—Kassa—Berlin, Budapest—Vienna—Paris were lines which helped to bring Hungary into the system of international traffic; they have now been replaced to some extent by other international lines, and have thus lost their former importance.

The total length of the Hungarian railway lines before the war was 19,723 kilometers, out of which 11,359 kilometers were taken away, and thus only 8,364 kilometers were left, i. e. 42.2%.

2. *High roads.* The loss in this category was also considerable. Out of a total of 43,629 kilometers 26,299 were taken from Hungary, and only 17,330, i. e. 39.7% left. The latter include only 3163 kilometers of first class roads. Hence the loss was painful not only in respect of quantity, but also of quality since the best and most expensive roads were those made in the alienated territories. The country has also lost those territories which supplied the best material for road-making.

3. *River navigation.* The natural unity of Hungary found expression in her waterways, since nearly all her rivers belonged to the system of the Danube. The Treaty of Trianon has greatly disturbed this natural unity. The Tisza for example, that Hungarian river *par excellence*, which rose in Hungarian territory and flowed through Hungarian territory into the Danube, was cut off from Hungary in such a manner that neither its upper nor its lower reaches are any longer in this country. The upper courses of the rivers rising in the mountains of Transylvania are under foreign rule, an ominous fact in the event of inundations.

The figures relating to navigable waterways are the following:

pre-war Hungary . . . . .	6.011	kilometers,
lost . . . . .	3.883	"
left . . . . .	2.128	"
% . . . . .	35.4	

Out of the navigable waterways left only 1063 kilometers can be used by steamers.

Hungary suffers, however, not only from the disturbance of her river system, but also from the fact that the neighbouring States entirely neglect the waterways. From the point of view of Hungarian export trade the Drave and the Save were formerly of great importance. The Hungarian Government, by careful dredging, always kept the Drave in a navigable state, and boats could without difficulty get to Barcs, and thence to Germany, Italy and Switzerland. At present this river is not navigable. On the Save our boats could get as far as Sisek, whence Fiume and the Adriatic could be reached, and Bosnia and Dalmatia victualled. At present the Jugoslav Government prohibits transit trade and reserves the river for internal navigation only. And here we must mention another fact injurious to Hungarian interests. The Succession States, in defiance of the Peace Treaty, which declared the Danube and its affluents to be free rivers, reserve coastal trade exclusively for their own undertakings. A further impediment to navigation is the fact that formerly the Danube between Passau and Orsova flowed through the territory of a single State, the Dual Monarchy, and that it now crosses four frontiers, involving four customs examinations with all their accompanying annoyances.

## 10. Fiume

The Entente Powers declared it to be one of the fundamental principles of the peace and of the economic order to be created that every State should as far as possible obtain an outlet to sea, the high road of the world's traffic. Nowhere could this principle have been more easily realised than in Hungary. Before the war Hungary spent huge sums in creating and developing the

harbour of Fiume and connecting it with the mother-country. The historic past also pleaded in favour of the retention of this port by Hungary. Up to 1540 Hungary possessed a fleet in the Adriatic and at one time even competed with Venice in sea power. When Maria Theresa incorporated Fiume with Hungary energetic measures were taken to utilise the port. Expensive roads were made, and it became an axiom that Hungary must secure immediate contact with the world's traffic on the sea. Lewis Kossuth also insisted on the importance of the sea to the nation. After 1867, when a constitutional Government had taken over the conduct of affairs, they considered the development of our only sea port as their main task. Hungarian maritime traffic was freed from the supremacy of the Austrian Lloyd, and the "Adria" sea navigation company was founded. The importance of Fiume gradually developed. A French writer said: „The moment is near when Fiume will rank among the first commercial ports and Hungary, possessing a marvellous network of railways and a modernised system of river navigation, will no longer need an intermediary to introduce her to the world's markets“. (Vautier, *La Hongrie économique*, Paris, 1893.) Unfortunately, this prophecy has not been realised; it was frustrated by the Treaty of Trianon. Fiume at present is a Sleeping Beauty. Grass grows in the streets, the warehouses are empty, trade is dead.

The evil which Hungary suffered does not merely consist in having lost the one port which brought her into contact with the world's markets, in the futility of the heavy pecuniary sacrifices she made in the interests of Fiume, and in having been deprived of the valuable commercial relations so long maintained before the war. It lies further in the fact that Hungary is debarred from all the advantages and educational value of sea-faring, and that under the present political conditions, when she is surrounded by hostile neighbours, and it is of vital importance for her to get into touch with the outer world through a sea-port, she cannot reach the coast, since the road to Fiume passes across Jugoslavia.

The Treaty of Trianon has deprived Hungary of all her ships, of her seaside places, and of all trade, industry and occupations connected with the sea. Before the war Hungary possessed 137 steamers and 412 sailing boats, with a tonnage of 147,906 and 1837 tons respectively.

## 11. Reparations

It is a paradox verging on brutality that Hungary who has been deprived of two-thirds of her territory and population, and has lost a considerable part of her natural resources, her industrial and other undertakings, should in addition be obliged to pay reparations. Hungary was ordered to offer „all her resources“ for these, to manufacture and supply all the materials necessary for the reconstruction of the Entente Powers, to supply timber and wood products, to hand over 20% of her ships, and her railways and rolling stock in good condition; to supply coal to Jugoslavia, and food to Austria, her former ally. When a considerable part of her stock of cattle had been taken away, whereby Hungary became poorer and the Succession States richer, she was further obliged to supply cattle to these States. There is perhaps no other country that could have survived this fierce ordeal; the victors, far from attempting to help Hungary, whose very existence was threatened, seemed bent on completing her ruin.

## Conclusion

In the above data I have endeavoured to express in figures everything that may be expressed through the medium of statistics. But all this is but a part, perhaps even the smallest part, of the havoc wrought by the Treaty of Trianon. The injuries inflicted on the economics of a country cannot be scientifically established. The narrow scope of the present study does not allow me to give details, which would throw further light on certain losses suffered by the nation. Neither is it possible to dwell upon

all those imponderabilia which impair the value of its economic work. The dark depression which weighs down the Hungarian soul hinders a full development of energies. We cannot express in figures the effects resulting from the reactions of the economic factors enumerated above. The deterioration of communications reacts unfavourably upon agriculture, the deterioration of the latter again prejudices traffic and so forth. The loss suffered by the nation is in fact much greater than can be inferred from the details given above, which represent the minimum as it were. Yet this minimum signifies an immense catastrophe for Hungarian economics, and indirectly, for those of the whole of Central Europe.

By prolonged efforts, sufferings and sacrifices the Hungarian nation has perhaps succeeded in averting the projected catastrophe. The conscience of the world has now awakened to the injustices inflicted upon the country; it realises that these must be repaired by a revision of the Treaty. We may hope perhaps that the Treaty of Trianon will be short-lived, and that the wounds of Hungarian economics will be healed.



Legal Amendment of the Treaty of  
Trianon through the League of Nations  
and Arbitration

BY BARON JULIUS WLASSICS



## I.

I am a convinced partisan of the idea of the League of Nations and of the utmost possible development of that idea. The predestined road of human progress must, it seems to me, follow the lines indicated by the profound and reassuring evolution of this idea. I cherish no Utopian illusions. I am aware that human nature cannot be radically changed. But I think it impossible that it should be the immutable mission of man to destroy his fellow-man incessantly, to annihilate the achievements of civilisation with reckless barbarity, to exterminate whole generations by means of poison gases, to people the globe with the blind, the lame and the disabled. I believe in the general effect of a development which seeks to combine in one permanent jurisdictional body all the sovereign States, and I believe that the closer association of the States will produce a volume of spiritual and moral energy which will recognise and exalt the principle that the supreme power above the States must not be brutal force, but international solidarity, the desire to live and work together. He who holds such a belief must of necessity approve the idea of the League of Nations — but such a one will feel more bitterly than others perhaps, the defective organisation of a structure devoted to the realisation of his high ideal. This must not be taken to mean that those who point out the imperfections of the present organisation seek to attack the League of Nations. On the contrary, it merely shows that they are anxious to reinforce the vital power of the organisation which has at last come into being. There is no doubt that whatever defects, imperfections and injustices

may mar the present structure, it nevertheless stands for the greatest advance hitherto made in the history of international organisations. Ever since the beginnings of human civilisation this idea has always been immanent. Some form of international organisation, more or less restricted, has constantly occupied men's minds and proclaimed itself in various catchwords, now as the World State, the "civitas maxima", now as the World Church, now as a league against the Turks, now as the balance of power, now as the "Holy Alliance". There have always been studious writers and philosophers who have formulated systems for the reform of international organisation. We will recall only the most notable of these: Pierre Dubois, King George Podiebrad, Erasmus, François de la Noue, Émeric Crucé, Hugo Grotius, Henry IV. (see his "Dessein" in Sully's Memoirs), William Penn, John Bellert, and the "Abbé de Saint Pierre" and Cardinal Alberoni with their famous programmes. Nor must we forget the important contributions made to the subject by Bentham and Palier de Saint Germain, and above all, by the great philosopher, Kant, in his conceptions of international organisation. No practical results were achieved, however. The two Hague Conferences were of great theoretical importance, and if they could have succeeded in making appeals to the International Courts of Arbitration compulsory, their practical significance would have been epoch-making. Though there are many, especially in Hungary, who were justly incensed by Wilson's abandonment of his original programme, all impartial critics will understand the feelings with which the President exclaimed "A living thing is born" when he had succeeded in creating the League of Nations, even in its present imperfect form. He recognised its defects, it is said, and all his collaborators have since declared that their ruling thought was necessarily, under the actual conditions, not the perfection of the organisation, but its creation. They had to trust to time for its development and strengthening.

The mere fact that there is at last a central body whose duty it is to deal permanently with international

questions, is of great value. It creates a contact between the various States which is the surest road to intimacy and understanding. There is no doubt that even if it does not prevent the possibility of war, the League of Nations puts notable obstacles in the way of ill-considered warfare, and thus promotes the maintenance of a lasting peace. Great hopes may be based in particular on the success of preliminary efforts of mediation, for the League will certainly take into account the possible destruction of whole cities within a few hours with the murderous technical appliances of modern warfare. The German General, Deimling Berchtold, recently reviewed the technique of a future war. Not soldiers will be wanted, said he, but technicians, persons to manipulate the machines and apparatus with which all life may be extinguished. Artillery, tanks and similar implements hitherto employed will go to the war museums, for future wars will be conducted in the air. The aerial fleet will destroy cities and everything that lives and moves. The destruction of modern warfare passes the imagination of a Jules Verne or a Wells, and transcends every terrific vision.

A future war would in fact mean the annihilation of human civilisation.

Under such circumstances the task undertaken by the League of Nations — the task of preventing, by mutual guarantees, a horrible modern conflict — cannot be too highly appreciated. The League, considering the serious objections to the manufacture by private persons of munitions and war material, proposes to guard against the evil international executive powers. Thus we now have sanctions of such private enterprize.

Amongst the benefits derived from the League of Nations I would note in the first place that after much procrastination we have at last a permanent international Court of Justice.

A further important benefit was the attempt made for the first time by the Covenant of the League to codify international executive powers. Thus we now have sanctions, hitherto lacking in international law, and should any

member of the League resort to war in disregard of the agreements embodied in Articles 12, 13 or 15, it will *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League. The severance of commercial or financial relations etc. also provides powerful sanctions. Provision is even made for the use of armed forces. It is true, however, that it would have been hardly possible to draft the Covenant more defectively. The original draft, which was not adopted, was a much better piece of work. This was not prepared by Wilson, but by Lord Phillimore, in conjunction with Mr. Taft, the former President of the U. S. A., and Mr. Elihu Root, the most distinguished international jurist of North America. We now know exactly how the work was done in the Sub-Committee appointed for the purpose. For Wilson the all-important thing was that the Covenant should be created, no matter in what form. Small wonder then that the wording should have been so careless that any Bill of secondary importance would need to be more precisely formulated than was the epoch-making Covenant.

One great defect of the Covenant is, that the sphere of its influence is defined in nebulous general terms open to misinterpretation. It is a plentiful source of evil that, in general, unanimity is required for its decisions. We know that but for Bourgeois' intervention, the principle that a majority of votes is sufficient in matters of procedure would not have been accepted. There are, of course, some *expressis verbis* cases where unanimity is not necessary. The advocates of unanimity urge international usage as hitherto followed, but they forget that the demand for unanimity has been the principal reason why so many international conferences have proved fruitless.

We may note the following lacunae in the Covenant: it fails to regulate the right of self-determination so freely promised; the freedom of the seas, proclaimed by Wilson the greatest guarantee of lasting peace, was forgotten altogether; in the matter of colonies, instead of adopting the policy of the "open door", the victorious Powers secured the most extensive dominion for themselves; provisions, it

is true, are made in connection with disarmament, but in these it is impossible to recognise the plan of universal disarmament promised prior to the conclusion of peace.

The protection of minorities was also omitted from the Covenant. Do we know the reason for this omission? Was Wilson afraid that it might prevent the Great Powers from signing? Whatever the reason, the second alternative was chosen, that of securing the protection of minority rights by the Peace Treaties and by special Treaties to be concluded between the Great Powers and the States concerned. Even international guarantees were granted in respect of this protection, but it is just here that there is most cause for dissatisfaction with the carrying out of responsibilities incurred. I have repeatedly emphasised and shall continue to emphasise the fact, that for us one of the true criteria of the value of the League must be its power to secure the national, religious and cultural life of our alienated nationals. It is of special importance for us that in proceedings concerning the protection of minorities, the intervention of the Permanent Arbitration Court should be secured. This is not a political body, like the Council or the Assembly — it is independent of any superior or inferior authority. In the two Germano-Polish minority questions which were comparable to our Optants question, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague decided that in neither case had Poland fulfilled her international obligations towards the minorities.

It would have redounded to the credit of the Covenant, had it, when declaring in Article 14 that "the Council shall formulate... plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice", further stipulated that this should be organised on the basis of compulsory international jurisdiction. Many persons are of opinion that the Covenant should have openly and directly provided for eventual modifications of the "dictated" Peace terms concerning territories. In my opinion a correct interpretation of Article 19 ("the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of

international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world") would mitigate this deficiency, and thus secure the possibility of appreciable changes in the territorial conditions created by the Peace Treaties.

A noteworthy modification of Article 10 has been suggested. The Article runs as follows: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled". It is a well-known fact that the wording of Article 10 was one of the pretexts put forward by the U. S. A. for not joining the League. This is the Article which also made us hesitate. As early as 1921 Canada urged that it should be omitted. Recognising the great importance of the question, the Assembly referred it to the Assembly of 1922. The Canadian Delegation, however, abandoned the plea for omission in 1922, but proposed two amendments. These were transmitted to several Governments in order that they might express their opinions. On the basis of these opinions, and after exhaustive discussion the legal Commission passed a resolution for the elucidation of Article 10. This laid down the principle that the Legislature of each State shall decide to what extent it should participate with military forces or otherwise in the fulfilment of its obligations. The Assembly has not formally accepted the interpretation of the legal Commission. Out of 43 voters, 29 accepted, and 1 rejected it, while 13 abstained from voting. The Assembly thereupon communicated the result of the voting to the Council.

An important modification affects the last Article — Article 26 — of the Covenant which pronounces that „Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly. No such Amendment shall bind any Member of

the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League“.

The Assembly considered this Article obscure and inconclusive. It established that Amendments shall be accepted by the Assembly by a three-fourths majority of votes, and that the affirmative votes shall include the votes of all Members of the Council represented at the sitting. The Amendments thus accepted shall only come into force when confirmed by the Members whose Representatives constituted the Council at the time of voting, and by the Members whose Representatives constituted the Assembly. A term of twenty-two months has been fixed for such confirmations; should the required number of confirmations not take place within that period, the Amendment becomes invalid. If any Member should not have agreed to the Amendment within twenty-two months, it may within a further term of one year officially notify its non-acceptance. In this case it shall cease to be a Member of the League. In my opinion even this modification requires further modification, because it does not provide for the case of a Member who not only rejects the Amendment, but also fails to notify this officially.

All these modifications — which will certainly entail the re-casting of various articles, and even developments of the modifications — prove that the deficiencies have been recognised even within the League itself, which no longer holds fast to the *noli me tangere* idea, still so loudly proclaimed in certain quarters as regards the Peace Treaties.

## II.

When we, under duress, accepted the Treaty of Trianon, our decision was governed by two considerations. One of these was our assumption that on the basis of Article 19 it would be possible to modify it in our favour even as regards the frontiers then fixed. The other was our interpretation of the Millerand Letter, which we believed, and in fact still believe, might provide a remedy for the most

terrible mutilation of our territory. The terms of Article 19 are peculiarly applicable to our situation, where the results of the dictated Treaty are so glaringly manifest. There is in the first place the aggressive coalition of the Little Entente, with their illegal practices. The victorious Powers themselves are affected by the Central European economic crisis and feel the international tension of the political atmosphere; these are certainly sufficient grounds for the intervention of competent authorities to remedy the injustices inflicted upon us, whose territory has been reduced by two-thirds. Here we may turn to Article 10, by which the Members of the League undertake to respect the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members, and to preserve them against external aggression. If the Paris Peace Treaties had been based upon right and justice, no objection could be made to this stipulation, but as it is it is the most repellent stipulation of the Covenant. It aims at nothing less, says a distinguished international jurist, than the preservation, for all time, of the fruits of victory for the Allied and Associated Powers. From the Hungarian point of view it aims at perpetuating the mutilation of Lesser Hungary, now covering but 91.000 square kilometers out of the 325.000 of pre-war Hungary.

The principle embodied in Article 10 should constitute the vital thesis of a future international law; but the essential preliminary of this is a thorough revision of the dictated Treaty of Trianon on the basis of right and justice.

Komarnitzky, in his well-known work, started from the defence of the existing *status quo*, but nevertheless came to the conclusion that from the juridical point of view Article 10 is not an Alliance, and does not mean "securing under all circumstances mutual territorial integrity". We can the more readily accept his argument, because we cannot regard the existing territorial conditions as the realisation of the rule of right and justice. I, therefore, agree that Article 10 does not generally mean the safeguarding under all circumstances of the territorial integrity of the States. The guaranteeing of territorial inte-

grity as embodied in Article 10 only refers to cases of aggression as defined by the League of Nations, i. e. the case of a State which resorts to war without observing the conditions prescribed by Article 12 (previous inquiry and moratorium).

Article 19 also, as at present drafted, does not fully guarantee practical results, unless loyally considered on a basis of international *bona fides*.

It is also doubtful whether unanimity in a decision of the Assembly as regards this question should be insisted upon. I believe that a majority of votes is sufficient, since a recommendation, an invitation, etc. may be decided in the Assembly by a majority of votes. (Permanent practice, decisions of principle: I. Ass. p. 530, II. Ass. C. I. p. 178.) On this basis, therefore, in my opinion, a majority of votes of the Assembly would also suffice for the issue of an admonition in the sense of Article 19. Bülow and Fauchille advocate unanimity. Schücking-Wehberg as also Lammash and Goellner, on the other hand, declare a majority of votes to be sufficient on the grounds stated above. Let us consider what the task of the Assembly is in such a case. "The Assembly may advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." There is no appeal against this. But there are no provisions to compel the holding of an inquiry and to direct proceedings resulting therefrom. *In thesi*, therefore, the possibility of modifications exists, — but *in praxi* no result can be achieved unless the thesis be loyally applied. I hereby draw attention to the Schücking-Wehberg point of view, the essence of which is that a more effectual enforcement of Article 19 would be possible, owing to its close connection with Article 11. According to Article 11 it is the duty of the League, in case of war or threat of war, to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations". Article 11 does not bind the hands of the League, but authorises it in principle to take any action it may deem necessary. On the other hand, Article

19 also aims at remedying international conditions endangering the peace of the world. I agree with the view that Article 19 comes into the general orbit of Article 11, and merely lays down regulations for a special case governed by the general principle enounced in Article 11. As such, therefore, it is also subject to the sanction embodied in Article 11.

### III.

Whereas many representatives of the victorious Powers have for a long time declared the Peace Treaties to be unapproachable sanctities, the number of those is from day to day increasing who regard as untenable the depressing conditions created by the so-called Peace Treaties, disastrous not only to the vanquished, but also to the victors. As regards Article 19 it was at first proclaimed that it does not affect the Peace Treaties, but merely refers to treaties subsequently concluded. This is recognised as nonsense to-day. There is no treaty in the world that may not be modified, even embargoes upon modifications may be modified. None of the Peace Treaties, however, prohibit modification, nor does the Covenant. We now possess authentic data as to how the Peace Treaties were made. Those who collaborated in the work make themselves heard one after the other, and tell us how perfunctory was their work, how uninformed and ignorant they were, and with what a complete lack of scruple they set about their task. The only object in view was to punish the culprits. Hungary was alleged to have promoted the war. It is now clearly proved that not the slightest shadow of war guilt falls upon Hungary. *Cessante ratione cessat lex ipsa.* If there be no guilt — the penalties expressed in the alienation of two-thirds of the territory of the country and the handing over of millions of its nationals to foreign rule, should cease. It is hard to say whether ill-will determined these proceedings, or a total ignorance of the traditions of a country with a history of a thousand years, and its cultural, ethnical and economic mission. I might quote the words of a long series

of those who now admit the gigantic errors and cruel misjudgments to which it is due that the Treaties, instead of serving the interests of world peace, have created hateful and untenable conditions. Cries of alarm are heard to the effect that the Peace Treaties signify the downfall of Europe, and even obstruct the sound development of the whole world. I will take only the testimony of the most authoritative among the makers of peace, and record what Mr. Lloyd George said at the meeting of the British League of Nations Union at the end of October, 1927: "The causes of dangers of war are in frontier conflicts the origin of which is in the fact that the Peace Treaties were made in 1919 when the Allied were filled with all the bitterness of a long war, and obtained only insufficient and unpractical information as regards European conditions. These frontier questions in Europe can only be solved in a pacific way, through the League of Nations, and even then only after the disarmament of the European Powers. Neither the Covenant of the League, nor the text of the Peace Treaties excludes a revision of the Peace Treaties. On the contrary, Clemenceau's covering letter to the Treaty of Versailles expressly promises Germany the possibility of revision."

To this we may add that the Millerand Letter promised the rectification of the Trianon frontiers. In his speech Mr. Lloyd George also pointed out the breach of the Treaty on the part of the Allies in enforcing disarmament upon the vanquished peoples, whereas the Allies themselves have so far taken no single step in that direction, in spite of their solemn pledges to the defeated nations. Can there be any sense of security in Europe when one soldier of the vanquished is opposed by twenty French and four Czechoslovak soldiers? The defeated peoples possess 250,000 soldiers, whereas the Allies keep 10 million men under arms on the Continent. Jurisdiction by Courts of Arbitration can only be introduced in Europe after general disarmament. Instead of this, however, nations armed to the teeth prefer to rely upon military forces.

Mr. Lloyd George indicates the League of Nations as the forum whose duty it is to make good the errors com-

mitted. It should, however, not surprise any one if we, contemplating the legal and political system of the League, are filled with scepticism as to its qualification in its present form to remedy the evils in question. So far it has identified itself too much with the *status quo*, with the protection of the interests of the victorious Powers. The protection of minorities, of which the League should be the international arbiter, might serve as an object lesson of how duties the fulfilment of which is a *sine qua non* for the protection of minorities can be neglected. Such protection would be the greatest achievement of modern international law — and what has become of it? In its place we see oppression, licence for the ruling nation to trample upon others, to impoverish them, to induce them to emigrate, and generally to submerge them.

Thus it cannot be wondered at if there are many who would wish to entrust the great task of revision to some other international body. This is not absolutely necessary, because the problem of modifying the Treaty of Trianon might be solved through the League of Nations and international arbitration, thus by essentially peaceful and legal means. The foremost, the indispensable condition is that this truth should take deep root in the conscience of the world: the dictated Treaties do not serve the purpose of world peace, but on the contrary can only undermine it. It is also indispensable that the whole world should realise the terrible vivisection committed on Hungary's vigorous body. I have never met one serious foreigner who, when I told him what has been taken from us, how many pure Hungarians, living in compact masses, were transferred to alien rule, did not exclaim: *but this is impossible*.

For a long time the public of the great nations has had no idea of the wrong done to us in the name of "Peace Treaty". Therefore we cannot but be deeply grateful to the so-called Rothermere campaign, which has greatly impressed, not only European, but also American public opinion. Senator Borah, and many noble-minded English statesmen, notably several outstanding personalities of the House of Lords, — and here I must particularly indicate

Lord Newton, — recognised long before the Rothermere campaign that there in an „unsolved Hungarian problem“ which must not be allowed to disappear from the order of the day.

Our principal duty, therefore, is to convince the public opinion of the world of the terrible injustice committed against us. We have every right to appeal to the conscience of the whole civilised world against the unscrupulousness with which we have been treated. We are in the fortunate position in this respect that a mere recital of facts suffices to convince any serious person. As regards the neighbouring States we trust that statesmanlike considerations will sooner or later prevail, and that they will come to the conclusion that arbitrary partition cannot secure quiet, peaceful possession. It is impossible that they should not themselves know they obtained their booty by means of a terrible act of injustice to Hungary, which will never cease to cause them trouble. They will also realise that it would be much wiser, and in fact the only statesmanlike course open to them, to re-establish peaceful neighbourly relations, the more so as it is to the interest of Europe, a demand of world economics, that the States in the Danube basin should not wear themselves away in incessant quarrels and embitterment. We would not doubt that the Great Powers themselves will not insist upon the perpetual maintenance of a dictated agreement, which instead of creating the desired peace, merely prepared a hot-bed for the growth of soul-consuming conflict.

They must realise, as many have already realised, that if they had been better informed, they would have drawn the new frontiers very differently, and would not have destroyed historic traditions, would not have torn economic and national units into pieces, would not have erased frontiers marked out by Nature herself.

They must realise that they should not represent as a model of perfection an arrangement which, as has now been historically established, was adopted with amazing carelessness.

They must realise that out of one national State they

carved three, with national minorities wounded to the heart. They disposed of peoples of whose history, character and cultural achievements they knew nothing. All they knew was whispered into their ears by our enemies.

They tore into pieces, they pasted together, provinces as to the past, the geographical situation, and the nature of which they had not the foggiest notion. But the makers of the peace even misjudged their own informants. Thus it happened that they assigned to the new States missions which the latter are unable to fulfil. Seven years have elapsed, and the problem of Central and Eastern Europe weighs heavily upon the civilised world. This must be remedied while the generation that saw the war still lives, for, as Lloyd George says, to the coming generation which knew nothing of its horrors the war will not be a living experience but only a film sensation. In vain do the victorious Powers seek the equilibrium and security of Eastern Europe in the new order of these States, for these are not even able to restore their own internal equilibrium. M. Benes is quite right in saying that boundaries of States cannot be drawn with mere national ideologies. He is right in saying that the historic past, economic, ethnographic and cultural points of view must not be neglected — but why, we ask, were these points of view neglected just at the time when the Paris Peace Treaties were dictated?

The only possible solution is to replace the precipitate dictated peace by carefully revised bilateral treaties.

All we ask is the revision of the Treaty of Trianon on a legal basis.

The legal basis is Article 19 of the Covenant.

Not even the victorious Powers dare insist to-day on the inviolability of the Treaty of Trianon.

Had she not trusted in Millerand's solemn promise, broken Hungary would never have signed the Treaty of Trianon. When the peace conditions were handed to the Hungarian Delegates, they protested against their injustice, and declared that they would result in catastrophe. In the name of the Allied Powers Millerand took upon himself to promise that the Boundary Commissions should be instruct-

ed to consult the League in every case when they considered the new frontiers to involve racial or economic injustices. It must not be forgotten that Millerand was not only Prime Minister of France when he made this promise, but also President of the Peace Conference, and thus in the fulfilment of this promise — as Lord Rothermere has pointed out several times — the honour of Great Britain is involved. We rely upon a better understanding of our cause, upon the awakening of the sense of justice, upon the conscience of the world, upon honest self-questioning on the part of those who so light-heartedly traced new lines upon the map of Eastern Europe, as to whether they had any knowledge of Central European conditions, the geography and culture of Hungary, her historic mission and rôle.

Did they realise that these lines take away two-thirds of her territory from Hungary, who for centuries fought heroically in defence of Christian civilisation, of Western culture? They hardly knew perhaps that Hungary carried on a life-and-death struggle against Germanisation even at the time when the Austrian Emperors sat upon the throne of the German "Bundesstaaten". Did they consider whether European peace would be endangered by creating new States where the greater part of the minorities, for the most part of a higher and more cultured type than their oppressors, live under conditions of cruel hardship and indignity.

The seven past years have shown that there is no hope of an honest execution of measures to protect minorities. "Acting upon false data they decided as regards frontiers and nationalities" said Lloyd George.

Established facts prove beyond doubt that the original decisions were the result of a wholly mistaken conception. It is obvious, therefore, that a wise revision of conditions is inevitable, for the new order of the world cannot be built upon foundations which history condemns as superficial and faulty.

We count upon a recognition of these facts, upon an awakening of the world's conscience, and this is why we have always believed that in the peaceful atmosphere of

mutual understanding, we should eventually obtain redress by strictly legal means of the terrible injustices inflicted upon us. This would benefit not only Hungary, but the whole civilised world. Sympathetic understanding would purge the souls of the victorious Powers of the elements of revenge and hatred. It would be the noblest task of the League of Nations to persuade the victorious Powers no longer to look upon the vanquished as enemies, but to abandon the merciless attitude induced by war mentality, and thereby give real peace to the world.

Our strength lies in the enlightenment of public opinion throughout the world. Those who drafted the Peace Treaty were ignorant of the real situation; the world did not realise the cruelty of the punishment inflicted upon us, whose one object in the war was to defend ourselves against attack. We coveted no one's territory — we only desired to continue the work of spiritual, economic and cultural development, which is our historic mission in the Danube valley. Even now we have no thought of war or violence; we only desire to use the existing international legal means available. We look to the League of Nations and to Arbitration for help.

But the League of Nations should not identify itself with the *status quo* of the Peace Treaties. An external connection between the League and the Peace Treaties does not mean an amalgamation of the two. The League has in theory a separate life — entirely independent of the *status quo* of the Peace Treaties. The straight road of development for the League lies in this direction. Should the League forsake this road and fail to preserve its independent existence, it would abandon its fundamental principle and *raison d'être*: the promotion of co-operation among the nations, the attainment of open, just and honest international relations.

#### IV.

Since we look to the League of Nations and to Arbitration for legal redress of the injustices inflicted upon us by the dictated Peace Treaty, we must explain how we imagine this should be carried out.

First of all, we must recognise the legal character of the League. We must be aware that it is neither a confederation of States, nor a super-sovereignty. It is not a Parliament, but a body composed of delegates who act upon the instructions of their own Governments, and are not responsible to any one but their own Governments. It is in a position to enforce obligations, but we must never forget the essential fact that its powers are rooted in the decisions of the various Governments, or, let us say, in the attitude of the Great Powers. Therefore, I see no advantage in the appointment of some other international body to deal with our claims for revision. In either case delegates would act in accordance with the instructions of their respective Governments. The attitude of the Great Powers would be in either case decisive. Therefore, it would be a fatal mistake to ask the League of Nations to redress the injustices caused by the Treaties, i. e. for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, without due diplomatic preparation.

Success would be secured by two conditions: the enlightenment of the public opinion of the dominant Powers, and the submission to their respective Governments, of evidence on the basis of which the Treaty of Trianon should be examined in consultation with all parties concerned, with special regard to the principle of nationality and the right of self-determination. We cannot think it possible that serious statesmen would refuse to listen to a request which aims at securing real peace, in face of the economic, cultural, political and national evils which have accumulated as a result of the *status quo*.

If we had no other argument to advance but the fact that when the Peace Treaty was under discussion, our evidence was not even read by the competent authorities, and that two-thirds of our territory and millions of Hungarians were alienated exclusively on the basis of misleading data furnished by our enemies, this alone should sufficiently support our plea for revision. It is an essential of conscientious procedure that competent judges should now consider the arguments advanced by us

at the time when our greedy neighbours probably represented them as tendentious falsifications of the truth.

This is why we must ask them to compare the respective arguments, and to give full weight to our own.

Could there be a more unworthy act than to dismember a country without deeming it worth while to examine its objections? We ask for justice, on the basis of Article 19 of the Covenant, that Article which our enemies are endeavouring, by quibbling, to declare inapplicable to the post-war Peace Treaties, these being altogether exceptional and inviolable.

At present even the Czech Foreign Minister considers that the Treaty of Trianon may be modified on the basis of Article 19. In his *exposé* of October, 1927, in the Foreign Committee of both Houses of the Czech Parliament, M. Benes said: "We all know that the Peace Treaties are no perfect creations". Why then was the cry of *noli me tangere* raised on their behalf? M. Benes further said that the Peace Conference did not maintain that the Peace Treaties and other Treaties were to be eternal, and this was the reason why Article 19, providing for modification, was inserted in the Covenant, which is an integral part of all Peace Treaties. "We have all signed this", said M. Benes. "we observe it and may justly refer to it. Hence every State may submit to the League of Nations a request for the modification of some Treaty. The preliminary condition, however, is that the State in question shall duly observe the fundamental principles laid down in the Covenant, viz.: loyalty and peaceful intentions towards the other party; further, it must be proved that the Treaty hitherto in force is inapplicable, and finally that the State in question is acting in good faith."

Our request for revision is presented with all peaceful intentions and loyalty, but we look for the same from our enemies. But is it loyal on the part of M. Benes to interpret the propaganda, without which we cannot hope to enlighten the public opinion of the world and promote understanding, as a menace, direct or indirect? Is it really we who menace? We may ask — wherewith? With the

forces of our dismembered, exhausted nation? or of our disarmed Army?

We have no weapon but our right to oppose to the insulting despotism of brutal force. We wish, by legal means and in a legal, pacific way, to obtain redress for our unjust treatment — one of the greatest aberrations on record — by those who have on their consciences the Peace Treaties of Paris, and especially the unparalleled mutilation of the Hungarian State.

Is it a crime on our part if we attempt to counteract the tendentious arguments and misrepresentations advanced when the Peace Treaty was concluded? Our silence would be the impardonable thing. In our unfortunate position it would be the most abject of hypocrisies, because there is no honest Hungarian who could quietly accept the mutilation of our country after a war in which we had no thought of conquest and expansion, but fought only in defence of our frontiers.

We have not been silent, but with our work of enlightenment we seek to serve the cause of real peace, the lack of which, in spite of the dictated Peace Treaties, is acutely felt by the victorious States; such a peace as would put an end to the justifiable unrest created by the superficial, ill-considered Peace Treaties.

At the London meeting of the League of Nations Union at the end of October, 1927, Lloyd George said that the present disputes and warlike preparations create the feeling that the catastrophe of 1914 will repeat itself, unless a better understanding can be created.

He insisted that in Europe the dangers of war lie in the frontier conflicts, the origin of which is that in 1919 the Peace Treaties were drafted in the spirit of embitterment caused by the long war, and that the information available regarding European conditions was "imperfect and unpractical". These European frontier questions can only be solved by peaceful means, through the League of Nations, and even in this way only if the European Powers disarm. Neither the Covenant, nor the text of the Peace Treaties excludes the revision of the latter. On the

contrary, the covering letter attached by Clemenceau to the Treaty of Versailles, expressly promises Germany the possibility of revision. The League of Nations neglects its duty if it refuses to render impartial justice as regards grievances formulated in connection with the Peace Treaties.

A remarkable incident here solicits my pen. When on presenting the peace terms, Lloyd George, after Count Apponyi's stirring speech, asked the latter where these compact masses of Hungarians were, Count Apponyi produced a map; the Conference broke up, every one gathered round Count Apponyi, and he explained and demonstrated. And what happened a few months later? We received the Treaty of Trianon with its terrible terms.

I think Lloyd George must recall that incident now, but at the time he thought only of destroying the great enemy, the Germany of the Kaiser. He left the fate of Hungary in the hands of the Little Entente — it is to-day a historic fact that the Treaty of Trianon is not the work of the Great Powers, but of the Little Entente. The makers of peace openly admit that they worked on the basis of false data. This is the real meaning of the diplomatic formula "imperfect and unpractical information regarding European conditions".

Lloyd George desires the inevitable revision — but he also most energetically demands disarmament. He makes revision the duty of the League.

This is also our position. We cannot believe, we must not assume that now, when the blunders committed in the making of the Peace Treaties are manifest, even acknowledged by those responsible for them, the League of Nations will identify itself with the maintenance of the *status quo*. The League imperils its future development if it fails to believe in its independence, and if it does not devote itself to the aims embodied in the Covenant, but rather identifies its activities with the maintenance of the *status quo* and of the conditions created by Treaties made in the suburbs of Paris. Even if the Covenant was connected superficially with the dictated Treaties, this does not mean an amalgamation of the League with the said

Treaties. It is the duty of the League, in the interest of its existence, not to obstruct, but to promote the assertion of just demands. The Great Powers themselves must see to this, for if they wish to maintain the League the practice of a different measure for vanquished and victors must cease.

The ultimate aim should as far as possible be a development of the League on such lines that all, whether great or minor powers, might turn to it with full confidence, as to an international power above parties. Therefore, I think nothing more desirable than that it should in cases of an essentially judicial nature avail itself more energetically than it has hitherto done of its right of reference to its supreme judicial organ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

It was wisely provided that the sphere of this high Court should not be restricted to the pronouncement of verdicts, but that it might advise and express an opinion to the League. Thus certain questions escaping from an atmosphere infected with politics might be brought before an authoritative forum, entrenched in its non-political serenity. Nothing is more calculated to popularise and strengthen the idea of the League than the growth of the conviction in the public mind that the rule of right, the victory of justice is secure before the organs of the League. I consider it, however, particularly dangerous if the organs of the League light-heartedly interfere with matters which are already being dealt with by an international Court. This is an intervention of politics in the sphere of law. The application in such cases of Article 11 of the Covenant requires great caution and wise consideration.

The nature of the steps that might be taken on the basis of Article 11 goes beyond mediation, but not so far as the use of armed force. Broadly speaking, such steps would be political measures taken by the League, or by the Powers represented on it, the extent of which would be decided by the political conditions and the relation of forces prevailing at the time of the application.

The duty of the League to intervene in order to obviate

causes of war, and its right to revise the Peace Treaties, are closely connected, and the true mission of the League can only be realised through their joint application.

Any interference in cases where some international Court is dealing with a controversy submitted to it, especially when such a Court has certified its own competence, as actually happened in the Hungaro-Roumanian land reform conflict, is calculated to obstruct international jurisdiction. Nothing is easier than to connect tendenciously some essentially legal question with some circumstance affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace, or that good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

As I write these lines, news has arrived that the jurists of the League, in the Germano-Greek controversy known as the Salamis affair, the legal aspect of which resembles the Hungaro-Roumanian land reform conflict, have expressed the opinion that if some matter is before an international Court — the Mixed Tribunal of Arbitration is such a Court — its proceedings must not be interrupted by taking away the matter from the independent judge and bringing it before the League of Nations. This is the correct attitude. The judicial attitude begins to assert itself. We hope the same measure will be applied in the Hungaro-Roumanian conflict.

The prestige of international jurisdiction will sink indeed if it is possible through a tendentious interpretation of Article 11 to interrupt, under a pretence of legality, the judicial course of a controversy as regards which an independent Court has declared itself competent. The proceeding adopted in the Hungaro-Roumanian conflict with reference to Article 11 was especially reprehensible. I may ask: what were the circumstances affecting international relations which threatened to disturb peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends? An upheaval of any kind? By no means; the issue was merely a request made that the unequivocal provision of an administrative nature of Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon should be carried out. It decrees that a substitute

should be appointed to replace a seceding member of the Mixed Tribunal of Arbitration. May the course of legal proceedings be interrupted in such a case? If so, confidence in the system of arbitration will be completely shaken. Should such a practice be adopted as the holding up of the course of international jurisdiction indefinitely on the basis of Article 11, we shall all feel convinced that it is not worth while to conclude arbitration treaties.

It follows that the first duty of the League is to nip in the bud any attempt at such tendentious, cynical methods.

However, unfortunately the same ungenerous spirit prevails as regards the rights of our minorities secured by Treaties, and the obligation to disarm, and we who have fulfilled even the most burdensome obligations imposed by the Treaty of Trianon, have had to submit to the disregard of the regulations referring to Courts of Arbitration.

In spite of all such disappointments, however, we trust in the ultimate victory of our right, on the basis of Article 19. We also trust that on reconsideration the League of Nations will find inapplicable, and therefore untenable the determination of the Trianon frontiers, and that its members will convince themselves that these endanger the peace of the world, as already shown by many distinguished literary authorities, English, American, Austrian and even French. They will understand that the Trianon frontiers are the cruel and inhuman result of uninformed judgment. They will understand that there can be neither peace nor contentment until the artificial maintenance of injustice gives way to a spirit of wide and tolerant humanity, which will not suffer iniquity, and looks to a straightforward, loyal peace as its goal. Peace, for which all the peoples which have suffered in the war, victors and vanquished alike, are longing. We trust in the ultimate victory of our cause, because we trust in the awakening of the conscience of the world.



# The Treaty of Trianon and Disarmament

BY ALBERT BERZEVICZY



The Treaty of Trianon, like all the other so-called Peace Treaties, contains stipulations of two kinds concerning disarmament. On the one hand it provides for the complete disarmament of the vanquished State — in the present case of Hungary — on the other it embodies a pious aspiration towards universal disarmament. It is a fact, acknowledged even by the competent authorities, that all clauses referring to Hungary have been fully carried out, whereas up to the present, i. e. more than seven years after the signature of the Treaty (June 4, 1920), no serious steps have been taken towards the realisation of general disarmament.

Out of the 364 Articles of the Treaty of Trianon, embodied in the Hungarian Code as Law XXXIII of 1921, and divided into eight parts, Articles 102—143, forming the fifth part, deal with the disarmament of Hungary.

The preamble to these Articles makes the statement — to which we shall return later — that Hungary undertakes to observe the clauses which follow, "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations". The subsequent "General Clauses" (Articles 102 and 103) oblige Hungary to carry out the disarmament prescribed in the following chapters within three months from the coming into force of the Treaty (July 31, 1921) and to abolish compulsory military service, to the end that the Hungarian Army should in future be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

It is common knowledge that the victorious States and those which joined them retained their own right to compulsory service, and that by depriving the vanquished States of this right, they not only made it impossible for

them to fill the cadres and keep up the reserves of their Armies, but also imposed upon them a disproportionate burden, since an army based upon voluntary enlistment alone is much more expensive than any defensive organisation based upon compulsory service.

The following Article (104) determines the total numbers in the Hungarian Army in such a manner that it shall not exceed 35,000 men, including officers and depot troops. In order to give an idea of what this means, we shall compare this figure with the area and the total population of Hungary, and shall apply the same method to the neighbouring States.

The strength of the Czecho-Slovak Army in peace time is 150,000 men, i. e. in relation to her area and population, 1071 soldiers per 1000 square kilometers, and 1.12% of the total population. In Jugoslavia, the strength of the Army is also 150,000 men, i. e. 544 soldiers per 1000 square kilometers, and 1.15% of the population. The strength of the Roumanian Army is 230,000 men, which corresponds to 762 soldiers per 1000 square kilometers, and 1.4% of the total population.

If we compare these figures with that prescribed for Hungary, the figure 35,000 (the one total both in peace and war) corresponds to 270 soldiers per 1000 square kilometers, and to 0.3% of the total population.

A full idea of this disproportion is, however, only to be grasped, if it be remembered that whereas the numbers determined by the Peace Treaty for Hungary may not be increased in case of war, and that, in the absence of compulsory military service there are no reserves to be called up, the military forces of our neighbours, which even in peace time are more than fifteen times greater than ours (530,000 as against 35,000), could, in case of war, be increased by mobilisation almost tenfold, i. e. to 5,050,000 men.

If it be pointed out that Hungary has in reality not even brought up her Army to the permitted strength, and has in fact only enlisted about 24,000 men, this may be partly explained by the excessive costliness of a voluntary army, but partly also by the fact that the Peace Treaty — as we

shall see — has deprived the Hungarian Army of every possibility, not only of offensive, but even of defensive war. We can therefore content ourselves with an army somewhat smaller than that allowed by the Peace Treaty.

As regards cost — according to the data of 1926, in which there has been hardly any change — that of the Hungarian Army constitutes 7% of the Budget, which is also the case in Roumania. The cost of the Jugoslav Army is even smaller, and only constitutes 5% of the Budget of the Jugoslav State. In Czecho-Slovakia alone is this item higher, accounting for 8.3% of the Budget. In this connection it should be noted that whereas in Roumania the sum spent annually on each soldier is 89 dollars, in Jugoslavia 321 dollars, and in Czecho-Slovakia 335 dollars, Hungary has to spend 560 dollars per annum on each soldier.

The Treaty of Trianon fixes by schedules the maximum and minimum effectives of the units of the Hungarian Army, and also prescribes that the proportion of officers shall not exceed one-twentieth of the total effectives with the colours, and that of non-commissioned officers one-fifteenth of the total effectives. The Treaty also determines the number of machine guns, guns and howitzers; it is instructive to note that the Little Entente disposes of 3750 guns as against the 183 allowed to Hungary, that the number of Hungarian machine guns and trench mortars is 525, as against 6400 in the neighbouring States, and that the number of Hungarian howitzers is 70 as against 570 in the possession of the Little Entente.

The last paragraph of Article 104 is noteworthy and characteristic, since it stipulates that the Hungarian Army "shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory of Hungary, and to the control of her frontiers".

It is certainly without parallel in the history of Peace Treaties that our country should, not for a definite period but for ever, be deprived not only of the possibility of attacking, but even of the natural right, inseparable from

the existence of a State, of defending herself should she be attacked. The grotesqueness of this measure becomes even more evident if it be remembered that at the time of the signature of the Treaty Hungary was not yet a member of the League of Nations, and so did not enjoy even the doubtful protection designed for its members in case of an attack from outside. However, this absurdity is now a Law which binds us, and what is more regrettable still, the Powers who dictated the Peace Treaties have taken care that the Hungarian Army shall really be incapable of resisting a serious attack, especially should it come from several sides at once.

Our former and possible future enemies, already sufficiently secured by the low strength of our Army, and by the abolition of compulsory service, possess further guarantees in the stipulations of Article 106 and those which follow.

It was determined that all measures of mobilisation, or appertaining to mobilisation, are forbidden; that in no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres; that the carrying out of any preparatory measures with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport is forbidden. In order to prevent the reinforcement of the Hungarian Army from similar organisations, it was stipulated that the number of gendarmes, customs officers, foresters, members of the local or municipal police or other like officials should not exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1913 within the boundaries of Hungary as fixed by the Peace Treaty. Provisions were also made that the term of service should be as long as possible, and that the number of officers and non-commissioned officers discharged for any reason should not exceed in any year one-twentieth of the total, the object being to prevent the formation of a kind of secret reserve, composed of trained and discharged officers and non-commissioned officers.

The total of arms and the stock of munitions were also prescribed by the Treaty, with the proviso that all war

material in excess of the quantity authorised, including any kind of unauthorised war material, should within a fixed time be handed over to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. As an example of the churlish procedure of our ex-enemies we may note that according to the schedule of the Treaty only 1150 rifles or carbines are allowed for 1000 men, and only 500 rounds of ammunition per arm.

Provisions had also been made that all arms, munitions and war material should be manufactured in a single factory. Caution had even been carried so far as to stipulate that sporting weapons manufactured in Hungary should not be of the same calibre as that of military weapons used in any European army. The importation into Hungary of arms, munitions and war material of any kind is strictly forbidden, as also the manufacture for foreign countries and the exportation of the same.

Article 119 deserves special mention: "the use of flame-throwers, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all similar liquids being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Hungary". This sounds as if these new and terrible instruments of modern warfare had been generally abandoned. We know, however, that this prohibition refers to the vanquished countries only; so far every attempt for their elimination by the League of Nations has proved futile; indeed, modern science is incessantly improving these horrible engines of wholesale slaughter. And yet, when the Hungarian Government applied to the Conference of Ambassadors for permission to supply the Army with gas-masks, this body for years very logically refused their request, thereby emphasising the fact that the Hungarian Army is not even entitled to defend itself. It was only after repeated applications that we obtained the necessary permission, and at an international meeting, the Conference of Ambassadors was blamed by the Czechs for their weakness in granting it.

Finally, the Peace Treaty forbids the manufacture and importation of armoured cars, tanks, or any similar

machines suitable for use in war; it excludes the use of heavy guns; it prohibits the use of monitors, torpedo-boats and armed vessels on the Danube, and only leaves us a few patrol boats. It forbids the construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes; it forbids the use of military or naval aircraft and of dirigibles.

The enforcement of the disarmament measures outlined above was entrusted by the victorious Powers to "Inter-allied Commissions of Control". We know that these were established here for a long time, imposing a heavy burden on the Treasury, and that we only recently succeeded in obtaining their withdrawal; this withdrawal does not amount to a cessation of control, since control will henceforth be exercised by the League of Nations through commissions to be sent to Hungary should occasion arise.

Having now acquainted ourselves with the terms of the Peace Treaty relating to the disarmament of Hungary, let us consider those providing for general disarmament.

I have already said that the disarmament of Hungary is represented in the Treaty of Trianon as preliminary to the initiation of a general limitation of armaments. Thus it embodies a promise, or rather — according to the text of the Treaty — the disarmament of Hungary would lose its *raison d'être* were it not followed by a general limitation of armaments.

This promise is formulated even more definitely by the Covenant of the League of Nations, which occupies the first pages of all Peace Treaties, or rather by its Articles 8 and 9. Article 8 in particular is so important that I feel compelled to quote the first four paragraphs:

"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest possible point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate

plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council".

The following paragraph states that the Council will consider how the evil effects attendant upon the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war can be obviated.

According to the last paragraph "the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes."

According to Article 9 a permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of the preceding Article, and on military, naval, and air questions generally.

Although the cunning provisions of Article 8 quoted above make it obvious that the contracting parties, or rather, the Powers dictating the Treaty, wished to leave the actual limitation of their armaments to the decision of the Governments of the several States, the whole text of the Article, taken in conjunction with what had been said in justification of the disarmament of the vanquished States, leaves no doubt as to the fact that by its Covenant, the League of Nations undertook a moral obligation for the initiation without delay of a limitation of armaments generally. That at the time of the drafting of the Covenant no one took the limitation of armaments to be a remote possibility, is shown by the fact that a revision of these limitations every ten years was prescribed. Thus two years hence a revision of the limitations should be due, but so far we see no preparation for any such revision.

Neither is there any doubt that Article 8 represents the limitation of armaments as essential for the mainte-

nance of peace, and makes no preliminary condition beyond the safety of the Members of the League as guaranteed by the Peace Treaties. These guarantees are quite extensive. The Covenant secures for every Member of the League its territorial integrity and political independence (Article 10), and the intervention of the League should they be threatened (Article 11). It secures arbitration in cases of dispute (Article 12—15), and undertakes to punish covenant-breaking States (Article 16). The most efficient security, however, for the victorious States is offered by the complete disarmament of the vanquished States, which we have experienced to the full in Hungary, and which was carried out to the same extent in Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. Only Turkey succeeded in smashing the Treaty of Sèvres, and making a more equitable agreement with the victors at Lausanne.

Since it is evident that the general limitation of armaments as promised in the Treaty of Trianon has not even begun, but that on the contrary, the victorious States are steadily increasing and developing their armaments, so that in spite of the complete disarmament of the vanquished, there are greater armies in Europe to-day than before the war, how can we avoid the conclusion that there has been a systematic evasion of the stipulations of the Peace Treaties relating to general disarmament? Its motive can only be the determination to secure permanently the absolute military superiority of the victors over the vanquished, and to keep the latter in a state of dependence, not to say slavery, in spite of the complete equality postulated by the League of Nations.

That this abrogation of the equality of States cannot mean peace, but only oppression, the rule of bayonets, needs no further demonstration. It is certain that there will be no peace as long as the vanquished are subjected to the rigid execution of every letter of the agreement, whereas the other party — the victors and the so-called victors — are allowed to infringe any provisions disagreeable to themselves in the Treaties they so loudly proclaim inviolable and sempiternal.

The execution of the clauses referring to disarmament of the Treaty of Trianon is but a further exemplification of the sad truth: *vae victis*.

In conclusion I wish to outline the steps taken by the Hungarian Government, and by other factors of political and social life in support of them, in execution of the Treaty of Trianon, and the efforts made to counteract the disabilities and burdens imposed by the Treaty.

First and foremost, the Hungarian Government have conscientiously carried out all Treaty obligations relating to disarmament, and as we have shown, have not even availed themselves to the full of the possibilities allowed in respect of the organisation of our armed forces.

The Hungarian Government were perfectly justified in endeavouring to obtain an appropriate recognition of our loyalty, in the removal as soon as possible of the burdens involved in direct control. That in this the Government only succeeded gradually and at a late date, is explained by the continuous intrigues by which our neighbours endeavoured to prevent recognition of our disarmament. The Inter-allied Military Commission of Control constantly received unfounded denunciations regarding hidden stores of arms and armaments, again and again necessitating investigations which invariably proved fruitless.

That we, preceding Germany by years, and following the examples of Austria and Bulgaria, endeavoured to join the League of Nations at the first favourable opportunity, was due partly to the fact that we wished to secure the foreign loan necessary for our financial reconstruction, and partly to our desire for greater security in the case of an attack from outside, because the danger that had threatened us at the time of King Charles' second attempt to regain his throne had showed only too clearly that the League of Nations, in spite of a possibility offered by its regulations, does not offer sufficient protection to a State which is not one of its members. Moreover, we assumed — and this was not the least weighty among our consider-

ations — that as members of the League we should more easily obtain a cessation of direct control.

When the matter was about to be discussed by the Council, we asked, on the basis of the explicit terms of Article 4 of the Covenant, to be permitted to be present. Our request was refused owing to the unsupported opinion of a so-called Committee of (anonymous) Jurists. Although we were not heard, the Council could not refuse to comply with our request on the basis of the Report of the Commission of Control, and thus direct control was abolished, much earlier than in Austria, for example. Future measures in this connection were to be regulated by the Council; it has not, however, been found necessary to take any such.

As regards a general limitation of armaments the Government could do no more than urge and promote its initiation by the League on every occasion. Their delegates have taken an active part in the work of the Sub-Committee concerned with this matter, and Count Apponyi defined our attitude at the last sitting of the Assembly.

In this respect the efforts of the Hungarian Government have been zealously supported by the Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs, the representative of Hungary in the League of Nations Union, and in the committees and conferences of the Interparliamentary Union by the Hungarian Interparliamentary Group.

The above mentioned Union dealt especially with this subject at their meeting in Vienna in 1922, and passed by a large majority a resolution urging a limitation of armaments. The Interparliamentary Union has systematically and continuously discussed the matter, and at the last meeting in Paris, in spite of strenuous efforts to make disarmament dependent upon security, our delegates, in co-operation with the Germans, succeeded in preventing the proposals of the Committee from being divested of their original character.

It is a well known fact that three years ago the Council of the League embodied in the so-called Geneva Protocol the principles on the basis of which the problem of

disarmament should be solved. These three closely connected principles are: compulsory arbitration, security against any offensive war, and general disarmament. The Geneva Protocol did not receive the necessary number of adhesions, mainly owing to the change of government in Great Britain, but found practical expression in the Locarno Agreement. One of its measures, indeed, remained intact, the plan of a world's conference to be convoked in the interest of general disarmament. The League appointed a Committee to formulate this plan, and the latter prepared a questionnaire as a basis of discussion.

In this preparatory Committee we did not obtain a seat; among the vanquished States only Germany and Bulgaria are represented. However, the Hungarian Government seized the opportunity, and in a memorandum submitted to the preparatory Committee defined its attitude in detail. This memorandum is interesting and objective, but provoked attack on political grounds. Those who disarmed us whilst they are steadily increasing their own armaments are reluctant to believe in our pacific intentions.

The memorandum endeavours to give serious replies to the questions asked by the preparatory Committee, which questions, however, are anything but serious. Those who were so well aware what disarmament is and how a State can be disarmed when it was a question of *our* disarmament, now, when it would be their turn, affect ignorance and naively ask what disarmament is really, and how is it to be defined and carried out. How are we to characterise such an attitude?

The Hungarian memorandum is for the time being merely a contribution to the vast material available; it awaits the convocation of the Disarmament Conference at some future date. Taking into account the activities of the preparatory Committee so far, there seems little hope of its materialisation or of the success of its labours.



# **The Treaty of Trianon in the Light of Geography**

**BY FRANCIS FODOR**



*Modern geography is a science dealing with the life of the surface of the earth.* It studies the manner in which the natural components (undulations of the ground, climate, water-system, vegetation and soil) combine with the population to form a living unit in some geographically unified territory. A unit that differs from all other units, and is, therefore, an *individuality*. The attention of this modern branch of science is sometimes directed towards the natural elements, and sometimes chiefly to the connection of human life with the surface of the earth. The most modern branch of the latter study is *political geography*, upon which, especially since the war and in connection with the Peace Treaties, the interest of statesmen, scientists and even of the public at large has been concentrated. After the war the political map of Europe was re-drawn. The thinking part of humanity still regards these new and confused lines with perplexity. Experts seek either to justify them or to demonstrate their unjustifiability; the public, however, feels vaguely that some arbitrary judgment must have governed their determination, because *at present the natural conditions of the surface are not in harmony with the political boundaries drawn across it, and hence the fundamental conditions of the economics of Europe as a whole are disturbed.*

*Such discord is nowhere more evident than on either side of the Trianon frontiers.* Economic, political, cultural and ethnographic conditions were radically upset here after the war. The result is a chaos which we may call a *geographical discord*. All political geographers agree that the political security and the economic prosperity of a State are closely connected with the problem of geogra-

phical harmony. It is the abvious task of political geography to draw attention to such discords as the above.

*States are no rootless things, but are rooted in the surface of the earth. A State consists of soil and population.* Ratzel, the great German political geographer of modern times, says that *every State is one part soil and one part humanity*. The wise men of the Peace Conference did not reckon with these relations, and ignored them when drawing the Trianon frontiers. Nor did they take into account what another German political geographer demands in every geographical unity: *an adequate connection between the communities dwelling in a given space and the space itself*. It is also open to doubt whether the makers of the peace considered the rule laid down by the German Professor Haushofer, that political geography should determine the conditions of the distribution on the surface of the earth of political units, conditions prescribed by the natural features of the States, their soil, climate and vegetation. There is no doubt that the re-mapping of Europe required much more serious consideration than it received, for according to the Austrian Professor Sieger, only political geography can enlighten politicians as to the possible relations of the various parts of the surface of the earth, all different in character, with the political units, the States.

This branch of science ought to have played a decisive part at the Peace Conference; we need seek no new arguments; *history itself will show in its examination of the past how illogical were the decisions of 1919*. It will not be difficult to prove that *the determination of the Trianon frontiers was a retrogression as regards the creation of States*.

Political geography has adopted several methods in examining the relations between the earth and the population, when combined to form a State. The old school named after Szupán inquires into the problem merely from the morphologic point of view; the favourable or unfavourable situation of some State is determined by its boundaries, its shape, its size, the quality and position of the

space it fills. The more modern conception, originating with the Swedish scientist Kjellen, regards *the State as a living organism* and examines the degree of *harmony or discord* existing between the territory of a State and its vital functions. To quote Kjellen's beautiful simile: *a State does not float in the air; it is, like a forest, bound up with the soil from which it derives its nourishment, and under the surface of which the roots of the various trees are interlaced. In this conception a State is the greatest of living organisms*, and the notion of the soil is inseparable from it; the soil itself lives and develops. *The higher union of soil and people, the State itself, shows all the phenomena of life*: it is born, it develops, it languishes or prospers, and may also decay or die.

Whether we examine the States created by the Treaty of Trianon from the morphological or the biological point of view, we arrive at the same conclusion, that *at Trianon no one took into account the second factor of the State, the soil; only the populations, or more correctly, the demands of certain smaller groups of the populations were considered. These demands were not always reasonable, and tended rather to retrogression than to progress*. All the creations of the Treaty of Trianon are unnatural, and are thus the cause of the political and economic troubles prevailing in Central Europe.

The unsoundness of the situation becomes manifest even if we disregard the disturbance of the vital functions of States, and consider the new States mechanically, as bodies, comparing them with the pre-war entities.

Hungary was before the war a Central European State in the narrowest sense of the term. Her situation was characterised by its *transitional nature*: *she was situated where the three great components of Europe meet*: the ancient soil of Western Europe, the youthful mountainous soil of Southern Europe, and the table-lands of Eastern Europe. The Hungarian State stood in the centre of the great climatic zones of Europe: the mild, rainy climate of Western Europe, the dry, cold climate of Eastern Europe, and the warm, dry climate of Southern

Europe. It formed a wedge where the *three great European families*, the Germanic, the Latin and the Slav families met. With the exception of the last-named fact, *all these transitional factors were favourable for the Hungarian State, for they made its economic life many-sided*. A further and still greater advantage of the situation of Hungary was that *she occupied the largest river-basin of Europe*. No other State in Europe held such a position. She enjoyed all the advantages of this situation for a thousand years, and in addition she had the advantage of such close proximity to the basin of the Adriatic that no other State could thrust itself between her and the sea. Thus already in the eleventh century, as a result of her efforts towards a maritime outlet, she possessed a small portion of the shores of the Adriatic. *This favourable situation did not sensibly change in the course of history*; sometimes, for purposes of self-defence, she passed beyond the Carpathians, our monarchs, at the summit of their power, obtained glacis and *outworks*, but the centre of gravity remained within the basin, and Hungary has always retained possession of the edges of the basin. *Even the Turkish conquest took the centre of the basin from the nation, and not the brims*. Our situation had the further advantage that the neighbouring countries also occupied, for the most part natural territorial units, and thus there was no danger of their meddling with our basin-system. Roumania was situated between the Carpathians, the lower course of the Danube and the Black Sea, Bohemia within the Czech basin, and Russia on the Sarmatian plateau. Our situation had only two danger-spots: one in Austria who, however, sought natural frontiers for herself before the eastern spurs of the Alps, (the territories assigned to her by the Treaty of Trianon had never been in her possession) and the other in Serbia, who, however, as a mountainous country, with inadequate forces, was unlikely to descend into the Hungarian basin.

Thus the natural situation of Hungary was very favourable. *After the war the geographical situation became exceedingly unfavourable. Converted from a comprehensive*

*Basin-State into one situated at the bottom of the basin her position was most dangerous.* She lost not only the advantages of her transitional situation, but also her favourable strategic situation and has been rendered *incapable of defending herself. She has lost her economic diversity*, of which fact we shall speak later in detail, together with the advantage of her inter-State situation. Before the partition the Hungarian basin-system was *the natural centre of gravity of a powerful Empire, of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*. The Austrian Empire could not be imagined without Hungary, so much so that the map of Austria was never drawn without Hungary. Before the partition Hungary had a *favourable intermediate situation*, flanked on three sides by an allied great State, the Austrian Empire, on one side by the sea; in the south, States of minor importance, Serbia and Roumania. As compared with this the present situation is most dangerous from the point of view of external politics: in the West, Austria, with her menacing readiness to join Germany; in the North, the most highly developed State of the Northern Slavs, Bohemia, in the South, the greatest Southern Slav State, Jugoslavia; these two Slav States propose to create a corridor between them in the West, and finally, in the East we have Roumania, situated even more dangerously than ourselves within the Slav pincers, but naturally hostile to us. *No other European State is in a more dangerous and encircled situation than present-day Hungary*, for Roumania and Jugoslavia, although similarly encircled, each possess a more or less valuable outlet to the sea. *Our encircled position is not only strategically but economically unbearable.* It is unnecessary to dwell in detail upon the formidable pressure exercised upon Hungary by the vast territories and the numerical superiority of the populations of our neighbours; it is sufficient to cast a glance at the map.

The fact, however, should not be overlooked that neither has the geographical situation of our neighbours been improved by the Treaty of Trianon. *Czecho-Slovakia is encircled no less than Jugoslavia and Roumania.* Objective truth compels us to point out that the mutilated country

possesses certain advantages over its neighbours even in its present situation: *the Hungarian State has remained in the centre of the great Danube basin, and the economic centre of gravity of our neighbours is still to be found in the Hungarian lowlands.*

Examining the politico-geographical conditions created by the Treaty of Trianon from the point of view of morphology, *the size of the State* will be the next problem we propose to deal with. Before the war Hungary, with its territory of 325.000 square kilometers, ranked among the *middle-sized States*, and stood on the list immediately after Italy, the smallest Great Power. Owing to the Treaty of Trianon it lost two-thirds of its territory and thus *descended into the category of minor States*, with a smaller area than any of its neighbours with the exception of Austria. It is true that the power and abilities of a State do not depend merely upon its size, but also upon *the economic possibilities of its territory and its population*. When, however, Trianon reduced the territory of Hungary to one-third of its former size, the fact was not taken into account that *the territory left is not in the same proportion to the former area as the remaining population to that of the un mutilated country*; more territory than population was taken from us; of the latter, two-thirds were left to one-third of the territory. Here we must already raise the question, although we shall deal with it later, whether the territory left is of equal economic value with the alienated territories. Every State has central and peripheral regions. As a rule, in basin-States the central territories are more valuable. *But Hungary had peripheral areas which from the economic point of view were more important than her central territories of the same size.* We must remember that the *industrial districts* were all situated in the mountains of the outskirts, and that their economic value was increasing; these industrial districts were able to support a *denser population* than certain central territories. I may be permitted to point out one more fact: only 5.1% of the territory of pre-war Hungary was unproductive; this figure has increased to 6.2% in present-

day Hungary. *The reduction of the territory of the country means in reality much more than a mere comparison of the figures relating to the pre-war and post-war territory shows.*

The territory itself offers *internal resources* to the State; *its shape* is important from the strategical point of view and from that of foreign policy. In relation to defence the question of *how long the frontier line is compared with the size of the territory* is highly important. It is true, however, that this relation is expressed by a mere figure, whereas in reality *the nature of the frontier* is decisive. As however in connection with the Trianon boundary it is absurd to speak of strategical frontiers, the conclusion to be drawn from the mere figure is essential. Since a circular line is the shortest line in relation to the area it includes, we call a geographically ideal State one whose shape most nearly approximates to a circle, because its frontier is relatively very short. This is especially important in the case of mutilated Hungary, who possesses frontiers that cannot be defended, and is surrounded by encircling States. On the frontier line of pre-war Hungary there were only 12.8 kilometers to each 1000 square kilometers of the total area; at present there are 18.2 kilometers. *Thus the shape of the country is much less advantageous than it was.* Before the war the actual length of the frontier compared with that of the ideal circular line showed a proportion more favourable than that of any other European State, in that the real frontier was only twice as long as the ideal line. Trianon has not materially altered this proportion which indeed is even smaller (1.7). But this is *only of theoretical value*, and is in fact detrimental, being entirely artificial; *it means that in determining the frontiers no natural lines were sought;* they were drawn quite arbitrarily, across villages, across areas which depended upon each other economically, across territories liable to inundations etc. The Trianon frontier, however, is not only the frontier of Hungary, but also that of her neighbours. The Czecho-Slovak State is even more awkwardly shaped than Hungary, and its extension lengthways would only be justified were it situated on the sea coast.

In considering Trianon-Hungary from the morphologic point of view we must now deal with the most important point, *the problem of the frontier*. This is the crux of political geography. Why? Conceiving the State as an organic living entity, *this organism must be a compact whole separated from all others* (Kjellen) The life of a State is compressed by its frontiers into a territorial unit. *The security of a State, the comfort of its economic life, its stability, depend upon the line of the frontier, upon its strategic and economic value, and upon its approximation to a natural barrier.* What qualities must a good political frontier possess? The answer to this question has been sought by many, has in fact been given by many, but among all their replies there is none which justifies the Trianon frontiers. The notion „frontier“ almost implies natural lines. According to Ratzel a political frontier is merely an abstraction of the wide, dividing zone supplied by nature. Within this zone the frontier may be drawn in very different manners. According to Hotzel the natural frontier is a line as regards which the realities attached to an individual space cease to exist, and are replaced by other spatial factors. Whatever definition we may chose for a natural frontier the essential factor is always the dividing zone. There may be prescribed frontiers, or frontiers mutually agreed upon, without such zones, but these are artificial frontiers, neither stable nor lasting. What are the advanges of natural frontiers as opposed to artificial ones? Their stability, their durability and their dividing power. These qualities are due to the fact that they were determined by nature, whose creations are regarded by mankind as unalterable, whereas artificial frontiers are due to coercion, or agreement, in short to human activities, and are, therefore, liable to change. As against the dividing force of natural frontiers they are valueless from the strategic, as well as from the economic point of view, and are merely peace frontiers, that is to say, frontiers that are valid only as long as military and economic peace obtains.

Before comparing the Trianon frontier with that in

existence for a thousand years we must ask *what the dividing zones should be?* On this point it is unnecessary to express my own view, and we may rely upon any foreign political geographer without any prejudice to the Hungarian cause. *According to Kjellen there must be a radical obstacle to inter-communication at the frontiers of States.* He adds that from this point of view *mountains rank first.* Not mountains in the abstract, but "*certain*" mountains. In illustration of this he says: "*That the Carpathians have the character of a natural frontier is evident from the fact that they are rocks upon which the waves of the Russian armies broke, but also from the fact that Russia several times succeeded in advancing as far as this barrier.*" Thus the Carpathians are natural frontiers on both sides. But he also regards the Southern Carpathians as natural frontiers: *"Roumania appears to be well anchored by nature against the snow-clad mountains of Transylvania."* This statement was made by Kjellen during the war. The Austrian Sölch, and also the Austrian Sieger point out that natural obstacles to inter-communication, e. g. great watersheds, are the real natural frontiers.

The question now is how far the Carpathians answer to the definition of natural frontiers, and how the artificial Trianon frontiers compare with them? It should suffice to point out that the Carpathians, 2000 kilometers long and 80—150 kilometers wide, surround the Hungarian basin, and that *ever since the Hungarians settled in this basin, the frontier has always been the wide, wooded zone of the Carpathians.* Not the mountain-ridge itself, but the zone. Their natural dividing force is shown in the history of a thousand years, beginning with the migration of peoples, the last waves of which were warded off by the Hungarians settled within them. No great knowledge of geography, but only a certain acquaintance with history is needed to prove that *in the whole of Europe there are only two immovable natural political frontiers, both along chains of mountains: the Pyrenees and the Carpathians.* After the Pyrenees there are no natural barriers so well adapted to act as frontiers as the Carpathians. The words

written by Reclus in the seventies are widely known: "*It is the extraordinary advantage of Hungary that she is a geographical unit in the strictest sense of the word. From the point of view of geography the Hungarian Kingdom is the most coherent area of Europe. Whatever the fate of the Central European States may be in the future, it is certain that the Hungarians will always play the most considerable part in the vast arena surrounded by the Carpathians.*"

In a certain respect the frontier-forming character of the Carpathians is even more valuable than that of the Pyrenees, because they *do not constitute so solid a barrier as the Pyrenees against Central European culture and intercourse in general*. It is of special importance that the Carpathians leave doors open in the West to cultural and economic influences, whereas they are closed towards the East. *The importance of the Carpathians as a strong strategical and cultural barrier towards the East and the North must be realised before the thousand years of Hungarian history can be understood, before we can see why this small people was able to maintain its political independence and its culture for a thousand years amidst the three great families of peoples, and was even able to draw alien races into its cultural community.*

The importance of the Carpathian frontier lies further in the fact that it completely separates the natural conditions of the territory within its circle from the surrounding territories. State organisations as a rule choose natural territorial units as their abode. The boundaries of these units may bisect or only approach each other and then diverge more or less sharply. Nature has created such conditions in the Carpathians, which *enclose a natural unit not only spacious enough to include a middle-sized State, but also independent and compact, yet not hermetically closed to the outside world*. What a unit of communications the territory of Hungary was, is evident from the fact that out of the total area of 325.000 square kilometers 314.000 were within the water system of the Danube basin, and only 11.000 square kilo-

meters in other water-systems, while even these territories were most easily approached from Hungary. What an ideal unit of communications the Carpathians enclosed is shown by the further fact that *although a railway line led through almost all their passes, there were only 29 of these.*

The importance of the natural Carpathian frontier is also demonstrated by *historical geography*. The Hungarian State was the first to recognise this importance, and *the weak geographical point of all the State organisations that existed here prior to the Hungarian settlement, was their failure to recognise this.* All the States which stretched from outside into the Hungarian basin, were soon compelled to withdraw. We may instance the Franconian Empire. Those States, which endeavoured to obtain a foothold within the basin, and did not take the Carpathians as a base but relied upon river frontiers, or only upon artificial frontiers, bulwarks, like some provinces of the Roman Empire, were soon swept away. *It is of the utmost importance for States whether they stop short at the boundaries of natural units, or stretch across them into other territorial units;* the result of such tendencies is always decided by geographical factors. We must point out that *up to the Treaty of Trianon no serious attempt had been made on the part of other States in the course of Hungarian history to try their own strength against that of the Carpathians.* The first of such attempts have been made by the Czechs and the Roumanians. These two attempts differ as to origin: the Czech attempt was initiated by a few politicians, whereas that of the Roumanians was perhaps due to a more general desire on the part of the people itself. The results of both are identical: *the last decade has proved that the function of the Carpathians as a frontier is not at an end, and that they have merely become the internal frontiers of the economic and cultural life, the political morals and ambitions of one and the same State. From the point of view of European peace such internal frontiers are the most dangerous of all; they are analogous to the frontiers of those small territories*

*which before the war made the Balkans a political, economic and cultural mosaic.*

What is the strength of the Trianon frontiers as against that of the ancient Carpathian frontier? What was the mentality of those who drew the frontier lines of New Europe? This mentality was aptly characterised by Kjellen in 1917: "*Since the time when the war developed into typical trench-warfare, they have thought that trenches will be the permanent equipment of the artificial frontiers in peace time also.*" These are prophetic words pronounced during the war. *They explain the whole problem of the Trianon frontiers. In fact the present Trianon frontiers are nothing more than trenches designed for "peace" time.* Their value is neither greater nor less. It is not greater, for they do not separate natural obstacles, but play the same part as trenches: *they are maintained by force, while one party is weaker than the other.* Neither is their significance of a different nature, since the two parties face each other as enemies, not only in the military sense, but also in respect of economics, politics and even culture. To quote one instance only of their coercive force: *there are at least one million Hungarian families, the members of which are separated from each other by these trenches.* Communication across them is, if not dangerous to life, in no case secure.

How are these Trianon frontiers compatible with the conception of natural frontiers, and what is their value from the point of view of durability?

The ancient Hungarian frontier was 4166 kilometers long, 85% of which was a natural frontier, i. e. the Carpathians. The major part of the rest was a *river frontier*. We could afford the luxury of regarding our pre-war river frontiers as artificial. Even of these there is very little left, in one section of the Danube, and along the Drave and the Ipoly. The length of our present frontiers is 1450 kilometers, out of which 23% at the most may be regarded, by stretching a point, as a natural frontier, although it is only a river frontier. What is the separating force of river frontiers, and especially of those created

by the Treaty of Trianon? *The only advantage of river frontiers is that they represent lines easily recognisable at sight.* It cannot, however, be said that they are permanent lines. Kjellen drew attention to the fact that the importance of river frontiers would probably increase after the war. But he also explained why, and by this explanation condemned them: "*Rivers play to a certain extent the part of natural trenches.*" *Thus, as a final result, the Peace Treaty has perpetuated trenches round mutilated Hungary.* This implies further that the Trianon frontiers are *purely military frontiers, but only towards one side*, since our enemies had a completely free hand when these frontiers were drawn.

After all this I need hardly explain that these frontiers are entirely indefensible from the Hungarian side. Where the frontier runs along rivers, it might have afforded a certain amount of protection — *had not our neighbours taken care in due time to obtain suitable bridge-heads on our side.* Such bridge-heads they possess opposite Pozsony, in front of the mouth of the Drave, and even above the Mura. Where the frontier runs across flat land, it was drawn in such a manner that *our neighbours obtained glacis in the plain in front of the mountains behind the frontier.* This is the reason why the eastern frontier runs on the verge of the lowlands in such a manner as to leave the great towns, Szatmár, Nagyvárad, Arad, Temesvár, situated in front of the openings through which the rivers coming from Transylvania cross the mountains, in the possession of the Roumanians, these towns representing the junctions of the glacis. The English geographer, MacFarlane has established that the natural boundaries of the Hungarian lowlands are the surrounding mountains; when, however, Roumania was allowed to descend from the mountains, and Serbia to cross the great river which forms her natural frontier, both these countries obtained a foothold in the plains, whence it would be only too easy for them to advance further.

*The most dangerous spot of the frontier, however,*

*from the point of view of defensibility, is just above the capital of Hungary, where the frontier passes from the Danube to the river Ipoly.* Here the frontier is at a distance of 35 kilometers from Budapest. *In the whole of Europe there is not another instance of the frontier of a foreign, and in the present case of a necessarily hostile country coming so near the capital. What else is this but the realisation of Kjellen's suggested trench-system as political frontiers in „peace“ time?* Can we wonder that a distinguished member of the assembly which determined this odious frontier, Nitti, should have been the first to exclaim: „*There is no peace in Europe.*“

The Trianon frontiers being military frontiers, can hardly be judged from any other point of view. Just as the trenches during the war were made regardless of any but military considerations, so the Trianon frontiers contemn economic interests and ethnographic conditions; they utterly disregard the requirements of traffic, run across towns, Sátoralja Ujhely for example, detach others from districts upon which they depended, and even in certain instances cut through farm buildings, while in many cases they separate the villages from the land owned by its inhabitants.

It is interesting to note that the most crushing criticism of the Trianon frontiers was pronounced in anticipation and involuntarily, by Sir Thomas Holdich, the famous frontier expert of the British Colonial Empire and President of the Royal Geographical Society, during the war. In his book published in 1918 he declared that in all his labours to determine frontiers he had always been guided by the following principles: 1. that the results must always be brought into harmony with the will of the people; 2. that lines must be sought which are supported by strictly scientific arguments; 3. that rivers are valueless from the point of view of defence. Which of these conditions, I ask, is fulfilled by the Trianon frontier which was determined after the publication of Sir Thomas Holdich's book?

All political geographers agree that *political frontiers*

*are only durable if they are at the same time natural frontiers. That they should further constitute an obstacle to traffic is considered by all the criterion of a natural frontier.* Looking at the Trianon frontiers from this point of view, a few figures will justify unreserved condemnation. As long as the Carpathians were our natural frontiers, only 29 railway lines led out of the country, whereas at present no less than 46 railway lines and 107 high roads cross the Trianon frontier, to say nothing of the immense number of secondary roads. *This network of communications along the frontier alone shows that the line does not run through uninhabited areas, separating zones, but through territories where the population is densest.* Nowhere along the Trianon frontier is the density of the population below 30—40 per square kilometer, and in several sections it even exceeds 100. No more crushing argument could be advanced against the efficiency of this frontier as a barrier.

Its futility in this respect is self-evident, if we consider the frontier drawn on an orographic map. We then see that the frontier runs through the peripheral districts of the plains. These transition districts are everywhere the most densely populated areas, for they allow of a many-sided economic production, owing partly to the more equable climate, partly to the greater variety of the vegetation, and finally to the different tendencies of the economic life of the districts which meet there, and are situated in the mountains on the one hand, and in the plains on the other.

For the time being we will say no more of the Trianon frontiers. In conclusion we would only point out that whereas thousands of years ago States endeavoured to make up for the lack of natural frontiers by artificial obstacles, the Chinese Wall for example, and the Roman *limes*, the helping hand of the Powers has enabled our neighbours to disregard even the most natural frontiers and to replace them by frontiers in the nature of trenches. Kjellen tells us that river frontiers are only found in the lower stages of the development of States, or as relics

*of ancient times.* We may add that in the past *river frontiers could only be maintained by mutual agreement.* In our case their determination was based upon a mere unilateral decision. *Another fundamental principle disregarded was that mountains should secure a barrier for both sides;* such barriers were replaced by navigable rivers which do not possess this political quality, more especially if the stronger party be allowed to secure bridge-heads to the detriment of the weaker party. No wonder, therefore, that the Hungarian nation should cry for justice, justice perhaps not so effectual as the justice of nature embodied in the Carpathians, but at least not diametrically opposed to nature itself and to the vital interests of a people.

There can be no doubt, as Kjellen says, that nature does not possess such large stocks of good natural frontiers so as to be able everywhere to satisfy the requirements of political distribution. This deficiency may be overcome by the *historic ties binding peoples living together, who strengthen the artificial frontiers by their sense of nationality and convert them as it were into spiritual frontiers.* Is such a consummation to be looked for in the case of the Trianon frontiers? The facts speak for themselves. For the last thousand years *the Czechs and the Slovaks have never lived in one and the same State; the Roumanians of Transylvania have never been in political community with their fellow-nationals in the Kingdom beyond the Carpathians, nor have the Croats with the Serbs. The racial affinity of the peoples within and without the Carpathian wall is also a fallacy;* the Slovak language is not identical with the Czech language, there is no such thing as a *Czecho-Slovak language;* Croats and Serbs differ fundamentally, and to speak of a „*Jugoslav nation*“ is no less nonsensical than to speak of a „*Czecho-Slovak nation*.“ Only the Roumanians on this and on the further side of the Carpathians are racially akin. The same considerations apply to cultural life, and the cultural conflicts in progress in the new States justify the statement that the *new frontiers are no spiritual frontiers.*

The frontier itself is a very important factor in the

life of a State, but much more important is another factor: *what is inside and what outside the frontier. The frontier is only the framework, and the nature of the soil it encloses decides whether the requirements of the people living upon it can be met.*

If the State consists of soil and people, Ratzel's definition of the State as a natural organism is satisfactory, for the State is really an organism rooted in the nature of its territory. If we disturb the harmony of the two by alienation to such an extent that the remnant of the soil and the State are no longer homogeneous, the foundations of the State will be shaken. As long as no modern State has come into being in a certain territory, as long as the economic life of that State has taken no firm root in the territory, a considerable portion of that territory may be withdrawn without upheaval. But not so, in the case of a State with a highly developed economic structure; such an operation would endanger the very life of the whole organism, especially if the territory in its entirety has been necessary to satisfy the requirements of the population. All this applies in the highest degree to a State whose territory is not homogeneous and only offers a harmonious whole by the amalgamation of its component parts. This description applies particularly to basin States. The organism of the Hungarian State would not have suffered the shock it has actually suffered, had it been a single plain with an evenly distributed population and a uniform climate; the economic life of Russia was not shaken by the loss of her Western territories, for she possessed territories of the same kind in abundance.

But the mutilation of Hungary has created an unbearable situation, for her territory was a marvellous example of a harmoniously built up State, and as a result of the assiduous labour of a nation for centuries, a perfect economic harmony was created within the Carpathians. Only in one respect was there a certain discord — in ethnographic conditions. We may ask whether this discord was so marked as to justify the breaking up of the natural and economic harmony, even where the Hungarians

and the alien nationalities benefited equally by it; whether disruption was justified by a certain degree of political dissension kindled and fostered from outside.

Let us first consider the natural harmony and compare with it the natural discord of present-day Hungary. *Some territory is harmonious from the point of view of nature, if it is composed of areas whose structure, climate, surface and vegetation are not uniform, but are varied in such a manner that these different components do not conflict, but rather complete one another.* These conditions, in a small territory, are usually to be found in a basin. The territory of Hungary was the greatest of such territories, in the central basin of the Danube, with a great variety of structure, climate and surface. The variety of its structure consisted in its possession of plains and mountains composed of different rocks. In the whole of Europe there is no other example of such harmony. The territory of pre-war Hungary consisted of 51% lowlands, 24% hills, 20% mountains below 1000 meters high. *The State as created by the Treaty of Trianon consists of 87% plains, the rest being hills.* In the territory of unmutilated Hungary there were ancient ore-bearing mountains, and mountains of a more recent age containing coal basins. What has become of this natural and therefore economic harmony since Trianon? *At present we do not possess a single mountain where we might postulate the occurrence of ores in large quantities.*

Owing to her basin-structure historic Hungary was composed of regions of varied climates. There were the plains with their dry and warm and in the summer rainless areas, there were the hilly regions with a milder climate, more rain and therefore more stable harvests, and there were the mountain districts with their special products. It is an economic fact of importance that the *mountainous districts always yielded crops of more uniform character than the plains*, especially as regards produce requiring careful cultivation and sufficient rain. *In the plains the averages of the crops, even of the cereals which resist the climate of the steppes more effectually,*

*were liable to greater fluctuations than those of the mountains.*

The varied climate secured that most important economic condition, the possibility of cultivating all products of the temperate zone in sufficient, even abundant quantities. During the last half century the country as a whole had never failed, even in bad seasons, to produce food-stuffs in such quantities as to make imports unnecessary. The climate of the territory marked out by the Treaty is uniform and our production has therefore lost the essential conditions of many-sided agricultural production. In addition, *the great economic catastrophe of a drought is liable to occur at any time, owing to the monotony of the climate*. All those territories have remained within the Trianon frontiers, where the weather is most uncertain, and where drought and late spring frosts are frequent.

The climate is closely connected with the *water question*. Modern agricultural products tend to become more and more dependent upon the economic utilisation of water. Without irrigation production cannot be increased. It is now common knowledge that without irrigation no satisfactory cultivation can be carried on in steppes, or in territories approximating to steppes, like the Hungarian lowlands. Owing to the natural harmony of pre-war Hungary the possibility of irrigation always existed. The rivers rising in the rainy mountainous districts all flowed towards the plains. By utilising these waters one million cadastral yokes could have been irrigated without difficulty. The English geographer, Mackinder, drew attention to the fact that the problem of increasing Hungarian agricultural production could only be solved by employing this excellent hydrographic unity for irrigation. One glance at the map of present-day Hungary and at the position of her frontiers will convince any one that *here again the Treaty has completely destroyed the natural harmony of the country, in that the frontiers run everywhere along the borders of the plains where reservoirs might have been built.*

Natural harmony was also marvellously expressed in

the *hydrographic unity* of the Hungarian basin system. The mountain rain-fall meant blessing or curse to the plains; blessing, if the populations of the respective territories lived in economic harmony and co-operated in the utilisation of these waters; since the Treaty, it has meant curse, for *the sources and the upper, water-collecting courses of all rivers flowing into mutilated Hungary have passed into the possession of hostile States which neglect even the humane duty of giving warning of floods.* We indicated this danger at the Peace Conference, of course without effect. *The problems of natural harmony were not understood, and those of economic harmony were disregarded.*

Climatic, orographic and hydrographic harmony find their common expression in *harmony of vegetation.* In this respect also the favourable conditions of pre-war Hungary were without parallel. There was no other State in Europe where half of the territory is arable land, one quarter forests, one-fifth meadows and pasture land, and only one-twentieth unproductive. Even in Denmark the proportion of productive soil is less favourable. This, however, is no mere consequence of the original harmony of nature, but rather the result of the economic wisdom of the Hungarian nation. We may point the moral by the example of pre-war Serbia, where natural conditions were identical with ours, and where nevertheless only 25% of the soil was productive. Why? Because the Serbian people have not yet attained the degree of economic culture which would enable them to recognise the significance of nature, and to bring their economic life into harmony with what nature offers. How has the Treaty affected the harmoniously distributed vegetation of Hungarian soil? It took away 86% of the forests, and thus only 11% of the remaining territory is wooded. Only Southern Russia possesses as little forest land as mutilated Hungary.

So far we have merely demonstrated the disruption of the various factors of nature. We have not yet considered what the unmutilated territory meant for the life of the State as such, and what present conditions mean.

If we conceive of the State as an organic being, we shall recognise that there are *vital requirements of this organism* which the State must satisfy primarily from its own soil. What are these requirements? In the first place food, then clothing, the raw materials of industrial life, sources of energy and the possibilities of traffic. These *requirements are met, not by a homogeneous, but by a harmonious territory*, a territory that may be regarded as an *economic unit*, a territory the *various regions of which complete each other economically*. All these conditions existed in the Hungarian basin-State. We had plains with a uniform production of cereals such as the great and the lesser lowlands, yielding even a large surplus, but lacking in industrial essentials, (coal, forests, mines). We had hilly districts with complementary agricultural production, fruit-culture, and even many industrial essentials, Transdanubia, for instance; and finally we had mountainous districts, where agricultural production was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the population who were dependent upon the produce of the lowlands; but on the other hand they possessed vast forests, ores, coal, water-power, great herds on the pastures of the mountains, and above all, industrial activities. With the sole exception of the environs of the capital, all our industrial districts were in the mountains and in the hilly regions. It is characteristic of our economic equilibrium that the plains sold 6.5 million metric quintals of wheat and rye annually to the mountain districts, and that the agricultural life of the plains was closely connected with that of the mountain districts; every year about 200.000 labourers descended from the mountains into the plains to gather the harvest. In addition, of course, to labour the mountains supplied the plains with coal, iron, wood above all, and also manufactured articles. *Owing to the disturbance of the economic equilibrium the level of production in the lowlands has declined. Since the war, the averages of the harvest have fallen to the level on which they stood in 1885.* As a result of the lack of fuel, formerly supplied by the mountain districts, in the lowlands all the waste material of

agriculture is being used at present as fuel, even straw and manure. *Thus the soil is being gradually exhausted.*

We owed to our basin structure the great advantage that the territories which completed each other economically were concentrically disposed. The lowlands were the heart and centre of the economic life of the country, to which all the traffic descended from the mountains through the river valleys. The central situation of the lowlands amidst the mountain districts represented a very powerful cohesive force in the State, in economic as well as in political respects. This united the mountain districts between themselves, and the Hungarians of the lowlands were the political cohesive force between the nationalities of the peripheries. These could never have freed themselves from the economic and political cohesive force of the Hungarians of the central lowlands, had there been no coercion from outside. It is unimaginable that these mountain districts should live in economic and political independence. Transylvania, the greatest of these regions, although set apart from the lowlands by nature, was never an independent State, save for the brief period when the lowlands were under the Turkish yoke, but even then Hungarian princes ruled Transylvania. As soon as the Hungarian nation reconquered the lowlands, the mountain districts, including Transylvania, at once came back into political community with the Hungarians, for the economic harmony of the various districts of the basin-system is of irresistible force. The most evident proof of this thesis is offered by the history of the decade following after the Treaty: the economic life of the peripheral districts is unable to form a political unit with incongruous territories. Just as the harmony between the various members of the basin-system is obvious, so also is the discord between the alienated districts and the original territories of the new States. What can industrial Upper Hungary, lacking bread, expect from Bohemia, which is even more industrial and less agricultural? Economic discord in this case arises out of the physical uniformity of the two territories. What can be the fate of Transylvania within Roumania, an

agricultural country like herself, where she cannot satisfy her industrial requirements, and is unable to sell her raw materials, especially her wood?

*Thus the Treaty has neither created harmony between the alienated territories and the annexing States, nor left harmonious territories within the frontiers of mutilated Hungary.* Economic equilibrium has been entirely destroyed, and the economic life of Hungary suffers to the same extent as that of the alienated territories. Hungary has at present no ores, no wood, no salt, no water-power; in Upper Hungary there are no more factories, for Czech industry has killed unwelcome competition. A double object has thereby been attained: Czech industry has got rid of Slovak competitors, and compelled them to become badly paid workers in its factories. The prices of manufactured articles are prohibitive in Transylvania, but on the other hand, the felled timber lies rotting in the country, and most of the salt mines have closed down.

We must not, however, attribute too much importance to the natural factors in the life of a State. Natural conditions merely indicate the tendencies to be followed by economic life, and man, as a thinking being, is able to shape these natural factors to his ends. As the geographer puts it: *the population of the State tends to assimilate with the soil.* This is so, and here we are confronted with a crime committed by the Powers which dictated the Treaty of Trianon. *They have forcibly destroyed the cultural work of a thousand years.* The Hungarian soil was always able to satisfy all the requirements of the nation, but only because the people, familiar with the nature of its soil, adapted it to their own requirements and their economic life, and on the other hand, spared no pains to render it suitable for their purposes. Natural conditions may baffle and obstruct man, or they may be favourable, but in themselves they never prescribe either political or economic conditions. *The nation itself creates its political and economic life,* and much depends upon its political and economic abilities. On the basis of this truth it may be shown how the Hungarian nation became one with its soil,

and as this organic process had reached a very advanced stage, it is now unable to recover the conditions of assimilation with its soil.

*The same changes which the Hungarian soil has undergone in the course of history, may be observed in the work of the Hungarian people and the character of the economic life of the country.* There may be much truth in the assertion that the Hungarians, when they first took possession of the country, were induced to settle in the plains of the Danube basin, because these were best suited to their principal economic necessity, that of finding suitable pastures for their cattle. *Later, the country gradually lost the character of a pastoral State;* as formed by Saint Stephen it had undoubtedly an agricultural character. The country preserved this character to the end, and only after the Turkish occupation did the inhabitants of the lowlands return to pastoral life. They were compelled to do so, as a result of the devastation of the country by the Turks. As the population grew denser, the nation once more recognised the economic possibilities of its soil and endeavoured to develop them. It made great efforts to revive agricultural production, not only to satisfy its own needs, but also to meet the requirements of Western Europe, whose population became highly industrialised and increasingly dense. *Neither Serbs, Roumanians, nor Czechs devoted a like amount of cultural energy to their respective soils.* The territory of the Czechs has never been devastated to such an extent as that of the Hungarians during the Turkish occupation; the territory of the Roumanians and Serbs is at present practically in the same condition as when it was freed from Turkish domination. In contrast to this, the Hungarian people, since the time when they became the masters of their own soil, that is, since the cessation of Austrian absolutist rule up to the war, *drained marshland the area of which is the size of Holland* (24.000 square kilometers), *built dams the length of which equals the width of the Atlantic Ocean,* solidified three great quick-sand areas of the lowlands, and reduced the forests of the mountain districts to such an extent as to secure the

*economic equilibrium of those regions. With the exception of Holland, no other European country has invested such an amount of cultural work in its soil as Hungary. Hungary is the last cultural region in the European sense of the word towards the south-east for beyond her there are only half-devastated regions. In Western Europe, including Hungary, the peoples worked their soils productively; all the others did was destructive or unmethodical.*

What has the Treaty done in this connection? It has surrendered Hungarian cultured districts to peoples on a lower level of economic culture, it has surrendered Central Europe to the Balkans. This is why Transylvania is decaying, and why the Bácska, the most fertile region of Europe, is doomed to ruin. These peoples are unable to assimilate the culture they have found in the territories annexed by them, and this is the reason why Roumanians who were given fertile land in the Hungarian lowlands, have preferred to withdraw into their mountains. There are no gymnastic feats in nature; cultural chasms cannot be bridged. *The territory of a State must be harmonious, and the same harmony must prevail between people and soil.* But who among the makers of the Treaty knew anything of the Hungarian soil, which cannot suffer an alien economic life on its surface.

The late Austrian Professor Sieger, who was anything but pro-Hungarian, might have addressed them, when he said; „*It is very desirable that statesmen should check territorial expansion, and rather compel the peoples to devote their abilities to the territories they already possess. Ignorance of foreign, unknown territories may become a danger to the State*“. France has made a halt at the Pyrenees, Russia withdrew from America. *It is only the politicians of the Balkans who ignore the force of the soul of the soil.*

If withdrawal is not effected in due time, the nucleus of the State is liable to be rent asunder. This is why Austria withdrew from Italy, as did also the German-Roman Empire. How heterogeneous the territory of Roumania has

become owing to its intersection by the Carpathians is shown by the fact that after the war it was seriously suggested that it might be wise to transfer the capital to some place inside the Carpathians, to Brassó for instance. Sir Thomas Holdich declared in 1918 that *the Roumanian frontier which then ran along the Carpathians was much more favourable for her than any other line across Hungary would be*. The incessant political and economic troubles in Jugoslavia are due to the fact that an uncultured mountain State has annexed flat and hilly territories of a higher culture, and thus the centre of gravity of the State can only be maintained in Serbia by coercion. *The development and growth of States must be conceived as an organic process which is rudely disturbed when natural factors are disregarded*. If these be disregarded discord between the old and the newly acquired territories is bound to follow.

And now we may pass to the question why even after Trianon, the Hungarian State must cling tenaciously to its claim on the border districts. It must claim them, even though their restoration entail ethnographic discord, because *the possession of these districts is a vital matter. Without the border districts no people can feel secure (from the economic or from the military point of view) in the depths of the basin*. The Turks had to withdraw, not because this area verged on Western Europe, but because the border districts weighed too heavily upon these plains from all sides.

*There is no doubt that the nationalities detached by the Treaty of Trianon were not only politically, but also economically a burden to the Hungarians settled in the central provinces. The nation spent much more on their territories than it derived from them in the way of taxation.* Thus for example in 1914 the Hungarians and the Germans, although only 63.3% of the population, paid 78.4% of the direct taxes. During the ten years before the war, disputes with the alien nationalities had a paralysing effect on the economic energies of the State just when it should have been devoted to economic progress. At that time the disunion of the people obstructed the economic exploitation of the

soil. Since Trianon, the natural disunion of the soil prevents economic consolidation. And yet, the Hungarian State cannot exist without the border districts.

That an economic harmonisation is impossible without them, is explained by Kjellen: "It is not monotony, but harmony that creates natural territorial units. Not formal homogeneity, not for example one fertile plain, but a harmonic distribution over the space of certain natural features (arable land, meadows, forests, mountains, water). Monotony is weakness, for it means monotonous production with its attendant dependence on others and its manifold perils. A natural territorial unit should satisfy all the requirements of its inhabitants as regards food." The requirements of a nation of 21 million souls were satisfied by pre-war Hungary; post-war Hungary cannot meet the needs of 8 million. Before Trianon this was possible, for, as we have seen, the nation made every effort to develop the *latent self-supporting capacity* of the soil.

We will quote a few figures to demonstrate the work achieved and the self-supporting capacity thereby developed, and then compare with them figures demonstrating the results of Trianon. During the 60 years preceding the war the total area of arable land was increased by 74%, an achievement unequalled in Europe, and only approached in Russia. From the seventies up to the war the wheat growing area increased by 55%, that of maize by 48%, that of potatoes by 53%, that of barley by 20%. On the basis of these figures it will be realised that within the period above mentioned the yield of wheat and of maize increased threefold (an increase unparalleled in the whole of Europe), the yield of rye by 50%, that of barley and oats was doubled. We produced more than our population needed, and thus Hungary was the nearest State to industrial Europe which disposed of a considerable surplus, a fact of immense importance for Europe.

We have already mentioned that after Trianon the level of our production fell. Moreover, we have lost a much greater proportion of productive area than of population. Whereas before the war there were 113 inhabitants to each

square kilometer of the productive area, at present there are 117. This figure speaks eloquently of the disastrous effects of the Treaty. We can compare the gravity of the present situation with our former prosperity, if we examine how far the Hungarian soil is able to satisfy the needs of the population.

Before the war only 76% of the wheat produced was consumed in the country, 71%, 84%, 87%, 95% of the rye, barley, oats and maize respectively, although the consumption was much greater than during the subsequent periods of distress. During the years following the conclusion of peace agricultural production only just met the reduced consumption, and there were even years when our production was insufficient. Since then the situation has somewhat improved and we have even been able to export certain quantities, but this is deceptive, since it is explained by the fact that *owing to the prevailing poverty, consumption has not yet reached the pre-war level.*

It is interesting, however, to note that *the major part of our surplus is being exported to those territories which we had in former times to supply with food, i. e. the alienated mountain districts. Almost  $\frac{1}{3}$  of our wheat export,  $\frac{1}{4}$  of our rye export, almost  $\frac{1}{3}$  of our oats export,  $\frac{1}{2}$  of our maize export go to these territories.* These facts illustrate better than anything else to what an extent the various parts of the Hungarian basin system are dependent upon one another, and *how futile it was to insert frontier lines between areas which thus complete each other, since it is impossible to hinder the natural economic process by artificial barriers.*

Thus we still have a certain amount of self-supporting agricultural capacity, when harvests are normal; but a drought may annihilate this capacity. If our self-supporting capacity hangs by a slender thread, it may be imagined to what a *state of dependence our economic life is condemned in other directions.* We have already spoken of our lack of forests. I may add that as a matter of course we *import our wood from our alienated mountain districts.* Hungarian mining has suffered heavier losses still; *for mining products*

*we are entirely dependent on foreign countries, and only a little coal of inferior quality was left to us. We have, however, no ores (with the exception of one iron mine), not one salt mine, and we, who were famous for our export of salt, must now import.*

We need not waste many words on our *industry*. This has always been the weakest spot of our economic life. Hungarian Governments long before the war, subsidised industry to enable it to compete with Austria. It was of great advantage to Czechoslovakia to annex the industrial districts of Upper Hungary, for by so doing she not only *deprived us of the major part of our industry, but also destroyed it in the interest of that of Bohemia*. The industry left to us is struggling against enormous difficulties, *for our industrial districts were not alienated in the same proportion as the territories supplying raw material*. Many branches of our industry, and these the most important, such as the agricultural and the milling industries, were left without adequate quantities of raw material, whereas some branches are unable to work up the raw material left. *Another proof of the organic unity and indivisibility of modern economic life!*

We must again insist on the fundamental truth that the *economic harmony of a State arises from the permanent union of soil and people. It may be said that any partition of a State is a mortal sin against human progress*. I will again quote Kjellen: *"The longer a people lives with its soil, and the higher its cultural development becomes, the more must the State be conceived of as an organism. Practical politics should, therefore, clearly recognise the degree of organic development."*

Without commenting further upon these axioms we may ask which was more likely to advance human progress: the further development of a culture which was the result of the establishment of the Hungarian people for a thousand years on their soil, or the invasion of that soil by Balkan peoples who had nothing in common with it? *From a general human point of view only such territorial displacements are justified, as promote the development of*

*cultured States into geographical individuals, and their final evolution as a more harmonious economic organism.* Which of these conditions has the Treaty promoted? It ran directly counter to them, and inflicted on us an injury even greater than the destruction of our economic life and the harmony of our territory: *it disturbed our national unity.*

The plea was that the peoples must regain their *right of self-determination*, and that *national States must be created.* This plea of itself betrays the ignorance with which the makers of the Peace Treaties undertook to re-draw the map of Europe. No one acquainted with the ethnographic conditions and the historic past of South Eastern Europe would ever have advanced this argument. They should have known that it is *impossible to draw ethnographic lines in this part of Europe, for nowhere are the peoples so intermixed as in the Balkans and the basin of the Danube.* It is utterly impossible to create national States here, and there could only be a question how far the nationalities should be incorporated into the various States. No one acquainted with the conditions would have undertaken to draw ethnographic boundaries in the Danube basin that showed even a semblance of justice. *Nations may arise here, but not national States.* Racial identity is no essential condition of the idea nation. Without multiplying examples we recall the United States. There is no doubt that its people are a nation, in spite of its heterogeneous composition.

The very idea of national States is modern and was raised at the time of Napoleon. There is no doubt, however, that the *idea of a national State is only justified if its maintenance and durability are secured by a well enclosed national territory.* (Sieger). Neither the Hungarians, nor any of the surrounding peoples can claim to be a national State, because even the most judiciously drawn frontier would either incorporate Hungarians into the new States, or leave a great number of nationalities under Hungarian rule. In the Danube basin the only solution would be to determine ethnographic boundaries, governed by consideration of the economic interests of the peoples concerned. *The Carpathian frontier would, of course, be the most reasonable*

*solution*, but even within this line there might be a frontier far more adequate than the present one.

If we consider the Trianon frontiers from this point of view, we find that *the economic dissonance thereby created is expressed in the loud lamentations of the oppressed nationalities*. This is all the more striking because at Trianon economic considerations were not even mentioned, and we heard only of ethnographic arguments. *And yet at present the ethnographic conditions demand rectification even more urgently than the economic anarchy. The Trianon frontier is not an ethnographic one, it does not separate nationalities, but only increases confusion.*

We have already quoted John MacFarlane who declared, in 1920, that not only were *geographic principles* violated by the partition of territory where Hungarians predominated, but also *ethnographic principles*: in the North, where an obviously Hungarian area was alienated, but also in the South, where the Bácska and the Bánát were allotted to Serbs and Roumanians, who are in a minority there.

As a final result the Treaty of Trianon has created *one national State, Hungary, and three States composed of various nationalities*, similar to that of pre-war Hungary, without, however, *all the advantages possessed by the latter*. In Czechoslovakia there are only 45.9% Czechs and Moravians, in Jugoslavia only 39.2% Serbs, and only in Roumania is the ruling race represented by a proportion of 66.7%. Czechoslovakia was created on the basis of a national State, but is in fact an artificial agglomeration, disparate as regards population as well as in the natural conditions of its various components; Roumania stands nearer to the idea of a national State than Czechoslovakia, but much farther than it stood originally; it includes masses of alien races on a much higher cultural level than the Roumanians, and its components are economically heterogeneous; Jugoslavia also is full of alien races on a higher cultural level than its nationals and distributed over areas naturally and economically discord-

ant; finally, in the centre, there is Hungary, a national State, it is true, but lacking all the conditions of independent economic life. *This is the situation created by the Treaty of Trianon!*

So far we have dealt only with objective data to illustrate, from the point of view of geography, the untenability of the Treaty of Trianon. But we must further consider that every nation possesses an historic past deeply rooted in the soil of the fatherland. To avoid the charge of undue sentimentality, let us again quote Kjellen: "*With every generation which, having finished its task on the paternal soil, returns to it, the sense of solidarity of the people with that soil increases, — that soil which is its playground, its workshop and its grave, but also its food-giver and its home.*" The soil of the alienated territories is filled with the generations of a thousand years — generations of laborious and martial Hungarians. This should be a warning to the occupying Powers!

Going back to those events of the past which prepared the catastrophe of Trianon, we shall see that Hungary, unable to people her territory adequately after the losses incurred in the defence of the West, admitted aliens into her domains. The Tartars and the Turks destroyed Hungarians, but not the Hungarian State. *The Treaty of Trianon was the reward of valour we received from the civilised West, to which the Hungarian people and the Hungarian soil now cry with all their strength: "Justice for Hungary!"*

# The Road towards Rectification

BY EMIL NAGY



During my frequent and lengthy sojourns in England I came to the conclusion that the English public feel a certain contempt for all propaganda because they consider it a one-sided affair. On the other hand, they are eager to learn the truth. They not only listen patiently to what a foreigner tells them about his own country, but they ask questions, inform themselves, inquire into facts. Under the stress of their cross-examination new points of view presented themselves, of which I had no idea when I looked at things with a Hungarian eye, from inside my unhappy country as devastated by the Treaty of Trianon. Now that I am back in that country I am in a tragic position, in that I see our cause from a standpoint different to that of my compatriots. Such a situation is a very painful one. To many I must appear a weakling ready to compromise on our great national questions, and on the other hand I am stigmatised as one led astray by illusions, whereas, contrary to the ideas that obtain in official circles, I am convinced that a revision of the Treaty of Trianon may be achieved by peaceful legal methods, if it be only realised how and where to approach the question, how and when to start with hopes of success on the thorny path of revision.

I am unfortunately no longer able to look at the Hungarian question with a purely Hungarian eye, for my conceptions have become so tempered by English ways of thinking that I am obliged to regard the affairs of my country from the standpoint of a sober and well-informed Englishman, as well as from that of a good Hungarian patriot. When, therefore, I am asked what could be done and in what manner, after a disastrous war, to mitigate

the Treaty of Trianon, I can only give an amalgam of my own and of the English point of view. Regarding the question soberly in this manner, I see clearly how the Peace Treaty might have been framed, even after a lost war, had it not been based upon false data entailing unbearable injustices. In my Anglo-Hungarian soul I can clearly conceive of a Peace Treaty which would have penalised us severely after the lost world war, but still only to such an extent as impartial persons knowing the circumstances might have decreed without scandalous injustice.

In the mental atmosphere of my long stay in England, I had regrettfully to recognise the cruel truth that the idea of Hungarian integrity, i. e. the idea of a restoration of pre-war Hungary, so naturally and enthusiastically cherished at home, does not appeal to the English. They appreciate our marvellous historic past of a thousand years, the poetry and beauty embodied in the idea of the Crown of St. Stephen, they recognise that we have for centuries past been the bulwark of Europe against the Turks and that we deserved better treatment by the Western Powers, they even acknowledge that the Treaty of Trianon has created a geographic, hydrographic and economic absurdity, but as against all this they only say — sometimes with emotion — "We are sorry... but we can do nothing". For the principle of self-determination, and the shaping of States on a national basis appeal to them more powerfully than our historic and constitutional pleas, even though based upon a past of a thousand years.

The war took a disastrous course from the point of view of the Hungarian race, in that those States whose kinsmen were living in Hungary, in their immediate vicinity, were either allies of the victorious Powers, or adopted such clever tactics that after the war they appeared on the scenes as such.

No sense of justice, no equitable mentality could have prevented the Great Powers, flushed with victory, from acting on the principle that the territories of Hungary inhabited in compact masses by Roumanians should be attached to Roumania, that the territories with compact

Serb and Croat populations should be given to Jugoslavia, and that the territories with a compact Slovak population should be annexed by neighbouring Bohemia. The racial affinity between Czechs and Slovaks is arguable, as they were never one nation in the course of history, but their languages are so closely related that in the post-war atmosphere of the Treaty of Trianon the most upright and well-informed statesmen, however anxious to deal justly with Hungary, could not have prevented the purely Slovak territories from being incorporated in the Czecho-Slovak State.

The fate of the Ruthenian territory is a different matter altogether. There is no racial affinity between Ruthenians and Czechs, and thus the fact that the Peace Treaty detached the Ruthenians from Hungary, and gave them to Czecho-Slovakia, without consulting them, is merely the result of greedy, imperialistic ambitions diametrically opposed to those great principles on which the League of Nations has been built up, and more especially to the principle of self-determination. The result clearly shows the iniquity of what happened, for although the Treaty of Trianon prescribes the autonomy of the Ruthenian territory, the Ruthenians, in flagrant violation of the terms of the Treaty, are still, seven years after the coming into force of the Treaty, without their promised autonomy. It is a scandal that the League of Nations is not powerful enough to force the Prague Government to carry out the obligations imposed on them in the Treaty of Trianon.

The honest and unbiased Englishman, therefore, says he perfectly understands that the territories inhabited in compact masses by Roumanians, Serbs, Croats and Slovaks should have been transferred to the respective neighbouring countries where their kinsmen live, but the arbitrary transfer of Ruthenian territory he cannot accept as just, nor even as excusable.

The thinking Englishman again is still more shocked to learn that the Treaty of Trianon deprived the mother-country of large territories which were not only not

inhabited in compact masses by alien nationalities, but whose population on the contrary was overwhelmingly Hungarian. Neither can he understand why the Germans of Southern Hungary were transferred to Balkan States regardless of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. A person who declares that after losing the war it was only just that Hungary should lose territories inhabited by compact masses of alien nationalities must, if he be logical, condemn the process by which, without any cogent reason, the Trianon frontier should have been so drawn as to detach from the mother-country about two and a half million Hungarians and Germans, who live in the closest geographic and economic union along that frontier.

I count among the most momentous hours of my life the occasions when in the course of my lectures in England, or in private gatherings, I demonstrated on maps to the English public the manner in which the Trianon frontier was drawn, by cruel incisions into the living flesh of the Hungarian race, under cover of detaching territories inhabited by compact masses of alien nationalities. I showed on the map that the Trianon frontier passed close to Szeged, throwing under an alien yoke compact masses of thorough-bred Hungarians, small farmers. I also showed how the frontier cuts into the purely Hungarian County of Komárom, detaching the pure Hungarians of the Csallóköz, of Érsekujvár, and of the territories between Budapest and Kassa, including the cathedral of the latter town where lie the remains of the apostle of Hungarian liberty, Francis Rákóczi, brought there twenty years ago by the freedom-loving Hungarians from Turkish exile. I pointed out how the Treaty tore off the purely Hungarian district called the Bodrogköz, merely because it was convenient for the Czechs to obtain a railway line instead of being obliged to construct one for themselves.

I told my astonished audiences how, for a like reason the town of Sátoraljaújhely was cut in two, with the grotesque result that the frontier runs between the houses of the town.

I also explained how the frontier was brought up

beyond Szabadka, separating masses of Hungarians from the mother-country, merely to place Belgrade at a convenient distance from the Hungarian frontier in the event of a future war. It is also obvious that the Czech frontier was drawn for a kindred reason, that in case of war, Czech guns may fire into Budapest. I spoke to the English public of the anomalies of the system all along the frontier, where the houses of villages are in Hungary, but where the poor small farmers are obliged to have passports if they wish to bring home their hay, because their pasture lands have been handed over to a foreign State.

Moving freely among various classes of English people, I never met with a single Englishman who was not shocked at the fact, that not only territories inhabited by compact masses of alien nationalities were detached from Hungary, but even purely Hungarian and German districts, the transfer of which was based upon no principle of nationality, but was merely the result of the greed with which the Trianon frontiers were determined in defiance of all justice and equity.

Any one who looks at these facts squarely must be convinced that these frontiers will not insure peace, but a new war. They were not drawn in an atmosphere of peace, but in one of vengeance, and thus are merely calculated to keep alive the spirit of hatred and strife in this part of Eastern Europe.

My English audiences were deeply impressed not only by these frontier questions, but by my refutation of the charge untruly made against Hungary of having provoked the war. I explained to the English public the fact which is now known throughout the world: that in that memorable Austrian Crown Council of 1914, the representative of Hungary, Count Tisza, protested vigorously against the proposed severe and fatal measures against Serbia, and that he was outvoted by the Austrian members of the Council.

This decisive fact alone should be a sufficient reason for the revision of the Peace Treaty, which was mainly based upon the assumption that part of the war guilt of

the Dual Monarchy rested upon Hungary. In the civilised world every wrongfully convicted person has the right to ask for a reconsideration of his case, should he be able to prove that his judges were mistaken in establishing his guilt. Hungarians of to-day may be compared with such a person, sentenced on false grounds, and if a restoration of the historic realm of St. Stephen be impossible, the above argument should suffice for the restoration to the mother-country at least of those Hungarians who live in geographical connection with the mutilated country, and were torn off, greedily, on the basis of false data.

The situation is so clear that I did not come across one well-meaning person in the whole of England who did not agree that the superficially and unjustly drawn Trianon frontier must be revised, unless those who at present rule the world are content to see the great idea of the League of Nations tarnished by lasting injustice, and this part of Europe converted into a powder magazine of incessant strife and unrest. Every one must be aware that no peace can dwell upon these frontiers, which perpetuate the mentality of war.

That all I have said above is true is confirmed by a statement made by Mr. Lloyd George, one of the authors of the Peace Treaty. There is no doubt that he took part in the determination of the Trianon frontiers, but when he subsequently convinced himself that these frontiers were drawn in such a manner as to detach from Hungary territories inhabited entirely by Hungarians along the frontier line, he declared — and we have no right to doubt the sincerity of his words — that he did not wish this, and if it happened nevertheless, it was because he was misinformed and deceived.

It is also well known that Wilson declared he had never desired to detach Hungarian territories along the frontiers inhabited by Hungarians, in flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination, nor did he propose to detach territories inhabited by Germans without consulting them.

It is easy to prove that even the French were misled as regards the Trianon frontiers. Our classic piece of evidence is the so-called Millerand Letter, dated Paris, May 6, 1920, and described as "Letter of Envoy to the President of the Hungarian Delegation of the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers".

The crucial sentence in this letter runs as follows:

"The ethnographic conditions in Central Europe are such that it is indeed impossible for the political frontiers in their total extent to coincide with the ethnical frontiers. It follows from this — and the Allied and Associated Powers have not resigned themselves without regret to this necessity — that certain isles of Magyar population will pass under the sovereignty of another State. But no statement pretending that it would have been better not to modify the former territorial status can be based on this situation. A state of affairs, even when millennial, is not founded to exist when it has been recognised as contrary to justice."

All who can read will see at once that even Millerand, then the French Prime Minister, was under the false impression that only certain small *enclaves* would be taken from the Hungarians, but had obviously no idea that the Trianon frontier would bisect territories inhabited by Hungarians in such a manner as to leave compact masses of Hungarians on each side of it. It was comprehensible in the post-war atmosphere, and even from the point of view of the principle of self-determination that when territories inhabited by compact masses of alien nationalities were detached, these would inevitably contain certain Hungarian *enclaves*. In the sentence of his letter quoted above Millerand excuses himself in this connection and explains that it was impossible that it should be otherwise. But the very fact that he should have so excused himself proves that Millerand believed he was only taking from Hungary certain *enclaves* embedded in territories inhabited by compact masses of alien nationalities, and was unaware that territories inhabited by compact masses of Hungarians were torn from the mother-country.

But I will quote another passage from the Millerand Letter:

"It is true that the Hungarian Delegation argues from the fact that the Conditions of Peace do not provide for a *plébiscite* anywhere.

If the Allied and Associated Powers have thought it unnecessary to have recourse to a popular vote of this nature it has not been until acquiring the certitude that such a consultation, if carried out with all guarantees of complete sincerity, would not offer a result differing sensibly from those which they have arrived at after a minute study of the ethnographic conditions of Central Europe and of national aspirations. The will of the people was expressed in October and November of 1918 at the collapse of the Dual Monarchy when the populations oppressed for so long united with their Italian, Roumanian, Jugoslav and Czecho-Slovak brethren. The events occurring since that epoch constitute so many proofs the more of the sentiments of the nationalities formerly subjected to the Crown of St. Stephen. The tardy measures taken by the Hungarian Government to satisfy the need for an autonomy felt by the nationalities is not able to create any illusion, they do not change at all the essentials of historic truth; notably, that during long years all the efforts of Hungarian policy were directed to stifling the voice of the ethnical minorities."

This passage shows even more clearly than the previous one the truth as set forth above, for Millerand states plainly that certain portions of Hungary were detached on the basis of the principle of nationality, and that *plébiscites* were unnecessary, since it was evident that these nationalities, had they been consulted, would have wished to be united with their brethren. I ask whether Millerand could have said this, had he had a notion that the frontier was drawn by the Peace Treaty in such a manner that it detached from Hungary about two million Hungarians living in compact masses immediately along the border, and also about 600,000 Germans in the same geographical position. No, no, never! Every impartial per-

son reading Millerand's Letter must conclude that the Trianon frontiers were drawn on the basis of false data.

In connection with the refusal of *plébiscites* it is interesting to note that subsequently one *plébiscite* actually took place, at Sopron, which opted for Hungary. This significant fact shows how defective was a Treaty which detached territories inhabited by compact masses of Hungarians from the mother-country without consulting them.

In my frequent intercourse with English people I have not met one well-meaning person who has not realised that although the whole of pre-war Hungary cannot be restored by peaceful means, on the basis of the principle of nationality, there is no doubt that it will be a lasting blot upon the League of Nations and civilisation, should the Trianon frontier not be rectified in the spirit of true peace, so as to restore the masses of Hungarians and Germans described above, to Hungary.

These patent truths have made a deep impression upon that prince of journalists, Lord Rothermere, and induced him to identify himself heart and soul with the idea that the Hungarian frontiers must be rectified in the sense of the true principle of nationality, and that those territories with predominantly Hungarian and German populations, who have racially no affinity with the countries by which they were annexed against their will, should be restored.

I am confident that the time will soon come when through the intermediary of Lord Newton, Lord Phillimore, and other British notables the whole of England will understand that the Trianon frontiers must be rectified in the sense indicated above, and in accordance with the great guiding principles of truth, of humanity and of the League of Nations.

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But I must admit that there are people who hold that these questions must not be raised, because the revision of one Treaty would involve the revision of all the others.

I am convinced that the time will also come for the rectification of the injustices of the other Treaties, but

meanwhile I maintain that the determination of the Trianon frontier was a very special matter. It is obvious that the injustices embodied in the other Treaties were *deliberate*, whereas the statements of Lloyd George and Wilson and the passages from the Millerand Letter quoted above show that the Hungarian frontier was drawn on the basis of utterly misleading information, in flagrant violation of that principle of nationality which was supposed to be the basis of the Peace Treaty.

There are also many who say that this revision cannot be accomplished without warlike complications which are dreaded throughout the whole world, and especially in England. In my opinion, however, the truth in this case also is just the opposite. This rectification of the frontier is necessary, and its main object is to create peace in this part of Europe, since it is obvious that with the present frontiers, which were created in the atmosphere of war and are the fruits of greed and misrepresentation, the Hungarians will never come to an understanding with their neighbours. *On the other hand, rectification of the frontier would necessarily result in the Hungarians making peace unconditionally with the neighbouring States*, and the serious majority of the Hungarian race, realising all the political difficulties of such a radical change, will certainly accept the idea of compromise on a large scale. The Hungarians are a friendly and magnanimous race, and it is their fervent desire to make peace with their neighbours and to form together with them an economic brotherhood about the Danube basin. But every one must realise — and according to my experience every sincere person *does* realise — that peaceful brotherhood and economic co-operation upon the ruins of the Dual Monarchy are impossible, unless the present Trianon frontiers be rectified in the manner suggested above. The Rothermere idea is obviously identical with my thesis, and cannot be otherwise interpreted; it is that should the Trianon frontier be rectified as suggested, *Hungarians must abandon the idea of pre-war integrity*, and must resign themselves to the loss of territories inhabited by compact masses of

alien nationalities, if on the other hand they get back those Hungarian and German territories which were irrationally alienated from the mother-country. Thus such rectification of the Trianon frontiers is indispensable in the interest of true and lasting peace, and economic co-operation among neighbouring States. Hungarians must accept the idea of rectification in the sense indicated by Lord Rothermere; if they persist in their dreams of the re-integration of pre-war Hungary, it is illogical of them to glorify Rothermere, since the indispensable complement and even the organic object of his proposal is the re-establishment of true, sincere and lasting peace upon the ruins of ancient Hungary.

Such revision would not merely be in the interest of Hungary, but also in that of the neighbouring States. According to Lord Rothermere's calculation only 32.000 square kilometers would be given back to Hungary, and there would still remain about 200.000 square kilometers attached to foreign countries. Such a modification would not be of such a nature as to shake the foundations of the neighbouring States; on the contrary, they would be freed from a persistent nightmare if they restored territories inhabited by Hungarians to the State to which they belong on all principles of self-determination and justice. What enormous sums would be saved by the three countries adjoining us if by the suggested modification of the Trianon frontiers they took the thorn from the flesh of Hungary and were thus relieved from the burden of maintaining armies on the present gigantic scale, — a burden the chief reason for which must be fear of the just vengeance of Hungarians.

A further condition of the restoration of true and lasting peace would be that the minority rights of the Hungarian *enclaves* still remaining in the possession of the neighbouring States should be respected as prescribed by the Peace Treaty. On the other hand this respect for alien nationalities should, of course, be reciprocated in Hungary, for the world must at last realise that every State may respect the language, the religion and the cultural rights

of other nationalities, without in the least endangering its own integrity. As a classic example I may quote the position of the Welsh population in England. Wales was occupied by the English about 1500 years ago, and from personal experience I know that its people still speak the original Celtic mother-tongue, which fact does not in the least disturb the English who, very wisely, show no concern about the question, because they realise that economic co-operation is not affected by the fact that a national minority speaks its own language and lives freely in the practice of its own culture and religion. On the other hand I know a Roumanian gentleman occupying a prominent political post at present, who was educated at the Eötvös College in Budapest at the expense of the Hungarian State and speaks Hungarian as well as I do, but who nevertheless hates Hungary. It is a false and outworn idea that it is essential to the unity of the State that minorities should be assimilated even by force. Unfortunately, this mistaken policy is being carried out at present by the Succession States. The Peace Treaties, however, rightly prescribe the protection of the language, religion and cultural rights of the minorities, and if these prescriptions were sincerely observed by all the States concerned, the just rectification of the Trianon frontiers might inaugurate the reign of real and lasting peace in this part of Europe.

There is yet another problem which, however loosely, is still connected with this question. This is the problem of the Sicilians (Szeklers) who live in the eastern part of Transylvania, in compact masses, inhabiting whole Comitats, and whose position is akin to that of Ulster in relation to the rest of Ireland. It is undoubtedly a great injustice that they should be compelled to belong to Roumania, whereas they are wholly Hungarian. This injustice could only be remedied by the autonomy of Transylvania. Such a solution would be welcomed by the Roumanians of Transylvania, who enjoy a degree of culture greatly superior to that of the Roumanians of the former Kingdom, and who are revolted by the gigantic corruption prevailing there. The constitutional life of Transylvania has for

centuries been based upon the co-operation of Hungarians, Roumanians and Saxons and the revival of the autonomy of Transylvania should be based upon this spirit of mutual effort. This would harmonise with the idea of the League of Nations, and if the statesmen in power when the Treaty of Trianon was drafted had been better informed, they would certainly have decreed the autonomy of Transylvania, in the same manner as they prescribed the unrealised autonomy of the Ruthenians. If the Hungarians could come to terms with the Roumanians within the limits of such an autonomy, it would be to the great moral advantage of both parties. The Roumanians would be released from the despotism of the Kingdom, and the Hungarians would regain their moral relations with the mother-country. Thus, even if we did not succeed in restoring constitutional integrity according to the historic principles of the realm of the Crown of St. Stephen, we might at least re-create the ethnic, literary and moral integrity of all the Hungarians of pre-war Hungary, for if the Hungarians of Transylvania were on good terms with the Roumanians there, there would be no reason why the Roumanians should prevent the cultural, literary and religious communion of the Hungarians of the mother-country with those of Transylvania.

These two autonomies would sooner or later be joined by the autonomy of Slovensko, and within its limits the Hungarian *enclaves* would have to accept the Slovak idea. Such a compromise would be beneficial to the Slovaks, because their interests are identical with those of Hungary, owing to the geographic and economic unity of the two. And Hungary, with her extended frontiers, would aspire only to peaceful development by honest, strenuous work.

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There are certainly many who will say that all I have set forth above is Utopian, a dream, because the hatred between mutilated Hungary and her aggrandised neighbours is so great, that this peaceful vision could never materialise. In my opinion the conception of a restoration of ancient Hungary by force of arms is a much wilder



dream. With all my soul I stand for the ideals of the League of Nations and of Arbitration Courts, and I loathe the very thought of war. In the future, wars will be fought by means of poisonous gases, and I am horrified to think that millions of men, women and children might be suffocated by bombs dropped from the air. So terrible is the picture conjured up by mention of a future war that if I were convinced it would occur, I should curse the hour when my children and grand-children were born.

I believe in justice, I believe in the idea of peace and I believe that by a rectification of the Trianon frontiers, by respect for the rights of minorities, and by the creation of the autonomies suggested above a work would be achieved, which ought to have been achieved at the time when the Peace Treaties were drafted, and might have been, had these been framed, not in the atmosphere of war, but in that of peace.

The reforms I have outlined above are not Utopian or illusory. They are idealistic perhaps, but the world has always been urged forward on the road of progress by ideals, and has, on the other hand, always been repelled by cynicism, hatred and greed, under the sway of which evil spirits the Treaty of Trianon was born. It must be rectified in the spirit of justice, peace, humanity, and the brotherly and economic co-operation of the nations.